$3.50

Public Opinion ✓

Published by
American
Enterprise
Institute

Oct/Nov 1981



ARE THE SOCIAL SCIENCES...

☐ USEFUL?

☐ LIBERAL?

☐ SCIENCE?

with
SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET and Walter
Berns, Irving Louis Horowitz, Irving Kristol,
Robert Nisbet, Kenneth Prewitt, David
Riesman, Alice Rossi, and James Q. Wilson

plus
Avoiding the 1980
Polling Debacle
by Mervin Field

and
Media and Business Elites,
Political Elites and
Academic Elites

Public Opinion

Volume 4, Number 5   October/November 1981

ublisher
William J. Baroody, Jr.

Co-Editors
eymour Martin Lipset
Ben J. Wattenberg

Managing Editor
Karlyn H. Keene

Associate Editor
Victoria A. Sackett

Assistant Editor
Nicola L. Furlan

Research Assistant
Mary Bruun

ditorial Consultant
Hunter C. Harrison, Jr.

ditorial Board
David R. Gergen, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick,
rving Kristol, Everett Carll Ladd,
Howard Penniman, Austin Ranney,
Richard M. Scammon, Laurence H.
ilberman, Herbert Stein, and
Richard J. Whalen

Consulting Editor for Opinion Roundup
verett Carll Ladd

ditorial Associate
Marilyn M. Potter

rt & Design Director
Pat Taylor

Chart Illustrator
Hördur Karlsson

taff Editor
lizabeth D. Ashooh

UBLIC OPINION, October/November 1981, Vol.
, No. 5. Published bimonthly by the American
nterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.
opyright 1981 American Enterprise Institute. Sub-
cription rates: $18.00 for one year, $34.00 for two
ears. Individual copy: $3.50. Information on bulk
rders or multiple subscriptions available on re-
uest. Editorial and business offices: c/o AEI, 1150
7th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. Send
hanges of address and all subscription correspond-
nce to Circulation Department, c/o AEI, same
ddress. "American Enterprise Institute" and
are registered service marks of the
merican Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Re-
earch.

econd class postage paid at Washington, D.C.

SSN 0149-9157

CONTENTS

2 **THE LIMITS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE**
by Seymour Martin Lipset
Proposed budget cuts have raised questions about the worth of the social sciences. What have they accomplished? The distinguished scholar and president of the American Political Science Association evaluates his field.

10 **IS SOCIAL SCIENCE A GOD THAT FAILED?**
A symposium with Walter Berns, Irving Louis Horowitz, Irving Kristol, Robert Nisbet, Kenneth Prewitt, David Riesman, Alice Rossi, and James Q. Wilson

16 **PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION POLLING: ARE THE STATES RIGHTER?**
by Mervin Field
The 1980 campaign featured more polling activity than any previous presidential season. The most visible polls were national; the most meaningful were the state polls which provided an unambiguous picture of the outcome. The author asks whether reliance on flawed national presidential election polls will jeopardize public acceptance of the survey method.

18 **STATING THE CASE FOR STATE POLLS**
by Cliff Zukin
The curtain may be about to rise on a new era in polling with the states in the spotlight. Dr. Zukin gives them top billing.

20 **PRIVATE OPINION/DOES THE PUBLIC APPROVE OF RONALD REAGAN?**
by Irving Crespi
The polls are sending conflicting messages. There is no dearth of data, but interpretation leaves a lot to be desired.

21 **OPINION ROUNDUP**
Elites, Education, Social Democrats, Supply-side Economics, and TV.

42 **MEDIA AND BUSINESS ELITES**
by S. Robert Lichter and Stanley Rothman
In this major study of media elites (with business elites offered as ballast), the authors profile a group out of step with the public. The article raises questions about journalism's qualifications as an "objective" profession.

47 **POLITICAL ELITES**
by Martin Plissner and Warren Mitofsky
Political party elites play an enormously important role in nominating our presidents, and in everyday American politics. But does this special squad represent the rest of the team? A comparative look at the attitudes of party elites, convention delegates, and the rank-and-file.

50 **POLITICAL SCIENCE ELITES**
by Richard Cattani
Only 8 percent of them think Reagan will be "one of the best" presidents. Sixty percent think Nixon was the "worst overall." A timely appraisal of political scholars at the annual APSA meeting unearthed these and many other attitudes, analyzed here by one of the poll's designers.

54 **ADVICE ON DISSENT**
by Richard Scammon
Both the Republican and Democratic parties are having discipline problems—in the form of "boll weevils" and "gypsy moths." Can the party caucuses control these pesky critters?

by Seymour Martin Lipset

The Limits of Social Science

As a graduate student and a young sociologist in the late forties and early fifties, I shared the sense of excitement about the future of social science and its implications for human betterment. We and our teachers saw ourselves as part of a social movement that would raise social science to the standards achieved earlier by the natural sciences. We would play a role in reshaping society, both nationally and internationally. We were convinced that social science had finally broken through the methodological and theoretical barriers that had kept it in a pre-scientific stage; it was ready to take off intellectually to make breakthroughs that would transform society. Thirty years later that promise is largely unfulfilled.

Policy makers, particularly since the 1930s, have called on social scientists to be social engineers, to tell them how to accomplish their objectives. This demand has not only distorted scholarly imperatives, but it has subjected social science to evaluations of its ability to anticipate specific outcomes. Social science cannot possibly meet these expectations.

To evaluate the findings of social scientists, we must recognize that the logic and methods of their disciplines are like those of the natural sciences. Both seek to find general laws. But social science hypotheses are commonly tested in our complex world. Natural science hypotheses usually are not. The social scientists' efforts to project relationships are more like those of an engineer than like those of a natural scientist, who can test his theory by isolating the relevant factors in an experimental setting.

The engineer, in building a bridge, a plane, or a rocket has to predict the outcomes of many different interactions. When he calculates what has to be done, he adds a "safety factor" which may involve making a wall or other structure two or three times as strong as the theory and estimates require.

Social scientists, however, cannot add safety factors. They can point to a range of probable errors in which they may be accurate—but the range often involves the difference between the success or failure of a policy, or costs the outcome of an election.

In dealing with the American economy, economists work to affect a three trillion dollar economy, through changes that involve a tiny proportion of the gross domestic product. One billion dollars equals 0.033 percent. Relatively small adjustments, such as reducing the budget deficit, are expected to have a major impact, but that assumption is usually unwarranted.

The proper function of social science has been defined by Thorsten Husen: "What social science research can do is to heighten the awareness among policy makers and the general public of the various aspects of social issues and help to reconceptualize certain aspects and notions, and, in rare instances, present some hard core facts." It can do no more for policy makers.

I

Inevitably, the debate over the worth of national investment in the social sciences is influenced by perceptions of the political leanings of academics and the ways these may affect the reliability of research findings. In this regard, the Republican skepticism about college professors is aggravated by the well-documented record of faculty opposition to the GOP. Social scientists in particular have been hostile to Republicans (see table 1).

In line with their voting record, faculty are much more likely than the public to identify their political orientations as left or liberal. In a 1977 national faculty

Table 1

SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATS AND LEFT THIRD PARTIES IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

Percent Democrat	1952	1956	1964	1968	1972	1976
All voters	44	42	61	43	39	52
All faculty members	56	62	78	61	57	66
Social science faculty	—	—	89	75	76	75
Other professionals	36	32	54	34	31	42
Clerical/sales personnel	40	37	57	41	36	50
Manual workers	55	50	71	50	43	58

Note: Data for the faculty from 1952 and 1956 are from surveys by Lawrence Howard; for 1964, 1968, 1972, and 1976, they are from studies by Everett Carll Ladd and Seymour Martin Lipset. The national data are from Gallup polls. The analyses have been conducted at the Institute for Social Inquiry, University of Connecticut.

survey that Everett Ladd and I conducted, 45 percent of the total sample and 58 percent of social scientists placed themselves on the liberal side of the spectrum compared to 27 percent of those interviewed in a national study of public attitudes conducted by the National Opinion Research Center at about the same time.

Even within the liberally oriented social sciences, there is a broad spectrum of political views. Economists are relatively conservative. They are followed by political scientists. Sociologists, anthropologists and social psychologists bring up the left. These variations flow in part from the subject matter they study. Economists and political scientists are preoccupied with the way the dominant institutions of society—the economy and the state—work. They prepare people for jobs in those institutions. The behavioral fields deal with topics that inherently remain a focus of discontent—race, stratification, deviancy, crime, and mental illness. They deal with "outsiders" rather than "insiders."

Academic Divisions

Political tension between social scientists and conservatives is inherent in the different views each holds about the extent to which social processes are subject to deliberate manipulation. Because social scientists assume that reliable scientific knowledge of society is possible, they believe it is possible to remedy social problems and injustices. Hence, social scientists as a group tend to support social planning.

Conversely, libertarians or classical liberals ("conservatives" in the American use) who oppose government planning, are predisposed to believe that the knowledge necessary to justify deliberate intervention to secure desired social results is unachievable. From Edmund Burke on, they have pointed to what Robert Merton has called "the unanticipated consequences of purposeful social action." Hence, they tend to reject the claims of social science to be scientific.

Aside from voting, the major political weight of academe is conveyed by policy-relevant publications and by the political activism of the best known scholars, particularly the social scientists. For the most part, their activity is weighted to the left.

Research on faculty political behavior, however, does not imply that professors, or the social scientists among them, are leftist radicals—opposed to the American political or economic system. As a group, American faculty are moderately liberal, not radical. But the most politically influential and active sector of academe—social scientists at the major centers of research and graduate training—tend to support very liberal policies in domestic and foreign affairs.

II

Though social scientists, like all other scholars, pride themselves on their objectivity, there can be little doubt that the changing emphasis in these disciplines are affected by the larger political scene, particularly by what happens within, and to, the left-liberal intellectual community.

Since World War II there have been three major political periods that have had a marked impact on academe. The first period—from the end of World War II to the early years of the Johnson administration—was marked intellectually by a broad consensus for liberal social reforms; the second—from the mid-sixties to the early seventies—was a time of campus turmoil and the rise of the New Politics, coincident with a conservative backlash in the country; the third—the mid-seventies to the early eighties—is characterized by the

CLONING INSTITUTE
CLONING TO EACH HIS OWN
Lichty
F. Wagner

"We're getting a huge federal grant! They need more taxpayers."

Grin & Bear It, by Lichty & Wagner, © 1981 Field Enterprises Inc., Courtesy of Field Newspaper Syndicate.

rise of the new conservatism in the mid-seventies to its triumphal presence in Washington in the early eighties.

Liberal reforms of the first period were focused on race relations and efforts to redistribute income and access to opportunity for the underprivileged. It was assumed that the benefits of democracy and economic productivity could be extended to the Third World; and there was a willingness to defend democracy abroad through resistance to Communism and Soviet expansionism. These expressions of liberalism reached their high point in the rhetoric and policies of the Kennedy administration, amplified in the first two years of Johnson's Great Society.

During these years, social scientists had a high level of confidence in their ability to become more "scientific" theoretically and methodologically, and a concomitant conviction that they would contribute research-based knowledge that liberal policy makers could use to improve the world.

The period from 1945 to 1965 witnessed a sustained high level of economic prosperity in the United States and most developed countries. It was one of the longest continuous periods of prosperity in Western history. Higher education expanded at a rapid rate, a development that provided more opportunity for young people generally, and resulted in jobs for academics in particular. Scholars seemingly had more influence on policy, were more respected, and were better funded than ever before. Racial and ethnic tensions declined.

"Scientism," the belief that society can be analyzed in much the same terms as the natural sciences, became very influential. In economics, this took the form of econometric modeling. Sociology and political science also relied increasingly on quantitative methods—principally survey research and, to a lesser extent, statistical and mathematical techniques.

The social sciences also developed theoretical consensus. Keynesian thought predominated in economics. It assumed that government planning could even out the business cycle and thus avoid high rates of unemployment and inflation, while encouraging growth. Economists also applied themselves to problems of economic development, seeking ways to speed up the process of growth in Third World countries. The other social sciences increasingly accepted the utility of functionalism and behavioralism. These approaches assumed that by conceptualizing society or the polity in terms of a system, much as biologists think of physical organisms, they could come to understand the reasons for various types of human action and could anticipate the ways in which changes in any given part of a system would affect other parts. This approach also implied that greater theoretical refinement and more empirical knowledge would enhance our ability to improve society and reduce various social morbidities.

There were some sour developments. New Third World nations, for the most part, failed in their post-colonial efforts at creating democratic institutions on the model of the metropolitan countries. The emergence of "cold war" tensions generally, and of McCarthyism as a reaction to them, undermined confidence that we were on a steady march toward a more internationally cooperative and domestically democratic world. Yet for the most part, these challenges to a liberal evolutionary view did not upset the larger conviction in progress and the potentiality of the social sciences.

The Vanished Consensus

The liberal political, theoretical, and methodological consensus of the first two postwar decades disintegrated with the protest era of the sixties. Starting first in the South and then in the black ghettos as a reaction to the frustrations generated by the slow fulfillment of the promise of integration and the Great Society, civil disobedience spread to the campus where it influenced the tactics of the growing anti-war protest. The militancy exhibited by the educated, privileged young resulted in a genuine crisis of authority in the larger society.

On the campus, the radicalism that emerged out of the anti-war protest turned on the university and the faculty as accomplices in the war—as the local representatives of reactionary extramural authority. The activists sought evidence of faculty complicity in the larger immorality; they found it in the form of research grants from the Department of Defense and other government agencies and outside consultantships.

From a political standpoint, the liberal dominance within academe was threatened from both the left and right. Affected by the new radicalism, some older scholars turned—or, more commonly, returned—to leftist orientations. Others, perceiving a challenge to democratic norms and academic values in the disruptive tactics and anti-intellectual slogans of the New Left radicals, turned toward conservatism or neoconservatism. For the most part, the attack from the left came heavily from the ranks of graduate students, young faculty, and feminists. Economics apart, the emerging conservative tendencies largely developed among older scholars.

The political controversies affected intellectual currents within the disciplines. Various strands of Marxism or neo-Marxism found numerous adherents. The Union of Radical Political Economists (with 2,000 members today) was formed during this time. The mainstream American Economic Association has close to 20,000. In political science, the left also organized formally in the Caucus for a New Political Science, seeking unsuccessfully to defeat the "establishment" by contesting elections for office in the American Political Science Association from 1969 to 1979. Radical sociologists, perhaps because they felt less alienated from the dominant trends in their field, did not organize in a separate group.

Not surprisingly, the conservative reaction has been strongest in economics, where Milton Friedman's monetarism, neo-classical macroeconomics associated with Robert Lucas, and most recently, supply-side economics identified with Arthur Laffer, have secured considerable influence as alternatives to Keynesian approaches. The latter lost influence, not only because liberalism declined intellectually, but also because the economy of the late sixties and seventies did not conform to Keynesian expectations.

The most influential younger economists of the 1970s are largely supporters of varying forms of anti-statist free market doctrines. They include, among others, scholars such as Martin Feldstein, Michael Boskin, Gary Becker, Dale Jorgensen, Robert Hall, and Thomas Sargent. Their leading role prompted one older recent president of the American Economic Association to complain that his field was now dominated by "young fogies."

Sociology and its smaller intellectual brother, anthropology, entering the sixties on the left of social science, proved highly vulnerable to radicalization. The more quantitative research scholars still hold an important position in sociology. But a radical mood is influential within the field. Sociologists devote much of their research and writing to documenting how the deprived of the world are exploited by the privileged. Dependency theory, which holds that the less developed countries are held back by foreign investments, dominates among sociologists writing about international problems. Studies of class, gender, race, and ethnic relations largely show how structural arrangements, the educational system, and hegemonic values operate to enhance inequality. The mentally ill are typically analyzed as another oppressed minority. Studies of crime and delinquency are treated as special cases of the larger phenomenon of deviancy, which is often explained as a form of rebellion in an unjust society.

Sociology, of course, has also had its swing to the right, although on a much smaller and less dramatic scale than economics. For the most part, the change has been in the direction of neoconservatism, rather than anti-statist conservatism. Neoconservatives remain committed to the use of government power to remedy various social injustices. They stress the need to protect institutions that safeguard liberty, and are deeply concerned about the expansionist activities of Communist movements, particularly in less developed countries.

Neoconservative sociologists have emphasized the progress that has already been achieved in attaining many liberal objectives, while also recognizing the limitations of many social reforms. They have stressed the role played by a variety of traditional institutions in maintaining democracy. In the area of race relations, scholars like James S. Coleman, Nathan Glazer, and David Armor have produced research pointing to negative effects of busing on school children and of affirmative action quotas on the larger structure of opportunities. Under the leadership of Otis Dudley Duncan, a group of statistically sophisticated researchers has documented the increase in social mobility and opportunity that has occurred on all levels of society since World War II. Daniel Bell, Edward Shils, and others have examined the function of religion and other traditional institutions in maintaining the social fabric. Morris Janowitz, Robert Nisbet, and Peter Berger have dealt with the ways in which secondary or mediating institutions foster the conditions necessary for a democratic society.

Yet it continues to be true that sociology, more than the other major social sciences, remains, even in the eighties, an intellectual bastion of radical and Marxist thought. There is no other arena in American life in which Marxist ideas are so influential. At the 1981 annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, for example, the book exhibit set up by the publishers featured hundreds of Marxist works.

If economics has veered to the right and sociology (and anthropology) to the left, political science has remained in the center of social science, which means that the average political scientist is still much more liberal in his political outlook than the average American. In various ways, the characteristic outlook that dominates the *leadership* of American political science is neoconservatism. But as among neoconservatives generally, most remain Democrats and are committed to the welfare state. Political scientists, perhaps because the state is their primary interest, still believe in the utility of state action to further social objectives. The majority identified themselves as liberal and voted Democratic in 1980.

The difference between political science and sociology is evident in the diverse ways in which they deal with power. The dominant approach in the former, associated with Robert Dahl, seeks to locate the distribution of power by examining the forces that affect the decisions of public authorities. Focusing on policy arenas yields pluralistic conclusions. Sociologists, on the other hand, either start with the assumption that in a capitalist society, control of economic resources is equivalent to power, or use a "reputational approach," asking samples of the population to name the most powerful people in their community. The latter method invariably finds most people answering "businessmen" or "politicians." Sociologists also seek to document the existence of a "power-elite," an upper class that interacts socially in diverse ways and makes decisions that it is able to get ratified by the political system through control of the economy. It is striking that in C. Wright Mills's work, *The Power Elite*, which is the fountainhead of the latter approach, there is no mention of political parties or elections as arenas that affect power.

Emphasizing the political orientations of social scientists and the ways these are reflected in their research and conclusions is not meant to imply that they do not engage in rigorous scholarship, nor that their empirical methods do not produce objective findings, i.e., results that are reproducible by other researchers using comparable techniques. The overwhelming majority—left, center, or right in political outlook—are as objective as natural scientists in their scholarship. For example, different approaches to power analysis, which yield alternative images of who has the most power, are followed through objectively. What determines the variations in conclusions, or policy recommendations, are either differences in the questions asked, in the way research problems are defined, or in those aspects of the results that are emphasized in publications.

Analysts of racial integration agree that mixing students from high and low family cultural backgrounds does not have adverse effects on the academic competence of the former, nor does it appear to have much positive effect on the latter. The more liberal sociologists conclude, however, that integration, including busing, should be pursued since it helps to dispel racial stereotypes and leads to a more mixed society. Those who emphasize the negative effects of forced racial integration stress the ways in which such policies contribute to resegregation or "white flight" from central cities to suburbs.

The varying conclusions reached by left and conservative students of economic development also reflect alternative concerns. The left explains low levels of development as a consequence of the drain on local resources of profits extracted from poor economies. The right emphasizes that the rate of economic growth in dependent nations in recent decades has been much higher than in the Western world in the nineteenth century and that various free market economies do better than state-controlled ones.

If social scientists can deliver objective answers to the questions they analyze, does this mean that policy makers of diverse orientations can make use of them? The answer given by administrations from Roosevelt to Reagan is "yes." All of them have made extensive use of social scientists. Close to half of Richard Nixon's cabinet members were social scientists. Jimmy Carter, as an engineer who believes in "solutions" to problems based on scientific knowledge, turned to the experts for answers. The initial domestic policies of the Reagan administration are influenced by the conclusions of academic publications, in this case of various monetarist and supply-side economists oriented toward the free market. Given the magnitude of the changes in government policy initiated by Ronald Reagan, he is clearly staking the future of his administration and the Republican party on the belief that these scholars are right. The administration's policies on issues such as government regulation of industry, school busing, affirmative action, and the poverty program are sustained by the research of relatively conservative social scientists.

III

What can we expect from the social sciences? The basic dilemma faced by social sciences both today and thirty years ago is the tension between the objectives of scholarship and policy making. As scholars, we seek to advance knowledge through a process which is necessarily incremental and which recognizes that today's findings and theories will inevitably be superseded. We are rarely able to isolate the impact of individual factors on macroscopic events, which are always the outcome of a myriad of forces. But the social sciences are also the policy sciences. The first graduate faculty of social science established at Columbia University in the 1890s was called the Faculty of Political Science, including the departments of economics, government, and sociology. The founders recognized that the social sciences deal with politically relevant topics.

Social scientists are good historians. They are able to understand the processes involved in what has already happened. But they have not been good forecasters. Robert Solow has emphasized the problem inherent in the economist's role as policy maker: "Why should anyone who forecasts so badly be expected to have worthwhile opinions on other subjects?"

The record of economists in anticipating major developments during the 1970s does not lend support to the argument that their theories can adequately account for the working of the economy, most notably, the changing relationship between unemployment and inflation (which until recently were assumed to be inversely related). A telling example is their failure to anticipate the 1973-75 recession. As Arthur Okun has pointed out, "most economic forecasters, including me, saw . . . a strong but well-balanced expansion in 1973 accompanied by an imperfect but hardly alarming record of price performance. Rarely has such a broad, bi-


SOCIAL SCIENCES STUDY A
YOU'RE AS MUCH FUN AS NINE OUT OF TEN CPAs
OLIPHANT

© 1981, the *Washington Star*. Reprinted with permission of the Universal Press Syndicate. All rights reserved.

'Do you have a study there showing that nine out of ten social scientists are dispensable?'

partisan professional consensus been so wrong."

Demography, a borderline discipline falling between sociology and economics, cannot boast of its record either. Extrapolating from the history of Western countries, demographers formulated the "theory of demographic transition," which projected a steady decline in the rate of population growth in advanced societies characterized by "the achievement of general literacy, urbanization, and industrialization" and the diffusion of knowledge of birth control methods. But as Dudley Kirk noted in the mid-1960s, the theory seemed to break down around World War II.

This period did not last either. Kenneth Boulding emphasizes that "fertility seems to be subject to quite unpredictable shifts. Thus, in the United States we had a period of high fertility (1947-1961) which was quite unpredicted, now we are in a phase of low fertility which was equally unpredicted. . . ."

Economists and demographers, of course, do not have the worst records. Other predictions of social scientists are equally inaccurate.

Sociologists erred in their expectations about the class structure of American society. Leftist students of stratification such as Robert Lynd and C. Wright Mills, alongside conservative sociologists such as August Hollingshead and W. Lloyd Warner, suggested that the high level of social mobility that characterized American society was a consequence of economic growth and geographical expansion, trends that could not continue ndefinitely. The growth of large-scale corporations and the decline of self-employment were also logically expected to reduce opportunity. Many anticipated the emergence of hard, fixed class lines and conflict as a result. Such forecasts also turned out to be erroneous because of the failure to evaluate properly the changes n the occupational structure and increased access to higher education. Social mobility on a mass as well as elite level remains as high as or higher than ever.

The most striking example of a generalized failure of sociologists to anticipate developments may be found n the field of ethnicity. Until recently, Marxist and non-Marxist scholars agreed on a standardized set of generalizations about ethnic and national minorities. They argued that ethnicity reflected the conditions of raditional society, where people lived in small communities isolated from one another and in which mass communications and transportation were limited. Most scholars anticipated that industrialization, urbanization, and the spread of education would reduce ethnic consciousness. Universalism would replace particularism. This argument found its corollary in the belief of Marxsts that socialism would mean the decline of ethnic tension and consciousness. Assimilation of minorities nto a larger integrated whole was viewed by both groups of analysts as the inevitable future.

As we know, the opposite has occurred, both in the Western and Communist countries, and in the less developed world as well. The Achilles' heel of Communism has turned out to be nationalism, not only that of Poles and Czechs vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, but also the rising national feelings of the various ethnic groupings within Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. In recent years, most of the multilingual, binational or bireligious states that have persisted for many decades, if not centuries, have faced turmoil. Canada, Belgium, Malaysia, and Lebanon all face crises of national existence created by the demands of minorities for autonomy or independence. Pakistan and Cyprus have faced division, while ethnic rebellion has been suppressed in Nigeria. In the classic Swiss case, tension has risen within multilingual cantons. France faces difficulties with its Basques, Bretons, and Corsicans. In Spain, Basques and Catalans have demanded linguistic rights and greater autonomy, while in Britain, nationalist parties in Scotland and Wales have pressed for devolution.

Political analysis is in no better shape than the other fields of social science. During the early fifties in the United States, I was one of a group of scholars who attempted to explain the phenomenon of McCarthyism. Most of us linked it to the tensions of a prosperous society, where individuals were rising or falling in status, producing heightened status concerns and anxieties and increased competition among groups. Status politics, rather than class politics, seemingly characterized such periods. The underlying mass trends that supposedly produced increased status tensions have continued, but McCarthyism disappeared. There are, of course, other continuing forms of group tension, such as the rise of white racist movements, which may be properly linked to status threats. But it is clear that the broad predictive power of the theory of status politics is not nearly as strong as was suggested.

The post-McCarthy era found many people analyzing "the end of ideology," or as in my own case, the "decline of ideology." The reduction in ideological tensions within advanced industrial societies was related in large measure to growing affluence, to the incorporation of previously excluded strata into the body politic, to the spread of education, and to the apparent reduction of many of the extreme inequalities of industrial society through the institutionalization of planning and the welfare state. Although many of the analysts of the end of ideology excluded intellectuals and young people from their generalizations, it is generally true that few anticipated the emergence of the forms of protest that characterized the growth of the New Left and minority movements in the late sixties and early seventies.

Charles Lindblom and David Cohen point out that "much of the mid-twentieth century investment of American political science in survey research on voting, a body of generalization to which the profession pointed with pride when claiming a new scientific status, is already obsolete." As three students of elections, Norman Nie, Sidney Verba and John Petrocik, note: "The survey instruments produce different results now than they did a while back."

What the Social Sciences Can Do

In citing the failures or, more accurately, the inadequate predictions of the various social sciences, it is not my intention to suggest that they are unable to deal with social and economic phenomena. Clearly, all the disciplines have done much to explain the ways in which economy, society, and individuals behave. Social science, however, is still at its best in advancing what Robert Merton has called "middle-range" theories, and in explaining developments limited in time and space—particularly in the past—where at least there is some possibility of analyzing real data. As social science moves outward to deal with systemic trends and tendencies, its capacity to explain diminishes. Economists are able to avoid some of the methodological consequences of this problem by focusing on analytically closed systems based on limiting sets of assumptions. They are, however, no more able than other social analysts to comprehend total system behavior. Our enduring analyses tend to be historical. There is nothing wrong with this; in many ways our best work resembles that of physicians who deal with the behavior of specific individuals rather than of biologists specifying the characteristics of a total system.

This emphasis on middle-range theory and on historical case studies does not mean that we should not try to deal with macroscopic developments or predict future trends. Sociologists fruitfully analyze consequences of changes in the proportion of the population who reach varying levels of education, or changes in the distribution of occupations, for example, the decline in the number of manual or skilled positions and the increase in professional or technical employment discussed earlier. We know a fair amount about the broader consequences of these changes: the values and behavior associated with a higher level of education; the patterns of social organization, life styles and orientations to work and competition that result from changes in organizational structure. Presumably, then, a systematic shift in the composition of the work force, levels of education, or of the age of the population, should have significant effects on the body politic.

Yet it should be noted that we cannot predict such secular changes at a macro level, nor the probability of specific events resulting from changes in the composition of a population, nor the relative causal weight of the same factor in different systems for any given time and place. There is abundant evidence that the more education people have, the more tolerance they display for ambiguity, and the more likely they are to support civil liberties and civil rights and to be free from crude bigotry. From this fact, it ought to follow that as the population of a country becomes better educated, the more favorable it will be to minority rights. But, as we know, this is not true. The McCarthyite America of the 1950s was the best educated country up to that time. Periods of massive intolerance have recurred frequently over the two centuries of American history, although education and wealth have increased steadily. Comparatively, we may point to the fact that some of the best educated nations have fallen victim to persecution manias, such as Germany in 1933. Clearly, unpredictable combinations of specific events or factors frequently negate the influence of even the most powerful structural factors.

The relationship between education, affluence, occupation, and political participation presents a somewhat similar phenomenon. All studies agree that higher education, higher economic position, and wealth correlate with increased political participation. Apparently, therefore, as the education, wealth, and occupational status of Americans improve, political participation should increase, but as we know, the percentage of the electorate voting was greater in the late nineteenth century than in recent times. We are better educated than ever before, a higher percentage of college graduates are in professional jobs, yet from 1960 to 1980 voting turnout rates have steadily declined. Education, class background, and the ease of voting are only some of the factors that determine propensity to vote; the efficacy of the political system and event effects are seemingly as important.

As Henry Aaron points out, the abundant research that reveals a strong relationship between education and earnings was assumed to demonstrate that increased educational opportunities would reduce inequality between the races and between the sexes. But the consequent investment in education did not produce the intended result because "other aspects of the environment, notably family and peer group influences, may persist for long periods of time, causing group differentials to continue over several generations."

Moreover, as Aaron goes on to emphasize, the "single-minded focus of analysts on education as an instrument succeeded . . . in directing attention from education as a right." Bringing social science findings



Drawing by Dana Fradon; © 1977, The New Yorker Magazine, Inc.

nto the arguments about segregation or the level of xpenditures obscured the issue of the right of all Amercans to equal treatment by their public agencies.

The reaction to James Coleman's 1981 report on he effects of education on learning illustrates anew the vay in which the interpretations of research results are ffected by political considerations. Much of the pubicity and debate surrounding the study concerns the mpirical finding that students in grades 10 and 12 do better in private than in public schools. But as Thorsten Husen notes, the issue is not private versus public chools: "The important thing is that he [Coleman] has been able to identify certain factors which are associated with good results in *both* private and public chools. Such factors were the amount of homework, bsence rate, class attendance, and degree of discipline nd order."

In economic, as in political or other forms of social behavior, more knowledge and systematic thinking are better than less knowledge and unsystematic thinking. But when one is involved in making major policy recomnendations and decisions for the future of nations, it s necessary to be humble, to be cautious, to know much more than we do, before being able to state conclusively he outcomes of specific changes. Clearly, the less precision in an analysis or prediction and the greater unexplained variance, the more likely that conclusions from he available data reflect what the observer wants to ind, whether that desire stems from an ideology, from n academic or intellectual commitment, from self-inerest, or from some other source.

Social science can test (predict) the relationship mong factors only when it can isolate them from other variables, and when the relevant factors and their efects are unambiguous and easily measurable. But the most significant relationships on a societal level rarely meet these criteria. With almost any complex problem, people who disagree about the consequence of a given policy will rarely resolve their disagreement conclusivey by reference to research. The improvement in reearch techniques—made possible by the use of the computer, for example—has not significantly increased he likelihood of reliable, unambiguous results.

The degree to which the conclusions of social science result from political orientations and the limitaions on the ability of social science to anticipate outcomes suggest that policy makers should limit their reiance on social science. Decision makers cannot assume hat the knowledge exists to predict macroscopic societal or economic outcomes. Hence, they should hedge heir bets. They should be cautious about introducing major reforms quickly, or when the times call for boldness, they should act on principle. The short-range reult is, as often as not, an unanticipated one. And when hings go wrong, the politician, not his adviser, is held esponsible by the electorate.

Policy makers have looked for five kinds of assistnce from social scientists:

1. Expert opinion about what the right policy is for dealing with given problems.

2. Defining the nature of a problem and how it got to be that way.

3. The range of options available to them.

4. Research evaluating the effectiveness of particular policies.

5. Support in the way of endorsements or legitimation of what they would do anyway.

The first task, as we have seen, is rarely possible. The second is often achievable since social science does pretty well at such historically oriented intellectual tasks. The third and fourth are possible, but subject to severe limitations. The fifth is most easily done and is often what the decision maker most wants.

The policy recommendation stemming from this is that decision makers should have a built-in "devil's advocate" mechanism. They should seek expert advice from diverse sources. Richard Neustadt, in his study of *Presidential Power*, notes that Franklin Roosevelt deliberately asked experts with sharply different views for detailed proposals. By doing so, he kept his own options open and could get a sense of the range of possible consequences. Such procedures, of course, offer no guarantees. Experts have been unanimous in their judgment and have still turned out to be wrong.

Conclusion

Several points need to be kept in mind when assessing the proper influence of social science on public policy. Social science research results are always approximate and indeterminate. Random error and measurement error must always be taken into consideration before accepting social science findings even when the research is of a qualitative nature. (How did the researcher go about selecting the data to be analyzed, and gauging the effect he or she was looking for?) Social science research is, for the most part, not done in controlled laboratory settings where conditions can be manipulated. Whether the research is a case study of some event or a sample survey of people interviewed at a certain point in time, the data are almost always a slice of reality drawn from past experience. It is impossible to specify and measure, let alone control, every variable that might have influenced the results in a real-world setting. Important simplifying assumptions must always be made. These place limits on the ability of social scientists to generalize and to predict beyond their data.

Is all this a counsel of despair, a confession of failure or inadequacy by a social scientist? Not at all. It is a declaration of independence, of autonomy, an insistence that people can still feel free to make their own history, that the future is not so determined that we should feel helpless about our ability to affect it. We are still far from having a Calvinist social science, from having to accept predestination. Social science can help us trace relations, but the future still remains an uncharted sea waiting for the venturesome. ☑

by Mervin Field

Presidential Election Polling: Are the States Righter?

Can national public opinion polls avoid another 1980 presidential election debacle? This article poses four arguments:

- In a unique democratic country whose people span a continent, we need to have frequent readings of the public mood. National polls, operating continuously, provide our leaders necessary and invaluable insights into the public mood on a wide range of issues.
- There is one situation, however, in which national cross-section surveys are *not* the best means of charting public opinion or preference trends. This occurs every four years when there are extensive media and polling activities designed to feed a widespread desire to know who is ahead in and who is likely to win the presidential contest.
- The polls' performance during presidential election campaigns is still the most publicized standard by which the larger spectrum of polling and survey methodology is judged. Those involved in sponsoring or conducting presidential election polls have a special responsibility to fulfill the highest standards achievable.
- The best way to assess voter preference in presidential elections is to poll on a state-by-state basis, not by the traditional national cross-section survey method. Averaging state-by-state variances to measure voter preference, as done in national presidential election surveys and regional surveys, has always been problematic.

What Went Wrong

Since 1936 we have had only twelve presidential elections. On two of these twelve occasions (the Truman-Dewey contest of 1948, and in 1980), the public has been shocked to find that the expected outcome conveyed by widely publicized national polls did not materialize on Election Day. In other presidential elections, one candidate was able to maintain a big lead throughout the campaign. In these instances—when the final poll result varied significantly from the outcome but showed the eventual winner in the lead—there was the widespread impression that the polls were accurate.

The performance of many national media-sponsored polls during the 1980 presidential election was another major embarrassment to those engaged in polling, and to the media who sponsored the polling efforts. As in 1948, the public's confidence in the survey method was severely shaken.

Despite Ronald Reagan's impressive popular victory, and his even more one-sided margin in the Electoral College, the expectation created by virtually all the published national polls right up to the final days of the

Table 1
1980 U.S. Presidential Election

	Reagan	Carter	Anderson	Others/ Undecided
Results of the popular vote (November 4)	51%	41%	7%	1%
Final Poll Results:				
Washington Post (Oct. 29-30)	39	42	7	12
CBS News/*New York Times* (Oct. 30-Nov. 1)	41	40	7	12
Gallup (Oct. 30-Nov. 1)	46	43	7	4
ABC News/Harris (Oct. 22-Nov. 3)	46	41	10	3
NBC News/ Associated Press (Oct. 22-24)	42	36	9	13

campaign, was that the outcome was going to be close and that Carter probably had an even chance of winning. The final published pre-election results of the five leading media-sponsored national polls are shown in table 1. The dates in parentheses indicate the interviewing periods.

During 1980, national presidential election polling results were featured prominently by sponsoring media and nationally distributed wire service reports. They were published and rebroadcast throughout the country. Presentation of the data usually included the standard caveat that the narrow margins between Reagan and Carter fell within the statistical margin of error. "Too close to call" became the refrain of headline writers, TV news people, and many pollsters through the final days of the campaign.

While most of the public and political analysts' attention was focused on national poll findings during the 1980 presidential campaign, a small number of observers relied on private and published state poll reports to determine how the race was going. In many states, there were frequent, publicly available media-sponsored polls tracking presidential preferences. There was also a wealth of private polling done by presidential campaign pollsters and candidates for state offices. While data from the private polling sources were ostensibly confidential, many reporters had access to them. Most of these reporters were sophisticated enough to assess the reliability of the data which became available. Several reporters highlighted the growing disparity between the national and state polls as the campaign progressed. Their reports provided a different and, in retrospect, a clearer picture of the campaign voting trends and the outcome of the race. One political writer, Dick Cattani of the *Christian Science Monitor*, regularly reported the race from a state-by-state vantage point. As early as September 15, Cattani cited the discrepancy between state and national readings, and he continued to cover the story this way through the final seven weeks of the campaign.

Every presidential election campaign engenders some discussion about the vagaries of the U.S. Electoral College system. When an election appears close, there is much speculation about how a candidate might win the popular vote, but fail to get the 270 electoral votes needed to be declared the winner. More emphasis is given to state poll readings in these times. During 1980, most of this discussion occurred early in the campaign when Independent candidate John Anderson stood relatively high in the polls, but diminished when his popularity began to slide in September.

A Clearer Picture

The amount of 1980 polling conducted at the state level was more extensive than ever before in a presidential election. This steady flow of state data provided a sounder base for determining who was ahead and for making projections. Those who followed these data saw a clear and unambiguous picture—a steady trend in Reagan's favor, culminating in his resounding victory.

There were fluctuations in state-by-state charting.[1] Consistently, though, these estimates led to the same general conclusion. Ronald Reagan was continuing to maintain a significant and comfortable lead in most of the states representing a large portion of electoral votes, until the final presidential debate on October 28.

Following the October 28 Reagan-Carter TV confrontation, there were reports of new polling in a number of pivotal states including Ohio, Illinois, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. Results of these post-debate polls showed Reagan's states becoming even firmer, Carter's states weakening, and the "too close to call" states breaking in Reagan's favor.

Thus, on the Friday before the election, the consistent and clear lead that Reagan had prior to the debates appeared to be growing even larger.

During the campaign, most of us who were keeping track of state charts felt uneasy about the lopsided national picture we were getting—our state polls showed Carter far behind. All of us were aware of the implications of the picture we were developing—a picture which was running counter to well-publicized and widely believed national poll data, and which contradicted the pronouncements of some very seasoned political analysts.

---

[1] Throughout the campaign, I maintained a chart of candidate standings by states. If a candidate was ahead in the latest poll (or polls) in a particular state by eight percentage points or more, then that state was classified as "strong" for that candidate. If a poll (or the average of two or more polls) ranged from a four to seven point lead, then that state was designated as "leaning" to that candidate. If a candidate's lead was less than three points, the state was classified as "undecided" or "too close to allocate." (I did not obtain polling data from a few small states. Allocation of these states was based on statements of the candidates' pollsters and others as reported by media sources. For example, it was reported periodically that both the Reagan and Carter pollsters and other private pollsters agreed that Montana was a strong state for Reagan. Presumably this unified position came from private and other data. However, I did not see the data.)

On October 11, on the basis of available state data, I published this summary:

> Reagan is now in a stronger position than he was two weeks ago. He has big leads in 17 states representing 136 electoral votes. Another 12 states representing 159 electoral votes are leaning toward him. The combined total of states currently in Reagan's favor is 29 and they represent 295 electoral votes. . . . Carter, on the other hand, is strongly ahead in just 6 states and the District of Columbia representing only 54 electoral votes. There are another eight states representing 100 electoral votes leaning to Carter, giving him a total of 154 electoral votes. Seven states with 89 electoral votes are fairly evenly divided at this time but even if they all broke in Carter's favor, he still could not win, according to our current measurements. . . . What we may be seeing is the development of a trend which would give Ronald Reagan not just a close and narrow win on Election Day, but a victory of substantial proportions.

During the final weeks of the campaign, the consistent contradiction between national and state poll data became increasingly difficult to explain. In the absence of any other explanation during most of the campaign, it was assumed that national polls were presenting an accurate picture of the nation's popular vote division. The disparity between national and state poll data was explained by offering the possibility that Carter was ahead in a few heavily populated states, but behind in a large number of less populated states. However, upon closer examination, this assumption could not be supported. Carter had leads in too few populous states to offset his vote deficiencies in other states—some of which were also large population states. Thus, during the final week of the campaign, a sophisticated observer of the state polls had to be gravely troubled by the national polls which proclaimed the race "too close to call."

Following the election, a number of the national pollsters offered the standard argument that their findings reflected public preference at the time of the polls, and that there was a big shift to Reagan after they stopped polling—presumably on the Saturday, Sunday, or Monday before the election. However, this late "big bang" explanation does not square at all with the consistent picture conveyed by state-by-state polling analyses during the course of the campaign.

Escape Clauses

Why didn't more media managers, political observers, and reporters make greater use of the extensive and available state poll data during the campaign? There are several plausible explanations.

Presumably, it was not clear during the spring and summer months of 1980 that there would be enough state polling available to provide a reliable alternative to traditional national cross-section surveys. Therefore, any editorial plan to use state polls would have been risky.

In addition, there was the impression created over the years that the results of the national polls corresponded closely with the outcome of recent presidential elections. This impression tended to obscure the fact that national cross-section surveys, even if free of serious methodological error, do not reflect the way we elect our presidents.

There were other reasons why there was not more reference to state poll data. The sheer volume of national poll data tended to preempt the available time and space for the interpretation and presentation of other survey data in the national news media. In addition, the "too close to call" impression conveyed by a number of analysts was more congenial with private

Stating the Case

Ronald Reagan's is not the only "new federalism" of the 1980s. We are also witnessing a new era in public opinion polling in which the state polls for the first time occupy a prominent position.

The 1970s saw a tremendous expansion of national polls, as the mass media became producers as well as consumers. The three commercial networks, the country's four leading newspapers, the two major news magazines, a major wire service—all invested heavily in survey research, joining Gallup, Harris, and others in telling Americans what Americans thought.

The attention given to the national polls, particularly in election years, tends to obscure a fundamental fact of American politics. In our political drama, the states are central actors. With regard to opinion polls, this imbalance is being corrected. Thus far in the decade, we have witnessed the birth of ten state-wide polling operations at major universities throughout the country, with more on the way. Added to already established commercial and public polls, ongoing state-wide survey organizations now exist in over half of the fifty states.

To encourage increased activity at the state level, representatives of six polls met at Rutgers's Eagleton Institute in January of 1980. There, we devised a set of questions that would be asked on spring surveys by each polling organization. A second conference of state pollsters was held in January of 1981. Twenty polls were represented.

As a result of the first meeting, a network was formed to bring together academic and nonacademic survey organizations engaged in public opinion surveys on the state level. The Network of State Polls will serve as an information clearinghouse about activities in other states, and will develop an information bank of state polling data for use by academic researchers to facilitate comparative research.

The Value of State Polls

Mervin Field cogently argues the case for the state polls in presidential election contests in the preceding article. The picture of the 1980 election pieced together from state polls was far less ambiguous than were the general interpretations based on national surveys. In survey research, it is simply not always true that the whole is equal to the sum of its parts. National polling data often obscure as much as they reveal. For example: a 1979 Harris survey found 44 percent of those surveyed rating their governor's performance positively, but the first round of cooperative state polling in 1980 found enormous variations in state-wide evaluations of governors—ranging from 64 percent positive in Florida to 23 percent positive in Massachusetts. National data, acting as a weighted average, often mask diversity.

Although national surveys add to our understanding of the electorate, many expectations that Carter, an incumbent president, though apparently behind in the race, would finally emerge as the winner.

This latter belief was strengthened by the expectation that Carter would settle the hostage crisis in Iran prior to the election. Many people believed that this single act was powerful enough to offset the public's reservations about President Carter. In addition, Carter was expected to be the chief beneficiary of the precipitous drop in Anderson's support during September and October.

There was also the presumption that the traditional Democratic party coalition (for example, rank-and-file labor, minority groups, the educational establishment, old-line Democratic party organizations) would in the final stages of the campaign "come home" to give Carter the votes he needed. Further, there seemed to be a widespread belief that Reagan would commit a major late-campaign blunder which would turn voters away from him.

There is the possibility that the weight of national poll data produced by the big national media and "media combines" (for example, CBS and the *New York Times*, NBC and the Associated Press, ABC/Lou Harris, the *Washington Post*, *Time*, and *Newsweek*) undermined the judgment of editors and political writers who worked for these media poll sponsors, and who may also have been overwhelmed by the prestige of these poll data sources.

It must have been difficult—perhaps impossible—for political writers not to rely on their own organization's poll results as the most authoritative. Many of them had immediate access to their organization's poll data through handy computer terminals. The close proximity of a large amount of continuous internally produced poll data tended to inhibit extensive critical review, and discourage a search for contradictory evidence. Since other national poll data from competing media seemed to corroborate the internally provided national findings, any further validation must have seemed unnecessary.

One example of the conflict editors faced in treating national vs. aggregated state poll data appeared in the Monday (before the Tuesday election) edition of the *Washington Post*. On page 1, the *Post* featured its final national cross-section poll which showed Carter leading by 3 percentage points. On page 4, however, David Broder's column, which dealt with a state-by-state analysis, described Reagan's big lead in the states and in electoral votes.

But these administrative and all too human explanations do not address possible technical errors. What about the polling methodology itself? Was there anything about the national polls themselves that could have contributed to the disparity between national and state poll data?

During every election campaign pollsters take great

(Continued on page 56)

---

or State Polls

by Cliff Zukin

dimensions of citizen behavior cannot be investigated at this level. We know very little about how people make choices on such key questions as bond issues, referendums, and local and state elections. Only through systematic study at the state level can we begin to piece together a conventional wisdom about how citizens make these important decisions.

National surveys also tend to focus on *electability* rather than *governability*—on partisan politics rather than on public policy. There are more important uses of survey research than trying to predict election outcomes or trying to explain voting behavior. Perhaps because the media are now so involved with public opinion polling, the lion's share of attention is given to this narrower use of survey research.

Polling is better able to explain what *did* happen than to predict what *will* happen. As we move from contesting elections to evaluating public policy, the contribution of state polls becomes clearer.

The states are natural laboratories for experimentation and innovation in public policy. Aided by survey research at the state level, we can investigate the effectiveness of governmental programs and policies, enabling them to serve as demonstration projects for the nation and for other states.

The Comparative Context

Isolated survey figures can be ambiguous or misleading. To be meaningful the data must be put in context. Time series data and trend lines provide one appropriate frame of reference. It is easier to draw conclusions when presidential popularity is going up or down than it is to interpret what a single 34 percent "fair" rating might mean.

The potential for confusion over "absolute" meanings of polling data is born out by a 1977 Eagleton study of "New Jersey Images." Two-thirds of state residents rated New Jersey as an excellent or good place to live. Those familiar with the state's somewhat tarnished image may find this difficult to believe. So did the *New York Times*. In fact, the *Times* found this so startling that they put the story on page one.

It wasn't until after the first collaborative effort by the Network of State Polls in 1980 that we unearthed the truth about the Garden State. The two-thirds favorable rating was, in fact, relatively uncomplimentary. In the five other states surveyed, an average of 86 percent rated their state favorably as a place to live, with New Hampshire leading the list at 91 percent. In a soft science, based on probabilities rather than firm laws, every clue available to us ought to be investigated.

The 1980s will be a decade of phenomenal growth for state polls. By sharing information, the Network of State Polls can help one hand know what the other is doing.

Field

(Continued from page 19)

pains to warn the public that their published poll results are not forecasts of the election outcome. They explain that campaign events occurring after the completion of a poll can affect voters' perceptions of the candidates; disproportionate rates of voter turnout on Election Day can affect results; undecided voters might break disproportionately for one of the candidates; certain small trends observed during the campaign can gather steam in the closing days or hours prior to the election and elude measurement; and all surveys have inherent statistical margins of error.

For all these reasons and others, pollsters have long argued that to make a flat prediction from poll results requires a higher order of analysis than can be provided by a single poll report.

Despite the logic of these observations and arguments, pollsters have learned that in order to maintain their credibility and reputation, they cannot rely on the simple pre-election caveat of "don't treat my results as a forecast" and be judged fairly by the press and public. Most important, to maintain the financial underwriting of their media sponsors, public pollsters are expected to produce final poll reports which correspond to the election outcome.

HERBLOCK'S CARTOON

"THIS TIME HE'S WORKING ON PREDICTIONS OF REAGAN APPOINTEES"


Final Carter-Reagan Poll: TOO CLOSE TO CALL
Acme Polls
©1980 HERBLOCK

© 1980 by Herblock in the *Washington Post*

As a result, pollsters have contributed to their own public relations problem by adhering to contradictory pre-election and post-election positions. Typically, the pre-election pollster cites all the reasons why his poll report is not a prediction. However, if an election result corresponds closely to his pre-election poll, the pollster is quick to broadcast that "we were right on the nose in calling the election!"

There has always been considerable, if not unavoidable, pressure on pollsters to fulfill the explicit or implied requirement of producing data which relate to an election result. At the very least, a pollster is expected to produce a model of those citizens found in samples restricted to the "likeliest" of voters, and offer some clues as to what will happen with those who are undecided.

Pollsters must attempt to model their samples to mirror the make-up of the electorate. To do so, they have available some reasonably reliable parameters for predicting the expected rate of state-by-state participation, which is the basis for calculating a national average.

In recent presidential elections, the voter turnout has been slightly more than 50 percent. That is, almost one-half of the citizen public in each election has *not* voted. To produce a representative model of Election Day participation from public opinion samples of all adults, or even of all registered voters, requires a system which reduces overall samples to smaller ones. The reduced samples reflect, in the judgment of the pollsters, those who are most likely to vote.

One method used extensively by pollsters in this effort involves a series of "intention to vote," or "likelihood of voting," questions administered to poll respondents. This "screening" process takes a variety of forms. Generally, an early question determines whether or not a respondent is eligible to vote. Most pre-election polls start with general public adult samples and rely on a respondent's testimony to obtain that person's registration status. If a respondent maintains that he or she is registered, the pollster generally accepts this.

However, there are many people who say that they are registered when, in fact, they are not. It is not necessarily a case of respondents "lying." Registration laws from state to state vary a great deal. There are frequent changes made in registration requirements and there are differences in the way registration lists are produced from time to time. Many people are not clear about their registration status because of a residential move or because of a failure to vote in a previous election. In addition, some people, if they should happen to be technically ineligible to vote at the time of the survey, may believe that this condition will be corrected before Election Day. Finally, there still exists the tendency for some people to feel they will lose face if they admit to not being registered voters. All these reasons combine to create serious unreliability in the assumption that a "registered voter" subsample consists of those actually eligible to vote.

Why, then, faced with the inaccuracies of respondents' identification of their registration status, don't pollsters simply use published registration lists?

Sampling from registration lists poses a different set of problems. For one, obtaining up-to-date registration lists is not an easy task. The deadlines set for citizens to register have been extended in many states to dates very close to Election Day, and it is difficult to get final lists in time to do pre-election polling. Relying on previously published lists means that persons will be included who are actually ineligible because they have not voted and have been purged from unpublished registration rolls. In addition, lists exclude other eligible people who have moved into an area, but whose registration status has not yet been formally posted.

In whatever manner it is developed, the sample of registrants used by pollsters is then subjected to a series of Election Day "turnout" questions ranging from one or two simple direct queries about how likely it is that a respondent will go to the polls, to a complex series of scaled questions measuring degree of involvement in the campaign, the importance of voting or not voting, previous voting history, knowledge of where the polling place is, and so on. At some stage, cutoff points are established when all respondents are arrayed or "turnout" probability weights are applied to each respondent. This process allows the pollster to eliminate from his analyses those people considered to be less likely or unlikely to vote, and to concentrate only on the preferences of those people who have survived the screening process.

Relying upon even the most sophisticated screening system to obtain a national composite of the electorate is still quite perilous. Registration criteria and voting turnout rates vary considerably from state to state. It is hazardous simply to average all these factors to produce estimates of voter preferences and electoral counts.

The range of respondent retention reported by some 1980 national polls after screening questions had been applied varied widely—from 54 percent to 75 percent—according to Seymour Martin Lipset.[2] There is a considerable body of data and literature which shows that nonvoters tend to be drawn from less mobile, Democratically disposed groups, the poor, minorities, the less educated, and the young.

The nonvoting adult population contains more people disposed toward the Democratic candidate (Carter, in the 1980 example) than the Republican candidate. The actual national participation rate average in the 1980 election was 53 percent. Thus, any national pre-election poll which retained a subsample of likely voters larger than this proportion, ran the great risk of containing a bias for Carter.

Despite these long-established insights and identified risks, there are a number of reasons why most national polls have not developed state-by-state parameters for screening registration status or likelihood of voting. In a typical national cross-section sample, the number of interviews allocated to any one state is not large enough to provide for any extensive statistical treatment at the state level. State polling organizations, on the other hand, are active in the numerous state elections occurring in non-presidential years, and generally operate on a continuing basis. As a result, they have greater opportunities to become familiar with their state's registration laws, turnout trends, changing distribution of voters by party and other characteristics. State polling organizations have both the need and the means to refine and update their state samples continually. National polling organizations, which are generally interested in the individual states only once every four years, cannot match this expertise.

Another methodological problem which might help explain why some national polls underreported Reagan's and overreported Carter's strength during the 1980 campaign, was their reliance on in-person interviews.

Historically, in-person interviews were considered the best way to gather survey data. In recent years, however, public access conditions have changed, and it is generally conceded by most pollsters that, when properly implemented, telephone interviewing is technically superior and more efficient than personal interviewing.

In a typical national cross-section survey involving 1,500 in-person interviews, a pollster generally clusters interviews at something like 300 or so sampling points. This means that at each of these sampling points, neighborhoods or clusters, an average of five interviews are taken. The effect of interview clustering on data quality in national presidential elections is particularly acute. There is as much reason for describing the example posed here as a 300-unit sample, as there is to consider it a 1,500-unit sample.

In technical terms, this clustering effect can be addressed with the probable result substantially increasing the "error tolerances" reported. Since the computations for error tolerance under conditions of multi-staged clustering are cumbersome, the error tolerance that gets reported is often derived from the simpler assumption of unrestricted sampling and consequently underrepresents the probable sampling-error tolerance. Were this calculated correctly, the TV anchor person or newspaper reporter who now ritualistically states "The error tolerance associated with these projections is plus or minus 3 percent" might have to say that error tolerance is a lot larger than that. This would certainly change the dramatic effect of the warning about how literally one can take the results. That is, what appears to be a tie may in reality be a one-sided, if not a landslide, election.

Telephone samples are usually clustered, but the area covered is much broader than in a personal interview cluster. Thus, they inherently have less cluster bias than do personal interview clusters.

---

[2] "Different Polls, Different Results in 1980 Politics," *Public Opinion*, August/September 1980.

Beyond the aspect of clustering, however, the implementation of some telephone sampling designs used in the 1980 presidential election fell short of any ideal. For example, the NBC/Associated Press poll, which used the telephone, reported[3] that it made no callbacks except when the interviewer encountered a busy signal. Limiting any sample to only those people who happen to be home and available at the time of the first call can produce highly questionable findings.

Because of the accelerated reporting urgency under which many media-sponsored pollsters operated during 1980, short interviewing time periods were imposed. Even with some callbacks, limiting interviewing to one- or two-day periods poses the danger that the persons reached may not be representative of the electorate.

The comments and criticisms made here on polling methodology were gleaned not from a close inspection of the procedures used by the polling organizations, but from publicized references. Presumably, if an examination on the order of the Social Research Council review of the 1948 polls were made, the picture would be clearer.

In summary, the negative public reaction to the national polls' performance in 1980 was perhaps as serious as the dismal 1948 presidential polling experience. It could be argued that the 1980 situation was more serious because polling is now so much more extensive and there is a greater reliance on and commitment to polling and survey methodology by a wider variety of public and private interests than ever before.

GRIN AND BEAR IT by Lichty & Wagner
144
EARLY BIRD POLL
Lichty & Wagner
10-24
©Field Enterprises, Inc., 1979

"I have an opinion on that subject, but I'm saving it for a national poll."

Grin & Bear It, by Lichty & Wagner. © 1979 Field Enterprises Inc., Courtesy of Field Newspaper Syndicate.

The public pays more attention to polls and polling methodology during presidential elections than at any other time. For pollsters, a presidential election year poses a unique test of measurement and public relations which occurs only once every four years. Since polling methodology and the judgment of polls are to be subjected to this test, then those engaged in this effort should be sure that operating conditions are optimal.

The performance of polling in presidential elections can be improved simply by viewing a presidential election not through one big national prism, but through fifty-one smaller prisms. Superficially, it would seem that to accomplish this, national polling organizations would have to expand their budgets by a multiple of fifty. This does not need to be the case, however. A program of monitoring state polls and augmenting their efforts on a selective basis would do the job for the big media combines without a large increase in expenditures.

Each of the three TV networks and their print medium partners spent huge sums of money covering the 1980 presidential election. They polled in many states during the primary election season. They conducted frequent national polls and state polls during the general election campaign. During the primary election season, they underwrote massive "exit" poll operations in most states where there were contests.

A lot of polling money spent by the TV networks and their newspaper partners could be more judiciously spent at the state level. There is already considerable state polling underwritten by local newspapers and TV stations, and undertaken independent of network headquarters' involvement.

During future presidential election years, the media-sponsored national poll organizations might consider the step of adding to their staff one or two polling specialists, who could systematically survey and evaluate existing private and public polling data on the state and local level. It is highly probable that they would uncover a large amount of valid and usable polling data, with much less investment than it takes to conduct independent surveys—which often duplicate other efforts. These round-ups of available state poll data could be combined with their own poll data taken in states where none was available. Most importantly, such a procedure would provide more assurance that presidential voting trends were being reflected accurately.

So long as U.S. presidential elections are the occasion for inordinate public scrutiny of polling, those who have a stake in this marvelous social invention should operate it in the best possible manner. It is imperative not to risk its precious public acceptance by relying on a presidential election polling system which has many flaws. ▽

---

[3] *Public Opinion*, January/February 1981.

ARE PUBLIC SCHOOLS MAKING THE GRADE?

PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND PARENTS DON'T MAKE THE HONOR ROLL

Question: Students are often given the grades A, B, C, D and Fail to denote the quality of their work. Suppose the PUBLIC schools themselves, in this community, were graded in the same way. What grade would you give the public schools here—A, B, C, D or Fail?

How about the public schools in the nation as a whole? What grade would you give the public schools NATIONALLY—A, B, C, D or Fail?

What grade would you give the principals and administrators in the local public schools in this community—A, B, C, D or Fail?

Now what grade would you give the teachers in the public schools in this community—A, B, C, D or Fail?

What grade would you give parents in this community for the job they are doing in raising their children to be self-disciplined and responsible young people—A, B, C, D or Fail?

	Public schools in this community	Public schools nationally	Principals and administrators in local public schools	Teachers in public schools in this community	Parents in this community for the job they are doing raising children to be self-disciplined and responsible
A	9%	2%	10%	11%	5%
B	27%	18%	26%	28%	24%
C	34%	43%	28%	31%	36%
D	13%	15%	12%	9%	16%
Fail	7%	6%	9%	6%	11%

Note: Those giving the public schools in this community an "A" or "B" grade dropped from 48% in 1974 to 36% in 1981.

Source: For *public schools in this community, principals and administrators and parents*, the Gallup Organization for the Charles F. Kettering Foundation, the National Association of Elementary School Principals, the National Association of Secondary Principals; for *public schools nationally, teachers in this community*, the Gallup Organization for Phi Delta Kappa and the Lilly Endowment; both May 1981.

Overall Commitment to Public Education

Question: How important are schools to one's future success—extremely important, fairly important, not too important?



Note: In 1973, 77 percent said schools were extremely important to one's future success, 19 percent said schools were fairly important, and 4 percent said not too important.

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization for the Charles F. Kettering Foundation, May 1-8, 1980.



Question: Turning now to the business of the country—we are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount. First, . . . improving the nation's education system.

Improving the nation's education system

	Too much	Too little	About right
1973	10%	48%	42%
1974	9	50	41
1975	9	53	38
1976	11	52	38
1977	10	57	33
1978	10	53	37
1979	8	55	36
1980	10	55	35

Note: In the 1980 survey, among the subgroups we examined (sex, race, geographic area, education, and political affiliation), majorities in all cases—with the exception of Republicans, for which there was a plurality—felt there was "too little" money spent on the nation's education. Seventy percent of blacks (the highest percentage) and 53 percent of whites selected the "too little" category.

Source: Surveys by the Roper Organization, latest that of December 6-13, 1980.

But We're Not Satisfied With Performance

CONFIDENCE IN THOSE RUNNING HIGHER EDUCATION HAS FALLEN

Question: As far as people in charge of running (read list) are concerned, would you say you have a great deal of confidence, only some confidence, or hardly any confidence at all in them? . . . Higher education.

Feb. 1966	1971	Sept. 1973	Sept. 1974	Mar. 1975	Mar. 1976	Feb. 1977	Nov 1977	Aug. 1978	Feb. 1979	Nov. 1980
61%	37%	44%	40%	36%	31%	37%	41%	41%	33%	36%

Note: In November 1980, more people had confidence in the people running higher education than in any of the other twelve institutions asked. The range was from 36% (those expressing a great deal of confidence in the people running higher education) to 13% for those running law firms.

Source: Survey by Louis Harris and Associates 1966-August 1978; ABC News/Louis Harris and Associates February 8-12, 1979-November 7-10, 1980.



AND CONFIDENCE IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS IS DOWN



Question: I am going to read you a list of institutions in American society. Would you tell me how much confidence you, yourself, have in each one—a great deal, quite a lot, some, or very little . . . the public schools.

1981 subgroups

	Great deal/ quite a lot	Some	Very little		Great deal/ quite a lot	Some	Very little
By age				By education			
18-24 years old	45%	33%	22%	Grade School	48%	26%	26%
25-29 years old	39	41	21	High School	40	38	22
30-49 years old	40	34	26	College	39	33	29
50 and older	41	34	25				
By race				By sex			
White	40	35	26	Male	39	34	26
Nonwhite	53	31	17	Female	41	35	23

Note: Question wording varied slightly over time.

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, latest that of July 17-20, 1981.

HIGH SCHOOLS HAVE "C" AVERAGE IN PREPARING STUDENTS FOR COLLEGE AND JOBS

Question: What grade would you give the public high schools in this community for the job they are doing in *preparing students to get a job* when they graduate from high school—A, B, C, D or Fail?

What grade would you give the public high schools in this community for the job they are doing in *preparing students for college*—A, B, C, D or Fail?

Note: "Don't know" not shown. "Don't know" = 15% for both categories.

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization for the Charles F. Kettering Foundation, the National Association of Elementary School Principals, and the National Association of Secondary School Principals, May 8-17, 1981.



Public Gets Tough on Curriculum and Standards

BACK TO BASICS

Question: Frequently on any controversial issue there is no clear cut side that people take, and also frequently solutions to controversial issues are worked out by compromise. But I'm going to name some different things, and for each one would you tell me whether on balance you would be more in favor of it, or more opposed to it?



Note: When the same question was asked in 1978 by the Roper Organization, the responses were identical.

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 81-2), January 10-24, 1981.

REQUIREMENTS

Question: Would you look over this card which lists high school subjects. If you were the one to decide, what subjects would you require every public high school student who *plans to go on to college* to take?

What about those public high school students who do *not plan to go to college* when they graduate. Which courses would you require them to take?

Percent who would require —— subject of students who plan to go to college

Percent who would require —— subject of students who do not plan to go to college



Note: *The year selected by the greatest number of respondents is the one reported here. This question was asked of those who would require the subject.

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization for the Charles F. Kettering Foundation, the National Association of Elementary School Principals, the National Association of Secondary School Principals, May 8-17, 1981.

TESTING

Question: (Hand respondent card) Let's talk a bit more about standardized tests like the one(s) that high school children take for getting into college. Different people have different ideas about testing. For each of the following statements, I'd like to know if you agree strongly, agree, disagree or disagree strongly. (Read each statement)

Teachers should be required to pass a standardized test in the subject they will teach, before they can teach in public schools



All students should be required to pass a standardized basic skills test before they can graduate



Consumers would be better off if people had to pass written tests before they became mechanics, repairmen or that sort of thing



Note: In 1958, in a Gallup/Kettering survey, 56% approved of a nationwide exam in order to get a high school diploma. By 1981, the number had jumped to 73%. Over 50% of high school students in a 1980 Bachman/University of Michigan study agreed that a student should have to pass a nationwide standardized test before receiving a high school diploma.

Source: Survey by Yankelovich, Skelly and White for the Educational Testing Service, January 28-February 29, 1980.

Moral and Morale Problems At School

DISCIPLINE PROBLEMS

Question: What do you think are the biggest problems with which the *public* schools in this community must deal?



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization for Phi Delta Kappa and the Lilly Endowment, May 8-17, 1981.

DEVELOPING A STUDENT'S MORAL AND ETHICAL CHARACTER GETS HIGH PRIORITY

Question: I am going to read off some of the areas to which the public high schools devote attention in educating students. As I read off these areas, one at a time, would you tell me whether you feel the high schools in your community devote too much attention, not enough attention, or about the right amount of attention to that area.



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization for Phi Delta Kappa and the Lilly Endowment, May 8-17, 1981.

SEX EDUCATION

Question: Do you feel the public high schools should or should not include sex education in their instructional program? Do you feel the public elementary schools should or should not include sex education in grades 4 through 8?

Should include sex education in their instructional program



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization for Phi Delta Kappa and the Lilly Endowment, May 8-17, 1981.

THE BIRDS, BEES AND VENEREAL DISEASE

Question: Do you feel the public high schools should or should not include sex education in their instructional program? (Those who said sex education should be included were then shown a card listing seven areas and asked whether sex education in these areas should be included)

Topics that should be included by all those who favor sex education



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization for Phi Delta Kappa and the Lilly Endowment, May 8-17, 1981.

School Governance

PUBLIC DIVIDED ON VOUCHER SYSTEM

Question: In some nations, the government allots a certain amount of money for each child for his education. The parents can then send the child to any public, parochial or private school they choose. This is called the "voucher system." Would you like to see such an idea adopted in this country?



Source: For 1970-71, survey by the Gallup Organization for the Charles F. Kettering Foundation; for 1980, survey by the Gallup Organization; for 1981, survey by the Gallup Organization for the Charles F. Kettering Foundation, the National Association of Elementary School Principals, the National Association of Secondary School Principals, May 8-17, 1981.

SPLIT ON TUITION TAX CREDITS, TOO

Question: It has been proposed that some government tax money be used to help parochial (church-related) schools make ends meet. How do you feel about this? Do you favor or oppose giving some government tax money to help parochial schools?



Note: In 1970, 52% favored tax support, 48% opposed. In a 1981 Gallup/*Newsweek* survey, 52% opposed this proposal: "Congress is considering a proposal that would give parents an income tax credit if they pay tuition to send their children to a private or parochial school." 34% were in favor, and 14% replied "don't know."

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization for Phi Delta Kappa and the Lilly Endowment, May 8-17, 1981.

4 OUT OF 10 UNLIKELY TO USE TUITION TAX CREDIT AID

Question: If you received a tax credit of between $250 and $500, how likely would you be to send your child to a private or parochial school?



Note: 16% indicated they already sent their children to private or parochial schools, and 4% responded "don't know."

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization for *Newsweek*, March 11-17, 1981.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION NOT NEEDED

Question: Two years ago a new Department of Education was established in the federal government in Washington, D.C. The present administration now says such a department is not needed and that its functions should be performed by a smaller agency or by other departments of the government. Do you agree or disagree with this view?



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization for Phi Delta Kappa and the Lilly Endowment, May 8-17, 1981.

LOCAL CONTROL BUT NOT LOCAL SUPPORT

Question: In your opinion, who should have the greatest influence in deciding what is taught in the public schools here—the federal government, the state government, or the local school board?



Note: In a November 9-13 *Los Angeles Times* survey, 63% of those surveyed approved of transferring "education programs to the local level" when asked about "some proposals made during the Presidential campaign." 75% of Reagan voters, 64% of Anderson voters and 55% of Carter voters approved of the transfer.

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization for the Charles F. Kettering Foundation.

Question: Suppose the local public schools said they needed more money. As you feel at this time, would you vote to raise taxes for this purpose, or would you vote against raising taxes for this purpose?



	Would vote to raise taxes	Would vote against
1969	48%	52%
1970	40	60
1971	43	57
1972	39	61
1981	33	67

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization for the Charles F. Kettering Foundation latest that of 1980 the Gallup Organization for Phi Delta Kappa and the Lilly Endowment, May 8-17, 1981.

THE PROSPECTS FOR A NEW ALLIANCE: THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATS AND THE LIBERALS IN BRITAIN

Much attention has been given to the emergence of a new political party in Britain, the Social Democrats. Launched in February, the new party recently reached a tentative accord with Britain's Liberal party to run single slates in upcoming elections. The data below examine the prospects for the Social Democrats, their enhanced standing when voters are "prompted" by the mention of an alliance (which could mean victory), and the groups from which the parties draw their support.

K.H.K.

THE RISE OF UNEMPLOYMENT

Question: What would you say is the most important issue facing Britain today?



Note: Top three categories only are shown here

Source: Survey by Market & Opinion Research International, London, latest that of September 14-18, 1981.

THE DECLINE OF MARGARET THATCHER

Question: Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with Margaret Thatcher as Prime Minister?



Note: Don't know not shown.

Source: Surveys by Social Surveys (The Gallup Poll) Ltd., London, latest that of September 9-14, 1981

IF THE ELECTION WERE HELD TOMORROW . . .

Question: How would you vote if there were a general election tomorrow?



	Conservative	Labour	Liberal	SDP
Total	27%	38%	16%	17%
By sex:				
Men	48	48	38	58
Women	52	52	62	42
By age:				
18-24 years	11	19	14	17
25-34	19	19	23	20
35-44	17	17	17	23
45-54	12	14	12	11
55-64	18	16	15	15
65 and over	22	15	19	15
By class:				
Professional and managerial	28	7	16	21
Other white collar/clerical	29	16	23	26
Skilled labor	23	38	34	34
Semi- and unskilled labor, those on unemployment and state pensions	19	40	27	20
Home owner Renters not shown.	77	42	60	67
Council	18	51	34	30

IF THE NEW ALLIANCE HAD A CHANCE . . .



Question: If there was a General Election tomorrow and the Social Democratic party and the Liberal party formed an alliance to fight this election, which of these parties would you vote for?

	June 1981	July	August	September
Conservative	27%	25%	25%	23%
Labour	32	29	31	32
Social Democrat / Liberal Alliance	39	43	41	44
Other	2	3	3	2

Source: Survey by Market & Opinion Research International, London, latest that of September 14-18, 1981.

OPINION ROUNDUP

EXAMINING ELITES

Comparisons of mass public and elite (leaders and activists) opinion often flounder because they are restricted to a narrow ideological dimension, specifically whether elites are more "liberal" or "conservative" than the populace. The differences between public and elite opinion extend beyond their relative ideologies and involve three other distinct dimensions.

The first is *degree of constraint*. The political views of elites are typically more coherent than those of the public, and thus, contending elites are more sharply differentiated one from another than are their less ideologically organized adherents in the general public.

Question: Do you favor or oppose the Equal Rights Amendment—also known as E.R.A.—the constitutional amendment concerning women? (National, Democrats, Republicans)

Do you favor or oppose the Equal Rights Amendment? (Democratic and Republican National Committee members)



Note: The National, Democratic, and Republican figures are from an April 1981 survey. The Democratic National Committee figures are from a May 1981 survey of 324 committee members. The Republican National Committee figures are from a June 1981 survey of 150 officers and members.

Question: What about some of the specific proposals? Should federal spending on . . . be increased, reduced, or kept about the same as it is now? . . . Military and defense programs. (Democratic and Republican National Committees)

If you had a say in making up the federal budget this year, which programs would you like to see increased and which reduced? Should federal spending on . . . be increased, be decreased, or kept about the same? . . . Military and defense programs. (National)



Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, April 22-26, 1981; CBS News May 1981 and June 1981.

“COSMOPOLITANISM”,

A second dimension which differentiates the public and elites is the *cosmopolitan standards* of judgment elites tend to hold. This is not to say that elites hold correct or worthy views. Elites are more likely, however, to have come into contact with judgments of what is a “sophisticated” response, and are more likely to have accepted these views. In the data presented below, almost all leadership groups are “more liberal” than the public on questions of personal morality—which really is to say that

Question: Which of the following do you believe are morally wrong, and which do you think are not moral issues? . . . Living with someone of the opposite sex.

Question: Which of the following do you believe are morally wrong, and which do you think are not moral issues? . . . Abortion.

Question: Which of the following do you believe are morally wrong, and which do you think are not moral issues? . . . Smoking marijuana.



Note: Public = 2,018 respondents (1,610 adults with an oversample of 408 teenagers aged fourteen and over, senior citizens, and blacks). Leaders = 1,762 respondents.

D MORAL QUESTIONS

most groups of leaders show a greater reflection of cosmopolitan standards than the populace. The data on differences within the general public by education are presented in this section to make the point that on questions touched by cosmopolitanism, most leadership groups are close to the college educated segments of the public—from which, of course, they come.

Question: Which of the following do you believe are morally wrong, and which do you think are not moral issues? . . . Homosexuality.



Question: I'm going to read you a list of statements relating to current issues. For each one I'd like you to tell me whether you agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly. . . . A woman with young children should not work outside the home unless it is financially necessary.



Question: Should divorce in this country be easier or more difficult to obtain than it is now?



Source: Survey by Research and Forecasts, Inc. for Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Company, *Connecticut Mutual Life Report on American Values in the 80s: The Impact of Belief*, September-December 1980. (For pages 30-31)

THE IMPACT OF

Elites are more likely to have incorporated *technical information* in their opinions on abstract policy issues. For example, each leadership group shown below was less supportive of the proposition that government "ought to make sure everyone has a good standard of living" than among the public. What we see here is not a less developed "liberalism" or pro-government stand among elites than among the populace, but a greater appreciation among elites of the complex problems confronting any such broad commitment.

Question: I'm going to read you a list of statements relating to current issues. For each one I'd like you to tell me whether you agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, disagree strongly. . . . The government ought to make sure everyone has a good standard of living. (General public)

In the five topic areas below, please indicate whether you agree or disagree with each statement (Agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, disagree strongly) . . . The government ought to make sure everyone has a good standard of living. (Leaders)



Question: I'm going to read you a list of statements relating to current issues. For each one, I'd like you to tell me whether you agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly. . . . The government should protect American industry from foreign competition by limiting imports from countries such as Japan. (General public)

In the five topic areas below, please indicate whether you agree or disagree with each statement. (Agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, disagree strongly). . . . The government should protect American industry from foreign competition by limiting imports from countries such as Japan. (Leaders)



Note: Public = 2,018 respondents (1,610 adults with an oversample of 408 teenagers aged fourteen and over, senior citizens, and blacks). Leaders = 1,762 respondents.

XPERT KNOWLEDGE

The opinions of elites are typically more constrained than those of the public, more cosmopolitan, and more influenced by technical information. Sometimes this mix means that leaders appear more liberal than their followers, but at other times, the opposite is true. Both groups have different roles to play in democratic decision making. To repeat a point made above, one gets from this no guidance on who is more likely to reflect wise judgment.

Question: I'm going to read you a list of statements relating to current issues. For each one I'd like you to tell me whether you agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly. . . . The benefits of nuclear power are greater than the risks involved. (General public)

In the five topic areas below, please indicate whether you agree or disagree with each statement. (Agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, disagree strongly). . . . The benefits of nuclear power are greater than the risks involved. (Leaders)



Source: Survey by Research and Forecasts, Inc. commissioned by Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co., *Connecticut Mutual Life Report on American Values in the 80s: The Impact of Belief*, September-December 1980.

Question: I'd like to ask you about the last eight presidents of the United States. Please keep in mind Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford and Carter. If you *had* to choose *one*, which president do you think (Read each item) . . . was best on domestic affairs . . . was best in foreign affairs. . . . (Harris)

Of presidents from Franklin Roosevelt through Jimmy Carter, if you *had* to choose *one*, which president do you think was . . . best on domestic affairs, best on foreign affairs, . . . (*Christian Science Monitor*/Roper Center)



Note: For Harris, "not sure" calculated out for consistency. "Not sure" = 12% for domestic and 8% for foreign affairs. For political scholars, the response "more than one" is not shown (1% for foreign affairs)

Source: Survey by Louis Harris and Associates, January 2-7, 1981 (General public); *Christian Science Monitor*/Roper Center, September 3-6, 1981. (Political scholars)

OF GADGETS AND ROBOTS

AUTOMATION . . .

Question: Here is a list of some utensils and appliances people have in their homes. (Show respondent card) Would you look down it and call off the ones, if any, that you have in your home right now.



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 81-7), July 15-22, 1981.

. . . AND AUTOMATONS

Question: How do you feel about the idea of using robots to work on assembly lines—would you like to see the use of robots greatly expanded or severely limited?

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 81-2), January 10-24, 1981.

LOOKING AT TELEVISION

I LIKE TO WATCH . . . 2 HOURS AND 55 MINUTES A DAY

Question: On an average day, about how much time, if any, do you personally spend watching TV?



98% of Americans have a TV

85% own a color set

51% have more than one set

Source: A. C. Nielsen Company estimates, 1981 data.

	Nov. 1961	Nov. 1963	Nov. 1964	Jan. 1967	Nov. 1968	Jan. 1971	Nov. 1972	Nov. 1974	Nov. 1976	Dec. 1978	Nov. 1980
National	2:17	2:34	2:38	2:41	2:47	2:50	2:50	3:02	2:53	3:08	2:55
By selected groups:											
College educated	1:48	—	2:04	2:10	2:17	2:19	2:12	2:23	2:24	2:31	2:14
Upper economic levels	2:02	—	2:14	2:21	2:24	2:30	2:29	2:47	2:40	2:52	2:44

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization for the Television Information Office, latest that of November 15-22, 1980.

A FAMILY AFFAIR . . . BUT NOT TOO OFTEN

Question: Here are some things most people experience in their daily lives. (Card shown respondent) Of course, they may all be important, but which three or four of those things do you find give you the most personal satisfaction or enjoyment day in and day out? Just call off the letters of the items.

Things that give the most personal satisfaction or enjoyment



Note: Percentages add to more than 100% due to multiple responses.

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 81-4), March 21-28, 1981.

Question: I've just asked you about your own daily television viewing time. Thinking now on a *weekly* basis, about how much time in an average week, if any, do you spend watching TV *with* your children?

Median hours reported by parents



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization for the Television Information Office, November 15-22, 1980.

Stay Tuned for the News

ALL THE NEWS THAT'S FIT

Questions: First, I'd like to ask you where you usually get most of your news about what's going on in the world today—from the newspapers or radio or television or magazines or talking to people or where?

If you got conflicting or different reports of the same news story from radio, television, the magazines and the newspapers, which of the four versions would you be most inclined to believe—the one on radio or television or magazines or newspapers?



Note: Percentages (for sources of news) add to 131% due to multiple responses. For trend line on these questions, see *Public Opinion*, August/September 1979, pp. 30-31. Between 1962 and 1964, television passed newspapers as a source of most news. Between 1958 and 1960, television passed newspapers as the most believable medium.

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization for the Television Information Office, November 15-22, 1980.

HYPING THE MEDIA

Question: Now here is a list of people in various kinds of occupations and professions. (Card shown respondent) For each one would you tell me whether you have a generally high opinion of them, a fairly good opinion of them, not too good an opinion, or a poor opinion of them? . . . Television and newspaper reporters.



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 80-10), November 8-15, 1980.

MEDIA BLITZED . . .

Question: Do you agree or disagree: Reporters in the major news media often give too much of their own opinions and not enough facts.



Source: Survey by Chilton Research Services for the *Washington Post*, July 20-28, 1981.

AND BOOSTED

Question: What has been your experience in the things you have known a good deal about personally, how often have news stories in the major news media been accurate?



Source: Survey by Chilton Research Services for the *Washington Post*, July 20-28, 1981.

The Season's Discontents

Question: Here are some things people have told us annoy them about television. (Card shown respondent) Would you look over that list and then tell me which two or three, if any, *you* are most annoyed by?

	May 1976	March 1978	April/May 1981
Too much violence	43%	43%	55%
Programs that insult your intelligence	34	35	42
Too much sex	27	32	41
Too many commercials	50	49	34
Too many soap operas	15	17	13

Note: Percentages add to more than 100% due to multiple responses.

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 81-5), latest that of April 25-May 2, 1981.



Ruling the Airwaves

Question: Television offers a wide variety of programming, not all of which is acceptable to everyone. Who do you think should have the primary responsibility to determine what is acceptable?



Note: When asked, "Should programs be taken off the air because some religious groups strongly object to them?" or whether "Shows should stay on the air as long as they are popular with many people?" 84% said they should stay on and 16% said they should be taken off the air, in a Roper survey of 1981.

Source: Survey by the National Survey Research Group for ABC, March 27-March 30, 1981.

Question: Pay TV channels like Home Box Office show adult movies and uncut scenes with sex or violence that are not shown on network TV channels. Do you think it is a good idea that pay TV channels show such movies uncut, or do you think that they should not be allowed to show such movies uncut?



Note: 73% of men, 59% of women thought it was a good idea for pay TV channels to show such movies uncut. 81% of those ages 18-34 shared this view, but only 45% of those 50 and older did. 74% of those with college educations agreed compared to 45% of those who did not graduate from high school.

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization for NBC, April 20-May 3, 1981.

Question: A number of criticisms and suggestions are also being made these days. Will you tell me for each of the following whether you mostly agree or mostly disagree with each one? Let's start with (Read first statement on list). Do you mostly agree or mostly disagree with this? (Record one answer below and continue with list). . . . Television and other media in this country reflect a permissive and immoral set of values which are bad for the country.



Source: Survey by Time/Yankelovich, Skelly and White, May 12-14, 1981.

Question: Do you think that television programs should deal with different kinds of values, ideas and lifestyles, including those you may not approve of, or do you think television should not deal with such topics?



Note: *The fundamentalism scale was created by asking respondents eight questions including religious attitudes, beliefs, attendance, and participation. Each question has a fundamentalist vs. nonfundamentalist response. Zero = took fundamentalist position on none of the eight questions. Low = took fundamentalist view on one, two, or three questions. High = took fundamentalist view on four, five, or six questions. Very high = took fundamentalist view on seven or all eight questions.

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization for NBC, April 20-May 3, 1981.

Dukes of Hazzard Vs. Dallas

RATING FRIDAY NIGHT FARE

Question: First, I would like to ask you a few questions about a number of television programs. As I read each one, please tell me if you are familiar with the program or not . . . "Dukes of Hazzard?" . . . "Dallas?" . . . (Asked of those familiar with the program) Did you watch . . . "Dukes of Hazzard"/"Dallas" . . . during the last month?



NIELSEN'S TOP TEN

Dallas
60 Minutes
Dukes of Hazzard
M*A*S*H
Private Benjamin
NBC Movie of the Week
NBC Tuesday Night Movie
Jeffersons
Best of the West
Loveboat

Source: A. C. Nielsen Company season average, September 21, 1980 through September 13, 1981.





Note: *For a description of fundamentalism scale see note at bottom of page 37.

Question: (Asked of those familiar with the program) How would you rate "Dukes of Hazzard"/"Dallas?" Would you say it is one of your favorites, very good, good, fair, or poor?



Note: *Numbers in parentheses = those familiar with the show, and have watched it, and gave rating for show.

Question: Still thinking about the programs we just discussed . . . is the program . . . ("Dukes of Hazzard"/"Dallas") . . . suitable for viewing by all family members, by teenagers and adults, by adults only, or is it not suitable for anyone?



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization for NBC, April 20-May 3, 1981.

Note: Category "no one" = 6% for both programs.

BOOK REVIEWS

Question: During the past year, about how many books either hardcover or paperback did you read either all or part of the way through . . .?



Profiles:

Light readers tend to be:
- high school educated
- people living in the South

Medium readers tend to be:
- 18-34 years of age
- college educated
- in household with children under 18
- living in the West and East

Heavy readers tend to be:
- women
- 18-34 years of age
- college educated

Nonreaders tend to be:
- men
- 35 years of age and older
- high school educated or less
- no children in household
- living in the Midwest

WHAT READERS DIGEST

Question: When as nearly as you can recall, did you last read any kind of book all the way through or part of the way through . . . either a hardcover or a paperback? Was that book a hardcover book or a paperback book? What kind of book was that? Was it a novel, biography, a book on how to do something, another kind of nonfiction? . . .



Note: Question asked of those who read book in last year = 75%. 43% of those indicated that the last book they read was hardcover, 57% paperback.

A NOVEL APPROACH

Question: During the past year have you read a book because of something you saw or heard on TV?



A PICTURE WORTH A THOUSAND WORDS

Question: Some people think that television has an effect on how they spend their time and others disagree. If you watched less television, do you think you would read more, read less, or read about the same amount?

If your children watched less television, do you think they would read more, read less, or read about the same amount?



Note: * Among parents with children 7-17 years of age, living at home

BEDTIME STORY

Question: About how often do you read to your (child) (children) under seven years of age? Would you say you read to them . . . almost everyday, more than once a week, about once a week, less often, never.

Read to children under age seven ★ ...



Note: * Sample = 308 parents with children under seven years of age.

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization for the American Library Association, July 21-August 14, 1978.

THE LEARNING CURVE ON ECONOMICS

SELLING GOLD WILL BE NO FREE LUNCH

Question: People in government and the media use a lot of words and phrases when they talk about the economy. I'm going to read you some of them. For each one, would you tell me when you hear that word or phrase used, whether you have a pretty good idea of what the person is talking about, some idea, or not much of an idea what that person is talking about? First, inflation . . .



JACK KEMP'S FOOTBALL FACES LONG YARDAGE

Question: (Asked if answered have "good" or "some" idea of what supply-side economics [is] . . .) Here are three statements that have been made briefly describing some economic theories. (Card shown respondent) Of course, such phrases can't describe any economic theory entirely, but could you choose the *one* which comes *closest* to describing what supply-side economics means to you? Just call off the letter.

☐ *a. The government should increase spending and cut taxes to give people more money to buy things—that will increase demand for goods and, therefore, stimulate private enterprise to produce more*

▨ *b. The government should cut taxes which will give more money to private enterprise. Private enterprise can then produce more and the whole economy will expand*

☐ *c. The government should cut its budget. That will help decrease the inflation rate and preserve the value of the dollar*



Note: *Percentage equals those who had "not much of an idea" or answered "don't know" when asked about their knowledge of supply-side economics.

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 81-4), March 21-28, 1981.

by S. Robert Lichter and Stanley Rothman

MEDIA AND BUSINESS ELITES

Yesteryear's ragtag muckrakers, who tirelessly championed the little guy against powerful insiders, have become insiders themselves. Newsmen have long cherished the vantage point of the outsiders who keep the insiders straight. But now, leading journalists are courted by politicians, studied by scholars and known to millions through their bylines and televised images. In short, the needs of a society increasingly hungry for information have contributed to the rise of a national news network—the new media elite. Leading figures within this network are anything but the low-lifes and ambulance chasers mythologized in *The Front Page*. Instead they constitute a new leadership group that competes for influence alongside more traditional elites representing business, labor, government, and other sectors of society.

As columnist Joseph Kraft writes, "in the past two decades, those of us in the press have undergone a startling transformation. We are among the principal beneficiaries of American life. We have enjoyed a huge rise in income, in status, and in power. . . . We have moved from the sidelines to the center of the action."[1]

Eric Sevareid, in his final CBS commentary, put it even more succinctly: "We are no longer starvelings and we sit above the salt. We have affected our times."[2]

The influence of the press is based not on money or political power but on the information and ideas they transmit to other social leaders, as well as to the general public. Even those who question the media's power to persuade grant their ability to help set the agenda for discussions about social policy. Bernard Cohen notes, "the mass media may not be successful in telling us what to think, but they are stunningly successful in telling us what to think *about*."[3]

As part of a larger study on elites, we surveyed members of the national media elite during 1979 and 1980.* We wanted to discover their backgrounds, attitudes, and outlooks toward American society and their own profession. We conducted hour-long interviews with 240 journalists and broadcasters at the most influential media outlets, including the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post*, the *Wall Street Journal*, *Time* magazine, *Newsweek*, *U.S. News and World Report*, and the news departments at CBS, NBC, ABC and PBS, along with major public broadcasting stations.[4]

Within each organization, we selected individuals randomly from among those responsible for news content. In the print medium we interviewed reporters, columnists, department heads, bureau chiefs, editors and executives responsible for news content. In the broadcast medium we selected correspondents, anchormen, producers, film editors, and news executives. A very high proportion of those contacted, 76 percent, completed the interview. The response rate was high enough to insure that our findings provide insight into the composition and perspective of this new elite.

To provide comparisons with a more traditional leadership group, we also surveyed executives at several major corporations. We interviewed at seven *Fortune 500* companies, ranging from a multinational oil company and a major bank to a public utility and a nationwide retail chain. We chose randomly from upper and middle management at each company and completed 216 interviews, or 96 percent of those contacted. The focus of this article is, of course, the media elite. At appropriate points, however, we will compare their attitudes to those of the successful and influential leaders in the business world.

---

* This study is directed by Rothman and Lichter, under the auspices of the Research Institute on International Change at Columbia University. The surveys of media and business leaders were supervised by Response Analysis, a survey research organization.

Who Are the Media Elite?

The social and personal backgrounds of the media elite are summarized in table 1. In some respects, the journalists we interviewed appear typical of leadership groups throughout society. The media elite is composed mainly of white males in their thirties and forties. Only one in twenty is nonwhite; one in five is female. They are highly educated, well-paid professionals. Ninety-three percent have college degrees, and a majority (55 percent) attended graduate school as well. These figures reveal them as one of the best educated groups in America. They are also one of the better paid groups, despite journalism's reputation as a low paying profession. In 1978, 78 percent earned at least $30,000, and one in three had salaries that exceeded $50,000. Moreover, nearly half (46 percent) reported family incomes above $50,000.

Table 1
Backgrounds of the Media Elite

White	95%
Male	79
From northeast or north central states	68
From metropolitan area	42
Father graduated college	40
Father occupation "professional"	40
College graduate	93
Postgraduate study	55
Income $30,000+	78
Family income $50,000+	46
Political liberal	54
Religion "none"	50

Geographically, they are drawn primarily from northern industrial states, especially from the northeast corridor. Two-fifths come from three states: New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. Another 10 percent hail from New England, and almost one in five was raised in the big industrial states just to the west—Illinois, Indiana, Michigan and Ohio. Thus, over two-thirds of the media elite come from these three clusters of states. By contrast, only 3 percent are drawn from the entire Pacific coast, including California, the nation's most populous state.

Journalism is a profession associated with rapid upward mobility, yet we found few Horatio Alger stories in the newsroom. On the contrary, many among the media elite enjoyed socially privileged upbringings. Most were raised in upper-middle-class homes. Almost half their fathers were college graduates, and one in four held a graduate degree. Two in five are the children of professionals—doctors, lawyers, teachers, and so on. In fact, one in twelve is following in his father's footsteps as a second generation journalist. Another 40 percent describe their fathers as businessmen. That leaves only one in five whose father was employed in a low status blue or white collar job. Given these upper status positions, it is not surprising that their families were relatively well off. Forty-five percent rate their family's income while they were growing up as above average, compared to 26 percent who view their early economic status as below average.

In sum, substantial numbers of the media elite grew up at some distance from the social and cultural traditions of "small town "middle America." Instead, they were drawn from big cities in the northeast and north central states. Their parents tended to be well off, highly educated members of the upper middle class, especially the educated professions.

Social and Political Attitudes

All these characteristics might be expected to predispose people toward the social liberalism of the cosmopolitan outsider. And indeed, much of the media elite upholds the cosmopolitan or anti-bourgeois social perspective that Everett Ladd has termed the "new liberalism."[5]

A predominant characteristic of the media elite is its secular outlook. Exactly 50 percent eschew any religious affiliation. Another 14 percent are Jewish, and almost one in four (23 percent) was raised in a Jewish household.[6] Only one in five identifies himself as Protestant, and one in eight as Catholic. Very few are regular churchgoers. Only 8 percent go to church or synagogue weekly, and 86 percent seldom or never attend religious services.

Ideologically, a majority of leading journalists describe themselves as liberals. Fifty-four percent place themselves to the left of center, compared to only 19 percent who choose the right side of the spectrum. When they rate their fellow workers, even greater differences emerge. Fifty-six percent say the people they work with are mostly on the left, and only 8 percent on the right—a margin of seven-to-one.

Table 2
Presidential Voting Record of Media Elite
1964-1976*

	Percent	Percent Voting
1964		
Goldwater	6	(62)
Johnson	94	
1968		
Nixon	13	(67)
Humphrey	87	
1972		
Nixon	19	(74)
McGovern	81	
1976		
Ford	19	(82)
Carter	81	

*Percentages based on those who voted for major party candidates. Third party vote never exceeded 2 percent.

These subjective ratings are borne out by their voting records in presidential elections since 1964, summarized in table 2. (The interviews were conducted before the 1980 elections, so our most recent data are for 1976.) Of those who say they voted, the proportion

Table 3
Media Elite Attitudes on Social Issues

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Economics				
Big corporations should be publicly owned	4%	9%	23%	65%
People with more ability should earn more	48	38	10	4
Private enterprise is fair to workers	17	53	20	10
Less regulation of business is good for USA	16	47	24	13
Government should reduce income gap	23	45	20	13
Government should guarantee jobs	13	35	33	19
Political Alienation				
Structure of society causes alienation	12	37	32	20
Institutions need overhaul	10	18	31	42
All political systems are repressive	4	24	26	46
Social-Cultural				
Environmental problems are not serious	1	18	27	54
Strong affirmative action for blacks	33	47	16	4
Government should not regulate sex	84	13	3	1
Woman has right to decide on abortion	79	11	5	5
Homosexuality is wrong	9	16	31	45
Homosexuals shouldn't teach in public schools	3	12	31	54
Adultery is wrong	15	32	34	20
Foreign Policy				
U.S. exploits Third World, causes poverty	16	40	25	20
U.S. use of resources immoral	19	38	27	16
West has helped Third World	6	19	50	25
Goal of foreign policy is to protect U.S. businesses	12	39	28	22
CIA should sometimes undermine hostile governments	26	19	36	19
	None	**Democracies**	**Friends**	**Anyone**
To what countries should we sell arms?	19	29	48	4

of leading journalists who supported the Democratic presidential candidate never dropped below 80 percent. In 1972, when 62 percent of the electorate chose Nixon, 81 percent of the media elite voted for McGovern. This does not appear to reflect any particular personal aversion to Nixon, despite the well-publicized tensions between the press and his administration. Four years later, leading journalists preferred Carter over Ford by exactly the same margin. In fact, in the Democratic landslide of 1964, media leaders picked Johnson over Goldwater by the staggering margin of sixteen-to-one, or 94 to 6 percent.

Most significant, though, is the long-term trend. Over the entire sixteen-year period, less than one-fifth of the media elite supported any Republican presidential candidate. In an era when presidential elections are often settled by a swing vote of 5 to 10 percent, the Democratic margin among elite journalists has been 30 to 50 percent greater than among the entire electorate.

These presidential choices are consistent with the media elite's liberal views on a wide range of social and political issues, as table 3 reveals. They show a strong preference for welfare capitalism, pressing for assistance to the poor in the form of income redistribution and guaranteed employment. Few are outright socialists. For example, they overwhelmingly reject the proposition that major corporations should be publicly owned. Only one in eight would agree to public ownership of corporations, and two-thirds declare themselves strongly opposed. Moreover, very few sympathize with Marx's doctrine, "from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs." Instead, they overwhelmingly support the idea that people with greater ability should earn higher wages than those with less ability. Eighty-six percent agree with this fundamental tenet of capitalism. Most also believe that free enterprise gives workers a fair shake, and that deregulation of business would be good for the country. Seventy percent agree that private enterprise is fair to working people, and almost as many, 63 percent, say that less regulation of business would serve the national interest.

Despite this basic support for private enterprise, we should not expect the media elite to lead the cheering section for Reagan's economic policies. Leading journalists may subscribe to a capitalist economic framework, but they are equally committed to the welfare state. Sixty-eight percent, about the same proportion that praise the fairness of private enterprise, also agree that the government should substantially reduce the income gap between the rich and the poor. They are almost evenly divided over the issue of guaranteed employment. Forty-eight percent believe the government should guarantee a job to anyone who wants one, while a slight majority of 52 percent oppose this principle of entitlement.

Of course, there is no necessary contradiction between praise for private enterprise and calls for government action to aid the poor and jobless. These attitudes mirror the traditional perspective of American liberals who—unlike many European social democrats—accept an essentially capitalistic economic framework, even as they press for expansion of the welfare state.

Despite their acceptance of the economic order, many leading journalists voice a general discontent with the social system. Virtually half, 49 percent, agree with the statement, "the very structure of our society causes people to feel alienated." A substantial minority would like to overhaul the entire system. Twenty-eight percent agree that America needs a "complete restructuring of its basic institutions." The same proportion generalize their criticism to include all modern states. They hold that *all* political systems are repressive, because they concentrate power and authority in a few hands.

It seems that a substantial portion of the media elite accept the current economic order, yet remain dissatisfied with the social system. Indeed, it is today's divisive "social issues" that bring their liberalism to the fore. Leading journalists emerge from our survey as strong supporters of environmental protection, affirmative action, women's rights, homosexual rights, and sexual freedom in general.

Fewer than one in five assents to the statement, "our environmental problems are not as serious as people have been led to believe." Only one percent strongly agree that environmental problems are overrated, while a majority of 54 percent strongly disagree. They are nearly as vehement in their support for affirmative action, an issue that has split the traditional liberal constituency which favored civil rights measures. Despite both the heated controversy over this issue and their own predominantly white racial composition, four out of five media leaders endorse the use of strong affirmative action measures to ensure black representation in the workplace.

In their attitudes toward sex and sex roles, members of the media elite are virtually unanimous in opposing the constraints of both government and tradition. Large majorities oppose government regulation of sexual activities, uphold a pro-choice position on abortion, and reject the notion that homosexuality is wrong. In fact, a majority would not characterize even adultery as wrong.

When asked whether the government should regulate sexual practices, only 4 percent agree, and 84 percent strongly oppose state control over sexual activities. Ninety percent agree that a woman has the right to decide for herself whether to have an abortion; 79 percent agree strongly with this pro-choice position. Three-quarters disagree that homosexuality is wrong, and an even larger proportion, 85 percent, uphold the right of homosexuals to teach in public schools. (A mere 9 percent feel strongly that homosexuality is wrong.) Finally, 54 percent do not regard adultery as wrong, and only 15 percent strongly agree that extramarital affairs are immoral. Thus, members of the media elite emerge as strong supporters of sexual freedom or permissiveness, and as natural opponents of groups like the Moral Majority, who seek to enlist the state in restricting sexual freedom.

In addition to these social and cultural issues, we inquired about international affairs, focusing on America's relations with Third World countries. Third World representatives to UNESCO have argued that the American press serves the interests of capitalism by "presenting developing countries in a bad light and suppressing their authentic voices,"[7] as a recent *New York Times* article put it. Such charges are supported by media critics like Herbert Gans, who claims that "conservative dictators . . . are apt to be treated more kindly (by the press) than socialist ones."[8] We cannot address these questions of media coverage. But we can assess the sympathies of the elite press on several of the controversial issues raised by these critics. Among these are U.S. arms sales, C.I.A. activity, and alleged American exploitation of developing countries.

In most instances, majorities of the media elite voice the same criticisms that are raised in the Third World. Fifty-six percent agree that American economic exploitation has contributed to Third World poverty. About the same proportion, 57 percent, also find

DOONESBURY **by Garry Trudeau**


WHETHER OR NOT STUDENTS HAVE REALLY CHANGED REMAINS TO BE SEEN. BUT ONE THING IS VERY, VERY CLEAR:
COMMENT
11-28
© 1977 G.B.T.
UNIVERSAL PRESS SYNDICATE
LIFE GOES ON.
COMMENT
THOUGHTFUL PAUSE..
COMMENT
ROLAND BURTON HEDLEY, JR., ESQ., ABC WIDE WORLD OF NEWS!
SIGN OFF
GBTrudeau

© 1977, G.B. Trudeau. Reprinted with permission of the Universal Press Syndicate. All rights reserved.

America's heavy use of natural resources to be "immoral." By a three-to-one margin, leading journalists soundly reject the counterargument that Third World nations would be even worse off without the assistance they've received from Western nations. Indeed, precisely half agree with the claim that the main goal of our foreign policy has been to protect American business interests.

Two issues dealing more directly with American foreign policy elicit a similar division of opinions. A majority of 55 percent would prohibit the C.I.A. from ever undermining hostile governments to protect U.S. interests. The question of arms shipments produces an even split of opinion. Forty-eight percent would ban foreign arms sales altogether or restrict them to democratic countries. Forty-seven percent would supply arms to any "friendly" country, regardless of the regime. Only 4 percent would be willing to sell arms to all comers.

Thus, in several controversial areas of U.S.-Third World relations, the media elite is deeply divided, with slight majorities endorsing some key Third World criticisms of America.[9] We noted earlier that many leading journalists criticize the American system from within, as "alienating" and in need of an overhaul. It appears that even larger numbers extend their criticisms to the international arena. About half charge America with economic exploitation and seek to limit C.I.A. activity and arms sales as instruments of our foreign policy.

Toward the Good Society

Thus far we have examined elite journalists' opinions on the great and small issues of the day. By charting their responses to numerous social issues, we try to gain an intuitive feel for their general perspectives on society and politics. The results can be deceptive. They create the impression of a broad ideological portrait of the media elite without ever asking journalists to deal with the "big picture." Their attitudes toward issues like abortion, affirmative action and arms sales provide us with benchmarks for understanding their outlook, since most of us have opinions on such pressing and hotly debated questions. But they do not address some of the most basic underlying issues of political life: What direction should American society take? What groups exert the most influence over social goals and political processes? How much influence *should* be wielded by such forces as business, labor, minorities, and the media?

These issues are as old as political philosophy. But it is not only philosophers who grapple with questions like "who should rule?" and "what is the good society?" Most people have answers to these questions, even if they haven't consciously arrived at them. Their answers express basic attitudes that underlie their transient opinions on current social issues.

In the interviews, we tried to tap these fundamental predispositions of political thought. First, we asked journalists about the goals America should pursue during the next decade. From a list of eight choices, we asked them to select the most important, second most important, and least important goal. The list, created by political scientist Ronald Inglehart, includes:

- Maintaining a high rate of economic growth
- Making sure that this country has strong defense forces
- Seeing that the people have more say in how things get decided at work and in their communities
- Trying to make our cities and countryside more beautiful
- Maintaining a stable economy
- Progressing toward a less impersonal, more humane society
- The fight against crime
- Progressing toward a society where ideas are more important than money

He classifies these choices as either "instrumental" and "acquisitive" values, on one hand, or "expressive" and "post-bourgeois" values, on the other.[10] In this list, the "post-bourgeois" choices are those dealing with participation, a humane society, beautiful cities, and placing ideas above money. On the basis of their other opinions, we would expect the media elite to be relatively supportive of these types of social goals. But relative to whom? Unlike standard polling items, these choices are not presented periodically to cross-sections of the American public. This is where our sample of business leaders comes in. As archetypal representatives of a bourgeois society, they should be oriented toward more conservative "acquisitive" values like a strong economy and national defense. Thus, they provide an appropriate comparison group for the media elite.

We found that substantial segments of the media elite endorse the "post-bourgeois" value orientation that Inglehart calls a "silent revolution" transforming the political culture of advanced industrial society. The results are shown in table 4. Only one in eight business leaders picks any of the "expressive" values as America's most pressing concern. By contrast, one in three journalists deems citizen participation, a humane society, or a society less oriented toward money as our most important goal—more important than either economic well-being or national defense.

Even among the journalists, a slight majority favor economic stability as the most important value. However, almost half of the media elite (49 percent) pick post-bourgeois values as their second choice, compared to 30 percent of the business elite. Forty percent of these leading journalists select a humane society as either their first or second priority, more than double the proportion among business leaders. Conversely, the businessmen list national defense more than twice as often as do the newsmen. Finally, the journalists are almost twice as likely as the executives to choose acquisitive values as the *least* important for America to pursue.

(Continued on page 59)

Lichter/Rothman

(Continued from page 46)

Overall, the media elite shows a clear preference for post-bourgeois goals, relative to the business elite. For many leading journalists, liberal views on contemporary political issues apparently reflect a commitment to substantial social change in pursuit of the good society, as they visualize it. Such a commitment would align them with emerging forces of social liberalism which are pitted against more established leadership groups. Therefore, as the final focus of our inquiry, we shall examine the media elite's evaluation of its competitors for social influence.

Figure 1

Media Elite's *Perceptions* of Influence among Leadership Groups



Who Should Rule?

Beyond inquiring about the direction our society should take, we asked a more pointed question: Who should direct it? Specifically, we asked the journalists to rate seven leadership groups in terms of the influence each wields over American life. Then we asked them to rate the same groups according to the amount of influence they *should* have. Each group was assigned a rating from "1," meaning very little influence, to "7," representing a great deal of influence.

The seven groups rated represent a cross-section of the major competitors for social power in contemporary America. They include black leaders, feminists, consumer groups, labor unions, business leaders, and the news media. The journalists' perceptions of these groups' influences are pictured in figure 1. They see four of the groups as relatively disadvantaged in the competition for social power. Feminists are least powerful, followed closely by black leaders, intellectuals and consumer groups. All four are clustered tightly together, however, well below the big three of labor, business, and the media. The unions rank third, leaving the media close on the heels of business leaders, who are perceived as the most powerful social group in America.

Thus, the media elite recognizes its own position of power, viewing itself as more influential than any other leadership group except the business community. It places itself between business and labor, traditionally the leading contenders for influence, and pictures the emergent forces of consumers, intellectuals, blacks, and feminists as playing a decidedly subordinate role.

When members of this elite are asked their preferences, this picture changes drastically, as figure 2 illustrates. They would strip both business and labor of their current perceived power, while raising the status of all the other groups. In the media elite's preferred social hierarchy, business leaders fall from first to fifth

Figure 2

Media Elite's *Preferences* for Influence among Leadership Groups



Table 4

Media and Business Elites' Choices of Most Important Goal for America in the Next Decade

	Acquisitive				Post-Bourgeois				Totals	
	Economic Growth	Stable Economy	National Defense	Fight Crime	Humane Society	Ideas, not Money	Community Participation	Beautiful Cities	Acquisitive	Post-Bourgeois
Most Important										
Media	10%	52%	6%	0%	17%	5%	11%	0%	67%	33%
Business	14	60	13	1	6	3	3	0	88	12
Second Most Important										
Media	9	18	14	8	23	15	8	3	51	49
Business	18	15	30	8	13	11	3	3	70	30
Least Important										
Media	15	2	12	10	10	9	22	17	39	61
Business	8	1	7	5	12	13	32	23	21	79

position, and unions drop to the very bottom of the ladder. Feminists move up only slightly, but blacks, intellectuals and consumer groups would all have more influence than either business or labor. Emerging at the top of the heap, as the group most favored to direct American society, are the media.

There is a certain irony in the media elite's choice of itself as preeminent in the race for influence. The press is traditionally ambivalent about its power, and journalists often either deny or decry the growing reality of a powerful media elite. In a 1976 study of elites conducted by the *Washington Post* and Harvard University, the media leaders were the only group to claim they want less influence than they already have.[11] In fact, one could say the same of our subjects, but it would be a deceptive interpretation of our findings. In absolute terms, these journalists would assign themselves a lower influence rating than they now have. On the other hand, they would assign even *lower* ratings to all the other groups, thereby leapfrogging themselves from the second position, as they perceive it, to the top spot they would prefer.

The business leaders, by the way, return the compliment. They perceive the media as far and away the most powerful influence on American society, with labor a distant second and business only third, followed by the four emergent groups. Not surprisingly, they, too, would prefer to sit atop the influence hierarchy, while burying the media well back in the pack in fifth position, precisely where the media elite would place them. Indeed, the hostility these two elites seem to feel toward each other is rather striking. Business leaders regard the media as the most powerful group of those listed and would reduce the power of journalists more than any other group. Media leaders perceive business leaders as the most powerful group and would likewise strip away most of their influence. One might speculate that these elites view each other with such mistrust precisely because each attributes great power to the other. In the ongoing struggle over the direction of our society, each appears wary of the other as its strongest competitor.

* * *

The pointed views of the national media elite are not mere wishes and opinions of those aspiring to power, but the voice of a new leadership group that has arrived as a major force in American society. Cosmopolitan in their origins, liberal in their outlooks, they are aware and protective of their collective influence. The rise of this elite has hardly gone unnoticed. Some hail them as the public's tribunes against the powerful—indispensable champions of the underdog and the oppressed. Others decry them for allegiance to an adversary culture that is chiseling away at traditional values.

While we advocate exploring the attitudes of the national media elite, we side with neither their extollers nor critics in declaring what kind of role the media do or should play. The crucial task that remains is to discover what relationship, if any, exists between how these individuals view the world and how they present that world to the public. This is the next key step to understanding how the evolution of the media elite has transformed American society.



"Don't let it bug you, clown. These are tough times for authority figures."

Reprinted by permission. © 1977 NEA, Inc.

---

[1] Joseph Kraft, "The Imperial Media," *Commentary*, May 1981, p. 36.

[2] Quoted in Gary Paul Gates, *Air Time* (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), p. 424.

[3] Bernard Cohen, *The Press and Foreign Policy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963).

[4] Several studies have shown these media outlets to be the most influential in influencing other social leadership groups. See, for example, William Rivers, *The Opinion Makers* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1965); Carol Weiss, "What America's Leaders Read," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Spring 1974, pp. 1-22; J. W. Johnstone, Edward Slawski, and William Bowman, *The News People* (Bloomington, Ind.: University of Indiana Press, 1976). For an extensive discussion of the news media elite, see Stanley Rothman, "The Mass Media in Post-Industrial America," in S. M. Lipset, ed., *The Third Century* (Stanford, Cal.: Hoover Institution Press, 1979), pp. 346-388.

[5] Everett Ladd, "The New Lines are Drawn," *Public Opinion*, July/August 1978, pp. 48-53.

[6] For a discussion of the effect of Jewish ethnicity on elite journalists' attitudes toward Israel, see S. R. Lichter, "Media Support for Israel: A Survey of Leading Journalists," in William C. Adams, ed., *Television Coverage of the Middle East* (Norwood, N.J.: Ablex, 1981), pp. 40-53.

[7] Paul Lewis, "Gloves Come Off in Struggle with UNESCO," *The New York Times*, May 24, 1981.

[8] Herbert Gans, *Deciding What's News* (New York: Pantheon, 1979), p. 37.

[9] For a more extensive discussion, see S. R. Lichter, "America and the Third World: A Survey of Media and Business Leaders," in William C. Adams, ed., *Television Coverage of International Affairs* (Norwood, N.J.: Ablex, 1982).

[10] Ronald Inglehart, *The Silent Revolution* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977).

[11] Barry Sussman, "Media Leaders Want Less Influence," *Washington Post*, September 29, 1976.

by Martin Plissner and Warren Mitofsky

POLITICAL ELITES

Few power centers in American politics have been so little studied as the national Committees of the two major parties. For much of their history, this neglect has been deserved. Until recently, little power has been centered in either.

In the past twenty years, however, and especially in the last ten, the Republican and Democratic National Committees have grown considerably in their ability to influence events. The Democratic party's increasingly complex rules for nominating its presidential candidates have given its national Committee significant leverage over state and local parties. The power to seat or not to seat convention delegates has become the power to influence how and when primaries and caucuses are held. The leverage of the Democratic National Committee (DNC) extends even to how and when local party officeholders are picked.

At the Republican National Committee (SNC), the checkbook, not the rule book, has paved the road to power. Adroit financial strategies have created a national headquarters and staff with a forty-million-dollar-a-year cash flow. Cash, expert consultants, and high technology flow daily from the national headquarters to state and local candidates and party organizations. Candidates at all levels look to the Committee for training programs and help in raising money. Pollsters, media consultants, and other campaign specialists look to the Committee for steady work, retainers, and referrals.

Three years ago, in an early effort to formulate policy at the Committee level, Republican National Chairman Bill Brock successfully advanced the Kemp-Roth tax cut as the party's major issue in the 1978 campaign. It is now law, only slightly altered, and the RNC can claim a major role in moving it forward.

For years, political scientists and others have studied the operations of the party system in Congress and the White House. Since the 1950s, there has been a steady stream of studies of the political elites found at national nominating conventions. In an effort to bring the same kind of attention to the increasingly activist national Committees, CBS News surveyed about 90 percent of the members of both Committees by telephone this spring. We interviewed 324 of the 369 DNC members and 159 of the 168 officers and members of the RNC. To obtain some measure of the degree to which these party leaders reflect the thinking of ordinary party members, we asked them a number of questions on public issues and general philosophy—the same questions asked in the most recent CBS News/*New York Times* poll of the general public.

The Democrats

On the Democratic National Committee, conservatives are genuine oddities. Among ordinary Democrats, they are almost a third. The largest share in both groups chose to be called moderates, but professed liberals are much more common among Committee members. Both groups, however, are less liberal than the delegates to the 1980 Democratic National Convention. Though that convention rejected the more liberal candidate, Edward Kennedy, the largest bloc of delegates called themselves liberal.

The disparities between rank-and-file Democrats and Committee members are especially striking when such issues as food stamps and increased military spend-

Table 1

	Rank-and-file Democrats	Democratic National Committee members	1980 Democratic National Convention delegates
Liberal	24%	36%	46%
Moderate	42	51	42
Conservative	29	4	6

ing are discussed with them. (See table 3.) The differences are even more pronounced on the overall Reagan tax and budget cuts. No issue provided so striking a contrast between rank-and-file Democrats and the national Committee members as did the question about a constitutional amendment to permit prayer in schools.

On a few issues, Committee members were closer to rank-and-file Democrats. These were all issues on which ordinary Democrats take what is generally considered the liberal position. The proportions favoring the liberal position were, however, considerably higher among Committee members. Both groups, for example, support the Equal Rights Amendment, but Committee members do so by a far wider margin.

The Republicans

On balance, Democratic National Committee members are more liberal than rank-and-file party members, but more conservative than recent convention delegates. In the Republican party, Committee members are more conservative than both the convention delegates and the rank-and-file Republicans.

Table 2

	Rank-and-file Republicans	Republican National Committee members	1980 Republican National Convention delegates
Liberal	11%	1%	2%
Moderate	33	31	36
Conservative	51	63	58

As might be expected, Republican National Committee members from the South are even more likely than the rest of the Committee to identify themselvs as conservative: 79 percent of the southern members think of themselves that way.

On specific issues, Republican National Committee members generally take the same conservative position as rank-and-file Republicans, but to a greater degree. (See table 3.)

National Committee members—whether Democrats or Republicans—are not known for their defiance of incumbent presidents of their own party. The current Republican National Committee is no exception. Ninety-nine percent approved of Reagan's budget cuts; 97 percent approved of his tax cuts. The latter figure contrasts strikingly with the CBS/*New York Times* preconvention poll of the party's national convention delegates, in which only 59 percent supported essentially the same tax proposal.

The all but unanimous Committee backing of Reagan's budget and tax plans was shared by the ordinary Republicans who had opinions about the measure when polled this spring. Nearly half of them, however, had not made up their minds at that time.

Deviations in the conservative consistency of both Committee and everyday Republican thinking appeared on the so-called "women's issues." A majority of both groups believe that if a woman wants to have an abortion and her doctor agrees to it, she should be allowed to have it. In this instance, they seem to be of similar mind with the delegates to last year's Republican convention. A majority of delegates polled by CBS and the *New York Times* opposed a constitutional amendment to prohibit abortion even though the convention, voting under a closed rule on a Reagan-backed platform, endorsed a plank supporting such an amendment.

Committee members, like last year's convention delegates, opposed the Equal Rights Amendment by about two-to-one. Rank-and-file Republicans, however, when polled by CBS News and the *New York Times*, were as likely to support the amendment as not.

Prayer in public schools evoked a sharp disparity between average Democrats and National Committee members. The same was true for the Republicans. In both parties, there was overwhelming rank-and-file support for a constitutional amendment permitting prayer in schools. Unlike their Democratic counterparts, Republican Committee members do not oppose the amendment outright. They do, however, support it by only a very narrow margin—compared to a huge margin (five-to-one) among Republicans in general.

The Committees and the Future of the Parties

The CBS News surveys were conducted at a time of particularly good feelings at the RNC, not quite the case at the DNC. Not only were the Democrats still getting adjusted to a Republican White House and Senate, but the Republican administration had just won the first of a series of coalition victories on its budget in the nominally Democratic House. Worst of all, perhaps, public opinion polls were showing something that had not accompanied previous periods of Democratic distress: the public's long-standing Democratic margin in partisan leanings had slipped seriously. CBS News asked members of both Committees for their explanation of this development. Republicans were twice as likely as Democrats to attribute the shift in party loyalties to a conservative trend in the country. Democrats were twice as likely as Republicans to attribute it to the popularity of Ronald Reagan.

Asked what could help the Democrats recover their lost support, Democratic organization leaders, not surprisingly, called for their own specialty: organization. Unlike Capitol Hill, where Democrats talk a good deal about new ideas and new directions, only one in ten of the Committee members thought recovery might depend on a change in the party's way of looking at things. As many called for greater stress on traditional Democratic issues. After organization, the most often-cited basis of hope for the party was—fingers crossed—Republican mistakes.

Republican Committee members were asked what

Republicans could do to promote further growth in popular support. The members were clearly in no mood to experiment. The most common answer was to stress the party's traditional positions. Communicating these positions more effectively came next. What was it most important *not* to do? The leading answer was not to change what Republicans were doing. Only a handful wanted to look for new issues. They like the ones they have.

Looking toward 1982, CBS News asked Committee

Table 3
Issue Profile

	REPUBLICANS		DEMOCRATS	
	RNC	RANK-AND-FILE	DNC	RANK-AND-FILE
GOVERNMENT SPENDING ON . . .				
MILITARY/DEFENSE				
INCREASE	89%	60%	22%	48%
DECREASE	1	5	18	13
KEEP SAME	7	31	51	36
FOOD STAMPS				
INCREASE	2	9	16	16
DECREASE	71	63	14	40
KEEP SAME	19	24	64	37
AID TO THE ARTS				
INCREASE	3	6	17	7
DECREASE	65	41	17	33
KEEP SAME	26	47	58	52
JOB PROGRAMS/CETA				
INCREASE	3	19	39	46
DECREASE	66	39	13	17
KEEP SAME	22	39	44	31
REAGAN'S TAX CUT				
APPROVE	97	44	17	26
DISAPPROVE	—	5	73	14
NOT SURE	3	51	10	60
REAGAN'S BUDGET				
APPROVE	99	48	10	23
DISAPPROVE	—	3	80	22
NOT SURE	1	49	10	55
PRAYER AMENDMENT				
FAVOR	46	81	19	79
OPPOSE	41	15	65	16
E.R.A.				
FAVOR	29	46	92	62
OPPOSE	58	44	4	29
TOO MUCH GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF BUSINESS				
AGREE	98	72	35	59
DISAGREE	1	22	49	30
ALLOW ABORTIONS WITH DOCTOR'S CONSENT				
SHOULD	52	55	80	64
SHOULD NOT	13	30	8	26
DEPENDS	23	11	8	7

members of both parties about a number of potential influences upon next year's congressional elections. Once again, the responses from the two Committees were quite different. Ninety-two percent of the Republicans expected Ronald Reagan's record to help Republicans running in their states. Only a third of the Democrats were concerned about Reagan hurting Democrats. They were much more worried about conservative political action committees (PACs) and the Moral Majority—three or four times as many as were concerned about Reagan's popularity.

Democrats lose sleep over right-wing PACs and preachers; Republicans are much more divided over whether these forces actually help them. Though three out of four of the Democrats worry about the PACs, only about half the Republicans think they help. And, while a majority of the Democrats worry about the Moral Majority hurting Democrats, only a fifth of the Republicans think this group helps *them*.

Party Favorites for 1982 and 1984

One asset which party officials normally value is the relative handful of leaders who enjoy national fame—whose appearance on behalf of local candidates can generate large turnouts of supporters and contributors, and attention from the local media. On the Democratic Committee, only two Democrats were named, unprompted, by more than a few members when they were asked who they would like to see campaigning in their state next year. They were Walter Mondale (29 percent) and Edward Kennedy (13 percent). Of the 324 Committee members interviewed, only one chose former President Carter. The member who did so represents the territory of Guam.

Republican Committee members were asked who, other than President Reagan, they would most like to have campaign in their states next year. Sixty percent chose Vice President Bush. Far behind, ranging from 9 to 4 percent, were Jack Kemp, Howard Baker, David Stockman, and Paul Laxalt.

Most Republican Committee members want and expect President Reagan to run for reelection. If he doesn't, by far the largest bloc on the Committee favors Bush (41 percent). Far behind (both under 10 percent) were Kemp and Laxalt.

On the Democratic side, Mondale with 20 percent, and Kennedy at 10 percent are again the first and second choices of those members of the Committee who had an opinion. Sixty percent did not. This group's preference for Mondale should be viewed in light of its members' 1980 allegiances. By a three-to-one margin, they supported Carter over Kennedy. The margin among delegates to last year's convention was three-to-two.

What the Parties Stand For

If the national Committee members, especially the Democrats, often seem at odds with the view of ordinary partisans, their responses were very similar (and greatly different from the other party's) when asked about the principal difference between the two parties. Nearly half of the Democratic Committee members said that the chief difference was that Democrats are concerned about the poor and the Republicans about the rich. The next largest response from Democratic Committee members was that their party, as opposed to the Republican, was for "the people."

Not surprisingly, Republican Committee members had an entirely different set of answers. Over half cited contrary attitudes toward the size and cost of government; the next largest bloc cited ideological differences (e.g. conservative versus liberal). In both cases, the responses of rank-and-file party members were remarkably close to those of the Committee professionals.

Speculations

Findings from this single survey are inconclusive on many points, but the CBS News study does invite the following speculations:

1. The processes, local and national, by which the DNC membership is chosen appear to filter out most of the many Democrats in the general population who regard themselves as conservatives.
2. A similar process appears to weed out the much smaller number of liberals in the Republican party. While the Democratic National Committee is consistently to the left of rank-and-file Democrats on the issues explored by CBS News, and the Republican National Committee generally to the right of rank-and-file Republicans, the differences on the Democratic side are much more pronounced.
3. Whether they are national Committee members or just ordinary partisans, Democrats and Republicans seem to have reached a consensus among themselves about what distinguishes the parties. Democrats see the parties primarily in terms of the class interests they serve. Republicans see themselves as representing different views of the role of government.
4. Neither Committee is aflame with bold new ideas or, for that matter, even a sense of needing them. The Republican Committee members were understandably content with their current leader and his programs, then at a very high level of personal popularity and legislative success. They attribute their 1980 victories largely to a conservative drift in the country, and are not inclined to alter their own course.
5. Democratic Committee members are less sure that any great upheaval has taken place in the minds of the people. They are inclined to blame Jimmy Carter for Democratic losses—and to credit Ronald Reagan for Republican gains rather than to recognize a victory of one set of principles over another. Many continue to think the traditional goals and values of the party are valid. "Better" for them means better leaders, better organization, and, best of all perhaps, Republican mistakes.

by Richard Cattani

POLITICAL SCIENCE ELITES

Why do so many students of politics and elections appear to be Democrats? Do political scientists respond to standard opinion survey questions like regular folk? Have they confidence in the very object of their study—the political system itself?

Curiosity about questions like these led us to develop a fifty-question survey of political scientists and to administer it at the annual convention of the American Political Science Association. It covered the presidency, national policies, political trends, and the respondents' own political and social attitudes. Half the questions were chosen from those regularly asked by various survey organizations, so that we could compare the political scientists with the general public.

The survey was not intended as a representative sampling of the 8,000-member American Political Science Association, or of political scientists generally. It was meant to be a timely appraisal—eight months into the Reagan administration and after its first initiatives were set in place—of the political scene from the vantage point of several hundred political scientists, who happen to be among the more active professionals.

The scholars we interviewed proved to be overwhelmingly Democratic and overwhelmingly liberal. By party, the political scientists in the *Monitor* survey were 61 percent Democratic, 10 percent Republican, 22 percent Independent, and 6 percent "other." (See figure 1.) They identified themselves as 35 percent very liberal, 39 percent liberal, 12 percent middle-of-the-road, and 15 percent conservative. (See figure 2.) The political profile closely resembles the 1975 and 1977 studies of the American professoriate by Everett C. Ladd and Seymour M. Lipset; the philosophical profile approximates the results from the 1969 Carnegie Commission study of American academics.

ABOUT THE *CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR*/ROPER POLL

The questionnaires were distributed to the 2,500 scholars who registered for the American Political Science Association annual convention in New York City, September 3-6, 1981. Over 520 scholars voluntarily completed the six-page questionnaire that weekend. The University of Connecticut's Roper Center, directed by Everett C. Ladd, helped with the design, processing, and analysis of the survey. The APSA and Thomas E. Mann, its executive director, aided in its distribution.

Presidents Past and Present

Of past presidents, Franklin Roosevelt provides the measure of greatness for political scientists. He was named by the political scholars as "best on domestic affairs" (54 percent); "best on foreign affairs" (28 percent); and "best overall" (69 percent). Among conservatives, Roosevelt was edged out by Eisenhower in the "best overall" category. But among Republicans and all other subgroups, FDR won. Carter was named by his Democratic-dominated critics as "least able to get things done" (64 percent). "Worst overall" was Richard Nixon (60 percent), with Carter trailing at 22 percent. Oddly, John F. Kennedy showed little following among the scholars, whereas among the general public JFK rates a close second to Roosevelt on domestic affairs and to Nixon, who ranks first on foreign affairs. (See Opinion Roundup, p. 33.)

Overall, the political experts approve Reagan more for his personal qualities than for his performance in office. Only 31 percent approve Reagan's "handling of his job as President," while 69 percent disapprove. At the same time, a 52 percent majority of the political scholars say they approve of him as a person. The general public has a more favorable impression of Reagan as a person—giving him an 80 percent approval mark—while 59 percent approve his presidential performance in the August Gallup poll. Female political scholars, like educated women generally, appear sharply more negative toward Reagan and his policies than do the male

Figure 1

Question: Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, Independent, or what?



Note: Among Independents, 22% thought of themselves as closer to the Republican party and 78% closer to the Democratic party.

Figure 2

Question: Now, thinking politically and socially, how would you describe your own general outlook—as being very conservative, moderately conservative, middle-of-the-road, moderately liberal, or very liberal?



Note: When asked how they would have considered themselves five years ago, 2% said very conservative, 8% moderately conservative, 11% middle-of-the-road, 37% moderately liberal, and 41% very liberal.

scholars.

The President's troika of top aides—Edwin Meese, James Baker, and Michael Deaver—win high grades (57 percent A and B), possibly sharing credit for the Reagan successes on Capitol Hill. But the grades for the President's Cabinet trail downward.

Table 1
Grading the Cabinet

	A	B	C	D	F
Secretary of State Haig	5%	21%	23%	25%	27%
U.N. Ambassador Kirkpatrick	11	18	20	19	31
Treasury Secretary Regan	13	23	35	16	13
OMB Director Stockman	21	22	15	16	25
Interior Secretary Watt	2	5	9	12	71
Defense Secretary Weinberger	10	23	24	19	23
Education Secretary Bell	5	14	29	26	26

Question: How would you grade these individuals appointed by Reagan to cabinet level posts?

Of the Cabinet members, Jim Watt flunked out. Even 18 percent of Republican political scholars gave Watt a failing grade. Women political scientists were more severe on Jeane Kirkpatrick than were their male colleagues. Forty-one percent gave the highest ranking woman in the administration a failing grade.

The scholars, despite their own liberal Democratic disposition, give the current President high marks for the way he's handled himself in Washington, particularly for his mastery of Congress. Nevertheless, the political scientists either do not like the President's policies, or they think Reagan's programs will fail to meet his own objectives. Only 8 percent of the political scholars say they think Reagan will become "one of the best" presidents; 26 percent think he will be "better than most," 30 percent "not as good as most," and 36 percent "definitely worse than most" presidents.

Asked to "grade" Reagan on a variety of roles, three-fifths of the scholars gave him an "A" for his relations with Congress, and another 28 percent a "B." This was by far his highest mark.

Table 2
Grading Reagan

	A	B	C	D	F
Relations with Congress	61%	28%	6%	2%	3%
His economic program	11	18	12	17	41
Foreign affairs	5	12	21	22	41
Social issues	5	9	12	18	56
His overall performance	9	20	19	25	27

Question: How would you grade Reagan's performance thus far? (With A the highest mark and F the lowest.)

The scholars were a little more worried than the general public about their own or their family's financial position for the next year, but they divided evenly between "better" (26 percent) and "worse" (29 percent) expectations. The largest proportions of both scholars and the public, though (45 and 55 percent, respectively), expect to maintain a financial status quo. Political scientists are not optimistic at all about Reagan's handling of the economy. Only 16 percent think the economy will improve in the next year, and three times that many think it will get worse.

In the domestic arena, the scholars tend to see Reagan's budget and tax cuts, and social security and energy plans as the least "harmful" and most effective of his programs. They rate his economic program negatively. Sixty-five percent of the scholars think Reagan's budget cuts will prove harmful, 35 percent helpful. By two-to-one his tax cuts also were called harmful. In noneconomic areas, the evaluations were even more negative: 89 percent harmful on the environment, 87 percent harmful on abortion and women's rights, and 84 percent harmful on race relations.

Reagan's prospects for balancing the budget by 1984 were dismissed by 88 percent of the scholars. Even a majority of conservatives (64 percent) and Republicans (52 percent) think Reagan will fail to balance the budget. However, the scholars look more favorably on the goal of a balanced budget than might have been expected, with 43 percent believing that the President *should* balance the budget in the next four years and 57 percent rejecting the goal.

On handling national defense, the scholars disapproved of Reagan's performance by 72 percent to 28 percent. The general public, by contrast, approved of Reagan's defense performance by 57 percent to 26 percent in the Gallup poll at the end of June. Asked if they thought the Reagan administration can meet its goals of a military buildup and a balanced federal budget by 1984, 88 percent of the scholars said no. On his handling of foreign policy, the political scholars again disapproved by three-to-one. The public, in a late June CBS/*New York Times* survey, gave Reagan an almost two-to-one vote of approval on the same question.

Despite some unflattering grades, President Reagan is thought likely to bring about a strengthening of the institution of the presidency in the next few years. Departing from their own recent laments over the weakening of the presidency, the political scientists decisively (60 percent) think the presidency will get stronger during the Reagan years, while a minority (30 percent) think it will stay the same, and very few (10 percent) say it will weaken. Conversely, Congress will get weaker under Reagan, the scholars say.

Realignment

The political scholars clearly do not believe the Republicans have managed the kind of realignment that Roosevelt presided over during the 1930s. By more than two-to-one (69 percent to 31 percent) they disagree with the assertion that a fundamental realignment is under way.

They back up their view with predictions of who will win control of the U.S. House of Representatives in 1982 and in 1984. Seventy percent of the scholars pick the Democrats to win again in 1982 and 65 percent pick the Democrats in 1984.

By a resounding 85 percent to 15 percent, the political scholars think the dominant political trend is toward dealignment—toward weakened party attachments and greater independence among voters. The view is shared across party lines in this scholarly community.

The political scientists do see evidence of a conservative tide. Sixty-nine percent of the APSA scholars agree that a "conservative tide is occurring in America," and 31 percent disagree. Republicans (86 percent), Democrats (66 percent), and Independents (69 percent), all concur with this view. However, by the same proportions, the scholars see it as a short-range trend. Only 32 percent think the tide will run for a "lengthy" period.

A reading of the political scientists' views shows them to discriminate at times on professional questions, going against what might be considered their preference by party or ideology. In their basic attitudes toward the American system, they appear more to fit in the moderate establishment mainstream than to be tugging in a liberal direction.

The Public and the Profs

The survey showed little disaffection from the system or foreboding for the nation among the political scholars. In general, they shared the public's confidence in things American. Two-to-one majorities of the scholars and the public called the American political system sound—with 13 percent of the scholars calling it "basically sound but needs some improvements." And majorities of scholars and the general public (56 percent for both) think Americans have not seen the best of times.

Elites such as scholars frequently see questions in different terms from the general public. Because they have more technical information in many cases, they often come away with a different sense of what the question asks. But it is still interesting to see where the two groups meet and part.

The political scientists and the public are at opposite ends of the scale on a constitutional amendment to permit prayers in school: the experts are nine-to-one against it, the public five-to-one in favor.

The political scientists (51 percent) are a little more likely than the public (44 percent) to think the quality of life of blacks in the United States has gotten better over the past ten years.

On the equal rights amendment, which would prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex, the scholars (83 percent) favor the constitutional change more emphatically than the public (63 percent).

The scholars and public both favor legal abortion by at least nine-to-one when the woman's health is endangered. But the public splits evenly on abortion if the woman is married and wants no more children, or if she is not married and does not want to marry the man. The political scientists, by more than four-to-one majorities, like similarly educated Americans generally, would still favor the woman's ability to get a legal abortion under those conditions.

On institutional reforms, both the public and scholars reject a single, six-year term for president—the scholars by three-to-one, the public by two-to-one. The scholars (71 percent) again oppose a two-term, twelve-year limit for Senate officeholders, while the public by two-to-one approves the change. Both political scientists and the public favor a change from the electoral college to direct popular vote, with the political scientists slightly less certain (56 percent to 67 percent for the public).

All in all, the American political scientists in the *Monitor* poll are at once liberal and Democratic in their policy commitments, and conservative in their attachments to the system. In all of these stands they closely resemble a larger community of which they are a part—intellectuals and commentators whose fields cover American society and politics.

Portions of this article appeared in the *Christian Science Monitor* in a slightly different form.

1/27/82 R 2110-1

$3.50

Public Opinion

Published by
American
Enterprise
Institute

Dec/Jan 1982

ACQUISITIONS EDITOR
STATISTICAL REFERENCE INDEX
CONGRESSIONAL INFORMATION SERVICE 1
4520 EAST-WEST HIGHWAY 20014 1
WASHINGTON, DC


ublic
pinion
HIS THE END OF AN ERA?
$3.50
Public
Opinion
POLITICAL
VOLCANO

ONE YEAR LATER, WHERE ARE WE?

POLITICS: Ben J. Wattenberg on the New Moment; Richard Cheney, Stuart Eizenstat, James Q. Wilson on Presidential Prospects; Wayne Shannon on Reagan and the Doctrine of American Exceptionalism

PRESS: David Gergen and Jody Powell

POLLS: Andrew Kohut Alvin Richman

ECONOMY: Rudolph G. Penner

Public
pinion

Volume 4, Number 6 December/January 1982

blisher
lliam J. Baroody, Jr.

-Editors
ymour Martin Lipset
n J. Wattenberg

maging Editor
rlyn H. Keene

sociate Editor
ctoria A. Sackett

sistant Editor
cola L. Furlan

search Assistant
ary Bruun

litorial Consultant
unter C. Harrison, Jr.

litorial Board
avid R. Gergen, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick,
ving Kristol, Everett Carll Ladd,
oward Penniman, Austin Ranney,
chard M. Scammon, Laurence H.
lberman, Herbert Stein, and
chard J. Whalen

nsulting Editor for Opinion Roundup
verett Carll Ladd

litorial Associate
arilyn M. Potter

t & Design Director
t Taylor

art Illustrator
irdur Karlsson

aff Editor
izabeth D. Ashooh

BLIC OPINION, December/January 1982, Vol. No. 6. Published bimonthly by the American terprise Institute for Public Policy Research. pyright 1982 American Enterprise Institute. Subiption rates: $18.00 for one year, $34.00 for two rs. Individual copy: $3.50. Information on bulk lers or multiple subscriptions available on reest. Editorial and business offices: c/o AEI, 1150 h Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. Send nges of address and all subscription correspondce to Circulation Department, c/o AEI, same dress. "American Enterprise Institute" and are registered service marks of the nerican Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Rerch.

ond class postage paid at Washington, D.C.

N 0149-9157

CONTENTS

2 THE NEW MOMENT
by Ben J. Wattenberg
New moments in politics occur not when our two political parties are slugging it out, but when they are agreeing. The author argues that Reagan, far from dismantling the Great Society, has ratified it.

7 HOW MUCH CAN ANY ADMINISTRATION DO?
Excerpts from an AEI Public Policy Forum with Richard Cheney, Stuart Eizenstat, David Gergen and James Q. Wilson
Three White House veterans and a student of the presidency argue that a chief executive can move the government in a new direction, but faces enormous obstacles along the way.

10 MEETING THE PRESS
A conversation with David Gergen and Jody Powell
Can any president survive the media's exposure? Dave Gergen, assistant to President Reagan for communications, and Jody Powell, his counterpart in the Carter years, grade Reagan's handling of the press and the media's coverage of him.

13 MR. REAGAN GOES TO WASHINGTON: TEACHING EXCEPTIONAL AMERICA
by W. Wayne Shannon
Ronald Reagan, more than any recent president, believes in and espouses the doctrine of American exceptionalism. The author argues that the rhetoric of uniqueness cannot solve our structural problems.

18 SUSTAINING THE NEW ECONOMIC STRATEGY
by Rudolph G. Penner
Most budget analysts, including the author, thought Congress would not change its spending patterns in 1981. They—and he—were partly wrong. Though problems lie ahead for Reagan's economic program, one can safely bet that the Democrats won't significantly change its course.

21 OPINION ROUNDUP

41 PUBLIC ATTITUDES ON DOMESTIC ISSUES, 1981
by Andrew Kohut
It may be a new moment in Washington, but nothing momentous shows up in this year's polls. The year began and ended with questions: Is the public more conservative? Will economic confidence be restored?

44 PUBLIC ATTITUDES ON MILITARY POWER, 1981
by Alvin Richman
Americans are dissatisfied with the state of our defenses. At year's end, we have an assertive, but not bellicose public.

47 SNAPSHOTS
by Karlyn Keene

48 PRIVATE OPINION
Does Reagan Have a Problem with Women?
The editors examine data on women's attitudes toward Reagan and his predecessors. Is he, or were they all, unpopular with the opposite sex?

50 WHAT'S AHEAD FOR BRITAIN'S NEW PARTY?
by Robert Worcester and Peter Hutton
Britain's new party, the Social Democrats, has won three recent by-elections. Does this auspicious start herald a new moment in British politics?

THE GROSS NATIONAL SPIRIT INDEX



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization, November 14-21, 1981.

In the June/July issue of *Public Opinion* we introduced the Gross National Spirit Index. Respondents' answers to six questions were combined to provide a measure of how Americans thought we as a nation were doing. At the time, we recognized that the Index—pieced together as it had to be from questions asked on a number of different surveys—was not a perfect product. We developed a new Index with questions which could be asked on a single survey, at the same time. To date, the new questions have been asked in one national survey (the Roper Organization in November) and in two state surveys (the Connecticut poll in June and August). The new GNS Index combines the results of these six questions: (1) In general, how satisfied are you with the way things are going in the United States today? Are you very satisfied, more or less satisfied, or not satisfied at all? (2) Over the next year or so, do you think things will go better for the United States, go worse, or stay about the same? (3) Over the next year or so, do you think the United States economy will get better, get worse, or stay about the same? (4) Do you approve or disapprove of the way Ronald Reagan is handling his job as President? (5) How satisfied are you with the way things are going for you personally? Are you very satisfied, more or less satisfied, or not at all satisfied? (6) How satisfied are you with your family's financial situation? Are you very satisfied, more or less satisfied, or not at all satisfied? The results are printed on page 35. For a complete description of the old Index, see *Public Opinion*, June/July 1981, pages 21-23 and *Public Opinion*, August/September 1981, pages 57-60.



Note: GNS Index using old questions.

See page 35 for GNS data.

RONALD REAGAN'S

Comparing Carter and Reagan

Question: Do you approve or disapprove of the way (name of President) is handling his job as President?



GALLUP

1977	Carter Approve	Carter Disapprove	Carter No opinion
Feb 4-7	66%	8%	26%
Feb 18-21	71	9	20
Mar 4-7	70	9	21
Mar 18-21	75	9	16
Mar 25-28	72	10	18
Apr 1-4	67	14	19
Apr 15-18	63	18	19
Apr 29-May 1	63	18	19
May 6-9	66	19	15
May 20-23	64	19	17
June 3-6	63	19	18
June 17-20	63	18	19
July 8-11	62	22	16
July 22-25	67	17	16
Aug 5-8	60	23	17
Aug 19-22	56	26	18
Sept 9-12	54	29	17
Sept 30-Oct 3	59	24	17
Oct 14-17	55	29	16
Oct 21-24	54	30	16
Oct 28-31	51	31	18
Nov 4-7	55	30	15
Nov 18-21	56	30	14
Dec 9-12	57	27	16

1981	Reagan Approve	Reagan Disapprove	Reagan No opinion
Jan 30-Feb 2	51	13	36
Feb 13-16	55	18	27
Mar 13-16	60	24	16
Apr 3-6	67	18	15
Apr 10-13	67	19	14
May 8-11	68	21	11
June 5-8	59	28	13
June 19-22	59	29	12
June 26-29	58	30	12
July 17-20	60	29	11
July 24-27	56	30	14
July 31-Aug 3	60	28	12
Aug 14-17	60	29	11
Sept 18-21	52	37	11
Oct 2-4	56	35	9
Oct 30-Nov 2	53	35	12
Nov 13-16	49	40	11
Nov 20-23	54	37	9

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of November 20-23, 1981.

EARLY MARKS

KEY EVENTS—CARTER

Jan. 31—Economic Recovery Act to Congress
Feb. 2—First TV address/fireside chat
Feb. 8—First press conference
Feb. 23—Second press conference
March 9—Third press conference
March 17—United Nations address
March 23—Announces water project decisions
March 24—Fourth press conference
March 25—Vance offers arms control package to Soviets
April 14—Drops $50 rebate proposal
April 15—Fifth press conference—announces anti-inflation program
April 18—Address to nation on energy problem
April 22—Sixth press conference
May 7—International Economic Summit
May 12—Seventh press conference
May 22—Notre Dame foreign policy speech
May 26—Eighth press conference
June 13—Ninth press conference
June 30—Tenth press conference—announces B-1 decision
July 12—Eleventh press conference
July 28—Twelfth press conference
Aug. 4—Signs legislation creating Department of Energy
Aug. 6—Thirteenth press conference
Aug. 23—Fourteenth press conference
Sept. 7—Signed Panama Canal treaties
Sept. 21—Fifteenth press conference—Lance resignation announced
Sept. 29—Sixteenth press conference—urges congressional action on energy bill
Oct. 4—United Nations address
Oct. 13—Seventeenth press conference
Oct. 27—Eighteenth press conference
Nov. 8—Addresses nation on energy legislation
Nov. 10—Nineteenth press conference
Nov. 15—Shah's visit
Nov. 30—Twentieth press conference

KEY EVENTS—REAGAN

Jan. 29—First press conference—announces elimination of Council on Wage Price Stability, freeze on government regulations
Feb. 5—Addresses nation on economy
Feb. 18—Addresses joint session on program for economic recovery
March 2—Announces El Salvador military assistance/advisers
March 6—Second press conference—announces federal hiring ceilings
March 11—Addresses Canadian parliament
March 30—Assassination attempt
April 11—Left GW hospital
April 28—First public address since shooting—addresses joint session of Congress
May 7—FY 1982 budget passage—House
May 12 " Senate
May 17—Notre Dame address
May 21—Compromise budget passed
June 5—Lefevre nomination rejected by committee—Reagan accepts withdrawal
June 16—Third press conference
June 29—Addresses NAACP
July 7—Nominates Sandra Day O'Connor to be Associate Justice Supreme Court
July 20—Ottawa Economic Conference
July 27—Addresses nation on tax/economic program
July 29—Congress acts on tax bill
Aug. 3—Announces firing of air traffic controllers
Aug. 12—Signs Economic Recovery Act and Omnibus Budget Reconciliation legislation
Aug. 19—U.S. pilots shoot down Libyan planes
Sept. 24—Addresses nation
Oct. 1—Fourth Press Conference/AWACS/budget
Oct. 28—AWACS sale approved
Nov. 12—Stockman news conference on *Atlantic* article/resignation submitted, refused
Nov. 23—Reagan vetoes Continuing Budget Resolution

Reagan: A Likable Guy

Question: Now I'm going to read you the names of some people in the news. As I read each one, tell me whether or not you have heard enough about that person to form an opinion and, if you have, then I want just your general impression. What is your impression of President Ronald Reagan: As of today, is it very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable—or haven't you heard enough about him yet to say?



Note: [illegible]
Source: [illegible]

Question: Apart from whether you approve or disapprove of the way Reagan is handling his job as president, what do you think of Reagan as a person. Would you say you approve or disapprove of him.



Note: [illegible]
Source: [illegible]

Question: Now I'd like you to describe the way you feel toward a few public figures using a scale of zero to ten, with zero representing your most unfavorable feelings, ten your most favorable feelings and one through nine standing for in-between feelings. If you feel you just don't know enough about a person to give a rating, please say so. First: Edward Kennedy. On a scale from zero to ten, how would you describe your feelings towards him? (Record below) And how would you describe your feelings towards Richard Nixon, on a scale from zero to ten? (Record below. Then ask for all listed names.)



Note: [illegible]
Source: Survey by ABC News/Washington Post, April 20-22, 1981.

In Charge of The Office

Question: Comparing Ronald Reagan to past presidents, do you think Reagan has accomplished more in his first few months in office than past presidents, accomplished less, or has he done about the same as other presidents?



Note: [illegible] said [illegible] accomplished more [illegible] in the first few months in office than past presidents. [illegible] and 45% said about the same.
Source: Survey by NBC News/Associated Press Poll, September 28-29, 1981.

AT HOME

Question: Now let me ask you some specific things (President Carter/President Reagan) has done. How would you rate (President Carter/him) on (read list) his inspiring confidence in the White House—excellent, pretty good, only fair, or poor?



1977	Carter Excellent/ pretty good	Only fair/ poor	Not sure
March	75%	15%	10%
May	62	31	7
July	65	30	5
September	50	41	9
October	46	49	5
November	51	44	5
December	55	39	6

1981	Reagan Excellent/ pretty good	Only fair/ poor	Not sure
January	77%	17%	6%
February	72	23	5
March/April	66	31	3
April	75	20	5
June	68	30	2
July	64	32	4
August	62	34	4
September	58	39	3
October/November	57	41	2
December	48	49	3

Source: Surveys by ABC News/[illegible] and Associates, and by Louis Harris and Associates, latest that of December [illegible], 1981.

WITH CONGRESS

Question: Now let me ask you some specific things (President Carter/President Reagan) has done. How would you rate (President Carter/him) on (read list) his handling relations with Congress—excellent, pretty good, only fair, or poor?



1977	Carter Excellent/ pretty good	Only fair/ poor	Not sure
March	65%	19%	16%
June	51	38	11
August	46	44	10
September	41	48	11
October	38	53	9
November	37	55	8
December	38	55	7

1981	Reagan Excellent/ pretty good	Only fair/ poor	Not sure
March/April	60%	33%	7%
April	73	22	5
June	66	31	3
July	67	29	4
August	67	28	5
September	62	36	2
October/November	65	32	3
December	55	42	3

Source: Surveys by ABC News/[illegible] and Associates, and by Louis Harris and Associates, latest that of December [illegible], 1981.

ABROAD

Question: And how would you rate him (Reagan) on his ability to gain respect for the United States among other important nations?



Note: [illegible]

Source: [illegible]

Question: Do you think Ronald Reagan has been too tough in dealing with the Soviet Union, not tough enough, or do you think he has set the right tone in his dealings with the Soviet government?



Source: [illegible]

THE BOTTOM LINE

Question: Do you think that Ronald Reagan has good judgment under pressure?



Note: [illegible]

Source: Survey by CBS News/New York Times, April 22-26, 1981.

Question: I am going to read you some things President Reagan has done or been identified with. Regardless of your overall opinion about Reagan, for each one would you tell me if you approve of President Reagan's position, don't approve of it, or have no opinion? First, do you generally approve or generally disapprove of (item)? . . . his degree of frankness and openness in dealing with the American people?



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 81-9), September 19-26, 1981.

Question: Suppose the 1980 election were being held over again today. Which candidate would you vote for: Ronald Reagan the Republican, Jimmy Carter the Democrat, or John Anderson the Independent?



Note: [illegible] ABC News/Washington Post [illegible] said they would vote for Reagan, [illegible] for Carter and [illegible] for Anderson.

Source: Survey by ABC News/Washington Post, October 14-18, 1981.

The Public Reacts to the Reagan Legislative Agenda

Question: Do you trust Ronald Reagan to make the right kind of decisions about . . . the federal budget . . . social security . . . military defense?



Source: Survey by CBS News/New York Times, September 22-27, 1981.

Question: Do you think federal spending on domestic programs for next year has been cut too much, has been cut by about the right amount, or should there be still more cuts?



Note: The persons were interviewed before [illegible] his speech on September 24. Responses above include persons interviewed before and after the speech.
Source: Survey by CBS News/New York Times, September 22-27, 1981.

Question: As you may know, the Reagan plan to reduce taxes and cut back or eliminate government social programs went into effect October 1. Do you think these Reagan tax and spending cuts will tend to help the nation's economy, hurt the nation's economy, or what?



Source: Survey by ABC News/Washington Post, November [illegible], 1981.

Question: President Reagan wants to balance the federal budget by 1984, but says he has to cut 75 billion dollars more in order to make the budget balance. If the only way to have a chance to balance the federal budget by 1984 were to make sharp cuts in (Read each item) would you favor such cuts or would you favor not balancing the federal budget?



Source: [illegible]

Question: Do you approve or disapprove of the way Ronald Reagan is handling U.S. relations with the Soviet Union?

Note: [illegible]

Source: [illegible]

Question: Specifically, do you think President Reagan should try to spend more money for national defense than he now plans, or should he try to spend less money than he now plans, or do you think President Reagan should try to spend about as much as he now plans for national defense?



Source: [illegible]

Question: Reagan has proposed a 12 percent cut in spending in addition to the one that took effect on October 1. What is your best guess—if spending is reduced by an additional 12 percent, will that mainly reduce waste in domestic programs, or will that mainly damage programs the country needs?

If spending reduced by an additional 12 percent...



Note: [illegible]

Source: [illegible]



Question: If these were the only things that could be cut enough to balance the budget, which would you prefer ... taking the money out of military and defense programs or giving up the tax cut Congress just voted for?



Note: [illegible]

Source: [illegible]

Perceptions of Fairness: Public Gives Reagan Low Marks

Question: Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: "Ronald Reagan has shown he really cares about people like me."



1981	Agree	Disagree
Feb	70%	30%
July	61	39
Sept	56	44
Oct	51	49

Source: [illegible]

Question: Do you feel that President Reagan's economic policies such as his budget and tax cuts will be fair and equitable for (Read each item), will be unfair and cause hardship on them or will go too easy on them?

Reagan economic policies such as budget and tax cuts will be...



Source: [illegible] and Associates, August [illegible] 1981.

Question: Overall, would you say Reagan cares more about serving poor and lower income people, middle income people, upper income people . . . or would you say he cares equally about serving all people?



Source: [illegible] November 17-22, 1981.

REAGAN AND HIS

Question: Do you approve or disapprove of the way (name of President) is handling his job as President?



APPROVAL

	Truman (4/45)	Eisenhower (1/53)	Kennedy (1/61)	Johnson (11/63)	Nixon (1/69)	Ford (8/74)	Carter (1/77)	Reagan (1/81)
Month took office		—		—	59%	71%	—	51%
After 1st month	—	68%	—	79%	61	67	71%	55
After 2nd month	—	59	73%	80	63	55	72	60
After 3rd month	87%	74	83	75	61	48	63	67
After 4th month		74	76	73	65	42	64	68
After 5th month	—	—	74	77	63	39	63	58
After 6th month	—	71	71	75	65	39	67	60
After 7th month	75	—	73	74	62	37	66	60
After 8th month	—	75	75	—	58	39	59	52
After 9th month	—	68	79	—	56	51	51	56
After 10th month	63	—	77	—	64	52	55	54
After 11th month	—	60	78	—	59	—	57	
After 12th month	50	68	77	69	61	46	52	

Note: In months in which [illegible] figures are presented.
Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of November 20-23, 1981.

PREDECESSORS



Will Reaganomics Work?

Question: A year from now, as a result of President Reagan's economic program, do you feel (Read each item) or not?



	Will	Will not	Not sure
[illegible]			
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	10%
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	10
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	11
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	10
[illegible]	27	[illegible]	11
[illegible]			
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	10
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	7
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	7
[illegible]			
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	6
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	8
[illegible]	[illegible]	52	7
[illegible]			
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	6
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	9
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

Source: [illegible]

Much Skepticism Exists

Question: Do you believe it is possible, or not, for the government to cut income taxes, increase military spending and balance the federal budget at the same time?

Source: [illegible]



Question: Do you think Ronald Reagan will, or will not, be able to keep prices from going up as fast as they have been recently?

Note: [illegible]

Source: Survey by CBS News/New York Times, September 22-27, 1981.



Question: Reagan said his proposals are aimed at balancing the federal budget by 1984. How would you rate the chances of Reagan balancing the budget by 1984—would you say Reagan has an excellent chance of balancing the budget, a good chance, a not so good chance or not much of a chance at all?

Note: [illegible]
Source: [illegible]



Will the Democrats Gain?

Question: If the elections for Congress were being held today, which party would you like to see win in this congressional district, the Democratic party or the Republican party? (Those who said they were undecided or voted for a different party were asked this question: As of today do you lean more to the Democratic party or to the Republican party?)



Registered Voters

	Republican	Democratic
1953	53%	47%
1957	47	53
1961	42	58
1965	38	62
1969	44	56
1973	46	54
1977	39	61
February/March 1980	42	58
[illegible]	42	58
Early August	42	58
Mid-August	38	62
June 1981	48	52
September 1981	43	57

Source: Survey by [illegible], September 19-24, 1981.

Question: Now, if you had to choose, which do you feel would do a better job on (Read each item)—a Republican- or Democratic-controlled Congress?

Would do a better job



Note: In 1978, a 53-32% plurality thought a Democratic-controlled Congress would do a better job keeping inflation under control.

Note: In 1978, 36% said a Republican Congress would do a better job cutting federal spending; [illegible] said a Democratic-controlled Congress would.

Source: Survey by Louis Harris and Associates, September 19-24, 1981.

The New GNS Data

GNS Methodology

Respondents' answers to six questions were combined to create the GNS Index. Each item was weighted equally so that a change in any individual item would produce the same change in the overall Index. If every respondent gave the most confident and approving answer to all six questions, the GNS Index would stand at 2400; if every respondent gave the least confident and least approving answer, the Index would have a value of 0.

Five of the questions we used had answers that fell very neatly into the categories "very positive," "less positive," and "negative or not at all positive." The presidential popularity question had only two categories which we treated as very positive and not at all positive.

For each question we assigned the most positive answer four points, the less positive answer (if there was one) two points, and the negative or not at all positive answer zero points. For question one, 7% said they were "very satisfied" (7 x 4 = 28), 47% said they were "more or less satisfied" (47 x 2 = 94) and 46% said they were "not satisfied at all" (46 x 0 = 0). Question one has a value of 123 in the Index.

Each individual item contributes between zero and 400 points for a total that ranges from zero to 2400 points.

Questions:

1. In general, how satisfied are you with the way things are going in the United States today? Are you very satisfied, more or less satisfied, or not satisfied at all?	**Very satisfied** **7%**	**More or less satisfied** **47%**	**Not at all satisfied** **46%**
2. Over the next year or so, do you think things will go better for the United States, go worse, or stay about the same?	**Things will go better for U.S.** **28%**	**Stay about the same** **29%**	**Go worse** **43%**
3. Over the next year or so, do you think the United States economy will get better, get worse, or stay about the same?	**Economy will get better** **28%**	**Stay about the same** **25%**	**Get worse** **46%**
4. Do you approve or disapprove of the way Ronald Reagan is handling his job as President?	**Approve of way Reagan handling job** **55%**	**Disapprove** **45%**	
5. How satisfied are you with the way things are going for you personally? Are you very satisfied, more or less satisfied, or not at all satisfied?	**Very satisfied** **32%**	**More or less satisfied** **49%**	**Not at all satisfied** **18%**
6. How satisfied are you with your family's financial situation? Are you very satisfied, more or less satisfied, or not at all satisfied?	**Very satisfied** **24%**	**More or less satisfied** **47%**	**Not at all satisfied** **30%**

	+4	**+2**	**0**	
1.	28	94	0	
2.	112	58	0	
3.	112	50	0	**=1090**
4.	220	—	0	
5.	128	98	0	
6.	96	94	0	

NOTE ON OPINION ROUNDUP

Most of the responses shown in these surveys were gathered either by personal interviews (Harris and Gallup polls) or by telephone (CBS/*New York Times* and the NBC/Associated Press polls). Unless otherwise noted, the samples usually consist of approximately 1,500 voting age men and women chosen to constitute a representative sample of the entire U.S. population. In the typical sample of 1,500 respondents, there is a 95 percent chance or better that the margin of error will not exceed ±3 percent variation from the distribution which would appear if the nation's entire population were questioned. The possibilities for error are larger when numbers are displayed for subcategories of each sample.

The reader may note that in some cases a "no opinion" column is shown while in others it is not. This reflects a common practice in the publication of polls: when the "no opinion" or "undecided" responses are relatively small, on the order of 10 percent or less, one reports only the answers of those who have a definite opinion. However, when "no opinion" answers are a high proportion of the sample, they *are* reported because they reveal a substantial degree of unawareness or uncertainty within the populace on the issues in question.

A QUALIFIED "YES" TO NEW FEDERALISM

Question: Which theory of government do you favor—concentration of power in the federal government or concentration of power in the state government?

Prefer concentration of power in...



Note: [illegible]
Source: [illegible]

Question: Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: "The federal government has the responsibility to provide certain kinds of services—such as medical care and legal advice—to those who cannot afford to pay for them."



Source: [illegible]

Question: Let me read you some statements some people have made about the way different levels of government should operate in this country. For each, tell me if you tend to agree or disagree? ... The best government is the government that governs least.



Note: [illegible]
Source: [illegible]

Question: Which do you think is more likely to administer social programs efficiently—the federal government in Washington or the government of this state?



Question: Which do you think is more understanding of the real needs of the people of this community—the federal government in Washington or the government of this state?



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, September 18-21, 1981.

AMERICANS HIGH ON SPACE

EXPLORING SPENDING PRIORITIES

Question: Do you think the United States is spending too much money on the space program, not enough money, or about the right amount?



Note: [illegible] the National [illegible] 1973 [illegible]

Source: Survey by NBC News/Associated Press, August 10-11, 1981.

Question: There are a number of things that have changed rather drastically over the past twenty years. Here is a list of some of them. (Card shown respondent) Would you read down that list and for each one tell me whether you'd like to see continued advances and developments on it in the future, or whether you think we've gone as far as we should on it now, or whether you think we've already gone too far on it now? First, exploration of space.



Note: In August of 1972, 44% would [illegible] continued advances in space exploration.

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization, Roper Report 81-8, August 15-22, 1981.

STAR WARS

Question: Should the emphasis of the U.S. space program be primarily on national defense or on scientific exploration?



Note: [illegible]

Source: Survey by NBC News/Associated Press, October 25-26, 1981.

Question: If you had a chance in your lifetime to travel in outer space, would you do so or not?



Note: In a spring 1981 poll of Connecticut residents by the Institute for Social Inquiry of the University of Connecticut, 42% said they would like to go into space, 54% would not. In early summer, some Minnesotans were asked by Minnesota Poll surveys conducted for the Minneapolis Tribune if they would like to fly on the space shuttle: 41% said they would and 58% said they would not. In both state polls, over one-half of the men said they'd like to travel into space and two-thirds of the women said they would not like to.

Source: Survey by NBC News/Associated Press, August 10-11, 1981.

Question: Do you think people from earth will eventually colonize the moon or other planets, or don't you think so?



Source: Survey by NBC News/Associated Press, October 25-26, 1981.

REALIGNMENT PROSPECTS

GALLUP

Question: In politics as of today, do you consider yourself a Republican, a Democrat, or an Independent?



Note: [illegible]
Source: [illegible]

1980	Democrat	Republican	Independent
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	34
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	32
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

1981	Democrat	Republican	Independent
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

ROPER

Question: Regardless of how you may have voted in the past, what do you usually consider yourself—a Democrat, a Republican, some other party, or what?



Note: For comparison purposes, "other (specify party)" calculated out. Independent includes "Independent" [illegible] and "No particular party" [illegible]
Source: Surveys by the Roper Organization (Roper Report).

1980	Democrat	Republican	Independent
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

1981	Democrat	Republican	Independent
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

ARE THEY FADING?

CBS/NEW YORK TIMES

Question: Generally speaking, do you usually consider yourself a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?



1980	Democrat	Republican	Independent
January	41%	24%	35%
February	44	25	31
March	41	26	33
April	43	24	33
June	44	23	33
August	43	24	33
September	46	23	31
November	46	24	30
1981			
January	39	27	34
April	36	28	36
June	39	28	33
September	38	26	36

Note: "Other" excluded [illegible]

Source: Surveys by CBS News/New York Times, latest that of September [illegible] 1981.

CONNECTICUT POLL

Question: Generally speaking, do you consider yourself a Democrat, a Republican or an Independent or what?



Connecticut Residents

1980	Democrat	Republican	Independent
June	34%	22%	44%
July	30	22	48
September	29	19	52
October	35	19	45
November	35	18	47
1981			
January	29	23	48
March	35	23	41
April	29	23	48
June	32	25	44
September	29	26	45
November	31	23	46

Note: "Other" excluded for comparison purposes.

Source: Survey by the Institute for Social Inquiry, University of Connecticut, latest that of November [illegible], 1981.

TIME/YANKELOVICH

Question: Are you a Democrat, Republican or what?



Registered Voters

1980	Democrat	Republican	Independent
January	49%	26%	25%
March 19-20	51	30	20
March 29-30	49	28	23
May	53	26	21
August	53	27	20
October	52	28	20
1981			
January	53	31	16
May	53	28	19
September	52	30	19

Note: "Other" [illegible] for comparison purposes.

Source: Surveys by Yankelovich, Skelly and White, latest that of September 15-17, 1981.

CALIFORNIA POLL

Question: Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Democrat, Republican, Independent, or what?



California Residents

1980	Democrat	Republican	Independent
July	43%	36%	21%
September	44	33	23
October	46	35	19
1981			
January	41	35	24
April	37	35	28
August	38	34	28
October-November	37	34	29

Note: "Other" was [illegible] for comparison purposes.

Source: Surveys by the Field Institute, latest that of October 26-November 1, 1981.

NATURAL FOODS

Question: There are a number of foods on the market these days known as "natural" foods. Do you think "natural" foods are better for you than other foods, or that they are just different from others but no better for you?

	1974	1977	1981
Natural foods are:			
Better for you	42%	61%	49%
Different but no better	43	29	33
Don't know	15	10	18



Question: Here is a list of some different kinds of food. (Card shown respondent) Would you read down that list and call off each one you personally regard as a "natural" food?



Note: None of these, 8%; don't know, 4%, not shown.
Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 81-8), August 15-22, 1981.

by Alvin Richman

Public Attitudes on Military Power, 1981

Americans remain predominantly dissatisfied with the state of U.S. military preparedness. These are just a few of the indicators of the public mood, gleaned from a number of polls, as the first year of the Reagan administration draws to a close:

- About half of the public believes the United States needs to be stronger militarily than the Soviet Union in order to protect its security, but only about 15 percent perceive the United States as actually stronger.
- Only about 5 percent of the public believes the United States can be weaker militarily than the Soviets and still be secure, but about 40 percent actually perceives the United States to be weaker.
- Overall, about a five-to-three plurality of the American public believes the United States has less military power relative to the USSR than they think the United States needs.
- Two-thirds of the public either approve the administration's "plans to increase military spending" (55 percent) or want even larger increases (13 percent).

A remarkable transformation of public attitudes on military readiness has occurred since the mid-1970s. The proportion of Americans supporting increased defense spending moved steadily upward after 1974, and reached its peak in 1980. The desire to beef up U.S. defenses was reflected in early widespread support for the Reagan administration's proposed increases in the military budget.

The growth in the public's support for military measures to enhance our security has been due partly to fading memories of the Vietnam experience. It also stems from a growing perception of superior Soviet military power and assertive use of that power. Largely because of these two factors—the Vietnam experience and Soviet power—the increase in the public's support for military measures has been uneven. Support for exercising military power abroad has increased less than support for building military power at home since the mid-1970s. At present, the public is much readier to build military power than to apply it, evidently believing that possessing military strength in itself deters threats to national security. America's recent experiences have helped shape the public's preferences for building rather than exercising military power and the public's selectivity regarding the circumstances it believes warrant U.S. intervention.

Building Military Power

In the mid-1970s, the proportion of Americans who perceived the United States ahead of the USSR in military power was about the same as the proportion who perceived the USSR ahead. Now, two or three times as many perceive the USSR ahead militarily as perceive the United States ahead.

This change in the public's view of U.S. military strength largely explains the sharp rise in support for increased defense spending. Most surveys conducted in 1980 and early 1981 show about 60 percent of the public in favor of increasing defense spending. Less than 10 percent favor reducing it. This was the highest level of support for defense spending since 1950, and marked a complete reversal of the anti-defense spending sentiment inspired by the Vietnam war.

The drop in support for "increasing" the level of defense spending recorded in recent months presumably reflects growing perception of the enactment of the Reagan administration's program for increasing military expenditures. There is less desire to increase military spending beyond these current, larger levels.

The reversals of attitudes toward defense spending during the past three decades are shown by responses to comparable polls conducted by Gallup, NBC News/Associated Press, and CBS News/*New York*

Times (see table 1). The latest poll, conducted by NBC News in November, shows that a plurality of the public (47 percent) now favors maintaining the newly proposed level of defense spending, 34 percent want to increase it further, and 14 percent want to reduce this spending level.

Table 1
PUBLIC VIEWS ON DEFENSE SPENDING

Pollster	Date	Increase	Decrease	Maintain Current Level
NBC/AP	Nov. 1981	34%	14%	47%
CBS/NYT	Apr. 1981	[illegible]	[illegible]	34
CBS/NYT	Jan. 1981	61	7	[illegible]
CBS/NYT	Feb. 1980	64	[illegible]	23
NBC/AP	Dec. 1979	51	[illegible]	[illegible]
NBC/AP	Sept. 1979	[illegible]	16	[illegible]
Gallup	July 1977	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	July 1960	[illegible]	[illegible]	45
Gallup	Feb. 1960	21	18	[illegible]
Gallup	Mar. 1950	64	7	24

Note: [illegible]

Exercising Military Power

Public support for committing U.S. troops abroad rose substantially in the late 1970s, reaching a high point in early 1980. Willingness to commit U.S. troops has declined somewhat since then, returning to roughly 1978-1979 levels.

Polls conducted by Potomac Associates show the sizable increase from the 1974 lows to the 1980 highs in the public's willingness to "come to the defense" of "major European allies" and Japan "with military force" in case they were attacked (see table 2).

Table 2

	Help Defend Japan with Military Force in Case of Attack by Soviet Union		Help Defend Major Allies with Military Force in Case of Attack by Communist China or Soviet Union	
	Favor	Oppose	Favor	Oppose
July 1980	74%	19%	66%	[illegible]
Sept. 1979	64	28	54	[illegible]
May 1975	[illegible]	27	[illegible]	[illegible]
Jan. 1974	48	34	37	[illegible]
June 1972	52	32	43	46

Note: [illegible]

The public remains selective, however, regarding the countries it is willing to help defend. About half of those polled now favor sending troops to help defend certain regions perceived to be vital to U.S. interests Western Europe, Japan, and the Persian Gulf. But no more than a quarter favor sending U.S. troops in defense of Poland, Israel, or South Korea.

Various polls conducted during the past year show a moderate but noticeable decline since early 1980 in public support for committing U.S. troops abroad, as well as considerable selectivity of the public regarding the countries it is willing to help defend (see table 3).

Support for defending various countries depends on overall attitudes toward military intervention as well as attitudes toward the particular countries involved. About two-fifths of the public is relatively "consistent" in its attitudes toward defending different countries: About 15 percent is basically interventionist—that is, disposed to send U.S. troops to defend any friendly country; about 25 percent is basically opposed to U.S. military intervention—that is, disinclined to defend any other country.

These conclusions come from a Roper poll taken

Table 3
Sending U.S. Troops* to Help Defend
Western Europe/West Berlin/
Persian Gulf/Poland/Yugoslavia
against Soviet Invasion

	Favor	Oppose
Western Europe		
July 1981	[illegible]	[illegible]
February 1981	[illegible]	[illegible]
February 1980	[illegible]	[illegible]
July 1978	[illegible]	[illegible]
West Berlin		
February 1981	[illegible]	31
February 1980	61	[illegible]
December 1979	[illegible]	[illegible]
July 1978	46	41
December 1974	34	[illegible]

	Favor	Oppose
Persian Gulf		
February 1980	61%	29%
Poland		
February 1981	28	58
January 1981	[illegible]	61
Yugoslavia		
April 1980	[illegible]	[illegible]
February 1980	[illegible]	48
March 1977	[illegible]	64
December 1974	11	65

Sending U.S. Troops* to Help Defend South Korea against Invasion by North Korea

	Favor	Oppose
February 1981	[illegible]	61%
July 1978	18	69

Sending U.S. Troops* to Help Defend Israel against Invasion by Arab Forces

	Favor	Oppose
July 1981	25%	61%
February 1981	26	66
February 1980	35	47
July 1978	21	65

Note: [illegible]

in February 1981 that found: (1) about 15 percent of the public favored "using" U.S. troops to defend all three areas tested—Western Europe (against Soviet attack), South Korea (against attack by North Korea), and "a Central American country" (against a Cuban-led Communist takeover)—and (2) about 25 percent opposed all three commitments.

Certain demographic groups were more likely to be interventionist. Men were more willing than women to help defend all other countries; whites more willing than blacks; those earning more than $30,000 annually more willing than those earning less than $20,000; conservatives more willing than liberals; and Republicans more willing than Democrats.

For the larger part of the public, willingness—or reluctance—to intervene largely depends on five specific factors: (1) perceived importance to the United States of the threatened country; (2) seriousness of the threat perceived to be facing that country (for example, being threatened with attack versus actually being attacked); (3) source of the threat (for example, Soviet/Cuban expansion versus a strictly regional or internal conflict); (4) perceived need for U.S. intervention in order to save the situation; and (5) perceived likelihood of intervening successfully and avoiding "another Vietnam."

Sending Supplies versus Sending Troops

In general, the public has been more favorably disposed toward sending military supplies or "non-combat" military advisers to threatened regions than to sending combat advisers or U.S. troops. For example, more than two-fifths of the public favored sending U.S. military supplies to Zaire (1978), Somalia (1978), and El Salvador (1981) to counter Soviet/Cuban threats to those countries. Somewhat less than two-fifths favored sending U.S. "non-combat" military advisers to these countries. But, only about one-fifth favored sending U.S. "combat" advisers to the three countries, and only about one-tenth favored introducing U.S. forces to counter the Soviet/Cuban military threats in Africa.

The main reason given by those opposed to military aid to Africa and Central America was that this could lead the United States into "another Vietnam situation." Those who favored aid were motivated mainly by the desire to prevent further Soviet/Cuban encroachment.

A sizable number on both sides of the military aid issue have been "cross-pressured" by the same concerns—concern about Soviet/Cuban expansion versus concern about becoming embroiled in a Vietnam-like situation; the desire to settle local conflicts by installing non-Communist governments versus the reluctance to use military force.

Such cross-pressures have helped make U.S. military aid a volatile issue among Americans. Support for providing military aid to African countries rose to a near two-to-one majority, for example, when the anti-Soviet intent of the aid was spelled out, and when assurances were given that sending aid did *not* imply the subsequent dispatch of U.S. troops. Support for sending U.S. military advisers to El Salvador rose to more than a two-to-one majority when the question stipulated that "Communist countries were sending military advisers to help the guerrillas."

The public's preferences about ways to protect U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf region are an exception to the usual finding that the public would rather send supplies than troops to help defend a threatened region. Recent polls by Roper and NBC have shown that the American public predominantly *favors* stationing U.S. forces near the Persian Gulf, but predominantly *opposes* supplying weapons to countries bordering the Gulf.

Not surprisingly, the public is less willing to employ nuclear weapons than to send troops or supplies to help defend U.S. allies. Gallup and NBC polls this fall found that the public predominantly opposed "using nuclear weapons" either (1) to thwart a "conquest" of Western Europe by Soviet conventional forces (49 percent opposed versus 37 percent in favor) or (2) to counter a "limited nuclear attack" by the Soviet Union against a West European ally of the United States (52 percent opposed versus 29 percent in favor).

Conclusions

Two external experiences during the past decade have done more than any other to shape the American public's attitudes toward military power described above. The Vietnam war has left a continuing wariness about intervening militarily abroad. Although polls have shown a sharp increase since the mid-1970s in the public's support for military means to enhance U.S. security, concern about becoming embroiled in "another Vietnam situation" remains a significant constraint on the public's willingness to intervene in situations which do not appear to threaten U.S. vital interests.

The public is more concerned about involvement of U.S. troops than about sending U.S. advisers or supplies. But one of Vietnam's "lessons" is that sending U.S. advisers or supplies may be a precursor for sending U.S. troops.

Second, the Soviet military build-up and interventions abroad have heightened the public's desire to increase U.S. military strength and counter Soviet expansion. The public may hope that increased U.S. military strength alone will deter Soviet expansionism. But if this proves insufficient, the public is willing to exercise force—short of using nuclear weapons—to counter the Soviets in situations perceived as vital to the United States.

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and not necessarily those of the U.S. Department of State.

Private Opinion

Does Reagan Have a Problem with Women?

During the 1980 presidential campaign, some observers began noting that polls showed Ronald Reagan running less strongly among women voters than among men. Some polls indicated that Reagan did especially poorly among younger women, and among those who were college-trained and in professional occupations, compared to his electoral position among their male counterparts. Since the campaign, there have been innumerable stories discussing Reagan's "women problem" and speculating on its sources. Against this background, we decided to examine systematically the President's standing among women in the electorate, by itself and in comparison to the position of previous presidents. A small portion of the survey data we reviewed is presented in these pages.

Two conclusions appear. First, it is indeed the case that Reagan gets a lower rating among women than men—consistently and systematically. The magnitude of the differences by sex is greater than that of previous presidents, at least back to Eisenhower. At the same time, the extent of these differences in Reagan's case should not be overstated. His approval rating among women is eight to ten points lower than among men—not insignificant, surely, but not massive either.

Second, the earlier suggestion that the President's lower marks among women are largely among younger, college-educated women, simply *is not supported* by the data. Women give the President a lower rating than do their male counterparts almost uniformly across age and class groupings.

The work reported on here did not seek to determine *why* women rate the President somewhat lower than do men, but *whether* they do.

Everett Carll Ladd

Question: Do you approve or disapprove of the way (name of President) is handling his job as President?



Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of September 1981.



Question: Do you approve or disapprove of the way Ronald Reagan is handling his job as President?



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization, November 14-18, 1981

Question: For whom did you vote for President?



Note: Sample size — 9,742 voters as they left the polls.
Source: Survey by ABC News, November 4, 1980

by Robert Worcester and Peter Hutton

What's Ahead for Britain's New Party?

For the critics of Britain's new Social Democratic party, skepticism has turned increasingly to apprehension—and in some cases to fear. In three recent tests, the party has successfully turned the support reflected in opinion polls into electoral victories. In late November, a "safe" Tory seat in Crosby (the Tories had a 19,000 vote margin here in the 1979 General Election) fell to the SDP's Shirley Williams, in alliance with the Liberal party. In the Croydon North-West by-election in October, Liberal three-time loser William Pitt won a 3,254 vote margin for the Liberal party in alliance with the Social Democrats. Previously, the seat was held by the Conservatives with a 3,769 vote margin over Labour.

In July, Roy Jenkins, one of the "Gang of Four" who lead the new party, managed to turn a 9 percent Liberal share of the 1979 General Election vote into a 42-point share in the Warrington by-election, by standing as the candidate for the Social Democratic party (with Liberal support). The Labour candidate, Doug Hoyle, saw a 10,274 Labour majority slashed to 1,759, in what was previously considered one of the safer seats in the country.

Thus, in three quite different psephological contests, the new Alliance performed remarkably well and with remarkable consistency. Clearly, there are rumblings in the electorate that must be felt at No. 10 Downing Street, and which can be heard above the din created by Labour party infighting.

Since the launch of the new Social Democratic party in March 1981, national opinion polls have shown a gradually increasing level of support for the SDP-Liberal Alliance. Both parties' commitment to continued membership in the European Community, their support for NATO, and their similar analyses of the ills of the British economy make them natural bedfellows. With each party determined to retain its separate identity, the extent of agreement between them has been startling.

Up to now, the SDP and the Alliance have had extraordinarily good press, leading many a critic to label the party as a "media creation." To some extent, these critics are right. From the start the SDP has used the services of public relations advisers, and this advice has shaped the way they treat the media.

To say that the Social Democrats are solely a media creation is, however, a trivialization of their by-election and local election achievements. The new party has taken every opportunity to use the media to its best advantage. The newsworthiness of the party means the media and the SDP have a mutual interest in reaching even larger audiences. But this could not have happened if the new party had not been well equipped for the launch. The "Gang of Four" had all previously been cabinet ministers in Labour governments of the 1960s and 1970s. Three of the four were also well known and well liked by the British electorate. Their ministerial experience enhanced their credibility and the credibility of the new party.

A Window of Opportunity

In a country battered by economic recession many people are responding to the optimistic and confident tones of the Social Democrats as the best hope for recovery. The argument that the two-party system has reduced British politics to a battle between two entrenched ideologies with nothing new to offer, is one many Britons have found easy to embrace.

The party has clearly attracted many previously politically inactive people as well as former supporters of the two old parties. A survey of 376 delegates to the London conference of the SDP in October showed that 58 percent of the delegates had never been members of a political party before, and that 85 percent had never stood as candidates for a political party in either a local or national election. Many—probably most—of the 51,800 members recruited in the first eight weeks of the party's existence must have been politically inactive previously. Its membership now stands at about 70,000, adding about 3,000 new members a month to its ranks.

The decline in support for the two parties which have dominated British politics for over half a century explains the success of the new party and the Alliance. Two and a half years into its administration, the Conservative government has lost nearly half the support it had at the time of the 1979 General Election, according to MORI's polls. Satisfaction with the performance of the government is almost at its lowest point since the election, and satisfaction with the way Mrs. Thatcher is doing her job as Prime Minister is little better. The decline in her own and the government's popularity has been gradual, but fairly consistent, since the spring of 1980 (See figure 1).

The official opposition does not present itself much more favorably to the British public. Satisfaction with Mr. Foot as leader of the opposition is now even lower than with Mrs. Thatcher, and his popularity has shown a similar decline since autumn of last year when he took over from Mr. Callaghan.

Meanwhile, Liberal party leader David Steel is the only one of the three main party leaders for whom more electors express satisfaction than dissatisfaction—indeed, in November by a substantial 27 percent.

Labour's concern with its internal battles (i.e., its deputy leadership and its constitution), rather than with the main issues facing the country, probably has much to do with the party's poor showing in the opinion polls. For many people who turned from Labour to the Conservatives in May 1979, there is no strong reason for returning to Labour.

A Platform Yet to Come

The SDP/Liberal Alliance rise, then, owes much to the poor image of the two main parties and of their leaders. In one important respect, however, the SDP/Liberal Alliance's popularity is enigmatic. One would expect a party, or alliance, which is ahead in the polls and capable of winning by-elections, to be seen also as the party with the best policies—especially on the issues of most concern to the electorate. The evidence in the polls at the moment, however, suggests that this is not the case.

A MORI poll conducted in Croydon the week before the October by-election showed that only 6 percent of the electorate believed the SDP had the best policies on unemployment—the issue considered most important in Britain today. Eight percent thought the Liberals did, 14 percent the Conservatives, and 41 percent Labour. On inflation, the second most important issue, 27 percent felt Labour had the best policies, 25 percent the Conservatives, only 7 percent the Liberals, and 6 percent the SDP. The poor standing of both the Liberals and SDP was similar for all the other issues considered, ranging from the Common Market to education and public transportation. A MORI poll taken a week before the Crosby by-election showed that electors felt the Conservatives had better policies than the SDP on the major issues—yet the SDP won the by-election.

Although the SDP is founded on a commitment to certain policy stances—particularly continued membership in the Common Market, support for NATO, and proportional representation—it has yet to issue policy statements to match the other main parties' statements.

Figure 1

Question: Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way . . . Mrs. Thatcher is doing her job as Prime Minister? . . . Mr. Foot is doing his job as leader of the Opposition? . . . Mr. Steel is doing his job as leader of the Liberal Party?



Source: Surveys by Market & Opinion Research International, latest that of November 27-December 1, 1981.

Its commitment to consultation with its membership on policy and constitutional issues means the electorate will have to wait until well into next year before finding out in detail the policies on which it is likely to stand. It is difficult not to conclude that support for the SDP today is based more on Labour and Conservative failures than on any detailed appreciation of policies the new party is likely to pursue.

Class Structure

The Conservative party has traditionally been the party of the middle classes—the managers, teachers, professional and white collar workers—while Labour has appealed most to the working classes—the blue collar, skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled workers. With the middle classes comprising less than 40 percent of the electorate, the Conservatives have to rely on winning a substantial proportion of the working-class vote to ensure their return to office. (See table 1.)

Table 1

	Conservative	Labour	Liberal	Other
Middle class				
October 1974	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	3%
May 1979	59	24	15	2
Change	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Skilled working class				
October 1974	26	49	20	[illegible]
May 1979	41	41	15	3
Change	+15	-8	-5	[illegible]
Semi-/unskilled working class				
October 1974	22	[illegible]	16	[illegible]
May 1979	34	49	13	4
Change	+12	-8	-3	[illegible]

Detailed analysis of opinion polls from the last two General Elections in October 1974 and May 1979, and recent poll evidence, show the extent of the electoral damage done to the Conservative and Labour parties. It was the massive swing of both the skilled and semi-/unskilled working classes to the Conservatives between the two elections which provided them a comfortable forty-four seat majority in the House of Commons in 1979. Whereas in October 1974 the Conservatives had only 26 percent of the skilled working-class vote, and 22 percent of the semi-/unskilled vote, by May 1979 these figures had risen to 41 percent and 34 percent, respectively, with both the Labour and Liberal parties suffering significant declines. Paradoxically, Labour's loss of 8 percent of the working-class vote contrasted with an increase of 5 percent in its share of the middle-class vote. The Conservative gains were particularly marked among new voters. Their share of the eighteen to twenty-four-year-old vote in 1979 had increased by 18 percentage points (from 24 percent to 42 percent) between the two elections, mainly at the expense of the Liberals.

Breaking the Mold of British Politics

The decline in Conservative support since May 1979 has not just been the result of these groups turning away from them. There has been a desertion of some 17 percent of the working classes and 22 percent of the eighteen to twenty-four age group, including four out of every five semi- and unskilled working-class respondents in this age group. But they have also lost a substantial amount of support among the middle classes—a decline of 14 percentage points—and all other age groups ranging from 11 percent of those fifty-five and over, to 18 percent of twenty-five to thirty-four year olds, and 19 percent of thirty-five to fifty-four year olds.

The rise in Alliance support has meant that the Labour party has failed to regain its 1974 share (40 percent) of the vote and its current 38 percent represents no overall change since its position in May 1979.

However, the detailed analysis shows this "no change" presentation to be a misleading one. Labour has, for example, more than won back the support it lost in some groups, gained support in others, and lost ground to the new Alliance in still others. With a 48 percent share, they have been particularly successful in winning back the young (eighteen to twenty-four, especially working-class) vote. Their middle-class gain in the 1979 election has now been almost wiped out, but was compensated for by a 3 to 4 percent gain in the somewhat larger working-class vote. While Labour's 3 percent gain in the somewhat larger middle-aged (thirty-five to fifty-four) group reflects only a working-class swing, the decline in support among older voters (over fifty-five) applies to middle- and working-class respondents, men, and women. (See table 2.)

Table 2

	Conservative	Labour	Liberal	Other
All				
May 1979	45%	38%	14%	3%
July-September 1981	29	38	14	19
Middle class				
May 1979	59	24	15	2
July-September 1981	[illegible]	[illegible]	13	[illegible]
Skilled working class				
May 1979	41	41	15	3
July-September 1981	22	45	14	18
Semi-/unskilled working class				
May 1979	34	49	13	4
July-September 1981	19	52	14	15
18-24 years old				
May 1979	42	41	12	5
July-September 1981	20	48	12	20
25-34 years old				
May 1979	43	38	15	4
July-September 1981	25	37	16	22
35-54 years old				
May 1979	46	35	16	3
July-September 1981	27	38	14	21
55 and over				
May 1979	47	38	13	2
July-September 1981	36	34	14	16

These findings clearly indicate that the SDP has not arisen merely as a result of straight switching of votes from an unpopular government. It has succeeded in drawing substantial—nearly equal—support from both of the major parties.

Current SDP Support

Although voting recall is not a reliable measure of actual voting in previous elections, it does give a broad indication which can be used to analyze the sources of current party support. A MORI poll conducted in September 1981 showed that 10 percent of those who said they voted Labour in 1979 now say they would vote Social Democrat, and 3 percent would vote Liberal, compared with 1 percent who would switch their allegiance to the Conservatives.

The MORI survey among electors in Warrington just after the by-election showed that an astounding 60 percent of those who said they had previously voted Conservative had switched their allegiance to the SDP. Of those who said they had voted Labour in 1979, just under a third (29 percent) switched to the SDP—an almost equal loss in terms of number of votes.

A poll conducted by MORI in the two days preceding the Liberal/SDP Alliance victory in the Croydon North-West constituency showed votes coming equally from the Labour and Conservative parties. Nearly a third of those who said they had voted Conservative (31 percent) and Labour (32 percent) in 1979 had switched their allegiance to the Alliance candidate. (See table 3.)

The recent by-election in Crosby also showed substantial desertions from those claiming to have voted either Conservative or Labour in 1979. The Alliance won 35 percent of Conservative support and 62 percent of Labour support, a mirror image of the "safe" Labour seat of Warrington.

The shift of support to the Social Democrats is interpreted by some observers as more evidence of the breakdown of class as a major determinant of British political allegiance. Not only has the working-class vote, in particular, become more volatile, but the willingness of electors to identify with a particular social class has declined markedly over the last two decades. A MORI poll in May 1981 showed only 29 percent saying they thought of themselves as belonging to a particular social class, compared with 50 percent who did in 1964. (*Political Change in Britain*, Butler and Stokes, 1969). Furthermore, only 15 percent of the total thought of themselves as working class, fewer than half of the proportion in 1964. For Labour, this must be bad news. At one time simply being "working class" was a sufficiently good reason to vote Labour. The new evidence suggests this hold on the electorate is diminishing. (See table 4.)

Table 4

Question: Do you ever think of yourself as belonging to a particular social class?

	Butler & Stokes 1964	MORI 1981	Change
Yes	50%	29%	21%
No	50	71	21

Question: Which class is that? **IF YES:**

		Percent of total		Percent of total	
Upper	2	(1)	2	(0.5)	0
Middle	28	(14)	43	(12)	15
Working	68	(32)	53	(15)	−15
Other	2	(1)	2	(0.5)	0

With the government's monetarist policies increasingly criticized by its own ministers and backbenchers as well as the press, and the Labour party preoccupied with its internal struggles, the Alliance has been given plenty of opportunity to woo the electorate. So far the media have been sympathetic, but this may change over time. If the threat of this infant prodigy is to be successfully countered, the two established parties will first have to improve drastically their public image.

Choosing a leader and agreeing on a division of seats with the Liberals will pose problems for the SDP. As the next General Election approaches, electors will demand more than vague promises and wishful thinking. This will probably cost the party the support of some who currently back it. Only when the SDP has committed itself to firm policy positions, and the subsequent electoral and media reactions are assessed, will it be clear whether the new party is really here to stay or already on the way out.

Table 3

	Warrington July 1981			Croydon October 1981			Crosby November 1981		
Of those who said they voted in 1979	Con.	Lab.	Lib.	Con.	Lab.	Lib.	Con.	Lab.	Lib.
Would vote today									
Conservative	34%	*	0	63%	2%	1%	61%	2%	6%
Labour	2	70%	16%	5	65	3	*	35	3
Lib/SDP Alliance	60	29	61	31	32	96	35	62	87

14/1/82 R 2110-1 A

$3.50

Public Opinion

Published by
American
Enterprise
Institute

Feb/March 1982

ACQUISITIONS EDITOR
STATISTICAL REFERENCE INDEX
CONGRESSIONAL INFORMATION SERVICE 1
4520 EAST-WEST HIGHWAY
WASHINGTON, DC 20014
BB-26788 1

CAN WE WIN THE WAR OF IDEAS?

with

**JEAN-FRANCOIS REVEL and
LUIGI BARZINI, HODDING CARTER III,
LORD CHALFONT, RICHARD HOLBROOKE,
SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, NORMAN
PODHORETZ, HARRISON SALISBURY, and
COUNT VON STAUFFENBERG.**

plus

**Raising the voice of America
by Les Lenkowsky**

**Environmentalism
Everett C. Ladd: Poll...ution
William Tucker: Elitism**

and

**Is the Era of Limits
Running Out?
a conversation with
Garrett Hardin and Julian Simon**

Public Opinion

Volume 5, Number 1 February/March 1982

Publisher
William J. Baroody, Jr.

Co-Editors
Seymour Martin Lipset
Ben J. Wattenberg

Managing Editor
Karlyn H. Keene

Associate Editor
Victoria A. Sackett

Assistant Editor
Nicola L. Furlan

Research Assistant
Mary Bruun

Editorial Consultant
Hunter C. Harrison, Jr.

Editorial Board
David R. Gergen, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, Irving Kristol, Everett Carll Ladd, Howard Penniman, Austin Ranney, Richard M. Scammon, Laurence H. Silberman, Herbert Stein, and Richard J. Whalen

Consulting Editor for Opinion Roundup
Everett Carll Ladd

Editorial Associate
Marilyn M. Potter

Art & Design Director
Pat Taylor

Chart Illustrator
Hördur Karlsson

Staff Editor
Elizabeth D. Ashooh

PUBLIC OPINION, February/March 1982, Vol. 5, No. 1. Published bimonthly by the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. Copyright 1982 American Enterprise Institute. Subscription rates: $18.00 for one year, $34.00 for two years. Individual copy: $3.50. Information on bulk orders or multiple subscriptions available on request. Editorial and business offices: c/o AEI, 1150 17th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. Send changes of address and all subscription correspondence to Circulation Department, c/o AEI, same address. "American Enterprise Institute" and are registered service marks of the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.

Second class postage paid at Washington, D.C.

ISSN 0149-9157

CONTENTS

3 **THE WAR OF IDEAS**
by Jean-François Revel
Events in Poland remind us that the good guys don't always win—especially when the battles are ideological. Democracies, the author argues, are ill-equipped to wage such wars, but they are not completely unarmed.

7 **CAN WE WIN IT?**
a symposium with Luigi Barzini, Hodding Carter III, Lord Alun Chalfont, Richard Holbrooke, Samuel Huntington, Norman Podhoretz, Harrison Salisbury, and Franz Ludwig Graf von Stauffenberg.
Distinguished commentators offer their views on the world situation and on the nature of propaganda, its application, and usefulness in democratic systems.

10 **RAISING THE VOICE OF AMERICA**
by Leslie Lenkowsky
The war of ideas can be won, but we need to stock the arsenal and raise the troops' morale.

12 **SHAPING UNDERGRADUATES' WORLD VIEW: GLOBAL DISINFORMATION**
by Victoria Sackett and Jeffrey Salmon
A recent survey tested undergraduates' awareness of global issues and found them woefully deficient. Their ignorance is not of world affairs, the authors contend, but of the test designers' world view.

16 **CLEARING THE AIR: PUBLIC OPINION AND PUBLIC POLICY ON THE ENVIRONMENT**
by Everett Carll Ladd
Public opinion data on environmental issues abound, especially in congressional testimony. The author examines several surveys on the Clean Air Act and finds significant deterioration in the quality of the interpretation.

21 **OPINION ROUNDUP**
Environmental update, volunteer activity, public values/private initiative, Harris rates Reagan.

41 **THE ENVIRONMENTAL ERA**
by William Tucker
Environmentalism—the liberal cause celèbre*—is really old-fashioned conservatism in disguise, says Tucker. Its champions constitute an elite which is fearful of the future and wedded to the status quo.*

48 **IS THE ERA OF LIMITS RUNNING OUT?**
a conversation with Garrett Hardin and Julian Simon
The Global 2000 report provides the backdrop for this spirited exchange about the ecological tenor of the times.

58 **REFORMING PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES**
by Martin Plissner
By the author's last count, at least seventeen commissions and panels are studying the presidential primary process. The reformers, he concludes, may not make the process more representative.

59 **A NEW (HAMPSHIRE) TAX REVOLT?**
by David Moore
Numerous successful candidates in New Hampshire have taken THE PLEDGE not to support a broad-based tax. But the voters may be having second thoughts about the oath.

by Everett Carll Ladd

Clearing the Air: Public Opinion and Public Policy on the Environment

Over the last fifteen years or so, environmental issues and concerns have become vastly more central in American policy debates. This new centrality can be seen in the sweep of laws, regulations, and court actions on environmental problems, and in the greatly expanded roster of interest groups that lobby actively on these matters. Now in 1982, the debate swirling around congressional action in amending the Clean Air Act—the country's most significant and controversial piece of environmental legislation—testifies further to the prominent place environmental issues have assumed on the American political agenda.

The various questions raised in the clean air debate are replete with technical complexities. Any citizen attempting to follow the argument must contend with such terms and acronyms as NAAQS (National Ambient Air Quality Standards); PSD (Prevention of Significant Deterioration) provisions; RACT (Reasonably Available Controlled Technology); among many, many others. Behind such terms are complicated questions of policy choice.

One important part of the clean air arguments has nothing to do with technical policy, but involves public opinion. What do Americans really want done? What are their preferences and concerns?

Attention to public opinion in a democracy is surely nothing new. What is quite new, and increasing, is the heavy recourse to poll data in an effort to establish favorable terms for the larger policy debate. Even the devil, it is said, can quote scripture: Certainly many different groups and interests have learned that they can quote public opinion data to support the objectives they seek to advance. In the battle over the Clean Air Act, those wanting major changes, and those who oppose such changes, have been citing public opinion data from major surveys which seem to confirm impressively their respective, *diametrically opposed* positions.

For additional data on the environment, see Opinion Roundup, pp. 32-37.

CONGRESSIONAL POLL . . . UTION

Appearing before the House Subcommittee on Health and the Environment last October 15, at the invitation of the subcommittee's Democratic majority, pollster Louis Harris made the case that Americans say emphatically that they want the Act left alone. "The largest single group, a majority of 51 percent, want to keep the Act without change. But another 29 percent opt for making the Act even stricter, while no more than 17 percent want it made less strict. This means that by 80 to 17 percent, a sizable majority of the public does not want to see any relaxation in existing federal regulation of air pollution."

As impressive as the overall distribution, Harris argued, "is the fact that not a single major segment of the public wants the environmental laws made less strict." Even those who voted for Ronald Reagan in 1980 (by a margin of 76 to 22 percent), Republicans (75-22 percent), and conservatives (76-21 percent) opposed any relaxation of the clean air legislation, according to Harris. ". . . this message of the deep desire on the part of the American people to battle pollution is one of the most overwhelming and clearest we have ever recorded in our twenty-five years of surveying public opinion," Harris concluded in his prepared testimony.

In the colloquy, Harris was even more emphatic.

To Democrat John Dingell of Michigan:

> . . . I am saying to you just as clear as can be that clean air happens to be one of the sacred cows of the American people, and the suspicion is afoot, however you slice it, that there are interests in the business community and among Republicans and some Democrats who want to keelhaul that legislation. And the people are saying: "Watch out. We will have your hide if you do it."

To Republican Don Ritter of Pennsylvania:

> But I also said you mess around with the Clean Air

and Clean Water Acts, and you're going to get into the deepest kind of trouble. I said earlier the Republican party is at a crossroads on this, and I will repeat it again: you people will go on and try to amend this Act. . . . [Congressman Ritter interjects: "Mr. Harris, your own data . . ."] All I can say to you, Mr. Ritter, is try it and you will see that you lose the '82 election.

The ORC Survey for the U.S. Chamber

This would suggest that public opinion is reasonably clear about what Congress should now do. But other opinion experts see the matter differently. Reporting on a national survey conducted in November 1981 (Harris's was taken two months earlier, in September) for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, the Opinion Research Corporation (ORC) found the people quite prepared to see the Act amended.

"There is no question about the American public's desire for clean air and for continuing efforts to improve the country's air quality," ORC noted, but interpreting "such survey findings as evidence of public opposition to any change in the Act" is "erroneous." "Most people are uninformed about the goals of the Act and about how the public and business are to achieve these goals. The public can distinguish between changes that are administrative and procedural and those that would affect air quality standards. There is sizable support for reviewing the Act in light of past experience and current technology. There is sizable support for administrative changes that do not affect standards. There is sizable agreement that changes in the Act probably can be made so that the cost of compliance can be reduced without lowering air quality. There is sizable support for the proposition that air pollution controls should vary from area to area, depending on the local situation, rather than requiring in all areas the stricter controls that are necessary in a few areas to combat particularly bad air."

Indicative of the general receptivity to change that ORC reported is the finding that even environmental activists endorse it. Seventy-eight percent of those who classified themselves as "active participants" in the environmental movement agreed that "changes in the Act probably can be made so that air quality will be protected at a lower cost than now."

What Do We Know About Environmental Opinion?

Clearly both Harris and ORC cannot be right. Fortunately, we can find out which one is right—or, at least, is less wrong. There has been extensive polling on environmental issues that allows us to reach some firm conclusions.

"Environmental issues seem to have become an enduring social concern," wrote Robert Cameron Mitchell in 1980, "much like health care, education, and other basic issues."[1] Mitchell noted that some people thought in the early 1970s "that public enthusiasm [for environmental protection] was a fad that would die as soon as the cost of pollution control programs became apparent." In fact, "the overall results of the Resources for the Future (RFF) survey [conducted in early 1980] —and those of numerous other polls taken in the past decade—demonstrate the fact that environmental protection enjoys continued strong backing. . . . The answers to a broad range of probing questions show abiding public support for national efforts to protect environmental quality."

Mitchell is unquestionably correct. In reviewing the corpus of survey information on environmental questions for this article and for the center section display (pp. 32-37), I was struck again by the emphatic nature of public backing for environmental protection. Representative of the type of opinion distributions one finds regularly are the responses to a September 1981 Roper Organization question whether "you think environmental protection laws and regulations have gone too far, or not far enough, or have struck about the right balance." Just one-fifth (21 percent) thought environmental regulations had been carried too far.

It is not that the public sees pollution problems in "crisis" terms. Rather, the sense is one of a con-

Table 1

DIRECTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, 1981

Question: There are . . . differing opinions about how far we've gone with environmental protection laws and regulations. At the present time, do you think environmental protection laws and regulations have gone too far, or not far enough, or have struck about the right balance?

	Gone too far	Struck about right balance	Not far enough	Don't know
National	21	38	31	10
Region				
Northeast	17	36	35	12
Midwest	25	40	27	9
South	20	36	31	13
West	24	39	32	6
Party				
Democrat	18	38	33	11
Republican	30	39	24	7
Independent	20	37	33	10
Ideology				
Conservative	26	37	29	9
Moderate	19	40	30	12
Liberal	16	35	42	7
Family Income				
Less than $10,000	18	36	30	16
$10,000—19,999	20	38	33	10
$20,000—29,999	20	40	32	7
$30,000 and over	28	36	28	7
Race				
White	23	38	29	10
Black	12	32	41	14

Note: For additional demographic breaks see Opinion Roundup, page 32.

Source: Survey by Roper Organization Inc., conducted late September 1981.

---

[1] Robert Cameron Mitchell, "Public Opinion on Environmental Issues," a report to the Council on Environmental Quality, 1980, p. 2.

tinuing problem which is manageable but which requires continuing attention. For example, the Opinion Research Corporation poll of November 1981 found that only 19 percent believed "air quality in the country" to be poor—but an even smaller 4 percent thought it was excellent. The large majority, some 70 percent of the population, ranked air quality in the fair-to-good range. Asked to compare present air pollution to that of five years ago, only 16 percent thought the problem had been reduced, while 37 percent said it had actually gotten worse, and 42 percent considered it essentially unchanged. Thus, the populace doesn't see a crisis, but neither does it think pollution problems are well in hand. Viewed in terms of end result, there is hardly a sense the country has gone too far in cleaning up the environment.

The Environment as a New "Materialist" Value

One of the most striking features of public opinion on environmental questions is the evenness of support across various groups in the population. Harris's point that backing for the Clean Air Act is much the same across the various age, income, occupational, educational, and even partisan and ideological groupings in the populace, is borne out on environmental questions generally. Older people are *somewhat* less supportive of environmental legislation and regulations than the young, men less than women, Republicans and conservatives less supportive than Democrats and liberals—but these inter-group differences are fairly modest. The Roper Organization's question on whether "environmental protection laws and regulations have gone too far. . . ." (see table 1) typifies the general pattern—in which environmental issues do not elicit group polarization.

Special note should be made of the essential similarity in response of educational, occupational, and income groups—outside the fact that more people of low socioeconomic status profess unfamiliarity. In an earlier issue of this magazine, I had suggested that there are significant class differences in environmental policy preference: "College-educated professionals, more than grade-school and high-school-educated manual workers, support environmental protection and reduced energy consumption even at the cost of unemployment and inflation."[2] Other commentators made this argument more forcefully. We were wrong—as Robert Cameron Mitchell has pointed out in this magazine.[3] A few environmental questions do reflect the class alignment I had described, but they are exceptions, not the rule.

Tracing an Error

In what is perhaps the most systematic study of value change in advanced industrial democracies, Ronald Inglehart described the shift occurring "from an overwhelming emphasis on material well-being and physical security toward greater emphasis on the quality of life."[4] He identified the motive force for this shift, as have I and many other observers, in the vast increase in material well-being that occurred after World War II. Quite simply, wrote Inglehart, "a desire for beauty may be more or less universal, but hungry people are more likely to seek food than aesthetic satisfaction. Today, an unprecedentedly large proportion of western populations have been raised under conditions of exceptional economic security." As a result, issues that "derive more from differences in lifestyle than from economic needs" have become far more prominent. Inglehart cited as examples "such things as *protection of the environment*, the quality of life, the role of women, the redefinition of morality, drug usage, and broader public participation in both political and non-political decision-making."[5]

Inglehart described the older economic security issues as involving "materialist" goals, while the newer lifestyle and cultural questions posed "post-materialist" values. Those with formal college training and in upper status occupations—especially the younger members of these socioeconomic groups—were the furthest removed from material scarcity and hence the most inclined to post-materialist stands.[6] A decade earlier, Charles Reich had made essentially this point—albeit more poetically and polemically—in *The Greening of America;* it appears as well in much of the literature on "the new class."[7]

Those of us associated with this general line of argument were not wrong in noting that over the 1960s and 1970s the American (and European) political agenda changed as many newer social, cultural, and lifestyle issues crowded their way upon it. And we were surely not wrong in detecting clear socioeconomic group differences on many of these new questions—where higher status groups, especially the college educated and those in professional occupations, took the more "liberal" and individual-choice-emphasizing positions. But we were wrong in assuming that environmental issues would behave like the new cluster generally.

It is now evident that two different sets of value change were occurring at the same time—sets which should have been kept separate because they reveal different patterns of group response. On the one hand, there was indeed a rise of values and interests that can properly be called "post-materialist," since they emphasize elements quite distinct from tangible economic or material positions. Many of the lifestyle and cultural issues fit in here. But the other set involves not something "after materialism," but rather an *enlargement and extension* of materialistic demands. Over the 1960s and 1970s, for example, Americans in all social and economic positions came to include such objectives as cleaner water and air as among those they wanted to "buy." Environmental concerns, at the mass public level, were not "post-materialist"; rather, they were a later-generation material emphasis.

---

[2] Ladd, "The New Lines are Drawn: Class and Ideology in America," *Public Opinion*, July/August 1978, pp. 52-53.

[3] Robert Cameron Mitchell, "Silent Spring/Solid Majorities," *Public Opinion*, August/September 1979, pp. 19-20, 55.

[4] Ronald Inglehart, *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 3.

[5] Inglehart, *The Silent Revolution*, p. 13. Emphasis added.

[6] Inglehart, *The Silent Revolution*, especially pages 72-89.

[7] Charles Reich, *The Greening of America* (New York: Random House, 1970). For a useful rendering of many of the different themes in the "new class" argument, see B. Bruce-Briggs (ed.), *The New Class* (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1979).

There really is nothing puzzling about this distinction, although many of us missed it. If average American families came to feel in the 1920s that having a motor car was something they were entitled to, why shouldn't Americans in the 1960s and 1970s, in a vastly richer society, have come to feel that clean rivers and clean air are something they have a basic claim to—not as an exotic new cultural expression but as plain garden-variety materialism? Americans have continued to want "more." The meaning of "more" has changed throughout American history with economic development—and today it includes a clean and healthy environment just as securely as it does good housing, motor cars, vacations, and television sets.

It is possible in theory, of course, to fit environmental issues into a larger scheme of "post-materialist" values—as many of us in fact did. But the theory simply has to be revised. Americans generally have responded to a clean environment as a basic material value. Referring to it in that way is not to play a semantic game. The pattern of response which the issue elicits across the population is one consistent with a general, widespread claim for "a better life"—not what one sees with regard to those highly contentious issues of change involving moral choice and styles of personal and cultural expression. Describing a clean environment as a "materialist" value renders it the way Americans clearly have—and accounts for both the persisting high support for environmental protection and the absence of significant group differences.

Confusions in Survey Research

Most survey researchers seem to have accepted, at least implicitly, the view that environmentalism is a "post-materialist" value set off from materialist claims. Following upon this, polls again and again have presented respondents with "trade-offs" in which they are asked to choose between the environment and some obvious material good, like economic growth or an adequate energy supply.

While we often use them, we know that trade-off questions are always tricky to construct since it is hard to phrase the alternatives to reflect fairly the actual choice—especially as the public sees the choice. To be avoided are trade-off questions with choices between objectives each of which is favored, or opposed, well-nigh consensually at the abstract level. And especially to be avoided are forced choices where the alternatives are nothing more than differing pieces of one basic value that the public wants, and believes it possible to attain.

Yet the latter is precisely what many of the polls have fallen into with their *environment* versus *growth* (or *jobs*, or *energy*) trade-offs. Americans have shown repeatedly that they want both of these facets of a more bountiful life—a healthy and growing economy, and a healthful and safe environment. If environmentalism were really some exotic new "post-materialist" value, there might have been something to be said for asking people whether they wanted it or more of the "old time religion." But as it is, the growth versus environment trade-offs have simply asked people to choose between two parts of one condition—which they favor strongly and, indeed, almost consensually.

I do not mean to suggest that policy makers are not required in some instances, in the complex application of environmental laws and regulations, to make difficult economic choices. Neither do I question that there are some people who have strong ideological preferences for economic growth at almost any price, while others have equally strong preferences for "learning to live with somewhat less" and a special environmental consciousness. But most Americans are not in either of these camps, any more than they are required to make highly technical and specific policy trade-offs.

Since people are uncomfortable and uncertain about the growth versus environment choice, they answer very differently depending on the emphasis which a question gives. Consider these examples. The ABC News/*Washington Post* poll of February 1981 asked:

> *. . . Can you please tell me if you tend to agree or disagree . . . [that] some important regulations aimed at protecting the environment should be dropped so we can improve the economy?*

Agree	*Disagree*	*No opinion*
54%	*40%*	*6%*

By a decisive margin, the public says it wants to draw back on environmental regulations in the interest of economic growth. But is that what people intend to say? In September 1981, CBS News/*New York Times* asked:

> *Which of these statements comes closer to your own feelings? . . . We need to relax our environmental laws in order to achieve economic growth, or . . . we need to maintain present environmental laws in order to preserve the environment for future generations?*

Relax environmental laws	*Maintain present environmental laws*	*Both/Neither (volunteered)*	*No opinion*
21%	*67%*	*4%*	*8%*

The conclusion one would draw from the CBS asking would be diametrically opposite that from the ABC question. In fact, both are highly misleading.

One of the clearest indications of where people in fact stand on the environment versus growth question comes from the Opinion Research Corporation survey of November 1981 referred to at the beginning of this article. ORC asked its respondents to indicate which statement among three they most agreed with:

> *We must accept a slower rate of business and new job growth in order to protect our environment.*
>
> *We can achieve our current national goals of environmental protection and business and new job growth at the same time.*
>
> *We must relax environmental standards in order to achieve business and new job growth.*

Accept slower growth	*Can achieve both*	*Relax environmental standards*	*No opinion*
15%	59%	22%	4%

Majorities of virtually every group chose the "we can do both" response. Thus, it was the position of 61 percent of liberals and 58 percent of conservatives, of 65 percent of easterners and 62 percent of westerners, 58 percent of men and 58 percent of women, of 51 percent of those with less than high school education and 67 percent of the college trained.

I recognize that ORC's middle response can be criticized as too undemanding—inviting people to have their cake and eat it too. But there is nothing wrong with an item's being undemanding if it captures a clear preference and perspective. It is one thing to insist on avoiding alternatives which, by their consensual attractiveness, rule out differences in public assessments of an issue which need to be explicated. It is quite another to force respondents to choose between two failures, neither of which they want, as many of the environmental trade-offs seem to do. "Would you rather mess up the environment in the reckless pursuit of more jobs, or close factories in the reckless pursuit of a clean environment?" No, the questions haven't been flawed so obviously, but they have boiled down to an unwise and misleading casting of alternatives. Which way do you want to deny a bountiful material future, Americans, by environmental damage or diminished economic growth?

It's a false choice. It doesn't conform to the way the public views the issues. It assumes a distinction Americans generally don't make, between a materialist economy and a post-materialist environment. It is just plain bad survey research.

Polling and Clean Air Policy

All we have learned from most of the trade-off questions involving jobs and the environment is something already demonstrated amply by many other survey data—that Americans are strongly committed to a clean environment and will say so clearly even in forced-choice questions that express alternatives that don't render the problem as they see it. This unequivocal environmental support is the decisive general predisposition which accounts for numerous specific findings—like those indicating that Americans favor strong clean air legislation and regulation.

When Louis Harris testified before the House Subcommittee on Health and the Environment, he was on firm ground in stressing that most Americans want a healthful environment. But Mr. Harris was on very weak ground indeed when he went further and argued that the citizenry had made a clear choice between the environment and other material values, in favor of the former, and would thus rise up in wrath at any modification of the Clean Air Act.

The latter interpretation is simply not defensible. An abundance of survey data show beyond any shade of doubt that Americans want the environment protected and they want to achieve other material objectives like an adequate energy supply and economic growth. There is not one iota of evidence suggesting that the public thinks it must choose between the two. It wants both environmental protection and economic growth *prudently* pursued.

Most people know little about specific technical provisions of the Clean Air Act—or any other such legislation. Indeed, when ORC asked "how much have you heard or read about the Federal Clean Air Act—a great deal, a fair amount, a little, or nothing at all," 31 percent said "nothing" and another 34 percent said "little." With 65 percent of the populace stating they know little or nothing about the specific legislation, Mr. Harris's suggestion that Americans insist passionately that Congress keep its "cottonpicking hands" off the legislation is little short of ludicrous.

It seems to this observer that the people have spoken clearly on the Clean Air Act, in their proper democratic role as the ultimate arbiters of general policy direction. They have said they do not want the move toward a cleaner environment abandoned or set back but that, of course, their sense of a sound and bountiful material existence extends somewhat beyond an absence of air pollution. Having spoken thus, the people can only look to leadership for the appropriate legislative and administrative "translations."

It is always helpful, in a democracy, to be able to claim that the people are on one's side. Opinion researchers should hardly be troubled that the contenders in this year's important clean air debate have maneuvered to position themselves advantageously with reference to public opinion. But we should hold firmly to our own clear responsibility—of letting the people's opinions stand out, unadorned by the preferences of interests and activists.

AMERICANS VOLUNTEER: A PROFILE

PERCEPTIONS . . .

Question: Would you say that people are more willing, less willing or about as willing to help their neighbors as they were twenty-five years ago? Are people more willing, less willing, or about as willing to volunteer for youth activities such as coaching or being a scout leader as they were twenty-five years ago? And are they more willing, less willing, or about as willing to help their elderly parents as they were twenty-five years ago?



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization/Roper Center for Public Opinion Research for the American Enterprise Institute, November 14-21, 1981.

. . . AND PRACTICE

Question: Did you do *any unpaid* volunteer work for an organization last week, that is, the week of November 7 through 13? (1965) During the last twelve months, from May 1973 through April 1974, have you done *any unpaid* volunteer work for a group such as those listed above or for any other type of organization? (1974)



Note: Groups listed in 1965 were: hospital or clinic, other health or medical, educational, social or welfare service, recreational, civic or community action. Groups listed in 1974 were: hospitals, clinics and other health groups, education programs, legal services, scouting and other youth programs, recreation programs, religious groups, social and welfare groups, civic and community groups, political groups.

Source: Survey by the U.S. Labor Department, 1965; ACTION/U.S. Bureau of the Census, April 7-13, 1974.

Question: Do you, yourself, happen to be involved in any charity or social service activities, such as helping the poor, the sick or elderly?



Note: A 1977 Gallup survey found 27% of Americans engaged in volunteer work. The level of involvement in the 1981 survey (29%) projects to more than 40 million adult Americans engaged in volunteer work.

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, September 18-21, 1981.

Who Volunteers and How Much?

One of the most important dimensions of a public/private partnership in solving common problems is volunteerism. With the economic difficulties and changing values of the last two decades, one might expect Americans to be less willing to give their time to volunteer activities than they were earlier. Survey data suggest that Americans *believe* this to be the case. When asked what they *do*, though, Americans for the last fifteen years provide a picture of volunteerism as an enduring spirit in American life. What the polls cannot tell us—because of different question wordings and frames used in the surveys available to us—is whether volunteer activity is *actually* increasing or declining.

Survey data do suggest that all educational, economic, and social groups are involved in charitable work, and that some groups are more active than others. The following pages provide a profile of American volunteers, tables of charitable contributions, and an assessment of Americans' views of the role of government and the private sector in meeting common needs and objectives.

Question: Do you regularly do any type of volunteer work?



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization/Roper Center for Public Opinion Research for the American Enterprise Institute, November 14-21, 1981.

Question: How frequently do you do volunteer work at or for a local organization?



Note: *The measure of religious commitment is based on a Guttman scale composed of eight items: feeling that God loves you, engaging in prayer, attending religious services, reading the Bible, having a religious experience, participating in a church social activity, encouraging others to turn to religion, and listening to religious broadcasts. Percentages in parentheses indicate the portion of the sample which fell into each group.

Source: Survey by Research and Forecasts for Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Company, September 1-November 15, 1980.

Why and How People Volunteer

LEARNING HOW TO HELP

Question: How did you learn about this [volunteer] activity?

All adult volunteers = 52% of sample



Note: Multiple responses per respondent. Three percent of respondents gave the answer "Other" and 4% "Don't recall." This Gallup survey used a much broader definition of volunteer activity than others did (including such activities as singing in the church choir, pro bono legal work, and helping neighbors with home repairs) and found that 52% of Americans volunteer.

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization for Independent Sector, March 13-23, 1981.

SPARING A DIME VERSUS GIVING TIME

Question: Please tell me if you yourself did any of the following things within the last month? First, contributed money to a charitable organization. . . .



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization/Roper Center for Pubic Opinion Research for the American Enterprise Institute, November 14-21, 1981.

DEFINING THE CHARITABLE IMPULSE

Question: For what reasons did you first become involved in this volunteer activity?

All adult volunteers = 52% of sample



Note: One percent of respondents gave the answer "Other" and 5% "Don't recall." Multiple responses per respondent.

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization for Independent Sector, March 13-23, 1981.

THE VALUE OF VOLUNTEERING

Question: I'm going to read you a short list of statements about volunteer work. For each one, please tell me if you agree or disagree. (Ask about each)



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization/Roper Center for Public Opinion Research for the American Enterprise Institute, November 14-21, 1981.

LEND A HELP





INDIVIDUALS

Year	Amount (billions)	Amount Constant dollars (billions)	Percent of Income
1955	$ 5.71	$15.49	1.85
1956	6.08	15.99	1.84
1957	6.52	16.59	1.87
1958	6.79	17.01	1.89
1959	7.26	17.79	1.90
1960	7.53	18.39	1.91
1961	7.96	19.02	1.90
1962	8.50	19.93	1.92
1963	9.03	20.86	1.94
1964	9.55	21.74	1.92
1965	10.36	23.06	1.93
1966	11.34	24.45	1.94
1967	12.15	25.44	1.94
1968	13.36	26.77	1.95
1969	14.71	28.07	1.97
1970	15.92	28.83	1.99
1971	17.02	29.33	1.98
1972	18.19	30.10	1.93
1973	20.43	31.95	1.94
1974	22.33	31.84	1.93
1975	24.24	31.54	1.93
1976	26.59	32.89	1.92
1977	29.32	34.25	1.91
1978	32.80	35.69	1.91
1979	36.54	36.54	1.90
1980	39.93	36.66	1.84

CORPORATIONS

Year	Current contributions (billions)	Constant dollars (billions)	Percent of Pretax Net Income
1955	$ .415	$1.126	0.86%
1956	.418	1.099	0.86
1957	.419	0.066	0.89
1958	.395	.989	0.96
1959	.482	1.181	0.93
1960	.482	1.162	0.99
1961	.512	1.224	1.05
1962	.595	1.422	1.11
1963	.657	1.518	1.14
1964	.729	1.659	1.13
1965	.785	1.747	1.04
1966	.805	1.736	1.00
1967	.830	1.738	1.07
1968	1.005	2.014	1.17
1969	1.055	2.013	1.26
1970	.797	1.443	1.11
1971	.865	1.490	1.05
1972	1.009	1.670	1.05
1973	1.174	1.836	1.01
1974	1.200	1.711	0.95
1975	1.202	1.564	1.00
1976	1.465*	1.812	0.94
1977	1.700*	1.986	0.96
1978	2.070*	2.252	1.00
1979	2.300*	2.300	0.97
1980	2.550*	2.341	1.05

Note:* AAFRC estimate.

Source: *Giving U.S.A.*, 1980 Annual Report, American Association of Fund-Raising Counsel, Inc., latest that of 1980.

IG HAND





FOUNDATIONS

Year	Current amount (billions)	Constant dollars (billions)
1955	$ .300	$ .814
1956	.305	.802
1957	.502	1.277
1958	.505	1.265
1959	.702	1.720
1960	.710	1.711
1961	.702	1.678
1962	.701	1.644
1963	.821	1.897
1964	.830	1.889
1965	1.13	2.515
1966	1.25	2.695
1967	1.40	2.932
1968	1.60	3.206
1969	1.80	3.434
1970	1.90	3.441
1971	1.95	3.360
1972	2.00	3.310
1973	2.00	3.128
1974	2.11	3.009
1975	2.01	2.615
1976	2.13	2.635
1977	2.01	2.348
1978	2.16	2.350
1979	2.24	2.240
1980	2.40	2.200

RECIPIENTS

	Religion		Education		Social Welfare		Health & Hospitals		Arts & Humanities	
Year	Cur.	Con.	Cur.	Con.	Cur.	Con.	Cur.	Con.	Cur.	Con.
1955	$ 3.33	$ 9.04	$ .733	$ 1.99	$ 1.53	$ 4.15	$ .595	$ 1.62	$ .199	$ .539
1956	3.75	9.86	.637	1.68	1.42	3.73	.920	2.42	.142	.373
1957	4.02	10.23	.868	2.21	1.50	3.82	1.01	2.57	.159	.404
1958	4.15	10.40	.977	2.45	1.47	3.68	1.14	2.86	.163	.408
1959	4.56	11.17	1.34	3.28	1.43	3.50	1.15	2.82	.197	.483
1960	4.79	11.54	1.50	3.62	1.41	3.40	1.13	2.72	.188	.453
1961	5.01	11.97	1.57	3.75	1.47	3.51	1.18	2.82	.195	.466
1962	5.25	12.31	1.68	3.94	1.57	3.68	1.36	3.19	.210	.492
1963	5.58	12.89	1.93	4.46	1.71	3.95	1.48	3.42	.225	.520
1964	5.91	13.45	2.05	4.67	1.69	3.85	1.45	3.30	.226	.467
1965	6.51	14.49	2.26	5.03	1.86	4.14	1.46	3.25	.225	.503
1966	7.06	15.22	2.35	5.07	1.91	4.12	2.07	4.46	.376	.811
1967	7.40	15.50	2.45	5.13	1.89	3.96	2.82	5.91	.379	.794
1968	8.22	16.47	2.93	5.87	2.11	4.23	3.02	6.05	.404	.810
1969	8.85	16.89	3.17	6.05	2.54	4.85	3.23	6.16	.548	1.05
1970	9.30	16.84	3.24	5.74	2.88	5.22	3.40	6.16	.623	1.13
1971	9.98	17.20	3.56	6.13	2.92	5.03	3.65	6.29	.916	1.58
1972	10.02	16.58	3.66	6.06	2.99	4.95	3.77	6.24	.930	1.54
1973	10.52	16.45	4.10	6.41	3.06	4.79	4.15	6.49	1.25	1.96
1974	11.94	17.03	4.14	5.90	3.12	4.45	4.29	6.12	1.30	1.85
1975	12.91	16.80	3.95	5.14	3.14	4.09	4.42	5.75	1.72	2.24
1976	14.22	17.59	4.49	5.55	3.16	3.91	4.85	6.00	2.31	2.86
1977	16.93	19.77	4.75	5.55	3.52	4.11	4.90	5.72	2.27	2.65
1978	18.45	20.07	5.56	6.05	3.97	4.32	5.48	5.96	2.50	2.72
1979	20.14	20.14	5.99	5.99	4.35	4.35	5.95	5.95	2.70	2.70
1980	22.15	20.33	6.68	6.13	4.73	4.34	6.49	5.96	2.96	2.72

PUBLIC VALUES, PRIVATE INITIATIVE

Late in 1981, as part of the American Enterprise Institute's Private Sector Initiative project, the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research designed a major national survey to examine how Americans view *public life* in the United States—specifically, the role of government and of the private sector in meeting *common needs and objectives.* The Roper Organization did all of the field work, interviewing in person a sample of 1,500 adults.

The common equation of *public* with *governmental* has been the source of endless confusion in interpreting opinion in this subject area. As many observers going back to Alexis de Tocqueville have noted, Americans have manifested a strong sense of nation and common purpose. The new survey documents further these commitments. But the survey shows the populace to be open and flexible on the question of *how* the various common goals, such as education, helping those in need, and assuring a growing economy, are best met—by what combination of governmental and private initiatives.

Americans are neither ideologically pro- nor anti- government. They criticize it strongly for perceived failings but look to it for many services it seems uniquely able to perform.

Similarly, the populace is pragmatic and open on the merit of greater private initiatives in meeting common social needs. People believe that the private sector can do many things better than government—but again their enduring commitment is to getting things done, not to one particular way, governmental or private, of doing them.

E.C.L.

STRONG "SENSE OF NATION" SOURCE OF COMMITMENT TO SOLVING PROBLEMS

Question: Earlier on in American history, many people around the world thought the United States was the very best place in the world to live. Do you think it still is, or not?



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization/Roper Center for Public Opinion Research for the American Enterprise Institute, November 14-21, 1981.

Question: Do you think the United States has a special role to play in the world today, or is it pretty much like other countries?



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization/Roper Center for Public Opinion Research for the American Enterprise Institute, November 14-21, 1981.

MEETING COMMON NEEDS

Question: Here is a list of some areas in American life. (Hand respondent card) For each, please tell me if you think the *total* amount of spending on them—from all sources, government and nongovernmental—at the present time is too high, too low, or about right. . . . Support for the arts. (Ask about each)



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization/Roper Center for Public Opinion Research for the American Enterprise Institute, November 14-21, 1981.

PUBLIC CRITICAL OF GOVERNMENT ROLE IN MEETING NATIONAL OBJECTIVES

Question: In general, do you think tax money spent for human services is used well or not?



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization/Roper Center for Public Opinion Research for the American Enterprise Institute, November 14-21, 1981.

Question: Of course, in any program, some money has to go to administrative expenses. Out of each dollar the government spends on helping the poor, how many cents do you think actually goes to the people who need help?



25 cents of each dollar spent by government on helping the poor actually goes to the people who need help

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization/Roper Center for Public Opinion Research for the American Enterprise Institute, November 14-21, 1981.

Question: And how much out of each dollar people contribute to the United Way actually goes directly to the people who are supposed to get it?



50 cents of each dollar people contribute to United Way actually goes directly to the people who are supposed to get it.

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization/Roper Center for Public Opinion Research for the American Enterprise Institute, November 14-21, 1981.

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT INEFFICIENT AND UNRESPONSIVE

Question: Another phrase is "responsive to people's needs." Does *this* phrase describe the federal government, or not? (Ask about each)



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization/Roper Center for Public Opinion Research for the American Enterprise Institute, November 14-21, 1981.

Question: Here is a list of institutions in our society. (Hand respondent card) For each, please tell me if you think the phrase "efficient and well-run" describes it or not. First, the federal government. Does the phrase "efficient and well-run" describe it, or not? (Ask about each)



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization/Roper Center for Public Opinion Research for the American Enterprise Institute, November 14-21, 1981.

BUT LOSSES IN SUPPORT WON'T BE MADE UP

Question: (Hand respondent card) The government has been spending money for each of these areas, but there is now talk of cutbacks. For each one, please tell me if you think support from the private sector—such as corporations, private charities, churches, and individual citizens—will make up for the loss of government support, or not? First, support for the arts. (Ask about each)



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization/Roper Center for Public Opinion Research for the American Enterprise Institute, November 14-21, 1981.

MAJOR ROLE FOR GOVERNMENT SEEN

Question: I'm going to read you a list of areas in which government might play a role. For each, please tell me if you think the government should play a major role, a minor role, or no role at all. First, increasing the number of blacks and minorities in good jobs. (Ask about each item)



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization/Roper Center for Public Opinion Research for the American Enterprise Institute, November 14-21, 1981.

WILLING TO LOOK TO DIFFERENT LEVELS TO SOLVE PROBLEMS

Question: I'm going to read you a list of activities that people have suggested the government could be involved with. For each, please tell me if you think it is best provided by the federal government, state government, local government, or should mostly be provided outside government?



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization/Roper Center for Public Opinion Research for the American Enterprise Institute, November 14-21, 1981.

RESPONSIBILITY HAS SHIFTED TOO FAR TOWARD WASHINGTON

Question: All in all, would you say the present balance of responsibility between the federal government on the one hand, and the state and local government on the other is about right, tipped too far toward the federal government, or tipped too far toward the state and local governments?



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization/Roper Center for Public Opinion Research for the American Enterprise Institute, November 14-21, 1981.

TACKLING PROBLEMS FACING THE NATION

Question: There are a number of problems facing us as a nation—reducing unemployment, improving the health of our citizens, training people for good jobs, and the like. In general, what is the best way of getting resources to tackle these problems? From taxes raised by the government, from efforts of large corporations, or through projects of private voluntary organizations like church groups and charities?



Note: Multiple response per respondent.

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization/Roper Center for Public Opinion Research for the American Enterprise Institute, November 14-21, 1981.

CORPORATIONS SHOULD DO MORE

Question: Right now, many corporations engage in what is often called "corporate philanthropy," in which they contribute money to what they consider worthy causes. Typically, this money can be deducted from their profits when they pay taxes. In general, do you think it is appropriate for corporations to make such contributions or should they stick to making goods and providing services?



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization/Roper Center for Public Opinion Research for the American Enterprise Institute, November 14-21, 1981.

Question: Would you like to see more of this [corporate] philanthropy, less of it, or about as much as there is now?



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization/Roper Center for Public Opinion Research for the American Enterprise Institute, November 14-21, 1981.

PRIVATE VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS WOULD DO A BETTER JOB

Question: Assuming the level of support is the same, do you think we will do better if human services are provided by government agencies, or by private voluntary organizations?



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization/Roper Center for Public Opinion Research for the American Enterprise Institute, November 14-21, 1981.

MAKING THE NATION MORE A NATION BY SOLVING PROBLEMS TOGETHER

Question: Where do you think the truly important work in solving our country's problems will be done in the next ten years or so—the government or the private organizations?



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization/Roper Center for Public Opinion Research for the American Enterprise Institute, November 14-21, 1981.

ENVIRONMENTAL UPDATE

AN IMPORTANT VALUE

Question: Do you think that federal *air* pollution standards are overly protective of people's health, not protective enough, or just about right?



Source: Survey by Louis Harris & Associates, May 6-10, 1981.

Question: Frequently on any controversial issue there is no clear-cut side that people take, and also frequently solutions on controversial issues are worked out by compromise. But I'm going to name some different things, and for each one would you tell me whether on balance you would be more in favor of it, or more opposed to it? . . . A cutback in environmental regulations and pollution controls—on balance, are you more in favor of it or opposed to it?



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 81-2), January 10-24, 1981.

NO BACKING AWAY FROM COMMITMENT

Question: There are also differing opinions about how far we've gone with environmental protection laws and regulations. At the present time, do you think environmental protection laws and regulations have gone too far, or not far enough, or have struck about the right balance?



	Gone too far	Struck about right balance	Not far enough	Don't know/ No answer
October 1973	13%	32%	34%	21%
October 1974	17	44	25	15
October 1975	20	37	31	12
October 1976	15	35	32	18
September 1977	20	39	27	14
September 1979	24	36	29	11
September/ October 1980	25	33	33	10
September 1981	21	38	31	10



Note: Among males surveyed, 26 percent said we had gone too far, 40 percent struck about the right balance, 28 percent, not far enough. Among females the figures were 17 percent, 36 percent, and 34 percent.

Source: Surveys by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 81-9), latest that of September 19-26, 1981.

AIR QUALITY INDEX

Question: Would you say the air quality in (*the country as a whole/your area*) is excellent, good, fair, or poor?



Note: Sample size equals 1,004.
Source: Survey by Opinion Research Corporation for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, November 20-22, 1981.

Question: Compared to the situation five years ago, do you think the air quality in (*the country as a whole/your area*) is better, worse, or about the same?



A LOWER PRIORITY THAN OTHER CONCERNS

Question: Here is a list of things people have told us they are concerned about today. (Card shown respondent). Would you read over that list and then tell me which two or three *you personally* are most concerned about today. . . ?



	Jan. 1974	Jan. 1975	July 1975	Jan. 1976	Jan. 1977	Jan. 1979	Jan. 1981	Jan. 1982
Inflation and high prices	56%	58%	44%	44%	48%	63%	56%	53%
Crime and lawlessness	30	34	36	40	40	31	35	37
Money enough to live right and pay the bills	25	30	30	26	28	33	31	29
The fuel and energy crisis	46	27	27	22	31	25	30	17
The way the courts are run	20	22	27	30	27	23	24	25
A recession and rising unemployment	15	33	22	20	19	20	24	34
Our relations with foreign countries	18	10	11	13	9	15	19	21
Wrongdoing by elected government officials	40	26	28	32	22	24	18	17
Getting into another war	7	11	9	10	8	9	18	16
Drug abuse	23	20	21	24	21	14	16	17
The way young people think and act	10	14	16	15	17	14	14	12
Pollution of air and water	12	11	12	11	13	10	10	7
Alcoholism	*	*	*	6	7	6	7	7

Note: * = not asked. Percentages add to more than 100 due to multiple responses.

Source: Surveys by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 82-2), latest that of January 6-20, 1982.

ENVIRONMENT AND OTHER VALUES

ENERGY VERSUS THE ENVIRONMENT

Question: There is continuing talk about an energy crisis and the idea that there won't be enough electricity and other forms of energy to meet consumer demand in the coming years. Some people say that the progress of this nation depends on an adequate supply of energy and we have to have it even though it means taking some risks with the environment. Others say the important thing is the environment, and that it is better to risk not having enough energy than to risk spoiling our environment. Are you more on the side of adequate energy or more on the side of protecting the environment?



	Jan. 76	Oct. 76	Sept. 77	Sept. 79	Sept./ Oct. 80	Sept. 81
Adequate energy	39%	33%	43%	43%	45%	39%
Protecting the environment	39	44	35	38	36	40
Neither/no conflict (vol.)	14	13	14	10	12	13
Don't know/no answer	8	11	8	9	7	7

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 81-9), latest that of September 19-26, 1981.

DEVELOPMENT MUDDLE

Question: Would you favor increasing drilling for oil and natural gas off the California and Atlantic coasts, or do you think the risks of oil spills are too great?



Note: Sixty-seven percent of Republicans, 60% of Independents and 57% of Democrats favored increasing drilling.

Source: Surveys by CBS News/*New York Times*, September 22-27, 1981.

Question: Would you favor or oppose allowing drilling for oil and natural gas in federal wilderness areas—those areas which were originally set aside by the government to remain natural and undeveloped?



Note: In a question asked by the Opinion Research Corporation for LTV Industries and Companies, 66% in 1978 and 76% in 1981 favored development or use of energy resources such as oil, natural gas, coal and water power in potential wilderness areas.

Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, September 22-27, 1981.

PROTECTION VERSUS PRICE

Question: Sometimes laws that are designed to protect the environment cause industries to spend more money and raise their prices. Which do you think is more important: protecting the environment, or keeping prices down?



Source: Surveys by NBC News/Associated Press, latest that of October 25-26, 1981.

Question: Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Protecting the environment is so important that requirements and standards cannot be too high, and continuing environmental improvements must be made *regardless* of cost.



Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, September 22-27, 1981.

GROWTH DILEMMAS

Question: I'm going to read you a few statements. For each, can you please tell me if you tend to agree or disagree with it? (Read statements). . . . Some important regulations aimed at protecting the environment should be dropped so we can improve the economy.



Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, February 19-20, 1981.

Question: Which of these statements comes closer to your own feelings? . . . We need to relax our environmental laws in order to achieve economic growth, or . . . we need to maintain present environmental laws in order to preserve the environment for future generations?



Note: Sixty-seven percent of Republicans, 80 percent of Democrats, 70 percent of Independents chose the "maintain present laws" category.

Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, September 22-27, 1981.

NATIONAL GOALS VERSUS MY HOME TOWN

Question: Would you favor or oppose keeping air pollution laws as tough as they are now, even if some factories might have to close?



Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, September 22-27, 1981.

Question: If a particular local area is not meeting the current clean air standards would you favor or oppose each of the following possible actions? Close the factories in the local area until they make the necessary changes to meet the clean air standards even if it results in unemployment and hurts the economy in the area.



Note: Sample size equals 1,004.

Source: Survey by Opinion Research Corporation for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, November 20-22, 1981.

Question: If a particular local area is not meeting the current clean air standards would you favor or oppose each of the following possible actions? . . . Relax the clean air standards in the local area if it will prevent unemployment and help the economic situation.



Note: Sample size equals 1,004.

Source: Survey by Opinion Research Corporation for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, November 20-22, 1981.

Question: I am going to read you a couple of current or proposed provisions of the Clean Air Act designed to achieve, maintain, and enforce clean air standards. For each one, please tell me if you agree with it, disagree with it, or have no opinion about it one way or the other. . . . If a city or county does not meet its federal clean air goals within the time set by Congress, that city or county should lose its federal money for sewers, roads, parks and so forth.



Note: Sample size equals 1,004.

Source: Survey by Opinion Research Corporation for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, November 20-22, 1981.

AMERICA'S CAN DO SPIRIT

Question: I am going to read you three statements about environmental protection and business and new job growth. Please listen carefully and tell me which statement you agree with the most. (Read choices) We must accept a slower rate of business and new job growth in order to protect our environment. . . . We can achieve our current national goals of environmental protection and business and new job growth at the same time. . . . We must relax environmental standards in order to achieve business and new job growth.



Note: Sample size equals 1,004.

Source: Survey by Opinion Research Corporation for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, November 20-22, 1981.

THE CLEAN AIR ACT

Question: Do you favor or oppose the federal government setting and enforcing national air quality standards?



Note: Sample size equals 1,004.

Source: Survey by Opinion Research Corporation for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, November 20-22, 1981.

Question: How much have you heard or read about the federal Clean Air Act—a great deal, a fair amount, a little, or nothing at all?



Note: Sample size equals 1,004.

Source: Survey by Opinion Research Corporation for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, November 20-22, 1981.

Question: The federal Clean Air Act was passed in 1970 for the purpose of establishing air quality standards and setting enforcement procedures. The most recent change to the Act was made about four years ago. The Act is now being reviewed again by Congress. This review could or could not result in changes. I am going to read you some statements relating to this. For each one, please tell me whether you agree or disagree with it.





Note: Sample size equals 1,004.

Source: Survey by Opinion Research Corporation for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, November 20-22, 1981.

Question: This year Congress will reconsider the Clean Air Act which is now ten years old. Given the costs involved in cleaning up the environment, do you think Congress should make the Clean Air Act stricter than it is now, keep it about the same, or make it less strict?



Source: Survey by Louis Harris and Associates, September 19-24, 1981.

MEDIA AND BUSINESS EMISSIONS POLLUTED

Question: Recommendations for changes in the Clean Air Act may come from many sources. I am going to name several of them. For each one, please tell me whether you would or would not trust that source if it recommended changes to the Clean Air Act.



Note: Sample size equals 1,004.

Source: Survey by Opinion Research Corporation for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, November 20-22, 1981.


I AM BLIND
DEAF
3 BEARS TO SUPPORT
PERSONALLY...I THOUGHT IT WAS A LOT CUTER THE WAY THEY BEGGED BEFORE WATT TOOK OVER...

© 1981. Reprinted by permission of United Features Syndicate

WATT'S THIS?

Question: Have you heard or read enough about James Watt to have an opinion of him? (If yes, ask) Do you approve or disapprove of the way he is handling his job as secretary of the Interior?



Note: In a CBS News/*New York Times* poll taken in late September, 73% of those surveyed "did not know enough" about him (Jim Watt) to have an opinion. Seven percent of the remaining 27% had a favorable opinion, 11% were not favorable and 9 percent were "undecided/no opinion."

Source: Survey by NBC News/Associated Press, October 25-26, 1981.

THREE MILE ISLAND FALLOUT

Question: We now import from foreign countries about 45 percent of the oil we use, and estimates are that at present usage rates we will need to import more over time. Furthermore, while other oil producing countries now have excess oil supplies, these excess supplies cannot last forever. Experts say this all means we must find ways both to conserve oil and to develop new energy sources. Here are some suggestions that have been made. (Card shown respondent) Would you go down that list, and for each one tell me whether it is something you think should or should not be done? First, increase offshore exploration for oil reserves under the ocean. . . .

	Should go into greatly increased program to develop nuclear energy	Should not	Don't know
February 1977	61%	23%	16%
March 1979*	57	30	13
March 1980	45	43	12
March 1981	49	35	16

Note: *The Roper Organization was in the field on March 29-April 4 in 1979. The Three Mile Island accident occurred on March 28, 1979.

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 81-4), latest that of March 21-28, 1981.



Question: I'm going to read you several statements relating to ways that have been suggested to improve our energy situation. As I read each statement, please tell me whether you strongly favor it, mildly favor it, mildly oppose it, or strongly oppose it. . . . more nuclear power plants to generate electricity.



Source: Survey by Opinion Research Corporation, for the LTV Industries and Companies, latest that of March 1981.

HARRIS LOOKS AT REAGAN

Question: How would you rate the job President Reagan is doing as president—excellent, pretty good, only fair, or poor?

Now let me ask you about some specific things President Reagan has done. How would you rate him on . . . handling the economy . . . handling foreign policy—excellent, pretty good, only fair, or poor?



Overall Job Rating

1981	Excellent/ pretty good	Only fair/ poor	Not sure
February 19-22	62%	30%	8%
April 29-30	67	29	4
June 3-7	60	39	1
July 8-12	55	43	2
August 11-16	57	42	1
September 19-24	54	44	2
October 28-November 3	51	47	2
December 9-13	47	52	1
1982			
January 8-12	52	47	1
January 27-30	49	50	1
February 12-17	44	56	—

Handling Economy

1981	Excellent/ pretty good	Only fair/ poor	Not sure
February 19-22	58%	32%	10%
March 27-April 2	53	43	4
April 29-30	58	36	6
June 3-7	51	47	2
July 8-12	50	47	3
August 11-16	52	45	3
September 19-24	49	49	2
October 28-November 3	41	56	3
December 9-13	39	59	2
1982			
January 8-12	41	57	2
January 27-30	42	56	2

Handling Foreign Policy

1981	Excellent/ pretty good	Only fair/ poor	Not sure
February 19-22	54%	34%	12%
March 27-April 2	45	49	6
June 3-7	49	46	5
July 8-12	47	46	7
August 11-16	45	48	7
September 19-24	51	43	6
October 28-November 3	50	46	4
December 9-13	47	50	3
1982			
January 8-12	49	47	4
January 27-30	49	45	6

Source: Surveys by Louis Harris & Associates, latest that of February 12-17, 1982.

THE IOWA POLL REFLECTS ON 1981

Question: Choose the three things you are *least* thankful for in 1981: High interest rates. Col. Muammar Qaddafi of Libya. The royal wedding. Iran. Nebraska football fans. The baseball strike. Brooke Shields. Massage parlors. Coin-operated video games. Dan Rather. Clothing with alligators on it. The neutron bomb.

Iowans least thankful for:



Note: Numbers add to more than 100 percent due to multiple responses. Sample size equals 1,022.

Source: Survey by the Iowa Poll, Des Moines Register & Tribune Company, September 9-15, 1981.

by David Moore

A New (Hampshire) Tax Revolt?

Then presidential candidate Ronald Reagan suggested to a New Hampshire woman on February 5, 1980, that the people in New Hampshire should be willing to look for a "broader-based tax" than the property tax as a solution to economic problems, Reagan supporters around the state shuddered. In New Hampshire, "broad-based taxer" was a term of invective used for over three decades by the late William Loeb, publisher of the *Manchester Union Leader*, against any political figure who might at some point in his life have even *toyed* with the idea that state sales or income taxes should be adopted in New Hampshire. As the only state without either tax, it had become a cardinal tenet of New Hampshire politics that no serious politician could be successful if he were stigmatized as a "broad-baser." It was not sufficient to express opposition to broad-based taxes "at this time," or "in principle." Instead, one had to take THE PLEDGE, which in the case of gubernatorial candidates meant a public oath to veto any sales or income tax should the legislature dare to pass one. "Every governor in the last twenty-two years," former State Senator Alf Jacobson said, "has taken a broad-based pledge."

Indeed, during his three terms as governor, Republican Meldrim Thomson reiterated his "axe the tax" pledge so often, one might have inferred that New Hampshire was a one-issue state. In fact, the 1976 election showed just that. Thomson's opponent, Harry Spanos, refused to take the THE PLEDGE, and Thomson won in a landslide. It was the only year he won so handily. A statewide poll conducted by my class right before the election revealed that 95 percent of the voters supported the candidate who was closer to them on the tax issue. Since the overwhelming majority opposed a broad-based tax, Thomson was easily the victor.

In 1978 the tax issue was turned against Meldrim Thomson. As an unsuccessful gubernatorial candidate in previous primaries, Democrat Hugh Gallen had long since taken THE PLEDGE, so his purity on that matter was unquestioned. After he won the primary in 1978, his major campaign issue against Thomson was the construction work in progress (CWIP) charges imposed by the state's electric company to help pay for the nuclear power plant at Seabrook. Gallen called the CWIP charges a "hidden" broad-based tax and chided Thomson for vetoing a bill that would have outlawed such charges. The quasi-tax issue proved decisive, and Gallen overcame an early poll deficit of over 10 percent to win the election.

Thus, when Reagan made his impromptu remarks in 1980, he inadvertently reopened an issue that, from all appearances, had been firmly decided by the people. With only three weeks before New Hampshire's first-in-the-nation primary, which all polls at the time showed to be a close contest, and with one loss already to George Bush the previous month in the Iowa caucuses, Reagan could ill-afford to become embroiled in a controversy over the state's Rube Goldberg tax structure. His supporters first denied that he'd said anything about broad-based taxes. When a reporter's tape recording was produced, they claimed Reagan was really talking about California and not New Hampshire. The next day, the media's attention shifted to new charges of kickbacks to Bush, and the Reagan/broad-base controversy died.

But there is an afterword.

New Hampshire still has not adopted a state income or sales tax, despite a projected $30 to $40 million deficit. Like those of other states, New Hampshire's revenues have been diminished by the national recession. In addition, two almost snowless winters (not this year) have hurt the ski industry, a major source of income. And, of course, federal cuts in revenue sharing have shifted a greater financial burden to the states.

Because of New Hampshire's financial problems, however, there appears to be growing support among public officials for a broad-based tax. Several political leaders, like Nashua Mayor Maurice Arel, have openly advocated such a measure. Governor Gallen talks about the need for "comprehensive" tax reform, though he sidesteps the issue of a broad-based reform. And Warren Rudman, New Hampshire's junior senator, recently argued that to pay for the federal programs turned back to the states under Reagan's swap proposal, New Hampshire may have to adopt a broad-based tax—though he quickly adds that he doesn't propose one.

The reluctance of some other officials to express support for a state income or sales tax is no doubt due to their perceptions of adamant public opposition. But, they may be surprised.

A statewide poll taken this past January reveals some startling changes in the thinking of New Hampshire citizens. Support for both a sales and income tax has increased dramatically over the past two years (see table 1). In each of three surveys (March 1980, March 1981, and January 1982), respondents were asked to indicate their support or opposition to several tax measures "if taxes do have to be raised." In the past year public opinion on a sales tax has shifted from overwhelming opposition to slight support.

Table 1
SUPPORT FOR BROAD-BASED TAXES

	Support	Oppose	Unsure	(N)
A. *Sales Tax*				
1980	19%	76%	5%	(613)
1981	21	73	6	(478)
1982	49	44	7	(496)
B. *Income Tax*				
1980	18	77	6	(603)
1981	20	74	6	(460)
1982	42	54	5	(493)

Source: Survey by the University of New Hampshire poll, latest that of January 4-10, 1982.

A similar, though smaller, increase in support is found for an income tax: 18 percent supported and 77 percent opposed the income tax in 1980, while for 1981 the comparable figures are 20 percent and 74 percent, and in 1982, they are 42 percent and 54 percent.

This doubling of support for a broad-based tax is not due, as some anti-taxers fear, to the influx of Massachusetts residents or other recent immigrants who haven't yet been acculturated to New Hampshire politics. All three surveys show that attitudes about taxes are approximately the same among all groups of residents, whether they have lived in the state for just a few years or all their lives.

Table 2
SUPPORT BY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

	Favor	Oppose	Unsure	(N)
A. *Sales Tax*				
Liberals				
1980	26%	64%	10%	(99)
1981	35	62	3	(55)
1982	53	45	2	(74)
Moderates				
1980	18	77	5	(194)
1981	20	72	8	(191)
1982	50	43	7	(175)
Conservatives				
1980	16	80	4	(204)
1981	19	78	3	(116)
1982	41	46	13	(111)
B. *Income Tax*				
Liberals				
1980	31	64	5	(96)
1981	37	56	7	(52)
1982	50	43	7	(74)
Moderates				
1980	18	73	9	(192)
1981	15	79	6	(182)
1982	46	48	6	(176)
Conservatives				
1980	14	83	3	(201)
1981	21	75	4	(114)
1982	39	59	2	(110)

Source: Survey by the University of New Hampshire poll, latest that of January 4-10, 1982.

The characteristic that most clearly differentiates voters is their political philosophy, with liberals more supportive of the broad-based taxes than moderates, and moderates more supportive than conservatives. Nevertheless, the shift in public sentiment is not due to an influx of moderates and liberals into the state. The proportion of citizens in each category has remained stable over the past two years. Instead, as shown in table 2, the shift in opinion has occurred among all three groups.

The reason for this shift in opinion may be found in the financial constraints faced by the state over the past two years. By withholding some money from local communities to help solve the state's problems, as Governor Gallen noted in his recent State of the State address, property taxes have increased. Yet the public is more strongly opposed to increases in the property tax (14 percent favor, 85 percent oppose) than to any other type of tax. Property taxes in New Hampshire are already among the highest in the nation.

Ironically, it was a question about property taxes that prompted candidate Reagan's remarks about broad-based taxes in February 1980. Shaking hands at a factory in Pittsfield, Reagan was stopped by Susan Vail, who said she would vote for him if he could give her a satisfactory answer to one question: what could be done to lessen the property tax burden?

Reagan answered that he thought the property tax was generally unfair, and that it "should be used only for services that are associated with property," such as police and fire protection. "What the people ought to be willing to do is look for a broader-based tax, based on your ability to pay. . . . If you're sick for six months, you don't pay for any income tax," he said. And in states that have sales taxes, "You can put off buying something. But the property tax—whether you're able to pay or not, if you've been flat on your back for six months—when that bill comes due, it's pay the bill or lose your house." [1]

That seemed persuasive to Susan Vail, who reportedly said, "I'm for Reagan now." But it is only recently that the idea has seemed persuasive to a large segment of the New Hampshire public. As more pressure is put on the states to assume the financial burdens of programs now funded by the federal government, and if the recession continues, the pressures on states like New Hampshire to increase taxes will be even greater. With such strong opposition to property taxes now, the broad-based tax, as Reagan argued in 1980, may become an attractive alternative when New Hampshire considers its next biennial budget in 1983. The "broad-based taxers" have not won, but now they have a sizable following.

---

[1] *Concord Monitor*, February 6-8, 1980, p. 1.

NOTE

ONLY THE FOLLOWING PAGES OF THIS

PUBLICATION HAVE BEEN FILMED

Cover 1, p. 1, 21-40, 42-

47, 51-59.

6/14/82 R 2110-1A

Public Opinion

ACQUISITIONS EDITOR
STATISTICAL REFERENCE INDEX
CONGRESSIONAL INFORMATION SERVICE 1
4520 EAST-WEST HIGHWAY
WASHINGTON, DC 20014
BB-26788 1

e wondered about CONSERVATIVES, LIBERALS, and CONSERVATIVES and NOW we wonder about NEO-RALS—with Felix Rohatyn, William Simon, Morton dracke and Michael Scully; (Are any of them neolibs?)

wonder about IEN; are the s telling us, holy ke(!), that they are rent from men? Midge Decter and Betty Friedan wonder with us;

And about the MIDDLE EAST, now that the Sinai has been returned (Dan Pattir); about attitudes toward the region (William Adams); about anti-Semitism in America (Ruth Clark and Greg Martire);



We wonder about EL SALVADOR, now that the elections are over and the TV folks have gone home; (William Schneider, Karlyn Keene, Victoria Sackett, Ben J. Wattenberg);

And, this being a magazine about public opinion, we even wonder about POLLS. Are people LYING(!) to the ☐☑☐ *pollsters? (I. A. Lewis and William Schneider)*

Public Opinion

Volume 5, Number 2 April/May 1982

Publisher
William J. Baroody, Jr.

Co-Editors
Seymour Martin Lipset
Ben J. Wattenberg

Managing Editor
Karlyn H. Keene

Associate Editor
Victoria A. Sackett

Assistant Editor
Nicola L. Furlan

Research Assistant
Mary Bruun

Editorial Consultant
Hunter C. Harrison, Jr.

Editorial Board
David R. Gergen, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, Irving Kristol, Everett Carll Ladd, Howard Penniman, Austin Ranney, Richard M. Scammon, Laurence H. Silberman, Herbert Stein, and Richard J. Whalen

Consulting Editor for Opinion Roundup
Everett Carll Ladd

Editorial Associate
Marilyn M. Potter

Art & Design Director
Pat Taylor

Chart Illustrator
Hördur Karlsson

Staff Editor
Elizabeth D. Ashooh

PUBLIC OPINION, April/May 1982, Vol. 5, No. 2. Published bimonthly by the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. Copyright 1982 American Enterprise Institute. Subscription rates: $18.00 for one year, $34.00 for two years. Individual copy: $3.50. Information on bulk orders or multiple subscriptions available on request. Editorial and business offices: c/o AEI, 1150 17th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. Send changes of address and all subscription correspondence to Circulation Department, c/o AEI, same address. "American Enterprise Institute" and are registered service marks of the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.

Second class postage paid at Washington, D.C.

ISSN 0149-9157

CONTENTS

2 **LIBERALISM'S BRAVE NEO WORLD?**
Two Views
Liberalism has fallen on hard times, but there may be something to replace it. Morton Kondracke and Michael Scully look at the newest of the "neo-isms"—neoliberalism.

6 **CHARTING THE ECONOMIC COURSE: CAN NEOLIBERALISM HELP?**
A conversation with Felix Rohatyn and William Simon
Do old economic problems have new solutions? Two prominent businessmen and political antagonists examine the Reagan philosophy, neoliberalism, and business involvement in foreign affairs.

13 **BANG-BANG TELEVISION: THE NEW SUPERPOWER**
by William Schneider
Public opinion on foreign policy obeys at least two masters—television and the foreign affairs elite. The nuclear freeze and El Salvador make the case.

16 **AN EDITORS' REPORT ON EL SALVADOR**
by Karlyn Keene and Victoria Sackett
The polls on El Salvador tell us that Americans don't want to get involved. Is isolationism the American way of life?

18 **PUBLIC OPINION: FOLLOWING THE LEADER**
by Ben J. Wattenberg
Public Opinion's *editor argues that the public debate on El Salvador has lacked the most important element of all—the President.*

20 **ARE WOMEN DIFFERENT TODAY?**
A symposium with Midge Decter and Betty Friedan
The editors asked Midge Decter and Betty Friedan to comment on what the surveys unearthed about some surprising differences and similarities between men and women (see Opinion Roundup).

21 **OPINION ROUNDUP**
Men and Women—where they differ, where they don't; Nuclear war and the Alliance; Reagan ratings; Miniskirts, Romance, Chivalry, Blondes; and the Ten Commandments.

42 **IS THE PUBLIC LYING TO THE POLLSTERS?**
by I. A. Lewis and William Schneider
Ask me a question and I might tell you lies. Two eminent survey researchers look at prevarication in the polls.

48 **AFTER THE SINAI WITHDRAWAL**
by Dan Pattir
This veteran journalist and former press secretary to Prime Minister Menachem Begin analyzes attitudes in the Middle East before and after the transfer of the Sinai.

51 **MIDDLE EAST MEETS WEST: SURVEYING AMERICAN ATTITUDES**
by William C. Adams
American attitudes toward the Middle East and its leaders have changed in the last several years. The author surveys the surveys. In a sidebar, he looks at television coverage of the region and finds it uneven.

56 **ANTI-SEMITISM IN AMERICA**
by Greg Martire and Ruth Clark
Do the number of anti-Semitic incidents in this country indicate a rise in anti-Semitism? Not necessarily. The authors analyze a major study of American attitudes toward Jews and find cause for optimism.

WOMEN AND MEN: IS A REALIGNMENT UNDER WAY?

Time has changed the role of women, but has it changed their minds? Recent news stories have highlighted areas where women's opinions differ from men's—war, peace, and Ronald Reagan, to name a few. Such stories led us to take a systematic, historical look at men's and women's attitudes. Where and when have they coincided and diverged? We looked at many hundreds of different questions which spanned the last thirty-five years.

1948-1952

We began our comparisons of the opinions of men and women by examining data from *1948-1952*. In this period we found that (1) public opinion differences between the sexes were generally very modest. The polling data support the old textbook conclusion that there are no sustained differences in the general social and political outlook of men and women. (2) The biggest differences in this period occurred in *expressed levels of political information and interest*. On many questions asked between 1948 and 1952, the proportion of women who said they had no opinion on or no interest in political issues was significantly higher than the proportion of men giving such responses. The one large dimension where men's and women's attitudes differed consistently—though not dramatically—involved the *use of force*. For example, the possibility of war, or foreign policy questions that raised such matters as a "firm stance" against the Russians, found men and women different in overall expressed outlook. The two sexes took what the traditional stereotypes have told us are their "natural" roles.

1960-64

The next period we looked at was *1960-64*. The pattern which emerged was identical to the one found in the earlier time span.

1. The differences in outlook between the sexes continued to be small and inconsistent in direction. That is, looking at the data overall, one can only conclude that there was no sustained variation in response by sex.

2. There continued to be some substantial differences in the amount of political information and political interest, with women expressing less of these.

3. The only substantive dimension where variations kept cropping up again involved the use of force. Women showed themselves more concerned about the possibility of war, more opposed to the death penalty for convicted murderers, and so on.

4. On various questions that might be called "women's issues"—involving the interests of women or matters that affect women much differently or more directly than men—there were no persistent dissimilarities. We had found the same thing in 1948-1952 and, to get ahead of our story, we found the same thing in later periods, right up to the present. On voting for a woman for president, abortion, ERA, whatever it happens to be—response differences between men and women are consistently small for all periods.

The Early Seventies

The next span for which we examined all issues was the beginning of the 1970s—1971 and 1972. Here again, the pattern initially noted in the 1940s held up. (1) Overall, men and women responded almost identically to most questions. (2) Again, the one area where we found significant divergences between the sexes involved the use of force. (3) As noted above, the differences on the "women's issues" continued to be negligible.

Our story continues on page 27.

1948

WOMEN LESS LIKE

Question: Do you think the Taft-Hartley Law should be revised, repealed, or left unchanged? (Ask only of those responding "Yes" to the following question: Have you heard or read about the Taft-Hartley Law which deals with labor unions?)*



Note: *Respondents who have heard or read about Taft-Hartley Law=79%.
Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, January 23-28, 1948.

Question: Now I'd like to read some of the kinds of things people tell me when I interview them and ask you whether you agree or disagree with them. I'll read them one at a time and you just tell me whether you agree or disagree. . . . Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on.



Source: Survey by the Center for Political Studies of the Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, Election Study 1952.

DIFFERENCES IN OUTLOO

Question: Do you believe that sex education should be taught in the high school here or not?



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization, July-August, 1950.

Question: Would you favor or oppose a law requiring all members of the Communist Party in this country to register (file their names) with the Justice Department in Washington?



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, March 6-11, 1949.

USE OF FORCE SPLIT

Question: What do you think we should do now in Korea. . . Keep trying to work out a way to stop the fighting in Korea, stop fooling around and do whatever is necessary to knock the Communists out of Korea once and for all even at the risk of starting World War III, or pull out of Korea right away and let them handle their own problems with the Communists?



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization, October 1952.

Question: The Selective Service Draft Law ends in June. Do you think Congress should or should not continue the draft law for another 3 years?



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, January 8-13, 1950.

952

O BE INFORMED

Question: Would you say that you, yourself, are interested in political affairs in this country—or do you prefer to leave that to others?



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, July 2-7, 1949.

Question: Would you like to see the United States go more in the direction of a welfare state or less in the direction of a welfare state?



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, September 25-30, 1949.

INSIGNIFICANT

Question: Do you think U.S. government spending should be increased, decreased, or remain about the same on the following . . . General expense of government?



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, March 26-31, 1950.

Question: Another of Truman's proposals concerns interstate travel. Do you think negroes should or should not be required to occupy a separate part of a train or bus when traveling from one state to another?



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, March 5-10, 1948.

THE SEXES EARLY ON

Question: Do you think the United States and all the Western European countries participating in the Marshall Plan should join together in a permanent military alliance—that is, agree to come to each other's defense *immediately* if any one of them is attacked?



Note: Other = 2% in each case, not shown.
Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, April 23-28, 1948.

Question: A U.S. senator has suggested that the United States should pledge (promise) that we will never use the atom bomb in warfare until some other nation has used it on us first. What is your opinion of this suggestion?



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, July 2-7, 1949.

1960–

WOMEN STILL LESS

Question: In your opinion, do you think that too much money, or not enough money, is being spent on welfare and relief programs in your area?



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, November 20-25, 1964.

Question: Have you been paying any attention to what is going on in Viet Nam? (If Yes, ask:) Do you think we did the right thing in getting into the fighting in Viet Nam or should we have stayed out?



Note: The national response for "Other/depends" was 1%; for men, 2%; for women, 1%.
Source: Survey by the Center for Political Studies of the Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, Election Study 1964.

STILL INSIGNIFICANT

Question: The government in Washington ought to see to it that everybody who wants to work can find a job. Now would you have an opinion on this or not? (If yes, have opinion ask:) Do you think the government *should* do this?



Note: Agree = agree strongly + agree not very strongly. Disagree = disagree not very strongly + disagree strongly.
Source: Survey by the Center for Political Studies of the Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, Election Study 1960.

Question: Would you favor or oppose having the social security tax increased in order to pay for old-age medical insurance?



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, May 17-22, 1961.

FORCE STILL A

Question: Are you in favor of the death penalty for persons convicted of murder?



Note: No opinion calculated out for comparison purposes. National = 11%; Female = 13%.

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, March 2-7, 1960.

Question: There has been a good deal of discussion about what we should do about Russia. In which of these directions do you believe the next administration should go in dealing with Russia? (Hand respondent card) (a) Adopt an even tougher policy of dealing with the Russians than we have up to now—even if it means taking some risks. . . (b) Keep on with about the same degree of toughness we have been pursuing in the last 2-3 years. . . (c) try a somewhat friendlier approach in the hope that the Russians will in time learn to play fair when they know more about us and what we believe in.



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization, October 1960.

964

IKELY TO BE INFORMED

Question: Now I'd like to read some of the kinds of things people tell us when we interview them and ask you whether you agree or disagree with them. I'll read them one at a time and you just tell me whether you agree or disagree. . . . Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on.



Source: Survey by the Center for Political Studies of the Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, Election Study 1960.

Question: There is much discussion as to the amount this country should spend for national defense. How do you feel about this—do you think we are spending too little, too much, or about the right amount?



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, March 2-7, 1960.

IFFERENCES IN OUTLOOK

Question: It has been estimated that it would cost the United States $40 billion—or an average of about $225 per person—to send a man to the moon. Would you like to see this amount spent for this purpose or not?



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, May 17-22, 1961.

Question: If colored people came to live next door would you move? (Asked of whites only.)



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, May 23-28, 1963.

IVISIVE ISSUE

Question: Suppose you had to make the decision between fighting an all-out nuclear war or living under Communist rule—how would you decide?



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, October 19-24, 1961.

Question: How about the chances of our country getting into war? Would you say that at the present time you are *pretty* worried about this country getting into another war, *somewhat* worried, or *not worried* at all?



Source: Survey by the Center for Political Studies of the Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, Election Study 1960.

1970-1972

ISSUE DIFFERENCES INSIGNIFICANT

Question: In general, do you favor or oppose the busing of negro and white school children from one district to another?



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, August 27-30, 1971.

Question: As you know, even though America is a wealthy nation, there are still many people living here who are poor. I will read you some reasons people have offered to explain why this is so, including some things that other people don't agree with at all. For each, I'd like you to tell me whether you agree a great deal, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat, or disagree a great deal. . . . The poor are poor because the American way of life doesn't give all people an equal chance.



Note: Agree = agree a great deal + agree somewhat. Disagree = disagree somewhat + disagree a great deal.

Source: Survey by the Center for Political Studies of the Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, Election Study 1972.

Question: I'd like you to tell me whether you agree or disagree with each of these next six statements. . . . This country would be better off if we just stayed home and did not concern ourselves with problems in other parts of the world.



Source: Survey by the Center for Political Studies of the Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, Election Study 1972.

THE USE OF FORCE STILL DIVIDES THE SEXES

Question: Suppose you were voting today on each of the three propositions listed on this card—which of the two statements —a or b would you vote for? Proposition III: (a) Young men who have left the United States to avoid the draft should be allowed to return to this country without some form of punishment. (b) Young men who have left the United States to avoid the draft should not be allowed to return to this country without some form of punishment.



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, June 23-26, 1972.

Question: Would you favor or oppose a law which would require a person to obtain a police permit before he or she could buy a gun?



Source: Survey by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Survey, 1972.

Question: Are you in favor of the death penalty for persons convicted of murder?



Source: Survey by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Survey, 1972.

A NEW ERA IN MEN'S AND WOMEN'S ATTITUDES

By the late 1970s, however, a big change was evident in the social and political responses of women and men. They had begun to take on the coloration of other groups in our society whose attitudes on a broad spectrum of issues are different. Differences of social and political outlook between men and women, while not huge, began appearing in a consistent pattern by the mid to late 1970s. It was the new regularity of these patterned differences that was striking. We looked at poll questions in detail for 1976 and for 1977.

1. It should be noted that on a good many questions there were still no significant differences by sex.

2. But many areas now evidenced for the first time *significant* and *sustained* variations.

3. One of these might be called the *compassion dimension.* Women were saying in 1976 and 1977 that they placed a greater emphasis on the role of government in getting jobs for people who lacked them, in helping blacks, in helping those in need generally, and so on.

4. The *risk dimension* was also one where men's attitudes contrasted with women's. For example, women were more receptive to strong governmental regulation to protect the environment.

5. The *force dimension* was still there and indeed was expanding. Thus, women were less supportive than men of high defense spending, more worried about war, less willing to support intervention in foreign affairs, more opposed to the death penalty, more in favor of gun control, and more resistant to certain other kinds of intrusions like wiretapping.

6. Some of the "traditional" issues on which men and women had long differed—such as support for prohibition or other restrictions on the use of alcohol—were now showing a marked shrinkage of the male-female split. The "wet-dry" issue is especially interesting because at earlier points in U.S. history this was the most dramatic male-female political cleavage. By the late 1970s, however, this issue showed only the slightest trace of its historic capacity to divide the sexes.

7. On women's issues—abortion, ERA, vote for women for public office, and so on—there were still no significant men-women differences in 1976 and 1977.

8. A striking new split involved *confidence in the system.* Again and again, women said they were less sure that the country would be strong and prosperous in the future, and were less certain that the society would be able to solve its problems and function successfully. In trying to account for these differences, some possible causes can be ruled out. It isn't, for example, that women as a group are less happy or less confident about their personal lives. In fact, insofar as mass survey data can get at such an issue, women show themselves somewhat *more confident* personally. It isn't, moreover, that women reflect some great *personal complaint* against the society. And it isn't that they are more inclined to despair about the capabilities of government—compared to men, they don't see governmental officials as less competent, more dishonest, or whatever. Rather, women were just less hopeful about the performance and prospects of the society.

The Eighties

At the beginning of the 1980s, everything seen for 1976 and 1977 continues to hold. There are broad if not enormously deep differences in the general social and political outlook of men and women. The differences now extend far beyond a few traditional "social issues" like pornography and the use of force, to encompass a wide assortment of social and political questions. Whether these new divisions in outlook will be sustained in the years ahead, or rather will fade, remains to be seen. The question of their persistence is linked to the whole matter of causality—something which Midge Decter and Betty Friedan address on page 20 of this issue.

1976 TO THE PRESENT

ON SOME ISSUES, DIFFERENCES ARE STILL INSIGNIFICANT

Question: We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount. First (Read Item A) . . . are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on . . . improving the nation's education system?



Source: Survey by National Opinion Research Center, General Social Survey, 1977.

Question: In general, do you favor or oppose the busing of (negro/black) and white school children from one district to another?



Source: Survey by National Opinion Research Center, General Social Survey, 1977.

Question: I am going to mention several general categories on which the federal government spends money. After each, please tell me whether you feel spending for it should be increased, decreased, or left about the same (if increase/decrease, probe:) Is that increased/decreased a great deal or somewhat . . . fighting crime?



Note: Increased = increased somewhat/great deal. Decreased = decreased somewhat/great deal.
Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, February 19-20, 1981.

MEN AND WOMEN ON DIFFERENT PATHS: PERCEPTIONS OF RISK

Question: Now I'd like to know how you feel about a number of important issues that face the country. Do you favor or oppose: relaxing environmental protection laws if it will help to improve the economy.

Registered voters



Source: Survey by *Time*/Yankelovich, Skelly and White, May 12-14, 1981.

Question: It has been recommended that wherever possible industry convert to the use of coal from oil and natural gas. Do you think environmental standards concerning air pollution should be relaxed to permit the use of coal or do you think they should be kept as they are now?



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, April 29-May 2, 1977.

DIFFERENCES ON COMPASSION EMERGE

Question: Now I'd like to know how you feel about certain issues. For example, do you favor or oppose: the passage of a full employment bill in which the government guarantees a job to everyone who wants to work.

Registered voters



Source: Survey by *Time*/Yankelovich, Skelly and White, November 1977.

Question: I'm going to read a few statements. For each, can you please tell me if you tend to agree or disagree with it? The government should work to substantially reduce the income gap between rich and poor?



Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, February 19-20, 1981.

Question: We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount. First (Read Item A) . . . are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on (Item)? . . . Improving the condition of blacks.



Source: Survey by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Survey, 1977.

Question: Now I'd like to ask about some *specific* federal government programs. Again, for each, please tell me whether you feel spending for that program should be increased, decreased, or left about the *same* (If increase/decrease, probe:) Is that increased/decreased a great deal or somewhat? . . .The social security program?



Note: Increased = increased somewhat/great deal. Decreased = decreased somewhat/great deal.
Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, February 19-20, 1981.

THE FORCE DIMENSION EXPANDS

Question: Do you think it will be best for the future of this country if we take an active part in world affairs, or if we stay out of world affairs?



Source: Survey by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Survey, 1976.

Question: Do you favor or oppose the death penalty for persons convicted of murder?



Source: Survey by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Survey, 1977.

SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES ON THE USE OF FORCE

Question: Would you favor or oppose a law which would require a person to obtain a police permit before he or she could buy a gun?



Source: Survey by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Survey, 1977.

Question: Do you think there should or should not be a law which would forbid the possession of handguns except by the police and other authorized persons?



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, June 19-22, 1981.

Question: Turning to another subject: Do you think we should return to the military draft at this time or not?



Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, October 14-18, 1981.

Question: Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statement about world affairs: The United States should keep to itself and stay out of world affairs. Is that agree/disagree strongly or agree/disagree somewhat?



Note: Agree = agree strongly + agree somewhat. Disagree = disagree strongly + disagree somewhat.
Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, April 20-22, 1981.

Question: I am going to mention several general categories on which the federal government spends money. After each, please tell me whether you feel spending for it should be increased, decreased or left about the same. (If increase/decrease, probe:) Is that increased/decreased a great deal or somewhat? . . . the military?



Note: Increased = increased somewhat/great deal. Decreased = decreased somewhat/great deal.
Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, February 19-20, 1981.

CONFIDENCE IN THE SYSTEM

WOMEN HAVE LESS CONFIDENCE IN COUNTRY'S FUTURE

Question: In commenting on how things are going in the country some people tell us that the problems we face are no worse than at any other times in recent years. Others say the country is really in deep and serious trouble today. Which comes closest to your own feelings—the fact that:



Source: Survey by *Time*/Yankelovich, Skelly and White, November 1977.

Question: Do you have a lot of confidence, some confidence, or no real confidence that in a few years from now our country will be strong and prosperous?



Source: Survey by *Time*/Yankelovich, Skelly and White, May 12-14, 1981.

IN PERSONAL LIFE, WOMEN HAPPIER THAN MEN

Question: Generally speaking, how happy would you say you are—very happy, fairly happy, or not too happy?



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, November 4-7, 1977.

TEMPERANCE TEMPERED OVER TIME

Question: If the question of national prohibition should come up again, would you vote wet or dry? (1948)
Would you favor or oppose a law forbidding the sale of beer, wine, and liquor throughout the nation? (1981)



Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, October 16-21, 1948 and January 9-12, 1981.

“WOMEN’S ISSUES”: THE SEXES CONVERGE

DRAFT

Question: Do you think that single women between the ages of twenty-one and thirty should be drafted now for nonfighting in the Army, Navy and Air Force?



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, July 30-August 4, 1950.

WOMAN FOR PRESIDENT

Question: If your party nominated a woman for president, would you vote for her if she qualified for the job?



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, August 15-20, 1963.

ABORTION

Question: Would you favor or oppose a law which would permit a woman to go to a doctor to end pregnancy at any time during the first three months?



ource: Survey by the Gallup Organization, December 8-11, 1972.

ABORTION

Question: Please tell me whether or not *you* think it should be possible for a pregnant woman to obtain a *legal* abortion if . . . she is married and does not want any more children?



Source: Survey by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Survey, 1977.

DISCRIMINATION

Question: In general, women in our society have not been as successful as men—in business, politics, the leadership positions in our country. I'll read you some reasons people have offered to explain why this is so, including some things that other people don't agree with at all. For each, I'd like you to tell me whether you agree a great deal, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat, or disagree a great deal. First, our society discriminates against women.



Note: Agree = agree a great deal + agree somewhat. Disagree = disagree somewhat + disagree a great deal.
Source: Survey by the Center for Political Studies of the Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, Election Study 1972.

ERA

Question: Now I'd like to know how you feel about a number of important issues that face the country. Do you favor or oppose: Passage of the Equal Rights Amendment?

Registered voters



Source: Survey by *Time*/Yankelovich, Skelly and White, May 12-14, 1981.

RATING REAGAN: HIS HANDLING OF THE JOB

GALLUP

Question: Do you approve or disapprove of the way (name of President) is handling his job as President?



Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of April 2-5, 1982.

HARRIS

Question: How would you rate the job President Carter/Reagan is doing as President—excellent, pretty good, only fair, or poor?



Source: Surveys by Louis Harris and Associates, latest that of April 16-22, 1982.

NBC NEWS/AP

Question: What kind of a job do you think Jimmy Carter/Ronald Reagan is doing as President . . . do you think he is doing an excellent job, a good job, only a fair job, or do you think he is doing a poor job?



Source: Surveys by NBC News/Associated Press, latest that of March 29-30, 1982.

CBS NEWS/NEW YORK TIMES

Question: Do you approve or disapprove of the way Jimmy Carter/Ronald Reagan is handling his job as President?



Source: Surveys by CBS News/*New York Times*, latest that of March 11-15, 1982.

ABC NEWS/WASHINGTON POST

Question: Do you approve or disapprove of the way Ronald Reagan is handling his job as President? Is that approve/disapprove strongly, or approve/disapprove somewhat?



Data for pages 33-35 are shown on page 36.

Note: Sample sizes: For 1981, September 25-26 = 501; October 1-5 = 1,004; October 9-12 = 1,200; December 11-12 = 1,208. For 1982, February 17-18 = 1,002; March 18-21 = 1,218.

Source: Surveys by ABC News/*Washington Post*, February 19-20–May 18-20, 1981; Chilton Research Services, July 1-9, 1981; *Washington Post*, July 20-28, 1981; ABC News/*Washington Post*, September 14-20, 1981; ABC News, September 25-26–October 9-12, 1981; ABC News/*Washington Post*, October 14-18–November 18-22, 1981; ABC News, December 11-12, 1981; ABC News/*Washington Post*, January 22-30–April 21-25, 1982.

REAGAN'S HANDLING OF THE ECONOMY

GALLUP

Question: Do you approve or disapprove of the way Reagan is (dealing with/handling) economic conditions in this country?



Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of April 2-5, 1982.

HARRIS

Question: Now let me ask you about some specific things President Reagan has done. How would you rate him on handling the economy—excellent, pretty good, only fair, or poor?



Source: Surveys by Louis Harris and Associates, latest that of April 16-22, 1982.

NBC NEWS/AP

Question: What kind of a job do you think Ronald Reagan is doing in handling the economy . . . do you think he is doing an excellent job, a good job, only a fair job, or do you think he is doing a poor job?



Source: Surveys by NBC News/Associated Press, latest that of March 29-30, 1982.

CBS NEWS/NEW YORK TIMES

Question: How about the economy? Do you approve or disapprove of the way Ronald Reagan is handling the economy?



Source: Surveys by CBS News/*New York Times*, latest that of March 11-15, 1982.

ABC NEWS/WASHINGTON POST

Question: Do you approve or disapprove of the way Ronald Reagan is handling the nation's economy?*



***Note:** In September and October 1981, this question continued "is that approve/disapprove strongly or approve/disapprove somewhat?" These response categories were combined above.

Sample sizes: For 1981, September = 500; October 1-5 = 1,004; December 11-12 = 1,208. For 1982, February 17-18 = 1,002; March 18-21 = 1,216.

Source: Surveys by ABC News, September 25-26–October 1-5, 1981; ABC News/*Washington Post*, October 14-18, 1981 and November 17-22, 1981; ABC News, December 11-12, 1981; ABC News/*Washington Post*, January 22-30, 1982–April 21-25, 1982.

REAGAN'S HANDLING OF FOREIGN POLICY

GALLUP

Question: Do you approve or disapprove of the way Mr. Reagan is handling our foreign policy—that is, our relations with other nations?



Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of April 2-5, 1982.

HARRIS

Question: Now let me ask you about some specific things President Reagan has done. How would you rate him on handling foreign policy matters—excellent, pretty good, only fair, or poor?



Source: Surveys by Louis Harris and Associates, latest that of April 16-22, 1982.

NBC NEWS/AP

Question: What kind of job do you think Ronald Reagan is doing in handling our foreign affairs—do you think he is doing an excellent job, a good job, only a fair job, or do you think he is doing a poor job?



Source: Surveys by NBC News/Associated Press, latest that of March 29-30, 1982.

CBS NEWS/NEW YORK TIMES

Question: Do you approve or disapprove of the way Ronald Reagan is handling foreign policy?



Source: Surveys by CBS News/*New York Times*, latest that of March 11-15, 1982.

ABC NEWS/WASHINGTON POST

Question: Do you approve or disapprove of the way Reagan is handling foreign affairs?*



***Note:** In October 1981 this question continued "is that approve/disapprove strongly or approve/disapprove somewhat?" Responses have been combined.
Sample size: October 9-11, 1981 = 1,004; December 11-12, 1981 = 1,208; February 17-18, 1982 = 1,002; March 18-21, 1982 = 1,218.

Source: Surveys by ABC News, October 9-11, 1981; ABC News/*Washington Post*, October 14-18 and November 17-22, 1981; ABC News, December 11-12, 1981; ABC News/*Washington Post*, January 22-30–April 21-25, 1982.

OVERALL APPROVAL

GALLUP

1981	Approve	Disapprove	No opinion
Jan. 31-Feb. 2	51%	13%	36%
Feb. 13-16	55	18	27
Mar. 13-16	60	24	16
Apr. 3-6	67	18	15
Apr. 10-13	67	19	14
May 8-11	68	21	11
June 5-8	59	28	13
June 19-22	59	29	12
June 26-29	58	30	12
July 17-19	60	29	11
July 24-27	56	30	14
July 31-Aug. 3	60	28	12
Aug. 14-17	60	29	11
Sept. 18-21	52	37	11
Oct. 2-5	56	35	9
Oct. 30-Nov. 2	53	35	12
Nov. 13-16	51	39	10
Nov. 20-23	54	37	9
Dec. 11-14	49	41	10
1982			
Jan. 8-11	49	40	11
Jan. 22-25	47	42	11
Feb. 5-8	47	43	10
Mar. 12-15	46	45	9
Apr. 2-5	45	46	9

HARRIS

1981	Excellent/ Pretty good	Only fair/ poor	Not sure
Feb. 19-22	62%	30%	8%
Apr. 29-30	67	29	4
June 3-7	60	39	1
July 8-12	55	43	2
Aug. 11-16	57	42	1
Sept. 19-24	54	44	2
Oct. 28-Nov. 3	51	47	2
Dec. 9-13	47	52	1
1982			
Jan. 8-12	52	47	1
Jan. 27-30	49	50	1
Feb. 12-17	44	56	*
Mar. 12-16	41	58	1
Apr. 16-22	38	61	1

* = less than .5%

NBC/AP

1981	Excellent/ good	Only fair/ poor	Not sure
Feb. 23-24	56%	26%	18%
Apr. 13-14	66	27	7
May 18-19	62	33	5
July 13-14	55	42	3
Aug. 10-11	63	35	2
Sept. 28-29	53	43	4
Oct. 25-26	51	46	3
Nov. 16-17	46	51	3
Dec. 14-15	48	50	2
1982			
Jan. 18-19	46	52	2
Jan. 27-28	47	51	2
Mar. 29-30	43	55	2

CBS/NYT

1981	Approve	Disapprove	No opinion
Apr. 22-26	67%	18%	15%
June 22-27	59	23	18
June 28-July 1	59	26	15
Sept. 22-27	53	33	14
1982			
Jan. 11-15	49	38	13
Mar. 11-15	43	42	15

ABC/Wash. Post

1981	Approve	Disapprove	Don't know/ No opinion
Feb. 19-20	68%	15%	17%
Mar. 25-29	62	24	15
Mar. 31	72	17	11
Apr. 20-22	73	19	8
May 14	66	25	10
May 18-20	65	26	9
July 1-9	57	25	8
July 20-28	62	29	10
Sept. 14-20	61	34	5
Sept. 25-26	64	33	3
Oct. 1-5	58	35	7
Oct. 9-12	61	33	6
Oct. 14-18	59	33	8
Nov. 18-22	52	38	9
Dec. 11-12	52	41	7
1982			
Jan. 22-30	52	39	8
Feb. 17-18	48	46	7
Mar. 3-8	49	46	6
Mar. 18-21	50	46	5
Apr. 21-25	51	44	5

HANDLING THE ECONOMY

GALLUP

1981	Approve	Disapprove	No opinion
Mar. 13-16	56%	32%	12%
Apr. 3-6	60	29	11
May 8-11	58	31	11
June 26-29	51	40	9
Aug. 14-17	53	35	12
Oct. 2-5	44	47	9
Oct. 30-Nov. 2	45	43	12
Nov. 13-16	43	48	9
Dec. 11-14	41	50	9
1982			
Jan. 8-11	41	51	8
Feb. 5-8	38	53	9
Mar. 12-15	38	54	8
Apr. 2-5	38	56	6

HARRIS

1981	Excellent/ pretty good	Only fair/ poor	Not sure
Feb. 19-22	58%	32%	10%
Mar. 27-Apr. 2	53	43	4
Apr. 29-30	58	36	6
June 3-7	51	47	2
July 8-12	50	47	3
Aug. 11-16	52	45	3
Sept. 19-24	49	49	2
Oct. 28-Nov. 3	41	56	3
Dec. 9-13	39	59	2
1982			
Jan. 8-12	41	57	2
Jan. 27-30	42	56	2
Feb. 12-17	39	59	2
Mar. 12-16	35	63	2
Apr. 16-22	33	64	1

NBC/AP

1981	Excellent/ good	Only fair/ poor	Not sure
Feb. 23-24	50%	33%	17%
Apr. 13-14	52	38	10
May 18-19	50	43	7
July 13-14	45	49	6
Aug. 10-11	52	43	5
Sept. 28-29	45	50	5
Oct. 25-26	39	57	4
Nov. 16-17	35	62	3
Dec. 14-15	36	61	3
1982			
Jan. 18-19	35	62	3
Jan. 27-28	37	59	4
Mar. 29-30	34	64	2

CBS/NYT

1981	Approve	Disapprove	No opinion
Apr. 22-26	54%	30%	16%
June 22-27	51	35	14
Sept. 22-27	49	38	13
1982			
Jan. 11-15	42	48	10
Mar. 11-15	38	52	10

ABC/Wash. Post

1981	Approve	Disapprove	Don't know/ No opinion
Sept. 25-26	59%	34%	7%
Oct. 1-5	53	37	9
Oct. 14-18	54	39	7
Nov. 17-22	45	49	7
Dec. 11-12	46	46	8
1982			
Jan. 22-30	46	46	8
Feb. 17-18	38	57	5
Mar. 3-8	42	53	5
Mar. 18-21	43	52	5
Apr. 21-25	44	51	5

HANDLING FOREIGN POLICY

GALLUP

1981	Approve	Disapprove	No opinion
Feb. 13-16	51%	16%	33%
Mar. 13-16	53	29	18
Aug. 14-17	52	28	22
Oct. 2-5	56	29	15
1982			
Feb. 5-8	44	38	18
Mar. 12-15	36	44	20
Apr. 2-5	36	45	19

HARRIS

1981	Excellent/ pretty good	Only fair/ poor	Not sure
Feb. 19-22	54%	34%	12%
Mar. 27-Apr. 2	45	49	6
June 3-7	49	46	5
July 8-12	47	46	7
Aug. 11-16	45	48	7
Sept. 19-24	51	43	6
Oct. 28-Nov. 3	50	46	4
Dec. 9-13	47	50	3
1982			
Jan. 8-12	49	47	4
Jan. 27-30	49	45	6
Feb. 12-17	44	51	5
Mar. 12-16	36	59	5
Apr. 16-22	39	56	5

NBC/AP

1981	Excellent/ good	Only fair/ poor	Not sure
Feb. 23-24	48%	33%	19%
Apr. 13-14	51	37	12
May 18-19	48	41	11
July 13-14	40	51	9
Aug. 10-11	46	47	7
Sept. 28-29	45	46	9
Oct. 25-26	45	49	6
Nov. 16-17	42	52	6
Dec. 14-15	43	52	2
1982			
Jan. 18-19	42	53	5
Jan. 27-28	44	51	5
Mar. 29-30	35	58	7

CBS/NYT

1981	Approve	Disapprove	No opinion
Apr. 22-26	54%	22%	24%
June 22-27	48	26	26
Sept. 22-27	52	25	23
1982			
Jan. 11-15	52	31	17
Mar. 11-15	37	40	23

ABC/Wash. Post

1981	Approve	Disapprove	Don't know/ No opinion
Oct. 9-11	63%	30%	7%
Oct. 14-18	61	26	13
Nov. 17-22	54	35	10
Dec. 11-12	53	33	15
1982			
Jan. 22-30	52	33	15
Feb. 17-18	40	41	19
Mar. 3-8	45	43	12
Mar. 18-21	43	45	12
Apr. 21-25	53	34	13

Note: For ABC/*Washington Post* surveys, approve = approve strongly/somewhat, disapprove = disapprove strongly/somewhat.

LIGHT FARE: OF LEGS, LOCKS, LOVE AND LANCELOTS

I WANNA HOLD YOUR HAND

Question: Would you describe yourself as: Very romantic, somewhat romantic, not very romantic, or not romantic at all?



Source: Survey by Audits and Surveys for the Merit Report, January 26-31, 1982.

CHIVALRY IS ALIVE AND WELL . . .

Question: Do you think that men should or should not maintain traditional manners toward women—such as holding doors, helping women get seated, and standing when introduced?



Source: Survey by Audits and Surveys for the Merit Report, March 22-25, 1982.

GENTLEMEN DON'T NECESSARILY PREFER BLONDES

Question: Do you agree or disagree that men are more attracted to blondes than to women whose hair is another color?



Source: Survey by Audits and Surveys for the Merit Report, February 22-25, 1982.

MINISKIRT GETS SHORT SHRIFT

Question: How do you feel about the miniskirt coming back in style?



Source: Survey by Audits and Surveys for the Merit Report, April 3-6, 1982.

THE ALLIANCE: SITTING ON DE-FENSE

U.S. HAS FAVORABLE NATION STATUS

Question: What is your overall opinion of the United States? What is your overall opinion of the Soviet Union?



Note: "Don't know" not shown. For overall opinion of the United States, "don't know" = 10% in Great Britain, 13% in France, 3% in West Germany, 16% in Italy and 29% in Belgium. For overall opinion of the Soviet Union, "don't know" = 12% for Great Britain, 14% for France, 3% for West Germany, 19% for Italy and 28% for Belgium.

CONFIDENCE IN NATO'S ABILITY TO DEFEND WESTERN EUROPE AGAINST ATTACK

Question: How much confidence do you have in NATO's ability to defend Western Europe against an attack?

CONFIDENCE IN U.S. ABILITY TO DEAL WISELY WITH WORLD PROBLEMS

Question: In general, how much confidence do you have in the United States to deal wisely with world problems?

CONFIDENCE IN U.S. DEFENSE

Question: If your country's security was threatened by a Russian attack, how much confidence do you have in the United States to do whatever is necessary to defend . . . (your country), even if this risked a direct attack against the United States itself—a great deal, a fair amount, not very much, or none at all?



Source: Survey by Gallup International for *Newsweek* and other news organiz
tions for the European countries. Sample size = 1,004 for Great Britain, 1,0
for France, 963 for West Germany, 600 for Italy, 1,027 for Belgium, 1,500 f

OPINION ROUNDUP

BRITS HAVE GREATER DOUBTS ABOUT AMERICAN PRESENCE

Question: Do you think that having American nuclear missiles stationed in . . . (your country) increases the chances of an attack on this country, provides greater protection against such an attack, or has no effect?


Having American nuclear missiles stationed in...

Question: Do you think that having American troops stationed in . . . (your country) increases the chances of an attack on this country, provides greater protection against such an attack or has no effect?


Having American troops stationed in...

WE'D RATHER FIGHT THAN SWITCH

Question: Some people say that war is so horrible that it is better to accept Russian domination than to risk war. Others say it would be better to fight in defense of your country than to accept Russian domination. Which opinion is closer to your own?



enmark, and 585 for Switzerland. Interviewing for the European countries was nducted in February 1982. The U.S. survey was taken by the Gallup Organiza-ion, with 2,062 people interviewed between February 12-21, 1982.

Note: Not all questions were asked in every country.

THE TEN COMMANDMENTS

FRENCH FRIED IN MORALITY POLL

Question: Here is a card on which are the Ten Commandments. Please look at them and tell me, for each one, whether it still applies fully today, whether it applies to a limited extent, or no longer really applies today to yourself?



Note: Sample size in each country = 1,200.
Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization for the European Values Systems Study Group, 1981.

by I. A. Lewis and William Schneider

Is the Public Lying to the Pollsters?

Do people lie to pollsters? If they do, can we trust the polls? Very little research exists that quantifies the problem, explains its causes, and proposes ways to minimize any resulting errors. The paucity of research is, in itself, surprising; any substantial amount of lying would seem to undermine the entire justification for polling.

Polls are reasonably accurate because people will tell things—their income, their political preferences—to a stranger that they might not reveal to friends, relatives, or even spouses. Pollsters believe that people will tell George Gallup how they voted even if they wouldn't dream of telling their neighbors. The confidentiality of the interview and the anonymity of the interviewer reduce the incentive to lie. Pollsters feel safe in assuming that most people do not lie, simply because there are no compelling reasons *to* lie.

Motivation is the key, and it can work in two ways. Although people have no particular reason to lie, there are no strong sanctions *against* lying to an interviewer either. Pollsters have to rely on people's inherent moral and psychological predisposition to tell the truth. These inclinations are strong, to be sure, but they are not universal, and there is no reason to believe that they are randomly distributed throughout the population.

Lying, in the strict sense of the word, entails a deliberate misrepresentation of the facts, or of one's true opinions. Typically, people lie in polls to conform to their impressions of social acceptability. Respondents who lie tend to do so in the direction of more socially desirable opinions and behavior ("I voted in the last election," "Racial discrimination is wrong," and the like). Related to this is the notorious tendency for respondents to regard the interview situation as a "test." Interviewees feel some impulse to give "the right answer" no matter what their actual feelings are.

As we shall see, this impulse can lead respondents to express an opinion about an issue they could not possibly know anything about, simply because they do not wish to appear empty-headed or uninformed. It is better to guess, it seems, than to confess ignorance.

Thus, a good deal of what appears to be lying may not be deliberate falsification. Interviewers might ask respondents to report facts they do not know or opinions they do not have. There are no strong incentives—and there is very little time—for respondents to be scrupulous in searching out the facts or probing their innermost feelings. No one is likely to check up on them, nor is anyone likely to care whether they, personally, tell the truth. People typically respond to catchphrases, slogans, or symbols without thinking them through very deeply. Why should they?

Thoughtlessness is certainly a problem, but it is not the same thing as lying. Much of the fault belongs to the researcher who asks difficult or impossible questions, or who interprets the answers to mean more than they probably do. That is neither lying nor respondent error. It is measurement error: the use of questions that are inappropriate for finding out what the researcher wishes to know.

The Magnitude of the Problem

How extensive is the problem of "invalid" poll responses? There have been disquieting signals for some time. Thirty-five years ago, Eugene Hartley surveyed college students at eight institutions to gauge levels of prejudice against members of various ethnic groups. One of the ethnic groups, "Danireans," was entirely fictitious. Columbia University students were most prejudiced against Danireans: the median response was to admit them as "visitors only" to this country but not allow them to have citizenship. City College of New York business students were least prejudiced; they said they would accept Danireans as citizens, work colleagues, classmates, and neighbors. At none of the eight colleges surveyed did the median respondent find Danireans acceptable "to my club as personal chums" or "to close kinship by marriage."[1]

More recently, the German weekly *Der Spiegel* published the results of an opinion poll showing the favorability rating of cabinet ministers in the Federal Republic of Germany. The pollsters included the name of a nonexistent official on the list. He came in sixth, ahead of ten other names.[2]

Since 1964, the Bureau of the Census has regularly reported a better known example of invalidity. Within several weeks following every presidential and congressional election, the Bureau surveys voter participation among very large national probability samples (approximately 45,000 interviews were conducted in 1978). Every year, more people claim to have registered and voted than can actually be accounted for by the official records (see table 1). Overreporting has been especially marked in off-year elections, when fewer people actually turn out to vote.

Table 1

PERCENT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CENSUS SURVEY ESTIMATES OF VOTING AND OFFICIAL COUNTS OF VOTES CAST

(Percent claiming to have voted in post-election survey *minus* total ballots as a percentage of U.S. voting-age population)

Congressional elections		**Presidential elections**	
1966	8.9%	1964	8.6%
1970	13.6	1968	7.5
1974	12.9	1972	9.0
1978	17.0	1976	5.1

Of course, the comparison between "reported" and "actual" voter participation rates is marked by measurement inaccuracies. The Census sample is known to underrepresent certain groups (for instance, nonwhite males twenty-one to twenty-four years old). The methodology allows for proxy reports of voter participation by other household members, 5 percent of whom in 1978 said they "did not know" whether the individual in question had voted. The "actual" figures for registration and voting are also imprecise. Local registration requirements vary (some areas have none at all), and the size of the total voting-age U.S. population at the time of an election can only be estimated. Moreover, the only uniform count of the total number of votes cast nationwide is the number of votes cast for president. But data from states that report the total number of votes cast indicate that there were about 2 percent fewer votes cast for president in 1976 than the total number of persons voting in the election.[3] Nevertheless, discrepancies of the magnitude reported in table 1 (17 percent more people saying they voted in 1978 than can be accounted for) must in some measure be attributed to "misrepresentation of the facts" by the survey respondents.

Howard Schuman and Stanley Presser asked respondents in 1978 whether they favored the real but highly obscure "Agricultural Trade Act of 1978." The straightforward question, "Do you favor or oppose the passage of this act?" elicited 19 percent in favor and 11 percent not in favor (69 percent volunteered the response, "don't know"). A subset of the respondents was asked a slightly different version of the question, one that included a filter that seemed to legitimize the "don't know" response. When asked "Do you favor or oppose the passage of this act, *or* do you not have an opinion on that issue?" only 6 percent favored it and 4 percent were opposed. In a 1979 survey, Schuman and Presser asked similar questions about the obscure but real "Monetary Control Bill of 1979." When no filter was offered, 13 percent favored the bill, 13 percent opposed it and 74 percent said "don't know." In the filtered version, "don't knows" went up to 93 percent, with 3 percent in favor and 4 percent opposed.[4]

In 1978, George Bishop and his colleagues at the University of Cincinnati asked a sample of that city's residents about a totally fictitious measure, "the 1975 Public Affairs Act." When various filters to screen out "don't knows" were applied, they found that between 4 and 7 percent of the respondents still expressed an opinion on the issue. With no filter ("Some people say that the 1975 Public Affairs Act should be repealed. Do you agree or disagree with this idea?"), fully one-third of the sample claimed to have an opinion (16 percent agreed, 18 percent disagreed).[5] In March 1982, the *Los Angeles Times* poll gave the respondent the option of saying "don't know" to the Bishop question and found 9 percent expressing an opinion on "the 1975 Public Affairs Act" (4 percent favored it and 5 percent opposed).

It should be pointed out that by inquiring about a fictitious measure the pollster is actually lying to the respondent. The authority of the interviewer legitimizes the question, just as the inclusion of a filter legitimizes the "don't know" response and increases its frequency quite markedly.

Some researchers have actually gone to the trouble of carrying out an independent validation of survey responses. Theresa Rogers interviewed 171 New York City residents in 1974, some by telephone and some in person. She asked them about their voting behavior in the 1973 mayoral election and subsequently went back to the record books of the New York City Board of Elections in order to validate the responses. She found that 26 percent of the respondents misreported their voting behavior in the previous year's election. Moreover, the bulk of the misrepresentation was in the direction of "social acceptability": 23 percent said they had voted when the records showed they had not, while just 3 percent said they had not voted when the record showed that they had. Altogether, 40 percent of the actual nonvoters in the sample claimed to have voted. Interestingly, Rogers found that misrepresentation was higher in the face-to-face interviews than in the telephone interviews; 43 percent of the nonvoters interviewed in person claimed to have voted, as compared with 36 percent of the nonvoters interviewed by telephone.[6] The implication is that telephone interviews are more anonymous and provide less incentive for respondents to create an impression of social acceptability.

Differences in interviewing techniques may also explain one phenomenon noted during the 1980 presidential campaign, namely, the "closet Reagan vote." Pollsters Patrick Caddell and George Gallup found that Ronald Reagan's support tended to be lower in face-to-face interviews than in telephone interviews taken at the same time. After the election, it was found that Reagan had made substantial gains during the campaign among weakly identified Democrats.[7] These Democrats, the hypothesis goes, may have been unwilling to reveal their true preference for Reagan in the personal setting of a face-to-face interview, but were less inhibited in the more anonymous setting of a telephone call.

The 1976 and 1978 National Election Studies conducted by the Center for Political Studies of the University of Michigan undertook the considerably more ambitious task of examining the official voting records of every respondent in their nationwide surveys, for comparison with the voting information supplied by the respondents themselves. In 1976, 77 percent of the respondents claimed they were registered to vote, while the validation showed that only 69 percent were actually registered—a difference of 8 percentage points. The difference was even greater when it came to voting—72 percent claimed to have voted in 1976, but only 61 percent actually did. In the 1978 congressional election, registration was overstated by 11 percentage points (73 percent claimed to be registered while 62 percent actually were) and voting was overstated by 12 points (55 percent said they voted, 43 percent actually did vote).[8]

In both years, approximately 14 percent of the sample were "misreporters," and most of them misreported in the direction of social acceptability (to be registered, to have voted). Those who had not voted but said they had outnumbered by ten-to-one those who had voted and said they had not. In the nationwide survey, the misrepresentation rate was lower than in Rogers's New York City study. The CPS data show 23 percent of the actual nonvoters claiming to have voted.

Because people tend to misreport in the direction of the more desirable social behavior, voting recall questions usually produce a heavier preference for the winner than was actually the case (except after Watergate, when fewer people recalled voting for Richard Nixon than actually must have). John Katosh and Michael Traugott examined the behavior of misreporters uncovered in the 1978 CPS National Election Study and concluded that "the direction of misreporting seems to favor the winning candidate."[9]

Misreporting shows up in the "nonsocially desirable" direction as well. For example, 3 percent of those in the 1978 CPS sample voted in 1978, but reported they had not. Both the Katosh/Traugott and the Rogers studies of voting behavior found that a number of respondents misreported in a direction opposite to expectations—that is, they said they had not voted, when in fact they had.

Rogers found a similar pattern in questions about educational attainment in her study of New York City voters. She asked her sample a straightforward factual question about their education in 1972 and again in 1974, when they were reinterviewed: "How many years of school did you finish?" After excluding those who had completed additional years of schooling between the two interviews, she found that one in every three answers was inconsistent. Moreover, as she reported, "The fact that 14 percent deflated their educational attainment in 1974, as compared with 1972, and 20 percent inflated it, suggests that respondents do not necessarily bias their answers to enhance their status."[10]

In these studies, varying proportions of between 10 and 41 percent of inaccuracies were not in the direction of desirable social behavior and would appear to be the result of simple memory error. It is reasonable to suspect that comparable percentages of the inaccuracies in the socially acceptable direction can be attributed to carelessness on the part of respondents.

Nonattitudes

Some years ago, Philip Converse investigated this problem and came up with a theory to explain invalid poll responses that goes considerably beyond carelessness, measurement error, or lying. Converse looked at the issue positions of people who were interviewed three times over the course of four years by the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center (respondents were interviewed in 1956, 1958 and 1960). Several issue questions were repeated during each wave of the survey. The distribution of the answers for the sample as a whole was remarkably stable from one interview to the next. But the answers given by *individual* respondents flip-flopped back and forth at a high rate.

Converse identified "two sharply discontinuous classes of respondents, the stable and the random." He found that something less than 20 percent of the total sample had real and stable attitudes on any given issue. The remaining 80 percent could be classified either as having no opinion or as giving statistically random responses. Thus, the replies given by the random group were shifting back and forth in all directions, with the changes tending to cancel each other out. The mean attitudes of the entire sample remained fairly constant.[11]

This tendency to give nonresponses or random responses can, to some degree, be controlled. In 1976, Jean Converse analyzed 198 Gallup poll questions and 114 Harris questions in order to identify the factors associated with a high level of "don't know" or "no opinion" responses. The single best predictor, as one might expect, was education: better-educated respondents are more likely to have opinions.

But the researcher went beyond the characteristics of the respondents and asked whether certain properties of the *questions* were associated with high nonresponse rates. She found that as the topic recedes from people's immediate, personal concerns, the volume of opinions thins out. On questions relating to such topics as morality, religion, quality of life, and crime—"matters of traditional belief and personal experience"—the nonresponse rate was quite low and the less well-educated were almost as likely to hold opinions as the well-educated. On questions relating to the environment, the economy, domestic politics, and foreign affairs, however, "no opinion" levels were very high and differences by education were pronounced.[12] In other words, the more remote the subject matter, the more random the responses are likely to be.

As noted earlier, in the studies by Bishop et al. ("the 1975 Public Affairs Act") and by Schuman and Presser ("the Agricultural Trade Act of 1978"), the volume of misreporting could to some degree be minimized by giving respondents the option of saying "don't know" (for example, ending the questions with "Do you have an opinion on this or not?" or "haven't you heard [or thought] enough about this to say?"). This filter legitimizes nonresponses and allows respondents to opt out of a question where they could not possibly have an opinion. Both studies reported that, when such questions are asked without a filter, the frequency of "don't know" responses actually *rises* with education. The poorly educated are the most likely to guess at the answer, while the well-educated report their true opinion, which is, of course, "don't know." The problem is that pollsters are not usually consistent in their use of filter questions or in their reporting of filtered answers ("35 percent of those with an opinion . . ."). It becomes difficult to assess trends or make comparisons among filtered and nonfiltered questions.

Poor Questions

Questions that ask respondents to reconstruct past experiences also run a high risk of misreporting. Jerald Bachman and Patrick O'Malley analyzed high school students' reports of the frequency with which they used various drugs (a) during the last twelve months and (b) during the last thirty days. They found that reports of monthly drug use were about three times as large as could be expected from the yearly figures. This discrepancy was about the same for all drugs, including frequently used alcohol and marijuana and seldom used cocaine and heroin. The authors attributed the discrepancy to underreporting of drug use on a yearly basis, rather than to overreporting on a monthly basis, citing evidence from other studies that as time elapses, underreporting tends to increase. That phenomenon has been observed for all sorts of events, including health experiences, delinquent behavior, consumer purchases, and income. The implication is that survey respondents are not strongly motivated to make careful and precise estimates of their experiences, especially as they recede into the distant past.[13] The message to survey researchers is not to take information concerning past behavior very seriously, unless the query is restricted to the very recent past or elicits a simple "yes/no" answer ("Have you used marijuana during the past year?").

Carelessness and random responses, while a serious problem, do not explain all misreporting, however. In a recent issue of this magazine (*Public Opinion*, February/March 1982, "Clearing the Air: Public Opinion and Public Policy on the Environment"), Everett Ladd suggested another explanation: that some respondents may not have been offered an appropriate response category. He cites questions that force respondents to choose between protecting the environment and achieving economic growth. Responses to such questions vary dramatically, depending on the terms used to pose the choice. Ladd's point is that many, perhaps most, respondents favor both objectives and do not see them as alternatives. If their preferred position is not offered by the interviewer, these people will opt for the most attractive available answer and shift back and forth, depending on how the question is phrased and when it is asked. Shortly after Earth Day or Three Mile Island, their response might have been in favor of the environment. Shortly after the fuel bill arrives, their response might go in the other direction. Similarly, people who are genuinely of two minds about a question might also give responses that appear to be random, when in fact, the poll question may not allow them to express their mixed or tentative opinions on the issue.

Who Misreports?

Certain social and psychological factors are also associated with misreporting. Two studies of voter participation, one by Lee Sigelman and the other by Katosh and Traugott, found that race and, more weakly, age and income were associated with invalid survey responses. Sigelman reports that "white and, to a lesser extent, elderly people are less likely than nonwhites and younger people to misreport a failure to vote."[14] Table 2 shows the tendency to misreport voting and registration for various demographic groups in 1976 and 1978. Misreporting is clearly higher among nonwhites, young people, and lower income groups.

Table 2

SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENTS WHO MISREPRESENTED THEIR REGISTRATION OR VOTING, 1976 AND 1978

	Percent Misreporting Registration		**Percent Misreporting Voting**	
	1976	**1978**	**1976**	**1978**
Total Sample[a]	15%	14%	14%	14%
Sex				
Male	17	14	15	15
Female	15	15	12	14
Education				
Grade school	14	13	15	13
High school	16	14	12	13
College	15	16	14	16
Age				
18-24	22	17	18	14
45 or older	12	12	12	13
Race				
Nonwhite	24	26	20	21
White	14	13	12	13
Income				
Less than $6,000	22	17	19	16
$20,000 or more	12	14	10	15

[a] Excluding those respondents whose names were not obtained and, for voting only, respondents who resided in places where the voting records could not be checked.

Note: N = 2,344 for 1976 and 2,262 for 1978 misreporting registration and 2,329 for 1976 and 2,230 for 1978 misreporting voting.

Source: John P. Katosh and Michael W. Traugott, "The Consequences of Validated and Self-Reported Voting Measures," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. 45 (Winter 1981), p. 525. Data are from the 1976 and 1978 American National Election Studies conducted by the University of Michigan's Center for Political Studies.

Bishop's study of the fictitious "1975 Public Affairs Act" showed that education and race were strongly correlated with the tendency to report an opinion, with blacks and low-education respondents most likely to offer a response to the nonfiltered question. Moreover, respondents who did not trust other people were much more likely than trusting respondents to say they had an opinion on the Public Affairs Act, even after education was controlled. Bishop and his associates argue that education, race, and trust all relate to an underlying factor of self-esteem. Those low in self-esteem (nonwhites, the poorly educated, the mistrustful) lack the confidence to acknowledge that they do not have an opinion on something that sounds important.[15] Such groups have abnormally low levels of voter participation since they feel that their choice "does not count," but they misrepresent that fact to interviewers because they do not have the self-confidence to admit it.

As noted earlier, the *Los Angeles Times* poll asked a national sample in March of this year whether they had a favorable or unfavorable impression of "the 1975 Public Affairs Act, or haven't you heard enough about it to say?" Those who expressed an opinion were more likely to be young, nonwhite, and low in occupational status and income. They were also more likely to offer opinions on other issues in the survey.

In Schuman and Presser's study of "the Agricultural Trade Act of 1978," opinion toward that obscure measure was associated with confidence in the government's management of the economy: those who thought the government was doing a poor job of handling unemployment and inflation were substantially more likely to oppose the Agricultural Trade Act. Their research also revealed that support for "the Monetary Control Bill of 1979" was associated with concern over inflation and a desire to balance the budget. These results suggest that many respondents attach the most readily available meaning to a question and then answer it in their own terms. Schuman and Presser noted that "respondents make an educated (though wrong) guess as to what the obscure acts represent, then answer reasonably in their own terms. . . ."[16]

A more recent Bishop study indicates that less-educated, less-informed respondents are exceptionally sensitive to question format. They will acquiesce more readily when only one argument is presented (as in an "agree/disagree" question) and will be quicker to accept alternative positions when those are made available by the interviewer. The critical factor seems to be how much information is *available* to respondents in memory. Here is how Bishop and his associates put it:

> We postulate that when respondents are asked a question about their opinions on a particular issue . . . they respond with "the first thing that comes to mind," or more formally, in terms of the information that is most *accessible* to them in memory.
>
> As a corollary, we would expect that less educated respondents would be most likely to give such top-of-the-head reactions to survey questions since they have little other public affairs information to draw upon.[17]

The format of the question, then, plays a critical role in determining the context and therefore the response. If, as Converse and Bishop suggest, most people do not have readily accessible attitudes on most subjects, then their responses will fluctuate with the signals emitted by the questions—and much of what they have to say will appear random, unmotivated, or invalid.

Opinions and Behavior

Finally, respondents are often suspected of lying when their actions turn out to be different from their opinions. But what people do is often poorly predicted by information about how they feel.

The distinction between attitudes and behavior is important in studies of prejudice. In the early 1930s, Richard LaPiere accompanied a young Chinese couple as they traveled through the United States. In the process, they visited 251 restaurants, hotels, and other establishments catering to the public. They were refused service only once. But about six months later, LaPiere wrote to every one of these establishments to ask whether they would accept persons of the Chinese race as guests or patrons. Over 90 percent of those who replied answered no.[18] It would be difficult to classify these responses as lies, since the respondents were probably unaware of the earlier behavioral evidence. It is far more reasonable to accept the results as evidence that people don't always do what they think they will do.

Surveys dealing with prejudice almost always find that bigotry declines with education. But bigotry is almost always measured by a willingness to accept negative stereotypes about a group ("Jews are too ambitious for their own good," "Black people have less innate intelligence than whites," etc.). Better-educated people, being more sophisticated, tend to reject negative stereotyping. Those who are less educated are more concrete and simplistic in their thinking. They have also had fewer opportunities to learn enlightened social norms—i.e., what the "right answers" are. Thus, when a poorly educated person endorses the negative stereotype that "Jews will choose money over people" or that "Blacks are poor because they are lazy," he may be unaware of what the "correct" response is (namely, to reject negative stereotypes as offensive and simplistic, whatever one's true feelings may be). In fact, well-educated people are the most likely to reject even those negative stereotypes that are demonstrably true, that "Jews are richer than other people," for instance.

In their 1969 study, *The Tenacity of Prejudice*, Gertrude Selznick and Stephen Steinberg found an interesting reversal of the correlation between education and prejudice: college graduates, and particularly high-income college graduates, were most likely to defend social club discrimination (members of a social club "have a right to keep Mr. Cohen out just because he is Jewish"). High-status groups that were lowest in anti-Semitic prejudice, as measured by acceptance of derogatory beliefs about Jews, were highest in their willingness to support behavioral discrimination against Jews.[19] Were these respondents lying when they rejected anti-Semitic stereotypes? They were probably reporting their true opinions, but their actual behavior simply cannot be predicted from those attitudes.

The same thing might be said about the results of a Harris question asked in December 1974 and January 1975, one year after the Arab oil embargo: "If it came down to it and the only way we could get Arab oil in enough quantity and at lower prices were to stop supporting Israel with military aid, would you favor or oppose such a move by this country?" The results showed an overwhelming margin, 63 to 18 percent, opposing any cutoff of military aid to Israel. Isn't the correct answer to reject a blackmail threat? The fact is, however, that such opinions are probably unreliable predictors of actual behavior.

Minimizing the Problem

A partial solution to these measurement problems is to improve questions and interviewing techniques, experiment with alternate approaches, and try to decipher the underlying signals and their effect on public opinion; that is now the art of survey research advances.

One example of such an advance is the randomized response technique first developed by Stanley Warner in 1965. In this procedure, respondents flip a coin to determine whether they will answer a sensitive question ("Are you a member of the Ku Klux Klan?") or a non-sensitive question ("Are you a member of the PTA?"). They tell the interviewer their answer without revealing which question they are responding to. Later, the researcher is able to figure out how many people said "yes" to the sensitive question because he knows (a) approximately how many people must have answered the sensitive question as a result of the random coin toss and (b) how many people would have said "yes" to the nonsensitive question. When results from the randomized technique were compared with results using a more straightforward method, it was found that more respondents admitted to the socially undesirable behavior under the randomized approach. Respondents did not necessarily lie when the question was asked outright. They just refused to answer.[20]

But even if procedures improve, there will always be an irreducible amount of inaccuracy inherent in the survey procedure. It is impossible, for one thing, to design a question that is completely free from measurement error. Respondents will always answer questions on their own terms, whatever the researcher intends. The best we can hope for is that the amount of measurement error be known, or at least held constant, so that trends can be assessed and comparisons made. In their study of drug use among high school students, Bachman and O'Malley note that, even with questions that are known to produce misreported answers, the inconsistencies are fairly constant from one year to the next.

In their separate studies of voter participation Sigelman and Katosh/Traugott conclude that, while the level of misreporting is substantial, it does not invalidate previous research on voter participation. The same relationships show up in the data whether validated or self-reported measures of voter participation are used. Misreporting does not seem to distort our images of voters and nonvoters in any significant way.

The results of survey research are useful and informative in spite of the many known sources of error. It all depends on how we look at the data. If we expect a survey question to provide a reliable, error-free depiction of people's true opinions on an issue, then we are expecting too much. Similarly, we are expecting too much if we want surveys to predict behavior.

What *can* we do with survey questions, then? First, we can obtain valuable information about how the public responds to certain ideas and signals and how these responses have been changing over time. Second, we can analyze relationships in the data in order to find out what causes particular opinions and behavior. In short, we don't have to believe in the total accuracy of survey results to make good use of them. ☑

NOTES

1. Eugene L. Hartley, *Problems in Prejudice* (New York: King's Crown Press, 1946), pp. 4-18.
2. Reported in *Le Monde*, January 6, 1982.
3. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-20, No. 344, *Voting and Registration in the Election of November, 1978* (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1980), pp. 4-7.
4. Howard Schuman and Stanley Presser, "Public Opinion and Public Ignorance: The Fine Line between Attitudes and Nonattitudes," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 85 (March 1980), pp. 1216, 1221.
5. George F. Bishop, Robert W. Oldendick, Alfred J. Tuchfarber, and Stephen E. Bennett, "Pseudo-Opinions on Public Affairs," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. 44 (Summer 1980), p. 201.
6. Theresa F. Rogers, "Interviews by Telephone and In Person: Quality of Responses and Field Performance," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. 40 (Spring 1976), pp. 65, 56-57.
7. Patrick H. Caddell, "The Democratic Strategy and its Electoral Consequences," chapter 11 in Seymour Martin Lipset, ed., *Party Coalitions in the 1980s* (San Francisco, Calif.: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1981), pp. 274-75.
8. John P. Katosh and Michael W. Traugott, "The Consequences of Validated and Self-Reported Voting Measures," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. 45 (Winter 1981), p. 522.
9. Ibid., p. 532.
10. Rogers, "Interviews by Telephone and In Person," pp. 57-58.
11. Philip E. Converse, "Attitudes and Non-Attitudes: Continuation of a Dialogue,' in Edward R. Tufte, ed., *The Quantitative Analysis of Social Problems* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Co., 1970), pp. 169-76.
12. Jean M. Converse, "Predicting No Opinion in the Polls," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. 40 (Winter 1976), pp. 515-30.
13. Jerald J. Bachman and Patrick M. O'Malley, "When Four Months Equal a Year: Inconsistencies in Student Reports of Drug Use," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. 45 (Winter 1981), pp. 536-48.
14. Lee Sigelman, "The Nonvoting Voter in Voting Research," *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 26 (February 1982), p. 52.
15. Bishop et al., pp. 204-06.
16. Schuman and Presser, p. 1223.
17. George F. Bishop, Robert W. Oldendick, and Alfred J. Tuchfarber, "Effects of Presenting One Versus Two Sides of an Issue in Survey Questions," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. 46 (Spring 1982), p. 78.
18. Described in Icek Ajzen and Martin Fishbein, *Understanding Attitudes and Predicting Social Behavior* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1980), pp. 17-18.
19. Gertrude Selznick and Stephen Steinberg, *The Tenacity of Prejudice* (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), pp. 85-89.
20. For a complete discussion of the Warner technique, see S. M. Zdep and Isabelle N. Rhodes, "Making the Randomized Response Technique Work," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. 40 (Winter 1976), pp. 531-37.

by William C. Adams

Middle East Meets West: Surveying American Attitudes

After the 1973 war in the Middle East, Israel's Chaim Herzog said, "The main battlefield now is the theater of opinion in the United States." On the surface, the opinion battle lines in the United States have been securely established for many years; the four-to-one ratio favoring Israel over the Arab states has held fairly steady. Although it is tempting to assume that American attitudes toward the region have been unshakable, opinions have not been immune to change.

Continued basic sympathy for Israel disguises crucial alterations in American views of the Middle East. A closer look at public opinion over the last several years reveals some significant shifts and suggests an unappreciated potential for volatility.

In this period, Americans came to view Egypt favorably. They also became enamored of Sadat, much more sensitive to differences among Arab states, more aware of and concerned about the status of the Palestinians, and far more critical of selected Israeli policies and leaders. Each of these trends is worth examining.

Egypt and Sadat

The image of Egypt and its leader Anwar Sadat underwent a dramatic transformation. After Sadat's 1977 trip to Jerusalem received saturation coverage, his personal popularity soared. By 1980 a Harris study concluded that Americans viewed Sadat as the most respected and most trusted leader in the Middle East, and that he was "more respected than most public figures in the United States." Harris politely did not say that—in just three years—an Arab head of state had become more popular than the president of the United States.

Sadat was undeniably an extraordinary man, and the American public's receptivity to him was no less extraordinary. It is difficult to overstate Sadat's impact on breaking down Arab stereotypes. Before Sadat, they were seen as alien religious fanatics, terrorists, or oil-rich sheiks. Although he was bitterly attacked in some Arab quarters for his efforts, Sadat emerged as the first Arab spokesman to articulate for Americans most of the key Arab complaints against Israel.

While admiration for Sadat was growing, Egypt's image was changing enormously. As recently as 1976, Gallup found American opinion about Egypt divided: 46 percent were favorable and 39 percent were unfavorable (12 percent had no opinion). By 1980, 71 percent viewed Egypt favorably; only 23 percent held an unfavorable image. Egypt's favorable rating had advanced from a bare plurality to a ratio of three-to-one.

Americans saw Sadat's death as a blow to peace prospects. Two-thirds of those surveyed (68 percent in an October 1981 NBC News/AP poll) said his death would "hurt the chances for peace in the Middle East." (Less than 2 percent said it would improve chances for peace.) Yet, the new American view of Egypt did not evaporate with Sadat's passing. In line with findings two years earlier, a January 1982 Harris poll determined that, of those with an opinion (92 percent of the total sample), 85 percent still saw Egypt as a "close ally" or "friend."

More Distinctions in the "Arab World"

Americans now make sharp distinctions among Arab states. They see them as a much less homogeneous bloc. As figure 1 shows, perceptions of the friendliness of various states have diverged substantially.

In 1976, attitudes toward Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and non-Arab Iran were highly clustered; the percentage of Americans who believed each country was friendly or allied fell within a narrow range of 32 to 35 percent. By 1982, impressions of these countries varied widely: Harris found that Egypt emerged with the clearest image. Americans had overwhelmingly decided that Egypt was an ally and friend. Indeed, the proportion holding that view matched the share seeing Israel as an ally or friend. Other opinions also changed.

Nearly six out of ten Americans now consider Saudi Arabia a friend or close ally; five out of ten consider Jordan a friend or close ally. Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Iran fall into a different category. Fewer than one-fourth of the respondents see these countries as friendly.

These evaluations are consistent with a 1979 Harris poll which asked if particular countries "really wanted a just peace in the Middle East." At the top were

Figure 1

Question: I am going to read you the names of some countries. For each, tell me if you feel that country is a *close ally* of the U.S., is *friendly* but not a close ally, is *not friendly* but not an enemy, or is unfriendly and an *enemy* of the U.S.



Source: Surveys by Louis Harris and Associates, latest that of January 8-12, 1982.

Egypt and Israel; 52 percent said Egypt really wanted peace and 51 percent said the same for Israel. In contrast, 28 percent said Jordan and 26 percent said Saudi Arabia were intent on peace. Only 19 percent said Syria and Libya truly wanted peace; and the PLO was at the bottom with 13 percent.

This three-tiered pattern was repeated in a later 1980 Harris survey. When asked whether the leadership in various countries was "reasonable" and willing to work for a peace settlement, respondents ranked Egypt and Israel highest, with 77 percent saying Egypt and 69 percent saying Israel has "reasonable" leadership. Next came Saudi Arabia (43 percent "reasonable") and Jordan (42 percent). Far behind were Syria (17 percent), Iran (16 percent), and Libya (15 percent).

From a slightly different perspective, these rankings are buttressed by responses to questions (Harris, January 1982) about which countries "could be a threat to the security and well-being of the United States." Sizable shares saw Iran (45 percent) and Libya (38 percent) as potentially menacing to the United States. Iraq was thought to be dangerous by 22 percent. Few people, however, saw the other states as potentially threatening (Syria, 15 percent; Saudi Arabia, 14 percent; Israel, 9 percent; Jordan, 8 percent; Egypt, 7 percent).

Middle Eastern countries have acquired separate identities. Americans appear to sort these countries into those that are very friendly (Egypt and Israel), somewhat friendly (Saudi Arabia and Jordan), and belligerent and unfriendly (Libya, Iran, Iraq, and Syria).

Such opinions have become widespread; they are not confined to a small sector of the attentive public. Harris surveys show that the proportion of the public that is "not sure" about the relations of various Arab states with the United States has declined steadily over the past six years. In the case of Libya the "don't know/not sure" category fell from 46 percent to 12 percent.

Palestinians versus the PLO

Increased cognizance of the Palestinians and emerging sympathy with some Palestinian claims add to the complexity of opinions toward the region.

In a 1975 Yankelovich survey, only half of those surveyed (52 percent) had heard of the PLO. By early 1978, that percentage had increased to 77 percent in a Gallup survey. Of those familiar with the PLO in 1978, only 14 percent said that the PLO represented the views of most Palestinians. In fact, a large majority—63 percent—believed that the PLO did not "represent the point of view of a majority of Palestinians" (23 percent were not sure).

In the same vein, there was no consensus about Yasir Arafat as a valid representative of Palestinians. By a narrow 35-30 percent margin (with 35 percent "not sure"), the public rejected the assertion that "Yasir Arafat is the real leader of the Palestinian Arabs and Israel ought to negotiate with him" (Harris, 1980).

As recently as March 1982, most Americans continued to distinguish between Palestinians and the PLO. A 55 percent majority agreed, in an ABC News/*Washington Post* poll, that the PLO "does not represent" most Palestinians; only 25 percent believed the PLO was representative.

Because Americans do not equate the Palestinian people with the PLO, many more say they ally with Israel when Israel is pitted against "the PLO"—65 percent to 6 percent—than when the alternative is "Palestinians"—47 percent to 14 percent (Harris, 1980). Yankelovich had found in 1975 that (among those who had heard of the PLO) the PLO was strongly viewed as "undemocratic," "anti-American," "backward," and comprised of "terrorists."

The public's distinction between the Palestinians and the PLO helps explain the surprisingly positive reaction to Palestinian calls for a homeland. In January 1978, Gallup asked those who said they followed Mideast news and who were aware of the PLO whether they favored (1) an independent Palestinian nation on the West Bank, (2) a West Bank state affiliated with Jordan, or (3) continuation of Palestinians "living as they are now in Israel and in the existing Arab states." Some sort of Palestinian entity was favored by 46 percent. (A separate state was supported by 24 percent, and one linked to Jordan was supported by 22 percent.) Only 30 percent wanted to continue current arrangements, and 24 percent were undecided.

The following year, the Gallup question did not provide the option of a state associated with Jordan.

When the choice was between a fully independent Palestinian state and the status quo, 41 percent opted for a separate state, while only 28 percent chose the status quo; 31 percent were undecided.

These reactions might be attributed in part to the American tendency to react sympathetically to causes evoking the "self-determination" of peoples. This instinctive reaction to favor all "homelands," added to a conception of Palestinians as non-PLO, and desires for a "solution," helps explain the unexpectedly positive response to the idea of a Palestinian homeland.

This is a topic on which public responses are even more sensitive to question wording than usual. In 1980, 71 percent in a Harris poll agreed that Palestinians "deserve their own independent state, just as much as the Jews deserved a homeland after World War II." Yet, only 15 percent agreed that "Arafat and the PLO should be given the West Bank and allowed to form an independent state."

Despite this continued public aversion to Arafat and the PLO, one might conclude that there is now a definite attraction to the idea of a Palestinian homeland. However, the results from one recent survey indicate that this point should not be overstated.

An NBC News/AP poll in October 1981 included a question on this subject but made it convenient for respondents not to answer: "Do you favor or oppose the creation of a separate Palestinian Arab state on Israel's West Bank, or don't you know enough about the issue to have an opinion?" Two-thirds (68 percent) took advantage of the escape hatch (which inferred that some amount of in-depth knowledge was necessary to answer the question). The third that did express an opinion was about evenly divided—15 percent favored a separate state and 18 percent opposed it.

This response to the NBC News/AP question suggests there is little intensity for the "separate state" position, and perhaps the public appreciates the complexities and ambiguities of the subject. The safest conclusion is that some tentative American recognition and sympathy has evolved for the Palestinian people, but such sympathy is inhibited by the specter of the PLO.

Israel versus Begin

Increased complexity has also characterized U.S. attitudes toward Israel, Israeli policies, and Israeli leaders. The American public assesses current Israeli leaders and government policies differently than it does the state of Israel.

There has been no departure from the high esteem in which most Americans hold the state of Israel. Gallup surveys showed that overall attitudes toward Israel have shifted little since 1976. In fact, Israel's ratings improved in 1980: the percent favorable increased from 65 (in 1976) to 74 (in 1980), while the percent unfavorable decreased from 25 to 21.

An overwhelming bloc of 86 percent agreed that "Israel is a small, courageous, democratic nation which is trying to preserve its independence" (Harris, 1980). An identical proportion had agreed with the same statement in 1975. Clearly, most Americans have maintained an opinion of Israel as a beleaguered and valiant friend. This should be borne in mind when reviewing the evidence of the newfound skepticism toward recent Israeli policies and toward Prime Minister Menachem Begin.

The harsh judgment of Begin appeared as early as 1978. In a revealing Harris poll in spring 1978, more Americans said they would trust Israel over Egypt in a disagreement concerning the peace settlement—43 percent would trust Israel and 24 percent Egypt. However, when asked who they would trust more—President Sadat of Egypt or Prime Minister Begin of Israel—35 percent favored Sadat and 35 percent said Begin. The image of Israel's leader had already dropped below support for Israel as a whole.

In later evaluations of the peace efforts, Americans became increasingly critical of Israel's approach. In four surveys in 1978 and 1979, Gallup asked those who followed Mideast news: "Do you think Israel is or is not doing all it should do to bring about peace in the Middle East?" The same question was posed for Egypt. In each of these polls—by small margins—Americans were more likely to say that Egypt was doing what it should do for peace than they were to say that Israel was doing enough for peace. This was a remarkable departure from traditional impressions of Arab intransigence.

During this period, increased confidence in Egypt, growing suspicion about Israeli policies, and heightened salience of the Palestinians combined to produce one of the first major national survey results in which a plurality of Americans favored an Arab (or, to be precise, Egyptian) position over an Israeli position. During a period of stalemated talks in late December 1978, 37 percent of the Harris respondents said Egypt was right to insist that "Israel must give some guarantee about Palestinian self-rule." Only 30 percent agreed with Israel that "this demand" violated the terms of the Camp David agreement.

In 1980, Harris asked this summary question: "All in all, by his actions and his policies, do you think Prime Minister Begin has created greater Arab hostility to Israel, or don't you think this is so?" The U.S. public was almost evenly divided; 35 percent blamed Begin for increasing Arab anger, and 37 percent rejected the notion. Twenty-eight percent were not sure. Only a few years earlier it would have been inconceivable that almost half of those Americans with an opinion would have considered the leader of Israel the source of Mideast antagonisms. Indeed, 61 percent of those with an opinion agreed that "Israel only seems to want to make peace concessions when the U.S. puts pressure on it to agree to peace terms." Most Americans (54 percent) agreed with the statement: "By advocating and allowing more Jewish settlements on the West Bank [Begin] is making it almost impossible to get a peace settlement." And a 39 percent plurality believed that "Israel has mistreated the Palestinian refugees, and that is wrong." (Only 29 percent disagreed.)

In a matter of just a few years, a large segment of the American public came to doubt the Begin government's commitment to peace and human rights. They no longer took the justness of Israel's leadership for granted. The automatic assumption that Israel was right and any Arab state wrong had been shattered.

At this point, Americans are about evenly divided about Begin. A January 1982 NBC News/AP poll found opinion split between those who thought "Begin's recent political and military actions have been too aggressive" (42 percent) and those who did not think so (37 percent).

Similarly, when a January 1982 national survey for the *Los Angeles Times* asked about impressions of Begin, 33 percent were favorable (8 percent "very" and 25 percent "somewhat" favorable), while 34 percent were unfavorable (13 percent "very" and 21 percent "somewhat"), and 33 percent were noncommital. Americans are divided. There is no overwhelming U.S. opposition to Begin, but he has lost the old favorable consensus—the unquestioned trust and rapport enjoyed by previous Israeli Prime Ministers such as Golda Meir.

Israel's general image has been strong and positive enough to have withstood the "short-term" damage of Menachem Begin and certain Israeli policies. Not only has Israel's overall high level of popularity been sustained, but Americans continue to favor Israel when asked which side is preferred in the conflict.

Israel versus Arab States

Gallup has frequently addressed the following question to those who have heard or read about events in the Middle East: "In the Middle East situation, are your sympathies more with Israel or more with the Arab nations?"

In January 1975, 44 percent said they supported Israel, while only 8 percent supported the Arab nations; the rest had no opinion or favored neither. Through the rest of the 1970s, the percentages fluctuated within a fairly narrow range. Six years later, despite complex transitions in public opinion toward many aspects of the region, the configuration was almost identical. In July 1981, 44 percent sympathized with Israel, compared to 11 percent for the Arab side.

Conventional wisdom might estimate that pro-Israeli sentiment is much greater than 44 percent. The impression that it is greater is due in part to the absence of any significant pro-Arab bloc of opinion—making the four-out-of-ten pro-Israeli segment appear larger. Also, as Seymour Martin Lipset has observed, the pro-Israeli contingent includes a disproportionate share of educated, articulate, and highly committed people. After discounting the usual uninformed "no opinion" group, along with those who always resist "taking sides" in foreign disputes, the pro-Israeli proportion is effectively larger than it first appears.

In a March 1982 replication of the Gallup wording, an ABC News/*Washington Post* survey reported increased support for *both* the Israeli and Arab sides over the July 1981 Gallup results of 44 to 11 percent, respec-

TV News and the Middle East

Since 1973, the Middle East has been the most prominent foreign region on nightly network TV news. Like American public opinion, TV news coverage of the Middle East has undergone some significant changes since the early 1970s.

A recent series of content analyses by American, Arab, and Israeli scholars* has evaluated coverage of the Middle East by ABC, CBS, and NBC. These researchers arrived at generally consistent and complementary conclusions: During the late 1970s, network coverage became far more critical of Israeli policies and leaders than ever before; became more interested in and slightly more sympathetic toward the status of the Palestinians; became extremely favorable to Egypt after 1977 (with Sadat and his policies virtually exempt from serious criticism); and became much more inclined to differentiate among Arab states (rather than to refer to the "Arab world"). There was no evidence, however, that the tenor of TV coverage of hardline Arab states like Syria had changed appreciably during the decade.

Phillip Heyl and I came to similar conclusions in an extensive content study of the agendas of the weeknight newscasts of all three networks from 1972 through 1980. In addition, our findings show that TV news had —until the hostage crisis—treated Middle East news almost entirely in terms of Israel's relations with bordering states and U.S. policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. Middle East news seemed synonymous with Israel, Israel's neighbors, and the United States. These were indisputably powerful stories and worthy of considerable news attention, but it is revealing to look at other developments in the region that were given short shrift.

As a result of its "eastern Mediterranean — Foggy Bottom" focus, television news — like most of the U.S. media — tended to screen out news stories such as those concerning the Yemenite war, the pre-Billy Carter machinations of Libya's Qaddafi, events in Iran prior to the ouster of the Shah, the initial pro-Soviet coup in Afghanistan, and most bilateral Soviet or European relations with Middle Eastern states. For example, despite the vast scale of U.S. military aid to Iran and the Shah's central role in America's Middle East strategy, Iran was largely ignored on TV news prior to the Shah's downfall. (Iran had usually been given only four or five minutes total per network during an entire year.)

Likewise, very low levels of coverage went to the Arab states of North Africa (except Egypt). Until Billy tively. The share siding with Israel increased to 55 percent and the pro-Arab segment went up to 18 percent. The proportional increase is greater for the Arab side even though the absolute percentage increase (11 versus 7 percentage points) is in Israel's favor. The pro-Israel ratio declines from four-to-one to three-to-one, but Israel also obtains a definite majority, rather than a plurality. If other surveys confirm these results and the pattern holds, it reflects a relative gain in support for Arab states, but not a loss of support for Israel.

Why has support for Israel been stable if in fact American opinion has shifted toward key Arab countries, toward Palestinians, and against the leader of Israel? Perhaps the best explanation is that Americans still see Israel as confronted by extremist Arab states that are viewed as implacable and irrational. Loyalty to Israel, withstanding blows by Begin, seems sustained by the perception that the PLO, Syria, Iraq, and Libya are fundamentally hostile to the United States, led by unreasonable and bellicose men, influenced by the Soviet Union, and obsessed with Israel's annihilation.

When asked to agree or disagree with the claim that "The Arabs will press on until they have destroyed the state of Israel, and that is wrong," 61 percent of the public agreed and only 23 percent disagreed (Harris, 1980). The PLO is overwhelmingly seen as a terrorist organization that is out to destroy Israel (62 percent). PLO terrorists are "international outlaws" who "hijack planes" and "kidnap people," say 57 percent of the public. A large plurality sees Arafat as supported by Russian arms. In short, the PLO is seen as "a force for war," rather than "a force for peace" in the region by 75 percent (ABC News/*Washington Post*, March 1982).

With these sorts of enemies, Israel's standing on the omnibus Israel-versus-the-Arabs question remains relatively high, even though American understandings of the region have changed profoundly over the last few years. Americans still do not take Israel's security for granted, nor have they abandoned their concern for Israel's fate.

In the midst of recent budget cutting, only 28 percent of the taxpayers wanted the United States to reduce military aid to Israel; 51 percent wanted it kept at current levels, and 9 percent wanted it increased (ABC News/*Washington Post*, October 1981). Also, a majority of the public opposed the sale of AWACS planes to Saudi Arabia, with a plurality fearing the radar planes would threaten Israel's security.

There is no guarantee that objections to the Begin government will not eventually erode the broad support for Israel. Images of Egypt and its president changed more radically than anyone could have dared imagine in 1976. The United States has a tradition of awe and admiration for Israel, but this tradition has not prevented the public from critically appraising Israeli policies or from quickly revising opinions about more moderate Arab states. "The Arabs" are no longer a monolithic foe in American eyes, and Israel is no more seen as thoroughly virtuous. Nevertheless, as long as the Middle East seems to produce more Arafats and Qaddafis than Sadats, Americans appear willing to stick by an imperfect Israel.

Carter's entanglement made the subject attractive in 1980, Libya and Qaddafi had been nonentities in nightly newscasts. Then, curiously, in 1980 Libya was presented, sometimes almost in passing, as a gangster state supporting international terrorism through arms, ammunition, training, funding, and sanctuary. In the preceding years, the networks had invariably covered the "explosions" of international terrorism, but they had neglected to probe its origins or its accomplices. (Had Billy Carter's understanding of Libya been based on TV news?)

The networks also gave relatively little notice to Soviet, European, or United Nations activities. Europeans provided an occasional Greek chorus in reaction to American initiatives, but their unique postures toward the Middle East received little coverage. The networks also downplayed the Soviet role in the region, especially when there was no direct interaction with the United States.

In May of 1974, when Libya's Qaddafi journeyed to Moscow and sharply realigned his nation (a far-reaching move that was surprising in light of his prior anti-communism), the networks missed the story. Egypt's relations with the USSR offer another example. Despite Egypt's near total dependence on the Soviets for arms and aid, Anwar Sadat expelled Soviet military advisers in 1972. In the face of the vast significance this held for a possible radical restructuring of Egyptian policies, and consequences for the entire region, the networks gave the story passing mention (altogether less than three minutes on two networks, and about four minutes on the third).

In Afghanistan, the initial pro-Soviet coup in 1978 was given less than three minutes on the nightly news. Surprisingly, the subsequent 1979 kidnapping and assassination of U.S. Ambassador Dubs received only perfunctory coverage and no real follow-up stories. It was not until Soviet troops physically landed in Kabul in late December 1979, that news attention was finally directed to Afghanistan. (The networks then typically incorporated the country into the Middle East by virtue of its "proximity" to certain oil fields.)

Consistent with their focus on crises, the networks would be sure to cover an Iran-Iraq war, or an overt Soviet invasion. However, the more "subtle" bilateral relations of other countries rarely made the nightly news, especially if the State Department was silent and if the story did not fit the Arab-Israeli conflict format.

---

*William C. Adams, ed., *Television Coverage of the Middle East* (Norwood, N.J.: Ablex, 1981).

by Greg Martire and Ruth Clark

Anti-Semitism in America

In 1980, the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith recorded three hundred seventy-seven incidents of anti-Semitism in the United States. In 1981, the number of such incidents doubled. These incidents, and many around the world, have led some observers to question whether anti-Semitism is on the rise again. Indeed, several of the factors associated with the growth of European anti-Semitism in the 1930s have reemerged in the late seventies—economic turmoil, uncontrolled inflation, and increasing political conservatism in the United States and in several European countries. Continuing turmoil in the Middle East provides potential fodder for perceived conflicts between the interests of the Israelis and the interests of the United States.

There are, however, many hopeful signs that anti-Semitism in our country may be on the wane:

- The impact of the 1960s and 1970s has strengthened the belief in social pluralism.
- A generation of young Americans with values different from their elders has reached maturity.
- Many quotas and restrictions against Jews have been lifted.

Against this background, the results of a major national survey of American attitudes toward Jews offer a clear and consistent picture of the nature and extent of anti-Semitism in America as we move into the 1980s. The study, conducted by Yankelovich, Skelly and White, Inc., under the auspices of the American Jewish Committee, indicates that while anti-Semitism remains a problem, many of its manifestations have declined significantly in the United States since 1964. In that year a baseline study conducted by the National Opinion Research Center, and later reported in Gertrude Selznick and Stephen Steinberg's book, *The Tenacity of Prejudice*, was taken. Some of the images of Jews as captured by the survey are reported here.[1]

Negative Images

The decline in anti-Semitism is most pronounced when it comes to traditional negative images of Jewish character.* One of the most consistent and dramatic changes in the survey is in the number who view Jews as unethical. Compared to 1964, non-Jews are less likely to view Jewish businessmen as dishonest, shrewd, or tricky. They are also less likely to believe that Jews are more willing than others to use shady business practices to get what they want (see table 1 for trends on negative beliefs). Another negative stereotype that has declined concerns Jewish control of business and indus-

---

[1] The Yankelovich, Skelly and White Inc., *Trend* findings reported in this article are based on those individuals who expressed an opinion about the questions asked. Sample size = 1,007 with a black/Jewish oversample of 143. Interviewing was conducted in March of 1981.

---

*The unrecalculated responses are shown at the end of this article. The "don't know" (1964) and the "not sure" (1981) categories were calculated out to maintain comparability.

When the questions probing the prevalence of anti-Semitic beliefs were first asked in 1964, respondents were asked whether each of twelve statements was "probably true" or "probably false." A "don't know" response was not offered. In March 1981, when Yankelovich, Skelly and White presented the same statements, the "not sure" category was offered to the respondent in order to increase the likelihood that positions that were taken were genuinely felt and not the result of a forced choice. In both 1964 and 1981, high "don't knows" were recorded on questions where people were less knowledgeable, for example, "The movie and television industries are pretty much controlled by Jews," and "International banking is pretty much controlled by Jews."

try. The belief that Jews control international banking and the movie and television industries has declined sharply since 1964, although it continues to be a fairly widespread notion. Since 1964, there has also been a drop in the proportion of non-Jews who accept stereotypic beliefs about offensive personal qualities of Jews. In 1964, one out of two non-Jews was likely to believe that "Jews have a lot of irritating faults"; today, only one out of four non-Jews is likely to share that belief. The view that "Jews don't care what happens to anyone but their own kind" has also declined among non-Jews.

There has been no real change in the image of Jews as clannish. Because they have maintained their separateness as a social group, Jews are subject to this charge. A majority of non-Jews continue to accept the view that "Jews stick together too much" and that "Jewish employers go out of their way to hire other Jews."

Despite the overall decline in anti-Semitic beliefs since 1964, there are two areas where negative images have risen. The belief that Jews have too much power in the United States has risen since 1964, when one in ten non-Jews felt that way. Today, one in four expresses that view. It is important to note, however, that this is not extraordinary. One in five white Americans believes blacks have too much power. The issue of whether American Jews are more loyal to Israel than to the United States is another area where attitudes toward Jews have changed since the mid-1960s. In 1964, 39 percent of non-Jews agreed that "Jews are more loyal to Israel than to America." By 1981, that figure had risen to 48 percent.

Positive Images

Much of the research about American attitudes toward Jews has focused on negative images. It is clear, however, that positive images of Jews are more pervasive than negative ones. The majority of non-Jews believe that Jews are "usually hard-working" (93 percent), "have a strong faith in God" (90 percent), are "warm and friendly people" (86 percent), and "have contributed much to the cultural life of America" (79 percent).

An Index of Anti-Semitism

In order to obtain a single summary measure of anti-Semitism, the Yankelovich study used an eleven-item index of anti-Semitic beliefs developed by Selznick and Steinberg for *The Tenacity of Prejudice*. The index combined responses to questions about Jews' power in the United States; their interest in their own kind; honesty in business; power in the business world; loyalty to Israel versus America; control of international banking; shrewdness and trickiness in business dealings; irritating faults; use of shady practices to get ahead; clannishness; and desire to run things. The results of the analysis of the index indicate that:

- Twenty-three percent of non-Jews can be characterized as *prejudiced*.
- Thirty-two percent of non-Jews are *neutral*, that is, they do not hold anti-Semitic views. However, they frequently do not hold strongly favorable views about Jews either. Many of these individuals have had little exposure to Jews and consequently do not have strong feelings one way or the other.

Table 1
TRENDS IN NEGATIVE BELIEFS ABOUT JEWS

	1964	1981	Net Difference
Probably true			
The movie and television industries are pretty much controlled by Jews	69%	46%	−23%
Jews have a lot of irritating faults	48	29	−19
Jews are more willing than others to use shady practices to get what they want	48	33	−15
The trouble with Jewish businessmen is that they are so shrewd and tricky that other people don't have a fair chance in competition	40	27	−13
International banking is pretty much controlled by Jews	55	43	−12
Jews always like to be at the head of things	63	52	−11
Jews should stop complaining about what happened to them in Nazi Germany	51	40	−11
Jews don't care what happens to anyone but their own kind	30	22	− 8
Jews are (not) just as honest as other businessmen	30	22	− 8
Jews stick together too much	58	53	− 5
Jewish employers go out of their way to hire other Jews	60	57	− 3
Jews today are trying to push in where they are not wanted	21	19	− 2
Jews are always stirring up trouble with their ideas	13	14	+ 1
Jews have too much power in the business world *	33	37	+ 4
Jews are more loyal to Israel than to America	39	48	+ 9
Jews have too much power in the United States *	13	23	+10

Note: Base = non-Jews. The responses shown here are based on those with an opinion. *These are posed in the form of questions to which respondents answered "yes," "no," or "don't know."

Source: Survey by National Opinion Research Center, 1964; Yankelovich, Skelly and White for the American Jewish Committee, March 1981.

- Forty-five percent of non-Jews are *unprejudiced* —that is, they hold relatively few anti-Semitic beliefs and have favorable attitudes toward Jews.

Overall, prejudice against Jews is most widespread among non-Jews who are older (30 percent of this group are prejudiced), less educated (28 percent) and black (27 percent). It is less widespread among those who are young (only 16 percent of this group were prejudiced) and those who are college graduates or postgraduates (14 percent).

Declining Anti-Semitism

Since 1964 there have been significant changes in American attitudes toward Jews. Such changes in national attitudes over time can come from several sources: changes in the views of individuals, changes in the composition of society, or both. The overall decline in anti-Semitism that has occurred in the United States since 1964 is not primarily the result of changes in attitudes among individuals; rather, it is the result of societal change. The forces of history, not individual psychology, are responsible.

An examination of the views of that cohort of Americans who were adults in 1964 (eighteen to fifty-five years of age) and are likely to be alive today (thirty-four years of age and over) reveals that among these individuals there has been no overall decline in the mean level of anti-Semitism. The death of many of those individuals who were fifty-five years of age and over in 1964 (and were highly anti-Semitic) and the coming of age of those individuals who were young children in the mid-1960s (and who are highly tolerant) explain the overall decline in anti-Semitic beliefs.

Table 2
TRENDS IN BELIEFS ABOUT JEWS

	Total		1964	1981
	1964	1981	18-54 years of age	35 years of age or older
Mean level-anti-Semitism index	42%	35%	36%	39%

Note: Base = non-Jews.
Source: Survey by National Opinion Research Center, 1964; Yankelovich, Skelly and White, for the American Jewish Committee, March 1981.

Another factor explaining declining anti-Semitism is the increased acceptance of diversity. Since 1964, Americans have grown more accepting of different lifestyles and beliefs in many areas, particularly the changing role of women and the tolerance of homosexuality. The study indicates that since 1964, Americans express more acceptance of atheists and the right of foreigners to "maintain their foreign ways."

A long tradition in social science research has linked prejudice to a tendency toward ethnocentrism and xenophobia. An index composed of affirmative answers to four statements found that the relationship between xenophobia and anti-Semitism is quite powerful. The statements were: "It bothers me to see immigrants succeeding more than Americans who were born here," "Nothing in other countries can beat the American way of life," "Foreigners who come to live in America should give up their foreign ways and learn to be like other Americans," and "The illegal alien situation is one of the most serious problems in America." In fact, xenophobia is the single most powerful correlate of anti-Semitism. Four out of ten non-Jews who are highly xenophobic are prejudiced, compared to one in ten who is prejudiced among those low on the xenophobia index. The impact persists even after controlling for education.

The Current Climate

While it has social and political ramifications, tolerance of diversity is essentially a psychological phenomenon. In the last twenty-five years, students of anti-Semitism have focused increasingly on the economic, social, and political factors associated with anti-Semitism. Domestic economic problems, energy problems and the related issue of Israel, increasing political conservatism, and the loss of U.S. power and prestige are all things which could have an effect on anti-Semitism in contemporary America.

The results of this study indicate that, at least at the present time, these economic and political factors do not appear to have had a major impact on the level of anti-Semitism in the United States. For example, individuals who are prejudiced against Jews are *not* significantly more likely to be concerned about unemployment, a recession, energy shortages, or a war in the Middle East (see table 3).

Table 3
ANTI-SEMITISM AND CURRENT ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONCERNS

	Total Non-Jews	Prejudiced	Neutral	Unprejudiced
Worried A Lot About:				
An energy shortage	51%	51%	55%	48%
A recession in the country	50	53	53	46
Another war in the Middle East	47	47	50	45
The possibility of a world war	47	50	49	44
Losing your job because of the economy	27	26	30	25

Note: Base = non-Jews.
Source: Surveys by Yankelovich, Skelly and White for the American Jewish Committee, March 1981.

In the political sphere, there appears to be little relationship between political attitudes and anti-Semitism:

- Twenty-seven percent of conservatives are prejudiced versus 22 percent of liberals.
- Twenty-one percent of non-Jews who have grown more conservative in recent years are prejudiced, compared to 23 percent overall.
- Jews are as likely to have grown more conservative in recent years as are non-Jews (29 percent of Jews versus 30 percent of non-Jews).

The Effects of Social Contact

Social contact between Jews and non-Jews is generally associated with less anti-Semitism. For example, 33 percent of individuals who are unprejudiced have contact with Jews in clubs and organizations to which they belong, compared to 20 percent of those who are prejudiced. But the link between higher levels of social contact and lower levels of anti-Semitism is not universal. One of the more interesting findings of the study is that among black Americans, social contact with Jews is associated with greater prejudice.

Some analysts have argued that the reason for black-Jewish tensions is that Jews have developed a "middleman" role—as merchants, teachers, principals, and so on—between the black community and the larger white society. This position receives some support from the fact that, relative to white-Jewish interaction, black-Jewish interaction is more likely to occur in impersonal settings (with doctors, dentists, and shopkeepers) and less likely to occur in more personal settings. The nature of the contact, and not the interaction itself, may produce the tensions.

The Impact of Religious Belief

One of the most controversial hypotheses about anti-Semitism is its possible link with Christian orthodoxy. The current analysis reveals three major themes relevant to the "religious factor":

- Christian orthodoxy and religiosity have declined significantly since 1964.
- Despite the decline, these factors are somewhat related to anti-Semitism. One in four (25 percent) Christian fundamentalists is prejudiced, compared to one in five (18 percent) of non-fundamentalists. Thirty-six percent of Christian fundamentalists are neutral compared to 25 percent of non-fundamentalists.
- The association of religion and anti-Semitism is, however, due to the effects of age, education, and race. After controlling for these three demographic factors, the association of religion and anti-Semitism disappears.

Cautious Optimism

The presence of anti-Semitic beliefs in American society continues to be cause for concern and vigilance. While anti-Semitic beliefs have become somewhat less widespread since 1964, they remain a serious problem. Nevertheless, a number of the factors which have contributed to declining anti-Semitism in the past two decades, such as an increasingly well-educated public, continue to operate.

Perhaps more heartening is the fact that it is generational change rather than individual change which is responsible for declining anti-Semitism. While the persistence of anti-Semitism for more than two millenia is reason for caution, the process of generational change described in this study provides hope that the current level of anti-Semitism will continue to decline in the future as today's generation of more tolerant young adults becomes the "older generation."

Table 4
NEGATIVE TRENDS, UNRECALCULATED

	Probably True		Probably False		Don't Know	Not Sure
	1964	1981	1964	1981	1964	1981
The movie and television industries are pretty much controlled by Jews	47%	25%	21%	29%	32%	46%
Jews have a lot of irritating faults	40	19	43	48	17	33
Jews are more willing than others to use shady practices to get what they want	42	23	46	46	12	31
The trouble with Jewish businessmen is that they are so shrewd and tricky that other people don't have a fair chance in competition	35	20	53	54	12	26
International banking is pretty much controlled by Jews	30	21	24	28	46	51
Jews always like to be at the head of things	54	38	32	35	14	27
Jews should stop complaining about what happened to them in Nazi Germany		28		42		30
Jews don't care what happens to anyone but their own kind	26	16	62	59	12	25
Jews are (not) just as honest as other businessmen	28	60	64	17	8	23
Jews stick together too much	52	40	38	35	10	25
Jewish employers go out of their way to hire other Jews	49	37	32	28	19	35
Jews today are trying to push in where they are not wanted	18	16	68	70	14	14
Jews are always stirring up trouble with their ideas	10	10	70	61	20	29
Jews have too much power in the business world	29	32	59	55	12	13
Jews are more loyal to Israel than the United States	30	30	47	32	23	38
Jews have too much power in the United States	11	20	77	67	12	13

Source: Survey by National Opinion Research Center, 1964; Yankelovich, Skelly and White for the American Jewish Committee, March 1981.

$3.50

R2110-1A

Public Opinion

Publishe
American
Enterprise
Institute

June/July 1982

Gross National Spirit Update page 21

ACQUISITIONS EDITOR
STATISTICAL REFERENCE INDEX
CONGRESSIONAL INFORMATION SERVICE 1
4520 EAST-WEST HIGHWAY
WASHINGTON, DC 20014
88-26788 1



Is America Still the Land of Opportunity?

With
Oscar Handlin
Michael Novak
Robert Lekachman
Seymour Martin Lipset
James Davis
Charles Hamilton
Frank Bryan

Public Opinion

Volume 5, Number 3 June/July 1982

Publisher
William J. Baroody, Jr.

Co-Editors
Seymour Martin Lipset
Ben J. Wattenberg

Managing Editor
Karlyn H. Keene

Associate Editor
Victoria A. Sackett

Assistant Editor
Nicola L. Furlan

Research Assistant
Mary Bruun

Editorial Consultant
Hunter C. Harrison, Jr.

Editorial Board
David R. Gergen, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, Irving Kristol, Everett Carll Ladd, Howard Penniman, Austin Ranney, Richard M. Scammon, Laurence H. Silberman, Herbert Stein, and Richard J. Whalen

Consulting Editor for Opinion Roundup
Everett Carll Ladd

Editorial Associate
Marilyn M. Potter

Art & Design Director
Pat Taylor

Chart Illustrator
Hördur Karlsson

Staff Editor
Elizabeth D. Ashooh

PUBLIC OPINION, June/July 1982, Vol. 5, No. 3. Published bimonthly by the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. Copyright 1982 American Enterprise Institute. Subscription rates: $18.00 for one year, $34.00 for two years. Individual copy: $3.50. Information on bulk orders or multiple subscriptions available on request. Editorial and business offices: c/o AEI, 1150 17th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. Send changes of address and all subscription correspondence to Circulation Department, c/o AEI, same address. "American Enterprise Institute" and are registered service marks of the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.

Second class postage paid at Washington, D.C.

ISSN 0149-9157

CONTENTS

2 THE IDEA OF OPPORTUNITY
by Oscar Handlin

The idea of opportunity has been a powerful force in American history. The Pulitzer Prize-winning historian looks back at the stuff of American dreams. Looking ahead, he predicts that recent government policies may be narrowing opportunity and incurring incalculable social costs.

5 IS AMERICA STILL THE LAND OF OPPORTUNITY?
A conversation with Robert Lekachman and Michael Novak

Two distinguished commentators argue about the conditions necessary to foster opportunity. The Reagan administration comes in for its share of blame and praise.

11 THE UPS AND DOWNS OF AMERICAN SOCIAL MOBILITY
by James A. Davis

This noted sociologist looks at the evidence of mobility in America and comes to conclusions that contradict some and confirm other bits of conventional wisdom.

16 RURAL RENAISSANCE: IS AMERICA ON THE MOVE AGAIN?
by Frank Bryan

After a century of leaving the land, Americans are returning to it. The author argues that the land could play a more important role today in the quest for opportunity than it has for over 100 years.

21 OPINION ROUNDUP

41 SOCIAL MOBILITY IN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES
by Seymour Martin Lipset

Does a rising tide lift all boats, including those far from our own shores? The author examines cross-national data and finds that major economic changes have produced substantial mobility around the globe.

45 INTEGRATING THE AMERICAN DREAM
by Charles V. Hamilton

One of the conditions necessary for upward mobility is the belief in opportunity. The polling data provide dramatic evidence that black Americans believe there is still significant opportunity in the United States.

53 BRITAIN RALLIES 'ROUND THE PRIME MINISTER
by Robert Worcester and Simon Jenkins

The war over the Falkland Islands has, for the time being, been a boon to the party in power. Initially cautious, Brits now strongly endorse the government's policies.

56 PHONY POLLS: THE POLLSTER'S NEMESIS
by Barry Orton

Survey research has grown, and so have its illegitimate offspring. The author looks at the variety and validity of pseudo-polls.

58 TELEDEMOCRACY AND ITS DISCONTENTS
by Michael J. Malbin

There are many reasons to beware of the new species of opinion polling. The author suggests that certain breeds threaten the way our democracy operates.

by James Davis

Up and Down Opportunity's Ladder

Mobility" is one of the few social science terms that means exactly what it says—movement of some kind. Geographic mobility is the clearest example (see Frank Bryan's "Rural Renaissance: Is America on the Move Again?" p. 16). If you are born in Mobile, Alabama and move away you are "mobile," but if you are born in Mobile and stay there until you die you are "immobile." Social mobility is a bit less obvious since it entails so many dimensions. Generally, sociologists define it as how far one has moved up or down life's ladder, and you don't have to be a sociologist to be aware of people who are "rising in the world," "on the skids," "going places," "drop outs," and so forth.

Defining that initial rung on the social mobility ladder is a bit tricky, because at birth we all are unemployed, illiterate, and broke. Such deprivation is universal, but if the baby's parents are "up there" we don't feel quite so sad, while if the baby's parents are clinging to a bottom rung, things don't look as promising. Thus, the convention has developed of assigning *parental* scores as starting values. If your dad was a bootblack and you are now a physician, sociology says you have experienced "upward intergenerational occupational mobility"—73 points worth, as we shall see.

Of the ladders available for objective research, occupation has received most scrutiny. When sociologists talk about "social mobility" they usually mean intergenerational occupational mobility. And they are, ahem, usually talking about males. We don't have good beginning rungs for women because so few *mothers* had jobs. In the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) General Social Surveys, a series of national samplings during the 1970s, just half (50.4 percent) of the respondents said "yes" to "Did your mother ever work for pay for as long as a year, after she was married?" Needless to say, current scholars are redressing this imbalance. The early results suggest the main themes of mobility research are androgynous, but in the first half of this report I will stick to the classic data and thus talk mostly about males.

Mobility research is not new. (Nor is mobility. See

Oscar Handlin's "The Idea of Opportunity," p. 2.) Pitirim Sorokin's 1927 volume, *Social Mobility*, is still worth reading, but the quantity and quality of mobility data changed enormously after World War II, when nationwide studies began. The landmark here is Peter Blau and Otis D. Duncan's 1967 book, *The American Occupational Structure*, a sophisticated and encyclopedic analysis of CPS (the Census Bureau's Current Population Survey) data from a probability sample of some twenty thousand U.S. men. The Blau-Duncan study is known as OCG-I for "Occupational Change in a Generation." A decade later in 1973, David Featherman and Robert Hauser gave us OCG-II, a thirty thousand case replication. Whether, like *Rocky* or *Superman*, we have further OCG treats in store is unknown, but a third data base has emerged on its own. Beginning in 1972, NORC began a series of samplings of American adults known as the General Social Survey (GSS). Most of the GSS questions are repeated word for word, year after year—not for lack of imagination but to catch social trends. One can pool GSSs to obtain a large sample—some 12,000 cases if one pools the eight surveys from 1972 through 1980. GSS 1982 is just completed, but we haven't seen any results yet.

After this brief introduction, let me turn to the daunting assignment of summarizing the findings of dozens of books and articles and analyzing the data. Necessarily painting with rather broad brush strokes, I say it looks like this:

1. Americans are frequent border-crossers
2. There is a lot more downward mobility than one might expect
3. But more of us move into the top levels than move out
4. Points 1, 2, and 3 shouldn't lead one to ignore the high amount of class continuity
5. Which is both promoted and mitigated by the "educational two-step."

Americans Are Frequent Border-Crossers

Comparing current situations with earlier ones, the General Social Survey and the Michigan election studies tell us:

- No more than 10 to 15 percent of those surveyed shift out of their original religion
- A bit less than 15 percent shift regions
- About 30 percent shift political party
- About a third have shifted from one state to another
- About a third cross the white collar v. blue collar/farm line, going one way or the other.

Occupational mobility is not rare. It is about as common as inter-state or inter-party mobility, and a lot more common than movement across the subcultural fault lines of religion and region.

Downward Mobility

Table 1 gives several examples of the classic way to examine mobility data, a nine-celled percentage table with fathers and sons each sorted into white collar, farm, and blue collar. For example, the fifth line of data says that in OCG-II, of 5,855 sons of farm fathers, 25.7 percent now have white collar jobs, 15 percent are still farming, and 59.3 percent have blue collar jobs.

Table 1

THE STANDARD BRAND, CONTEMPORARY U.S., FATHER-SON MOBILITY TABLE

	Son's Job					
Father's Job	**White Collar**	**Farm**	**Blue Collar**	**Total**	**N**	**Origins**
(A) OCG-I (1962)						
White Collar	69.8%	1.4%	28.8%	100%	4,290	24.4%
Farm	22.9	22.3	54.9	100	5,141	29.2
Blue Collar	36.5	1.7	61.9	100	8,180	46.4
					17,611	100.0
(B) OCG-II (1973)						
White Collar	66.1	.1	32.9	99	7,232	27.6
Farm	25.7	15.0	59.3	100	5,855	22.3
Blue Collar	38.1	1.1	60.9	100	13,148	50.1
					26,235	100.0
(C) GSS (1972-1976)*						
White Collar	66.5	.5	32.9	100	762	25.6
Farm	24.4	19.9	55.7	100	734	24.6
Blue Collar	35.4	.8	63.8	100	1,483	49.8
					2,974	100.0
(D) GSS (adjusted for education)						
White Collar	54.0	1.2	44.7	100	762	25.6
Farm	34.2	17.6	48.3	100	734	24.6
Blue Collar	37.7	.8	61.5	100	1,483	49.8
					2,979	100.0

*Calculated from tables in John W. Meyer, Nancy Brandon Tuma, and Krzystof Zagorski, "Educational and Occupational Mobility: A Comparison of Polish and American Men," *American Journal of Sociology* (1979), 84:978-986.

Sticking with nonfarm jobs for the moment and squinting just a bit, I say each study is consistent with this proposition: "About a third of the white collar sons move down to blue, and about a third of blue collar sons move up to white collar." The ascent of the blues is, of course, "The American Dream," but the descent of the white collars is seldom lauded in Labor Day speeches on our open society. Yet the probabilities are similar in either direction. Not all descents are sickening plummets, I grant you. Indeed, as we will see, the top of the blue collar group (Craftsmen) have occupational prestige scores on a par with the bottom of the white collar (Clerical and Sales). True enough, but most white collar fathers are among the more prestigious "Professional and Managerial" group and most blue collar fathers are within the less prestigious "Operatives, Service Workers, Laborers" group rather than Craftsmen. Taking the *top* of the whites and the *bottom* of the blues and combining OCG-I and OCG-II, 16 percent of the Professional and Managerial sons ended up in Operative-Service-Labor, while 22 percent of the Operative-Service-Labor sons ended up in Professional and Managerial. For nonfarm workers, the chances of downward mobility are about the same as the chances for upward mobility.

Moving into the Top Levels

If the white collars have about the same chance of moving down as the blue collars have of moving up, why do we hear only about upward mobility? Perhaps part of our sense of progress comes from the astounding increase in real incomes in this century. Contemporary blue collar workers live a lot better than pre-World War II white collar workers. But another part comes from a profound mathematical principle: if you apply the same percentage to a larger number you will get more cases than if you apply it to a smaller number. Look again at table 1. About half of us come from blue collar homes and only about a quarter from white collar homes. Most of this difference can be accounted for by occupational structure, but some of it is due to fertility. Blue collar families generate more sons for the tables than the same number of white collar families. Consequently, there are roughly twice as many sons who moved from blue to white as moved from white to blue.

And then there are the farm sons. If asked to nominate one single social trend to characterize America in the last century, I would opt for "Land Rush"—a rush of farmers and farm sons to get off the land. GSS data, for example, suggest that among Americans born around 1890, half had farmer fathers while among those in the birth cohort of 1955 (in their early twenties during the GSS years 1972-1980) the figure is down to 6 percent. Rural southern blacks, Yankee adolescents on stony hillsides, and Scandinavian lads from the endless prairies: all had this in common—as adults the vast majority were working in cities, most (about 55 percent in table 1) as blue collar workers, but a sizable minority (about 25 percent) as white collar. Farm sons were more likely to end up as white collar workers than as farmers! Since nobody (one percent or less) from nonfarm origins ends up working in agriculture, the land rush added considerably to the number of people crossing into white collar jobs. Averaging over the three studies and fudging a weensy bit to make things tidy:

- 50 percent stayed in their father's group (immobile)
- 25 percent moved from farm or blue collar into white (up)
- 10 percent moved from white collar to blue (down)
- 15 percent moved from farm to blue (down)

These four numbers can be combined and rearranged into several pretty patterns:

- (25% + 10% = 35%) i.e. the one-third crossing the white collar line one way or the other
- (25% + 10% + 15% = 50%) Half the sons are mobile if you use a three-way split
- (25% ÷ 10% = 2.5%) More than twice as many move into white collar as move out
- (15% − 10% = 5%) Most entrants into the blue collar stratum came from farm
- (15% + 10% = 25%) If you consider movement from farm to blue collar as downward mobility (more on this later), upward mobility (25% moving from farm or blue collar into white) and downward mobility are about equally common.

Assuming the rates stay the same, the *rate by origin* principle allows us to speculate about the future of mobility. Three predictions: (1) As white collar jobs increase vis-à-vis blue collar, downward mobility will increase and upward mobility decrease in absolute terms; (2) the evaporation of farm origins will reduce downward mobility more than it reduces upward; and (3) these two trends either will or won't cancel each other out and the rates may or may not stay the same.

While "just" half the sons remain in their paternal stratum, they are considerably more likely to end up there than sons from other strata. At the top, two-thirds of the white collar sons stay put, but that is a lot more than the one-third or less of blue collar or farm sons who scale those heights. And, of course, the opposite occurs for blue collar jobs, where blue collar sons end up with more than their fair share. In less technical language, "them as has, gets." The consequence is a perpetuation of family privilege and of family underprivilege.

Statistically, we are talking about a positive correlation between the prestige of father's and son's occupations. These correlations may well be the most studied statistic in sociology. I have seen dozens of them. The numbers vary with the sample and the particular statistics used, but they are always positive: in any community, region, ethnic group, or whatever in the United

States, it is safe to bet that the higher the prestige of the father, the higher the prestige of the son or daughter.

Whether this goes on more than two generations has not been well studied. My guess (drawing on unpublished research by Christopher Jencks and NORC) is that there is very little correlation between the prestige of grandfathers and grandsons, and what there is is explained by father's occupation. As the old American aphorism goes, "shirt sleeves to shirt sleeves in three generations." The American pattern seems to be one of moderate continuity but not of dynasties or a permanent underclass.

The "Educational Two-Step"

How do fathers pass on the occupational baton (or short end of the stick)? We know it isn't direct inheritance of jobs. If you remove the minority of cases where fathers and sons have exactly the same job titles, the patterns in table 1 change little. Instead, the key variable turns out to be schooling—the number of years of formal education.

When a third variable strongly influences a correlation, statistical rules say it must have an important association with both. Thus, the contribution of schooling to father-son occupational inheritance consists of two separate steps, a relation between father's occupation and education and a second relation between son's occupation and education.

Step one can be called the liberals' step, since it makes the United States look bad and would cost a lot of money to change. Table 2a uses GSS data to illustrate the strong differences in schooling still present in America:

- More than 60 percent of white collar sons have a year or more of college, in contrast to 32 percent of blue collar and 18 percent of farm sons.
- Almost 60 percent of farm sons failed to finish high school in contrast to 36 percent of blue collar and 15 percent of white collar.
- Most white collar sons have a year or more of college, most farm sons never finished high school, and blue collar sons are evenly split between college, high school, and less than high school.

Americans don't feel comfortable about discussing it, but we still have sharp class differences in schooling. As best we can tell, these differences are not going away. (Race differences in schooling are going away, but that's another matter.) Younger birth cohorts do have strikingly higher levels of education. For the birth cohorts of 1900, 1910, 1920, 1930, and 1940 the portions with 12 or more years of schooling are estimated as 23 percent, 36 percent, 50 percent, 58 percent, and 72 percent.

Step two of the educational two-step runs from education to occupation and it should please the conservatives since it suggests the system is working fairly and wonderfully and it would be a shame to monkey with it. More exactly, table 2b shows that when one looks at the occupational effects of education and father's stratum simultaneously, education is very important and class origins not very important:

- In each origin stratum, the proportion of white collar sons rises dramatically with education.
- In each educational level, the effects of father's stratum are moderate at best.
- A blue collar or farm son with a college degree has a better chance at a white collar job than a white collar son without a degree.

Liberals (rightly) decry the gross class differences in schooling, and conservatives (rightly) point with pride to the palpable meritocratic effects of schooling in

Table 2

EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT AND OCCUPATIONAL MOBILITY (GSS)

(a) Father's Occupation and Son's Education

	Son's Education								
Father's Occupation	**0-8**	**9-11**	**12**	**13-15**	**16+**	**Total**	**0-11**	**13+**	**N**
White Collar	5.0%	9.7%	22.6%	28.3%	34.4%	100%	14.7%	62.7%	762
Blue Collar	15.7	20.3	32.0	18.3	13.8	100	36.0	32.1	1,483
Farm	41.0	17.8	23.0	8.6	9.5	100	58.8	18.1	734
									2,979

(b) Father's Occupation, Son's Education, and Son's Occupation
(Proportion of Sons in White Collar Jobs)

	Son's Education				
Father's Occupation	**0-8**	**9-11**	**12**	**13-15**	**16+**
White Collar	28.9%	33.8%	51.2%	67.1%	90.8%
	(38)*	(74)	(172)	(216)	(262)
Blue Collar	12.1	18.3	25.9	53.7	84.8
	(232)	(301)	(474)	(272)	(204)
Farm	11.6	12.2	25.4	46.0	80.0
	(301)	(131)	(169)	(63)	(70)

*Numbers in parentheses represent the total cases for the proportions above.

every origin stratum, but the sociologist is interested in how these two steps combine to influence father-son inheritance. Table 1d shows what happens to the data in table 1c after a little experiment. Let us give the sons in each paternal stratum of table 1c the same educational attainments—through a statistical procedure called "direct standardization," not, I hasten to say, through federal handouts. Then let's see what this does to inheritance. Comparing tables 1c and 1d we see the adjustment eliminates about half the inheritance. For example, in table 2c white collar sons have a 31.1% advantage in white collar jobs compared with sons of blue collar workers (66.5 − 35.4 = 31.1) but when class differences in education are eliminated statistically their advantage drops to 16.3% (54.0 − 37.7 = 16.3). Other statistics, other data sets, and other occupational measures give slightly different numbers, but one can routinely explain half or more of the father-son occupational prestige correlation by son's schooling.

The American system of education acts powerfully and simultaneously to:

—preserve class differences across generations because the well-born go much farther in school and schooling is crucial for good jobs;

—cancel out class differences across generations because not all well-born go far in school (a third of white collar sons have no college), a number of lower status sons get a lot of schooling (a third of blue collar sons have some college) and schooling is more important than class origins in getting good jobs.

These then are the main themes in mobility research: an impressive amount of intergenerational mobility in all directions, rates of downward mobility almost as large as rates of upward mobility, more movement into the very top than out of it because of origin distributions and the secular decline in farming, a persistent positive correlation between father's and son's occupational prestige, and the powerful effect of schooling both in transmitting status across generations and in promoting mobility.

Ethnic Group Mobility

When you jam thousands of people into nine little boxes like the mobility tables in table 1, their idiosyncrasies don't get much chance to shine through. Nevertheless, the data so far have been strictly about individual Americans, as have the vast number of sociological mobility studies. But sociologists are interested in groups too—in particular, ethnic groups such as southern blacks, Irish Catholics, or French-Canadians. Like feminine mobility, ethnic group mobility has not been thoroughly studied because of a shortage of data. The U.S. Census does not ask about religion—partly because Jews, among others, have found that having their religious preference on government lists is not always advantageous—so Census Bureau studies such as the OCGs do not include religion. GSS, however, includes detailed data on religion and nationality and its 12,000 cases enable us to study relatively small groups.

Ethnicity is like pornography in that, as Mr. Justice Stewart remarked, you can't define it but you know it when you see it. To see it you have to look at combinations of at least four variables: race, religion, region, and national origin. These variables are so intricately interwoven that many possible combinations sound facetious, for example, "Black, Southern, Swedish Catholics." Therefore I have used four variables to point out selected combinations that make sociological and statistical sense. Ethnic classification is not standard and other (well-meaning but misguided) sociologists might do it differently. Figure 1 shows my version.

Starting at the top of figure 1, we first divide the cases by race. For the 288 self-defined American Indians, that is that. They appear with their case count and abbreviation (AMERIN) in the upper left corner. Blacks are not sorted on religion because 83 percent were raised as Protestants, but they are divided on region. Blacks have experienced an epochal trek from the rural South to the urban North. Therefore, I divided them into three groups: those who grew up in and stayed in the South (642 cases), those born in the South and now living in the North (288) and those born in and living in the North (335). Northern born blacks returning to the South make excellent feature copy but are too few in number (1.7% of GSS blacks) to include. Whites (there were too few Orientals to consider) are divided first on religion ("In what religion were you raised?"). The 249 Jews are not further subdivided.

Roman Catholics are sorted by national origin ("From what countries or part of the world did your ancestors come?"). In order of size: Italy (450), Ireland (387), Germany (341), Poland (227), Mexico (166), Czechoslovakia (96), France (88), England (80), Puerto Rico (58), and French Canada (53). The Catholic groups are not subdivided on region because they are heavily northern (strictly speaking, non-southern). While about a third of the GSS population lives in the Census region South, for seven of ten Catholic groups the percentage is under 15, for Czechs and French the figure is a bit under the norm (24% and 31%) and only Mexicans (40%), with their southwestern concentration, are relatively southern.

Protestants are sorted into ten nationalities and in some cases by original region also. The regional pattern of Protestant (and Catholic) groups gives us an almost instant course in American history and geography, since even today their homes reflect time of immigration and historical patterns of agriculture and transportation. Scandinavian groups are emphatically non-southern (less than 15 percent for Danes, Finns, Norwegians, and Swedes, half or more of whom grew up in the Midwest); the Dutch and Germans are a bit "dis-southern" at 25 percent each, but the four old migration, large, Protestant groups (English, French,

(Continued on page 48)

(Continued from page 15)

Irish, and Scotch) have 40 to 50 percent born in the South. They are subdivided by region. All of which gives us a total of fourteen white Protestant groups, four subdivided by region and six intact but relatively "Northern."

The twenty-nine ethnic groups in figure 1 comprise 62 percent of all GSS respondents. Of the remainder some are members of small nationality groups (17 Belgians, 12 Chinese, 18 Romanians, etc.), a handful were raised as "Other" or "None" in religion, but the largest chunk, about a fifth of all the cases, were ineligible because they could not pick a single national origin. Of these, about half simply didn't know and half reported multiple origins with none dominant. We are all, as Franklin D. Roosevelt told the DAR, descendants of immigrants, but about a fifth of us have become ethnically pureed in the Cuisinart of American history.

While Americans seem inhibited about discussing social class, quite the opposite seems true for ethnicity. I suspect we all hold the following beliefs about our own group: (1) We started at the very bottom; (2) We are especially hard working and self-sacrificing; (3) We have come a long way but not as far as we deserve; and (4) Among us, unlike other groups, Mamma really runs the family. Similarly in the intellectual world much more is published than known about ethnicity and we do not have the classic data bases comparable to those in table 1. However, Andrew Greeley of NORC pioneered in studying ethnicity by pooling national surveys and unpublished results from the GSS, allowing us to follow his lead with more recent samples. Table 3 lays out the key facts.

Since the results here are in terms of "occupational prestige scales" rather than white-blue-farm, we must detour briefly to consider measurement. Tables like table 1 treat large occupational categories (collars) but one may also study mobility in terms of specific occupations (e.g. physicians or bootblacks). To do so, the jobs must be placed on a single scale of prestige or "social standing." This turns out to be much easier than one might think. One of the remarkable conclusions of modern sociological research is the high agreement on the prestige of occupations. When one asks the man or woman in the street to judge the social standing of specific jobs, one finds striking consensus across time (1925 to today), occupational strata, educational levels, regions, sexes, even nations of the world. Consequently, sociologists have developed prestige scales for occupations. The GSS uses the Hodge-Segal-Rossi scale, which runs from a low of 9 points (bootblacks) to a high of 82 (physicians).

Table 3

OCCUPATIONAL AND EDUCATION SCORES OF ETHNIC GROUPS

Group	Occupational Prestige Father's	Occupational Prestige Own	Change in Rank	Schooling
(1) Jewish	45.3	46.6	0	48.8
(2) ScotPN	45.1	46.1	0	35.0
(3) FrncPN	45.1	43.1	-4	32.2
(4) EnglPS	42.9	43.3	-2	21.0
(5) EnglPN	42.0	42.3	-5	23.3
(6) SwedeP	41.8	40.2	-6	8.6
(7) DanesP	41.8	42.7	-1	18.9
(8) FrncPS	41.3	45.1	+4	11.4
(9) IrishC	41.2	41.9	-2	22.8
(10) ScotPS	41.0	44.6	+5	19.2
(11) EngliC	40.8	46.0	+8	33.7
(12) NorwyP	40.3	42.6	+3	15.0
(13) GermnC	40.1	39.6	-2	0.9
(14) GermnP	40.1	39.8	+1	- 1.6
(15) FrnchC	40.0	39.6	-1	17.3
(16) IrshPN	39.8	39.1	-1	0.4
(17) IrshPS	39.4	39.1	-1	-21.1
(18) FrcanC	37.9	36.0	-5	-15.1
(19) DutchP	37.9	37.3	-2	-28.8
(20) CzechC	36.7	39.7	+6	- 2.1
(21) ItalyC	36.3	38.2	+2	- 7.1
(22) Amerin	35.8	34.2	-3	-23.3
(23) BlckSN	34.9	29.9	-5	-35.2
(24) PolesC	34.3	38.0	+4	-10.5
(25) PrrcoC	34.0	30.7	-2	-57.9
(26) BlckNN	32.9	35.4	+2	1.2
(27) FinnsP	32.6	36.2	+5	-19.5
(28) BlckSS	32.1	28.6	-1	-46.3
(29) MexcoC	30.5	32.1	+3	-31.9

Note: N = North, S = South, C = Catholic, P = Protestant.
See figure 1 for key to national origin abbreviations (e.g. Prrco = Puerto Rican).

The left-hand column of table 3 gives the average (mean) prestige score for fathers of the twenty-nine groups, that is, how they lined up at the starting gate. Since the mean age of the respondents is about forty-five and fathers average thirty years older than their children, the typical father in these data was born around the turn of the century and the typical respondent (we are dealing with both men and women in this section) was born just at the beginning of the Great Depression. The figures can thus be seen as a rough estimate of how the twenty-nine groups stood in occupational prestige in the first third of the 20th century. Top position went to the Jews with a mean of 45.3. The Poles' position, 34.3, is distinctly lower, and the anchor spot went to Mexican Catholics with a score of 30.5. The rankings, by and large, confirm our social stereotypes:

- Of the bottom eight positions all but two went to nonwhites (the three black groups and Indians) or Latins (Mexicans and Puerto Ricans.)
- While the Catholic group spans a larger range than the stereotype (from nine to thirty) none of the Catholic groups was in the top quarter.
- Of the top eight positions, five went to the older Protestant groups (Scotch, French, English), both northern and southern.

There are some surprises:

- Even a generation ago Jews had the highest prestige of any ethnic group.
- The Scandinavians showed a wide range in prestige origins from rank six (Swedes) to rank twenty-seven (Finns).
- The Protestant Irish, both northern and southern,

Figure 1

ETHNIC GROUPS IN THE GSS


Variable
Race
American Indian (AMERIN, 288)
White
Black
Religion "in which you were raised"
(JEWISH, 249)
Catholic
Protestant
Region at age 16
South
Any
North
South
North
Current region
Canada, French (FRCANC, 53)
South (BLCKSS, 642)
North (BLCKSN, 288)
North BLCKNN, 335)
National origin
Czechoslovakia (CZECHC, 96)
Denmark (DANESP, 69)
Holland (DUTCHP, 132)
England (ENGLIC, 80)
England (ENGLPS, 460)
England (ENGLPN, 632)
Finland (FINNSP, 72)
France (FRNCHC, 88)
France (FRNCPS, 44)
France (FRNCPN, 60)
Germany (GERMNC, 341)
Germany (GERMNP, 1248)
Ireland, (IRISHC, 387)
Ireland (IRSHPS, 312)
Ireland (IRSHPN, 268)
Italy (ITALYC, 450)
Mexico (MEXCOC, 166)
Norway (NORWYP, 140)
Poland (POLESC, 227)
Puerto Rico (PRRCOC, 58)
Scotland (SCOTPS, 109)
Scotland (SCOTPN, 141)
Sweden (SWEDEP, 151)

were distinctly farther down the ladder (ranks sixteen and eighteen) than the other old Protestant groups, these being the famous "Scotch-Irish" or less affectionately, "Hill Billies." They started—and remained—below the rank of the later arriving Irish Catholics.

While table 3 shows that Jews and Mexican Catholics started out 14.8 points apart, it is hard to say whether 14.8 is big or small. I think it is small—or at least smaller than most of us would expect.

One yardstick is the distribution of individuals. In the cumulative GSS, 25 percent of the individuals report father scores above 45 and 22 percent report father scores below 30.5. Thus, while Jews were the highest prestige group in the parental generation, their average score was at the "bottom of the top quarter" for all Americans. Comfortable, maybe, but hardly aristocratic. Similarly, almost a quarter of all Americans had paternal prestige scores lower than those of Mexican Catholics, whose position was uncomfortable, maybe, but hardly down and out. While the twenty-nine ethnic groups were spread out in their original scores, they were all spread through the middle of the U.S. distribution. None of them could be termed patricians and none pariahs.

If the first striking feature of the group data is the small range of the original status differences, the second is the large size of the inheritance or stability.

If one calculates a scale known in the sociology business as a "Pearson product moment correlation (r)" for father's and own jobs, one obtains an *r* of + .870, which is in two words, a whopper. Since a high correlation between origins and destinations means low mobility, the theme here is one of relative immobility. For example, if we simply subtract father's score from own job using the data in table 3 (e.g., for Jews 46.6 − 45.3 = + 1.3), the median change is ± 1.6. Thus, the typical movement of an ethnic group is up or down less than two points on another scale, the Hodge-Segal-Rossi scale. Only two groups shifted five or more points: English Catholics moved up from 40.8 to 46.0, while blacks who moved from South to North dropped from 34.9 to 29.9.

Berry's World
COMPLAINTS
© 1979 by NEA, Inc
Jim Berry

"IT'S ABOUT THE AMERICAN DREAM ..."

Reprinted by permission. © 1979 NEA, Inc.

When talking about individuals, the theme was "a lot of continuity and a lot of mobility" but when talking about ethnic groups the theme seems to be "a lot of continuity and some mobility."

Even a correlation of .870 is not perfect and the groups did not cross the finish line in perfect follow-the-leader form. The third column in table 3 shows the change in *rank* for each group. For example, Mexican Catholics started at rank twenty-nine, ended up in rank twenty-six, and got a rank change score of + 3. Four groups increased their rank by five or more points (Finnish Protestants, Southern Scotch Protestants, Czech Catholics, and English Catholics), and four groups fell back five or more ranks (black migrants from South to North, French Canadian Catholics, English Northern Protestants, and Swedish Protestants).

How do you zoom past your competitors? Hard work? Tough mammas? Maybe, but again schooling has a definite impact. So we tune up for another two-step, this time at the group level.

Step one says the higher the paternal status of a group, the higher the education of its sons and daughters. The index I used is simply the percentage with a year or more of college minus the percentage with zero to eleven years of schooling. Thus, Jews have 62.3 percent with some college and 13.5 percent with zero to eleven giving an index of + 48.8. Puerto Ricans, at the other extreme, have 8.8 percent with some college and 66.7 percent with zero to eleven years giving an index of — 57.9. The other twenty-seven groups lie between these scores. The product moment correlation between "Fathers" and "Schooling" in table 3 equals + .837, which is substantial. You can reach the same conclusion without any calculations by inspecting the right hand column in table 3. With one exception, all the minus signs are lower than the positive scores—that is, except for German Protestants, children from the top sixteen groups were more likely to have some college than to be high school dropouts, while for the bottom thirteen groups "high school dropouts" outnumber those with a year or more of college.

The second half of the educational two-step (à la table 2b) requires us to demonstrate that the educational level of an ethnic group affects its occupational prestige, *controlling* for father's prestige.

The left hand column in table 4 rearranges the twenty-nine ethnic groups and the educational score predicted by using father's job in a regression equation. High scores mean the group went a lot farther in school than one would predict from their fathers' jobs; negative scores mean the group did not obtain as much schooling as one would predict. The highest "overachievers" are northern-born, northern-living blacks. Their educational score is not smashing (a value of 1.2 and rank fourteen), but they got an awful lot of schooling considering their parental starting point at rank twenty-six. Other overachievers by ten or more points are English Catholics, Finnish Protestants, Polish Catholics, Jews, Mexican Catholics, and French Catholics. At the opposite end, southern-born blacks (migrant or not), French Canadian Catholics, Dutch Protestants, Southern Irish Protestants, and Puerto Rican Catholics all fell ten or more points short of their predicted scores.

Table 4
EDUCATION AND MOBILITY

Ethnic Group	Schooling Net of Father's Job	Change in Rank
(26) BlckNN	32.73	+2
(11) EngliC	22.35	+8
(27) FinnsP	13.66	+5
(24) PolesC	13.43	+4
(1) Jewish	13.02	0
(29) MexcoC	12.66	+3
(15) FrnchC	10.29	−1
(9) IrishC	9.28	−2
(20) CzechC	8.81	+6
(10) ScotPS	6.77	+5
(12) NorwyP	6.37	+3
(21) ItalyC	5.98	+2
(5) EnglPN	5.44	−5
(7) DanesP	2.12	−1
(3) FrncPN	1.31	−1
(2) ScotPN	0.31	0
(4) EnglPS	−1.75	−2
(8) FrncPS	−2.66	+4
(16) IrshPN	−5.52	−1
(13) GermnC	−6.65	−2
(22) Amerin	−7.51	−3
(6) SwedeP	−8.18	−6
(14) GermnP	−9.15	+1
(28) BlckSS	−10.42	−1
(18) FrcanC	−10.71	−5
(23) BlckSN	−14.52	−5
(19) DutchP	−24.41	−2
(17) IrshPS	−24.85	−1
(25) PrrcoC	−32.34	−2

Note: N = North, S = South, C = Catholic, P = Protestant.
See figure 1 for key to national origin abbreviations (e.g. Prrco = Puerto Rican).

Is there a pattern here? I find it interesting that seven of ten Catholic groups are overachievers, as are seven of fourteen Protestant groups and the one out of four nonwhite groups who didn't attend southern schools.

Intriguing, but the question is whether schooling-net-of-father's-occupation affects prestige. Look at the right hand column in table 4 where the change in rank data are repeated. Again, the plus signs are up toward the top and the minus signs toward the bottom. More exactly:

- Of the ten groups which moved up two or more ranks, nine are overachievers.
- Of the nine groups which moved zero, one, or two ranks, five are overachievers.
- Of the ten groups which moved down two or more ranks, two are overachievers.

As with individuals, schooling is simultaneously the key mobility mechanism (as shown by the strong association between "overachievement" and change in rank) and the key mechanism in maintaining the ethnic "peck order" (as shown by the reduction of the father-own correlation from + .870 to + .324 when education is controlled).

Education Begets Prestige

Some groups moved up, some groups moved down, some groups stayed put. How, overall, did the pattern change? If we think of the ranks in terms of a top quarter, a bottom quarter, and a large middle, I draw four conclusions:

- At the bottom, the four nonwhite and two Latin Catholic groups ended up about where they started, while the Poles and Finns moved up.
- At the top, Jews remained in the number one spot and the old Protestant groups, if anything, improved their standing as the southern Scotch and French moved into the top quarter while only the northern English moved down.
- Among the non-Latin Catholics, the English zoomed up into the top quarter, but the other groups mostly remained in the middle half.
- Among the Scandinavians and German Protestants, the trend was toward the middle half as the Swedes dropped from the top quarter and the Finns moved up toward the middle.

As in the case of individual mobility, the ethnic mobility results have something for every ideological taste. The highest prestige group is so far from the top and the lowest group so far from the bottom that ethnic differences in occupational prestige must be characterized as moderate. Schooling is the key to ethnic mobility: groups who get more schooling move up in the pack, groups who get less fall back—whatever their odd cooking habits and weird religions. Statistically, educational attainment is a much better predictor of a group's current prestige than is its original (father's) prestige.

All this is true and cheery, and yet, the amount of schooling a group gets is still powerfully influenced by the paternal occupational level. A generation of "rapid social change" still shows "old Protestants" (ScotPN, FrncPS, ScotPS, EnglPS, and FrncPN) in five of the seven top ranks and blacks, Latins, and American Indians in the bottom six positions. The issues and problems of "border crossing" for the contemporary United States are not limited to the Immigration Service. ☑

by Frank Bryan

Rural Renaissance:

This land is your land
This land is my land
From California
To the New York Island
Woody Guthrie ©

There has always been in the United States a final option: moving on, snapping the bonds of inequality and the pain of promises unfulfilled through flight; going west, heading north, coming back, seeking out those faraway places that seem at least in fancy to offer the promise of new choices, new opportunities—a new life. Throughout two centuries, as a well-meaning people worked, however falteringly, to cut away the blockages to socioeconomic mobility associated with location, there has been a recurrent bottom line—"getting out."

Roger Williams fled to Providence. Ethan Allen adventured north to the banks of Vermont's Winooski River, Daniel Boone went to Kentucky, John Bozeman to Montana, John Sutter to California. The government sent Lewis and Clark to set the compass and George Custer to kill the Indians. It conquered Mexico and passed the Homestead Act; it helped build canals and drive the spikes for the railroads. Mostly, however, it simply established conditions and then watched as we oozed westward in giant kaleidoscopic arcs; up and over, down and across in what Daniel Elazar calls "geological strata" of population settlement, one overlapping the other until finally we had been everywhere at least once.

"Moving on" is a theme of the American experience that appears on every cultural horizon. We write it and paint it. We sing and recite it. We see it in the wild geese over our fall pastures; we hear it in the early morning rumblings of the eighteen wheelers. We smell it along our coasts, in the mud of the great Mississippi, over the wild prairie grasses of the Missouri breaks. We feel it in our bones and sense it in our roots. It is as generic to the concept of America as freedom itself. But, like freedom, "moving on" is multidimensional. Many of its properties are dark on the edges, as Mark Twain told us in *Huckleberry Finn*, the ultimate American tale of freedom through movement. It is clear, however, that the pattern that holds this incredibly complex quilt together is opportunity. Movement has been a great leveler in American political experience—often a more important influence than the political mechanisms that have been created on behalf of those seeking socioeconomic mobility and freedom of opportunity.

Whether or not geographical mobility consistently leads to opportunity is open to question. Those who moved on believed it did. Hamlin Garland remembers his father's rough-hewn lyrics in *Son of the Middle Border:*

Away to Colorado a journey I'll go
For to double my fortune as other men do
Oh wife, let us go, oh don't let us wait:
I long to be there and I long to be great
While you some fair lady and who knows but I
May be some rich governor long 'fore I die

The theme of this issue of *Public Opinion* is "America, the *land* of opportunity." There has always been plenty of land and there still is. But in what sense does it offer another chance or, in many cases, a first chance? In plain fact, it has the potential to play a more important role now in the quest for opportunity than it has for over a hundred years. This is because after a century of leaving the land, Americans are now returning to it. As we swing closed the door on the twentieth century, this simple fact is of vast importance in understanding American social dynamics.

There are few clear hinge decades in the history of American internal migration streams. The main currents have flowed in tandem, criss-crossed and overlapped, camouflaging shifts and playing havoc with attempts to generalize. In the nineteenth century, the westward movement and urbanization dominated. Ur-

Is America On the Move Again?

banism crested at century's turn, but the phenomenon continued until 1960. Westwardness (originally a rural-to-rural pattern) peaked earlier (1840-1860) but likewise has continued throughout our history. Even as late as the decade of the 1940s, over 80 percent of the Pacific Coast states' population increases came from migration from the East. "Go west young man" and "how you goin' to keep 'em down on the farm" have been enduring themes. Both are yoked to the notion of opportunity.

Urbanism started somewhat later, fed in the East by foreign immigration and in the West by rural dreams gone sour. The driving force behind it was economic opportunity, especially in the early days. In 1850 less than 15 percent of Americans lived in cities; by 1920 more than half did. Between 1880 and 1890, the population of Minneapolis jumped from 47,000 to 164,000; Omaha from 30,000 to 140,000; Spokane from 350 to 20,000; Denver from 35,000 to 95,000.

In the twentieth century, the magnetism of the city continued but was soon overlapped and overshadowed by the suburban impulse. Simply stated, urban dwellers began to demand land—not much land, but at least enough to care for, to mow and trim and tinker with. Technology (trollies, telephones, and automobiles) made it possible, and the government, especially in the later stages, helped with housing and highway policies. The process was accelerated after World War II by the baby boom. By mid-century we had reached what William Kowinski called in a recent *New York Times Magazine* feature, the "golden age" of suburbia. To label suburbanization a migratory pattern, however, is to create a mistaken image. It was a readjustment of the urban industrial revolution. Also, the move to the suburbs was more a manifestation of status achieved than opportunity sought.

This century did provide an important new regional twist—the South-to-North movement—which, except for a slowdown during the depression, was fairly steady through 1960. This trend, too, was heavily biased by the socioeconomic draw of the city. The first great wave of modern country music bewailed the loss of rural lifestyles amid the impersonality of the northern cities. Now widely popular, country music's historical roots remain geographically southern and thematically rural versus urban.

The twentieth century has exhibited little that is generically different from the two major migration patterns that have dominated our history almost from the beginning, the tendency to drift west and metro-magnetism. Until now.

Charting the Return to the Outback

Indeed, the 1970s seem to have composed one of those rare hinge decades when a fundamental shift came clear. Peter Morrison of the Rand Corporation calls it "one of the most significant turnabouts in migration in the nation's history." It, coupled with a concomitant reversal of South-to-North streams, may be the *first and only* significant turnabout since the urban explosion after the Civil War.

What are the statistical dimensions of this turnaround which has been called "remarkable," "pervasive," "astounding," and "unanticipated" by demographers and sociologists? They were outlined cautiously by Calvin Beale in 1975 in a paper entitled, "Where Are All the People Going?" delivered at the first National Conference on Rural America. Since that time Beale has become the most often footnoted scholar in the field. He made two points: (1) rural areas were growing faster than metropolitan areas for the first time since the early 1800s; (2) nonmetropolitan counties which were not adjacent to metropolitan counties were also making gains for the first time in over a century. A torrent of analysis followed, most of it with a wary eye cocked to the 1980 census.

The census data are now in and they confirm Beale's insights. Between 1960 and 1970, population in nonmetropolitan counties not adjacent to a metropolitan county *and* without a city of 10,000 population (in short, the "outback") registered a population change of —2.7 percent. In the ensuing decade they *gained* 13.6 percent! Metropolitan counties, on the other hand, gained only 9.8 percent in the 1970-1980 period (see table 1).

Table 1
PERCENTAGE CHANGE
IN AMERICAN
COUNTY TYPES

	1960-1970	1970-1980
Metropolitan counties	17.0%	9.8%
Nonmetropolitan counties adjacent to a metropolitan county	7.3	17.4
Nonmetropolitan, nonadjacent counties with a city of 10,000 or more population	7.0	14.5
Nonmetropolitan, nonadjacent counties without a city of 10,000 or more population	−2.7	13.6

Source: Economic Development Division, U.S. Department of Agriculture.

John Wardwell and Jack Gilchrist show in a recent article in *Demography* that "the phenomenon of large metropolitan deconcentration and nonmetropolitan growth is also characteristic of the locations of employment activities." During the 1970s, more than 40 percent of all new housing was constructed on rural land. Another factor emphasizing the tie between rural growth and new potential opportunity structure based on movement toward the land, is the heavy dependence of rural areas on immigration rather than natural growth. Natural decrease of population in any section of America is unusual. But, in some rural areas there were disproportionate numbers of older people (past child-rearing age) which, combined with social taboos against large families among young adults, caused a natural population decrease in more than 10 percent of all nonmetropolitan counties between 1965 and 1970. Yet these very counties (most of which had been long-term losers of population previously) actually gained population through immigration. Sociologists Kenneth Johnson and Ross Purdy called this "a pattern of population growth without precedent in recent U.S. demographic history."

There are some exceptions to the turnaround phenomenon. The South still demonstrated more urban than nonurban growth in the 1970s. The Northeast was the only area to show an actual decline in metropolitanism, a —1.8 percentage change. There has been a second reversal. The old South-to-North streams have begun flowing North-to-South. The South is now on the positive end of the migration pipeline and northern immigrants to Dixie are, like their southern counterparts of the 1940s, urban bound. The West and the South together accounted for 90 percent of national population growth in the 1980s.

Woodchucks, Flatlanders, and the Gangplank Syndrome

Like most social phenomena, the new rural migration is misunderstood. Professionals rarely agree on the wherefores and the whys of the modern urban exodus. One of the principal sources of contention is the question, "Why are people going to the country?" Some say they are going for traditional economic reasons, following footloose industries into the hinterland. There is much precedent for this economic "push-pull" theory. In Vermont, for example, the coming of a single large IBM plant in the 1960s triggered an economic expansion that profoundly affected the state's population growth. History also shows that the rural-to-urban movement slowed during economic hard times, when jobs were scarce.

Others claim that the new urban migrants to the country are different from their rural-to-urban counterparts of old in that they are moving primarily for "lifestyle" opportunities, not employment opportunities. They are said to want scenery, a slower pace of life, and neighbors—they want to "get back to the land." Who is to say that the contemporary fascination for tranquility and evening whip-poor-wills is more or less a matter of "lifestyle" than the call of the bright lights and honky-tonks that lured many a farm boy into the arms of the city in an earlier era? And who is to say that those who are presently heading for the outback will be less disillusioned, alienated and culture-shocked when they find the myth of rural virtue is as booby-trapped as the myth of city life was fifty years ago? Surely the urban sophisticate is no more familiar with the realities of "getting away from it all" in the country than the ruralites were with the realities of "excitement, challenge, and opportunity" in the city.

What kind of reception will the new urban migrants receive when they get there? What do the natives ("woodchucks" as they are sometimes called in Vermont) think of the newcomers ("flatlanders" according to the woodchucks). Some feel the woodchucks will react hostilely to the flatlanders. Oregonians, fearing that their rural lifestyle would be ruined by urban migrants, openly campaigned against settlement (for example, telling California via bumper stickers "Don't Californicate Oregon"). Vermont, which long touted the state as "The Beckoning Country" seemed to want to slam the door when newly elected governor Tom Salmon cried "Vermont is not for sale" to a standing ovation from the legislature during his inaugural address in 1972. Others opt for the "gangplank" hypothesis which postulates that the last on board will be the most selfish residents of rural places, scampering to shut off settlement soon after their own arrival.

In gauging an answer to the question, several points should be kept in mind. First, rural people traditionally have been less protective of their environment than urban people. Second, rural people have by and large supported economic development in direct proportion to the lack of it where they live. Third, there is evidence that the gangplank theory doesn't hold. In a study of residents of seventy-five high net immigration, nonmetropolitan counties in twelve states from North Dakota to Ohio, published recently in *Rural Sociology*, the following question was asked:

"Should elected officials try to attract new residents to their area?"

	Metropolitan-origin migrants *n = 415*	*Nonmetropolitan migrants* *n = 174*	*Rural residents* *n = 359*
Yes	73%	77%	75%
No	27	23	25

Source: Frederick C. Fliegal et al., "Population Growth in Rural Areas and Sentiments toward Future Growth," *Rural Sociology*, 46 (Fall, 1981) pp. 411-429.

Another study has shown that full-time farmers are more likely to be protectionist than are part-time farmers (who were more apt to be newcomers). City cousins with a hankerin' to get back to the soil, however, can take solace in remembering that there are precious few full-time farmers left. As far as the attitudes of rural residents are concerned, folks, there is good reason to believe the gangplank is still down—at least for some.

Computers in the Country: the Face of Modern Ruralism

One looks for meandering country roads and one finds straight, glossy ones built to federal specifications. One looks for pastured Jerseys and one finds Holsteins huddled in environmentally controlled "free" stalls. One looks for barefoot farm boys with fishing poles and finds none. One looks for boundaried villages, country stores, and neighbors. But the villages have been extended, the country stores have been gentrified, and the neighbors are gone. One thinks of a politics "close to the people" and finds instead highly centralized state governments dominated by their bureaucracies. One thinks "country" and finds . . . there is as yet no proper word for it. We will need one soon. This is not how rural America is now, totally. But this is the way it is fast becoming.

The early American agrarian republic was small farm, small town rural. The industrialized nation was metro-urban. It now appears that those rural areas of America which were ignored by the urban-industrial revolution are the most benign environments for the post-modern technostate. America's hinterland has long been shunned by the national consciousness. Now, unfettered by the paraphernalia of the most recent condition (urban industrialism), it is in a position to assume developmental precedence as our third century of natural life begins to unfold.

Neal Peirce, in a recent book on the South (*The Deep South States of America*, W. W. Norton, 1974), entitles a portion of his chapter on Mississippi, which is the most rural state in the region, "From Cotton to Computers." Well said. The huge majority of American scholars and opinion elites, who will be called upon to forecast the coming arrangement of people and land, are urbanists in disposition and culture. If there is one notion of which they must disabuse themselves, it is that rural areas are technologically retarded. The interstate highway system is to rural America what the trollies were to the suburbs of the past. The computer is the telephone. Life and business can now be conducted on the periphery—the extreme periphery.

Leading in the technocratization of rural areas has been the farmer. The statistics are mind boggling. Such a tiny fraction of our population is involved in actual farming, yet it feeds so many. The typical urbanite would be as amazed at the workings of the normal, computerized dairy herd as a North Dakota wheat farmer would be at the operation of Washington's new Metro system. The failure to come to grips with the pervasive impact technosystems have had on rural life girdles most attempts to understand modern ruralism. This failure may result from the amazing quickness of the rural transformation, which occurred in only two decades (1955-1975). Rural places are expected to be following, bringing up the rear, needing a helping hand from those who adjust the urban-industrial conditions to the new technocracy, but one finds precisely the opposite. They know what they are doing and, in many respects, because there are fewer monkey wrenches to be thrown into the workings from the urban-industrial period, they are forging ahead. I have dealt with the causative elements of this model in other writings. Let me summarize the political conditions that seem to exist in those American states where technology and low density living have been suddenly wedded.

- The old attitudinal dichotomy between rural and urban is disappearing. It still exists as an ideological construct in America, but size of place of residence no longer clearly locates it.
- Political systems are growing more centralized and bureaucratic. Local governments have less autonomy in rural states than in urban states.
- Citizen fatigue is prevalent. Even though the scope of governance is just as broad as in urban areas, there are fewer people to do the negotiating and this leaves the major interest groups and bureaucracies more fully in control.
- More and more rural people live in technological cocoons, protected from the natural harshness of rural life—television under Montana's lonely big sky, air conditioning for Mississippi's piney woods, four-wheel drive vehicles for Vermont's deep snowed winters. This estrangement from the land produces an artificiality in modern rural culture that affects political life.
- The concept of "neighbor" and neighborhood

suffers when a people's spatial distance (which defines "rural") reinforces the atomizing effect of technology itself. One's friends need not even be in the same town, to say nothing of next door. The same goes for one's co-workers. One may shop here, and politic there, join the jogging club here and send one's kids to school there. Rural people are more apt to be *both* spatially and technologically estranged from one another and are even less apt to be attached to a sense of "community" than urban people.

- The sense of political community is further threatened by functional fragmentation. The one-man, one-vote dictum laid down in *Baker* v. *Carr* (1962) means that rural legislative districts are twisted and reshaped every decade and seldom match the boundaries of local governments. In Montana a rancher may share a political relationship with one neighbor in a SID (special improvement district) for mosquitoes, with another neighbor in a SID for coyotes, and another with a third neighbor for water. The county plows the roads but the state representative is elected from a slice of the county combined with a census enumerator district or two from somewhere else.

April is the Cruelest Month: Opportunity for the Few

It could be a springtime for America—an opportunity to reexplore the outback, reset our roots and reestablish our presence on the land. But springtime, as T. S. Eliot has told us (*The Waste Land*, 1922) can be cruel, "stirring dull roots with spring rain." As a people, our roots were stirred in the 1970s by the longing for a largely mythical past, a green past of pastoral simplicity that promised, as Charles Reich suggested, a green future, a rural future.

It appears that we will have a rural future but it may not be the future of the dream; of farmsteads, slow living, human scale communities, understandable politics (close up and personal)—the simple life, the "good" life. If there is a certain cruelty in that, it was self-inflicted, for the dream itself was an indulgence, as Richard Hofstadter and so many others have warned.

The more important question is how many of us will be involved in the unfolding of this latest geographic revolution? In what sense is it an affirmation that America still is a *land* of opportunity? The fact is that this latest migration, like the suburban one before it, seems to be another example of a movement of those with one kind of status seeking another kind. There is a great turnstile at the border of rural America these days, and it is keyed by financial and professional status. The gangplank is still down, if you have the means to walk up it.

How is this so?

Protection and Projection

To partake of the new rural renaissance, one needs either the financial wherewithal (one must be able to purchase a tract of land) and/or (usually "and") a mind that understands and can manipulate the technosystem—that vast complexity of rules and regulations operating to protect the land from the existence of human life on it. There are two forces building the fences and, although they like to call each other names, they share a profoundly important common denominator—the status prerequisite. One is protectionist. The other is projectionist. One seeks to set the land completely aside, to be watched but not touched. The other seeks to use the land in a planned orderly fashion. *Neither* makes room for the status-deprived.

It is clear how the protectionist mentality works, for it does not discriminate against anyone. Its denial to the poor of a piece of rural America is an unfortunate spin-off from the greater priority—protecting the land from humans in general. The projectionists discriminate, not in a nasty way, mind you, but the result is the same. Planners, although they are loath to admit it, need to plan *for* something. That something is defined in terms of prevailing class values. The prevailing class in rural America is a technocratic (elsewhere I have called it "systems") elite.

The systems elite values order, neatness, cleanliness, uncluttered landscapes and rational lifestyles—a planned rural romanticism. They fix up a covered bridge. They save a ghost town. They bring a small "clean" industry into the county and landscape it to fit the terrain. Most of all, they zone. Their power flows from a proposition that is as estranged from the prevailing view of ruralism as frost is from Biloxi: ruralites *like* zoning. Farmers *are* zoners. Those who deal with and understand nature, soon learn that one must plan in order to survive. Nature is the most efficient of systems. In rural America it is also the most visible. The new migrants bring a zoner's mentality with them and find it reinforced by the natural inclination of the population.

In concept, of course, zoning means selection and selection invites discrimination. Land-use plans which, on their face, simply promote orderly development are apt to turn the development process in particular directions. Vermont's "Act 250," for example, has a bias in favor of ten-acre lots, which, of course, are unaffordable for most. A ten-acre lot, a Morgan horse, and a four-wheel drive vehicle are the "unobstructive measures" with which one documents the prevailing lifestyle in the Green Mountain State. Rural ghettoization is a fact of life as the understatused huddle in their trailer parks, drive big, used, gas guzzlers and watch the fences appear around the land of their childhood.

There will be no "Homestead Act" for the second rural migration. Inasmuch as it is driven by an economic push-pull theory of employment opportunity, it is biased in favor of those with the professional skills of the tertiary class—knowledge managers and consultants. To the extent that it is driven by the push-pull of quality of life factors, one must remember that scenery does not put tuna fish in the lunch box. ☑

THE GROSS NATIONAL SPIRIT

In the June/July 1981 issue of *Public Opinion*, we introduced the Gross National Spirit Index. Respondents' answers to six questions were combined to provide a measure of how Americans think we as a nation are doing. To date, the questions have been asked on five national surveys and on numerous state surveys. The questions which compose the Index are shown on page 22.



Note: The May 13-June 2 figures are preliminary findings from a national telephone survey by National Research (a division of William R. Hamilton and Staff) using random digit dialing designed to replicate the Yankelovich sample.

Source: Surveys by the Roper Organization/Roper Center for Public Opinion Research for the American Enterprise Institute, November 14-21, 1981; Civic Services, Incorporated, March 5-19, 1982; Yankelovich, Skelly and White for the American Council of Life Insurance, April 17-May 16, 1982; Audits and Surveys for The Merit Report, May 3-6, 1982; William R. Hamilton and Staff, Inc., for the American Council of Life Insurance, May 13-June 2, 1982.



Source: Surveys by MGT of America (Tallahasee, Florida), May 1-11, 1982; Opinion Research Associates (Tulsa, Oklahoma), May 13-17, 1982; Institute for Social Inquiry, University of Connecticut, June 2-6, 1982.

OLD GNS



Note: For explanation of the "Old" Gross National Spirit Index, see Public Opinion, June/July 1981, pp. 21-23.

METHODOLOGY

Respondents' answers to six questions were combined to create the GNS Index. Each item was weighted equally so a change in any individual item would produce the same change in the overall Index. If every respondent gave the most confident and approving answer to all six questions, the GNS Index would stand at 2400; if every respondent gave the least confident and least approving answer, the Index would have a value of 0.

Five of the questions we used had answers that fell very neatly into the categories "very positive," "less positive," and "negative or not at all positive." The presidential popularity question had only two categories which we treated as very positive and not at all positive.

For each question we assigned the most positive answer four points, the less positive answer (if there was one) two points, and the negative or not at all positive answer zero points. For question one asked by the Roper Organization, 7 percent said they were "very satisfied" (7 × 4=28), 47 percent said they were "more or less satisfied" (47 × 2=94) and 46 percent said they were "not satisfied at all" (46 × 0=0). Question one asked by the Roper Organization has a value of 123 in the Index. Each individual item contributes between zero and 400 points for a total that ranges from zero to 2400 points.

1. In general, how satisfied are you with the way things are going in the United States today? Are you very satisfied, more or less satisfied, or not at all satisfied?

	Very satisfied	More or less satisfied	Not at all satisfied
Nov 14-21	7%	47%	46%
Mar 5-19	3	46	51
Apr. 17-May 16	5	47	48
May 3-6	*	51	42
May 13-June 2	6	52	42

2. Over the next year or so, do you think things will go better for the United States, go worse, or stay about the same?

	Things will go better for U.S.	Stay about the same	Go worse
Nov 14-21	28%	29%	43%
Mar 5-9	29	36	35
April 17-May 16	27	39	34
May 3-6	36	34	30
May 13-June 2	37	33	30

3. Over the next year or so, do you think the United States economy will get better, get worse, or stay about the same?

	Economy will get better	Stay about the same	Get worse
Nov 14-21	28%	25%	46%
Mar 5-9	31	34	35
April 17-May 16	30	32	38
May 3-6	39	32	29
May 13-June 2	37	31	32

4. Do you approve or disapprove of the way Ronald Reagan is handling his job as President?

	Approve of way Reagan handling job as President	Disapprove
Nov. 14-21	55%	45%
Mar. 5-9	46	54
April 17-May 16	48	52
May 3-6	53	47
May 13-June 2	53	47

5. How satisfied are you with the way things are going for you personally? Are you very satisfied, more or less satisfied, or not at all satisfied?

	Very satisfied	More or less satisfied	Not at all satisfied
Nov. 14-21	32%	49%	18%
Mar. 5-9	23	51	26
April 17-May 16	29	51	20
May 3-6	37	47	16
May 13-June 2	35	47	18

6. How satisfied are you with your family's financial situation? Are you very satisfied, more or less satisfied, or not at all satisfied?

	Very satisfied	More or less satisfied	Not at all satisfied
Nov. 14-21	24%	47%	30%
Mar. 5-9	20	49	32
April 17-May 16	22	50	28
May 3-6	25	54	22
May 13-June 2	25	51	24

**The Roper Organization/
Roper Center for Public
Opinion Research**

Nov. 14-21, 1981

Q.	+4	+2	0	
1	28	94	0	
2	112	58	0	
3	112	50	0	1090
4	220	—	0	
5	128	98	0	
6	96	94	0	

Civic Services, Inc.

March 5-9, 1982

Q.	+4	+2	0	
1	12	92	0	
2	116	72	0	
3	124	68	0	1040
4	184	—	0	
5	92	102	0	
6	80	98	0	

**Yankelovich, Skelly and White
for the American Council of
Life Insurance**

April 17-May 16, 1982

Q.	+4	+2	0	
1	20	94	0	
2	108	78	0	
3	120	64	0	1082
4	192	—	0	
5	116	102	0	
6	88	100	0	

**Audits and Surveys
for The Merit Report**

May 3-6, 1982

Q.	+4	+2	0	
1	28	102	0	
2	144	68	0	
3	156	64	0	1224
4	212	—	0	
5	148	94	0	
6	100	108	0	

**William R. Hamilton and Staff, Inc.
for the American Council of
Life Insurance**

May 13-June 2, 1982

Q.	+4	+2	0	
1	24	104	0	
2	148	66	0	
3	148	62	0	1200
4	212	—	0	
5	140	94	0	
6	100	102	0	

OPINION ROUNDUP

AMERICANS ASSESS OPPORTUNITY

THE LAND OF PROMISE

Question: Earlier on in American history, many people around the world thought the United States was the very best place in the world to live. Do you think it still is or not?



Note: *Don't know = less than .5%.

Source: Survey by Civic Services, Inc., March 5-18, 1981.

Question: How proud are you to be an American, are you extremely proud, somewhat proud, or not proud?



Note: *Not proud = 0.
**Don't know = 0.

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization and the Roper Center for the American Enterprise Institute, November 14-21, 1981.

HARD WORK CAN TURN RAGS TO RICHES . . .

Question: Do you think it's possible nowadays for someone in this country to start out poor, and become rich by working hard?



Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, May 22-26, 1981.

Question: I'm going to read you a few statements. For each, please tell me if you tend to agree or disagree with it. . . . It is true in this country that if you work hard, eventually you will get ahead.



Note: In March 1981, 63% agreed to the ABC News/*Washington Post* question, 37% disagreed.

Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, January 22-30, 1982.

. . . BUT IT'S NOT EASY

Question: Compared to twenty-five years ago in this country, do you think it is easier or harder for an individual to get ahead financially?



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization and the Roper Center for the American Enterprise Institute, November 14-21, 1981.

BEST TIMES AHEAD FOR SELF AND COUNTRY

Question: I am going to read you a few statements and after each I would like you to tell me whether you tend to agree or disagree with each . . . America's best days are behind it.



Note: Sample size = 597

Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, January 27-30, 1982.

Question: Do you tend to feel the best times in your life will come in the future or not?



Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, March 3-8, 1982.

CHANCES OF ACHIEVING GOOD LIFE

Question: Thinking of your concept of the good life, how do you think your chances are of achieving it—very good, fairly good, not very good, or not good at all?

Chances of achieving the good life are:



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 82-1), December 5-12, 1981.

WE'RE BETTER OFF THAN OUR PARENTS

Question: Thinking now of your parents when they were your age, would you say you are better off financially than they were, not as well off as they were, or what?



Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, March 3-8, 1982.

OUR CHILDREN WILL OUTDO US

Question: Now, thinking of your children when they get to be your age. Would you say they will be better off financially than you are now, not as well off, or what?



Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, March 3-8, 1982.

BLACKS SEE BRIGHTEST PROSPECTS

Question: Now, taking some specific aspects of our life, we'd like to know how confident you feel about them. First, do you feel very confident, only fairly confident, or not at all confident that: . . . Life for our children will be better than it has been for us.



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 79-9), September 22-29, 1979.

ADULT PESSIMISM

Question: Now I'm going to read you a list of statements, and for each one, I'd like you to tell me if you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree. . . . Young people can no longer take for granted that they will be able to live better than their parents.

Registered voters



Note: Sample size = 1,221.
Source: Survey by Time/Yankelovich, Skelly and White, May 14-16, 1980.

YOUTHFUL OPTIMISM

Question: Do you agree or disagree with each of the following? . . . People like me don't have much of a chance to be successful in life.

High school seniors



Source: Survey by the Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, for the National Institute on Drug Abuse, 1981.

Question: When you are older, do you expect to own more possessions than your parents do now, or about the same, or less?

High school seniors



Source: Survey by the Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, for the National Institute on Drug Abuse, 1981.

Notions of Rights and Privileges

Question: I'm going to read off a number of different things. For each would you tell me whether you think it is a privilege that a person should have to earn, or a *right* to which he is entitled as a citizen? First, a reasonable amount of leisure time. Is that a privilege, etc.?



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 82-3), February 13-27, 1982.

RISING TIDES IN

EDUCATION: OPPORTUNITY KNOCKS

Median years of school completed for persons twenty-five and over

	White	Black and other
1940	8.7	5.7
1950	9.7	6.9
1960	10.8	8.2
1970	12.2	10.1
1975	12.4	11.4
1980	12.5	12.1
1981 (est.)	12.6	12.2

Source: National Center for Education Statistics.

One year or more of college completed for persons aged twenty-five to twenty-nine

	Percent
1950	17.9
1957	20.7
1959	22.4
1962	25.4
1964	25.0
1965	25.0
1970	31.3
1975	41.6
1980	44.7

Source: United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.

Total number of college students enrolled

	(in thousands)
1910	355
1920	598
1930	1,101
1940	1,494
1950	2,281
1960	3,583
1970	7,920
1980	12,096
1981 (est.)	12,322

Source: National Center for Education Statistics.

UP THE OCCUPATIONAL LADDER

Percent of population who are:	1900	1910	1920	1930	1940	1950	1960	1970	1980
Professional/Technical and Managerial/Proprietors/Officials	10%	11%	12%	14%	15%	18%	22%	25%	27%

Source: *Historical Statistics of the United States, Part I* and *Statistical Abstract of the United States* (1981).

MONEY WHISPERS

Median family income (1980 dollars)

	Total	White	Black
1950	$11,361	$11,792	$ 6,398
1955	13,596	14,196	7,829
1960	15,637	16,235	8,987
1965	18,169	18,937	10,428
1970	20,939	21,722	13,828
1975	21,004	21,845	14,271
1980	21,023	21,904	12,674

Source: United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.

Per capita family income (1980 dollars)

	Total	White	Black
1950	$3,689	—	—
1955	4,211	$4,442	$2,143
1960	4,721	4,915	2,455
1965	5,438	5,755	2,885
1970	6,583	6,930	3,987
1975	6,959	7,341	4,368
1979	7,674	8,130	4,772
1980	7,309	7,745	4,708

Source: United States Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1981.

AMERICAN LIFE

UNCLE SAM'S SOCIAL SAFETY NET

	Unemployment insurance—benefits paid by federal government (millions $)
1940	519
1945	446
1950	1,373
1955	1,467
1960	2,867
1965	2,283
1970	4,158
1975	19,362
1980	18,411

Source: United States Department of Labor.

	Social security (OASDHI) benefits paid by federal government (millions $)
1940	16
1945	240
1950	727
1955	4,300
1960	10,800
1965	16,600
1970	29,100
1975	62,500
1980	115,500
1981	136,300

Note: Disability added in 1956.
Source: Social Security Administration.

Food Stamps	(millions $)
1961	.38
1965	32.
1970	551.
1975	4,386.
1980	8,700.
1981	10,600.

Source: United States Department of Agriculture.

AT HOME AND ABROAD

	Home ownership as a percentage of total housing
1900	47%
1910	46
1920	46
1930	48
1940	44
1950	55
1960	62
1970	63
1980	66

Source: For 1900-1970, *Historical Statistics of the United States, Part I*; for 1980 *Statistical Abstract of the United States* (1981).

Number of U.S. travelers overseas

	(thousands)
1920	302
1930	538
1940	156
1950	676
1960	1,634
1970	5,260
1980 (est.)	8,163

Source: For 1920-1970 *Historical Statistics of the United States, Part I*; for 1980, U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service and U.S. Department of Transportation.

THE FRUITS OF OUR LABORS

	Americans owning automobiles Percent	... Owning two or more Percent
1952	60	4
1956	72	9
1960	77	15
1964	78	22
1968	79	26
1970	82	28
1977 (est.)	84	37

Source: For 1952-1970, *Historical Statistics of the United States*; for 1977, Motor Vehicle Manufacturers' Association.

	Americans owning clothes dryers Percent	... and washers Percent
1960	20	55
1965	26	57
1970	45	62
1975	58	70
1979	62	77

Source: *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, 1981.

Recreational boats owned	Millions of units
1960	8
1965	8
1970	9
1975	10
1980	12

Source: *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, 1981.

Americans owning televisions	Percent
1950	9
1955	65
1960	87
1965	93
1970	95
1975	97
1980	98

Source: For 1950-1970 *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, 1981; for 1980 A. C. Nielsen and Company.

Americans owning dishwashers	Percent
1960	7
1965	14
1970	27
1975	38
1979	43

Source: *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, 1981.

MOBILITY IN AMERIC

We present data here that, in a unique way, attempt to show American mobility over time. The data presented on pages 30-33 show how Americans compare their present occupational status and educational level with that of their fathers, and their current family income level, geographic situation, and religious preference with those when they were growing up. A summary chart of the direction of overall mobility, or highlights indicating mobility, is also provided. The single bar shows respondents' *current* status. The recollections of each such grouping of respondents is then presented—providing a measurement of mobility. For example, of the 15 percent of all respondents who classify their occupations as professional/technical, only 16 percent of their fathers were members of that high status professional/technical group. In addition 21 percent of their fathers were in high status managerial/administrative fields. The remaining 63 percent came from families where the father was in a lower status occupation—indicating substantial upward occupational mobility.

OCCUPATION: MORE THAN ONE-HALF ARE UPWARDLY MOBILE

Questions: (A) What kind of work (do you/did you) normally do? That is, what (is/was) your job called? Occupation: ________ (B) What (do/did) you actually do in that job? Tell me, what (are/were) some of your main duties? (C) What kind of place (do/did) you work for? Industry: ________ (D) What (do/did) they (make/do)? (E) (Are/Were) you self employed or (do/did) you work for someone else?

(A) What kind of work did your father (Father Substitute) normally do while you were growing up? That is, what was his job called? Occupation: ________ (B) What did he actually do in that job? Tell me, what were some of his main duties? (C) Wh kind of place did he work for? Industry: ________ (D) What did they (make/do)? (E) Was he self-employed; or did he work for someone else?





Note: * = less than ½ of 1 percent, combined data 1972-1978, 1980.

Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, 1972-1978, 1980.

WHAT THE POLLS SAY

EDUCATION: ONE-HALF ARE UPWARDLY MOBILE

Question: What is the highest grade in elementary school or high school that (you/your father) finished and got credit for? (If finished 9th-12th grade or don't know) Did (you/he) ever get a high school diploma or a GED certificate? Did (you/he) complete one or more years of college for credit—not including schooling such as business college, technical or vocational school. Do you (Does he) have any college degrees?





Note: Combined data 1972-1978, 1980.

Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, 1972-1978, 1960.

INCOME: MORE ARE UPWARDLY MOBILE

Question: In which of these groups did your total *family* income, from all sources, fall last year before taxes, that is?

Thinking about the time when you were 16 years old, compared with American families in general then, would you say your family income was—far below average, below average, average, above average, or far above average?





Note: Combined data 1973-1978 and 1980. For total family income at age 16, Below average = Far below average + Below average. Above average = Far above average + Above average.

Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, 1973-78, 1980.

GEOGRAPHIC MOBILITY: STILL PUTTING DOWN ROOTS

Question: How long have you lived here in (name of community)? (1968) How long have you lived here in (city/town/county)? (1972, 1976, 1980)



Note: For 1980, 10% one year or less; 10% 2-3 years; 12% 3-5 years; 10% 6-9 years; 18% 10-19 years; 44% 20 years or more.

Source: Surveys by the Center for Political Studies, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, Election Studies, latest that of 1980.

AMERICANS MOVING UP BUT NOT OUT

Question: In what state or foreign country were you living when you were 16 years old? (If state named is same state respondent lives in now, ask) When you were 16 years old, were you living in this same (city/town/county)?



Note: Combined data 1972-1978, 1980.
*Suburb/small city = Suburb/Town/Medium city/Small city.

THE MORE THINGS CHANGE, THE MORE THEY STAY THE SAME

Question: Which of the categories on this card comes closest to the type of place you were living in when you were 16 years old? (Present "urbanness" derived from NORC size of place)



Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, 1972-1978, 1980.

THERE'S NO PLACE LIKE HOME

Question: If you had the opportunity, would you like to move somewhere else, or would you stay here where you are?



Note: In a December 5-12, 1981 survey by the Roper Organization, asking respondents to name those items on a list that they had done in the past year, 15% said they had moved their place of residence. The figure was 15% for men, women, and whites, and 13% for blacks; those aged 18-29 years, 30%; 30-44 years, 15%; 45-59 years, 6%; 60 and over, 4%; among non-high school graduates, 9%; High school graduates, 13%; College, 21%; those living in the Northeast, 10%; Midwest, 13%; South, 15%; West, 24%.

Source: Survey by Research and Forecasts, Inc. for Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co., September 1-November 15, 1980.

RELIGION: THE APPLE DOESN'T FALL FAR FROM THE TREE

Question: What is your religious preference? Is it Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, some other religion, or no religion? In what religion were you raised?



Note: For religion in which raised, data combined for 1973-1978, 1980. For present religious preference, data combined for 1972-1978, 1980. * = less than ½ of 1 percent.

Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, 1972-1978, 1980.

IMPORTANCE OF RELIGION TODAY DEPENDS ON ITS IMPORTANCE WHILE GROWING UP

Question: How important would you say religion is in your own life—would you say very important, fairly important or not very important?

When you were growing up, how important was religion to you—would you say very important, fairly important or not very important?



Source: Surveys by the Princeton Religion Research Center and the Gallup Organization, Inc., for the Religious Coalition, April 14-17, 1978.


YOU'RE SUFFERING FROM WHAT USED TO BE CALLED THE AMERICAN DREAM ... NOW WE CALL IT DELUSIONS OF GRANDEUR.
Mike Keefe
THE DENVER POST 82
FIELD NEWSPAPER SYNDICATE

A NATION OF IMMIGRANTS

LATE ARRIVALS LESS DESIRABLE

Question: Since the beginning of our country people of many different religions, races, and nationalities have come here and settled. Here is a list of some different groups. (Card shown respondent) Would you read down that list, and thinking both of what they have contributed to this country and have gotten from this country, for each one tell me whether you think on balance, they've been a good thing or a bad thing for this country?



CLOSING THE OPEN DOOR

Question: In recent years, there has been a lot of discussion about the number of immigrants allowed into our country. On the whole, would you say that you would like to see the number of immigrants allowed to enter our country increased, or would like to see the number decreased, or do you think we are letting in about the right number now?



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 82-4), March 20-27, 1982.

UNITED NATIONS EVALUATION

1944: GET THE US INTO THE UN

Question: If a new council or union of nations is formed after the war to take the place of the old League of Nations, should this country join?



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, June 9-14, 1944.

UN GIVEN GOOD CHANCE IN SMALL SPATS

Question: In general, what chance do you think the United Nations organization has (will have) to prevent wars between (big nations) (small nations)—good, fair, or no chance at all?



Source: Survey by National Opinion Research Center, May 1946.

THE EARLY 50's: ONE WORLD GOVERNMENT

Question: Do you think the United Nations should or should not be strengthened to make it a world government with power to control the armed forces of all nations, including the United States?



Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of March 24-29, 1955.

CONTINUED MEMBERSHIP FAVORED

Question: Do you think the United States should give up its membership in the United Nations, or not?

	U.S. should give up UN membership	Should not	No opinion
January 1951	14%	72%	14%
May	12	75	13
November	13	75	12
January 1962	9	86	5
November 1963	8	79	13
August 1967	10	85	5
February 1975	11	75	14

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of February 7-10, 1975.



Question: How do you feel about the United States being a member of the United Nations—are you strongly in favor of the United States being a member of the United Nations, or moderately in favor of it, or not very much in favor of it or not at all in favor of it?



Nota: In favor = strongly in favor/moderately in favor. Not in favor = not very much in favor/not at all in favor.

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 81-4), March 21-28, 1981.

But Mission UN-Accomplished

Question: Turning now to the United Nations, here is a list of some of the functions of the United Nations. (Hand respondent card) Would you go down that list, and for each one tell me whether you think the United Nations has been highly effective in that area, moderately effective, only somewhat effective or not at all effective? (Read item—ask about each)



Note: Effective = Highly effective/Moderately effective. Not effective = Only somewhat effective/Not at all effective.

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 81-4), March 21-28, 1981.

OPINION ROUNDUP

MORE EFFECTIVE IN THEORY THAN PRACTICE

Question: In general, do you think the United Nations is doing a good job or a poor job in trying to solve the problems it has had to face?

	UN is doing good/fair job	Poor	No opinion
1950	57%	37%	5%
1951	56	36	8
Aug. 1953	67	22	12
Dec.	57	30	13
1954	59	26	15
1956	51	37	12
1967	49	35	16
1970	44	40	16
1971	35	43	22
1975	33	51	16
Sept. 1980	31	53	16

Note: In the 1980 political ideology subgroups, the responses were: Left: Good/fair = 36%, Poor = 54%. Moderate: Good/fair = 35%, Poor = 51%. Right: Good/fair = 24%, Poor = 61%. "Good/fair" = "Good" + "Fair." The "Fair" category only existed in the 1950, 1951, and August 1953 surveys.

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of September 12-15, 1980.



Question: Has the way the Security Council of the United Nations handled the Iranian situation made you think more or less of the United Nations as an effective peace keeping organization?



Note: Sample size = 1,041 (December 1979), 1,227 (January 1980), 1,221 (March 1980).
Samples = registered voters.

Source: Surveys by *Time*/Yankelovich, Skelly and White, latest that of March 19-20, 1980.

Question: Has the way the United Nations handled the Russian invasion of Afghanistan made you think more or less of the United Nations as an effective peace keeping organization?



Note: Sample size = 1,227 registered voters.

Source: Survey by *Time*/Yankelovich, Skelly and White, January 23-24, 1980.

UN ASSESSMENT ABROAD

Question: In general, do you feel the United Nations is doing a good job or a poor job in trying to solve the problems it has had to face?



Source: Survey by Gallup International Research Institute for the Charles F. Kettering Foundation, fall and winter of 1974-1975 and spring 1976.

TUITION

SUPPORT OUTWEIGHS OPPOSITION IN THE LATE SEVENTIES

Question: Would you favor or oppose giving a tax break to families that pay tuition for their young children's education? (Asked of voters as they left voting booths)



Note: "No opinion" calculated out, all were 10% or less, except the race category, "Black," which was 12%.

Source: Survey by CBS News, November 7, 1978.

Question: Private and parochial schools charge tuition. Would you favor or oppose giving parents who pay this tuition a break on their income tax?



Note: 63% of whites and 65% of blacks favor giving parents who pay private or parochial school tuition a break on their income tax; 56% of Protestants and 74% of Catholics, 74% of non-high school graduates, 59% of high school graduates, 60% of those who have had some college, and 54% of college graduates are in favor.

Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, January 23-26, 1979.

AX CREDITS

TODAY OPPOSITION OUTWEIGHS SUPPORT

Question: Congress is considering a proposal that would give parents an income tax credit if they pay tuition to send their children to a private or parochial school. Do you favor or oppose this proposal?

1981



Note: In the same survey, 24% of parents said they would be likely to send their child to a private or parochial school if they received a tax credit of between $250 and $500, 60% said not likely, and 17% said they already send their children to a private or parochial school.

Sample size is 520.

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization for *Newsweek*, March 11-17, 1981.

Question: Do you think parents who send their children to elementary and secondary private schools should get a tax break for the tuition they pay, or don't you think so?

1981



Note: In the same survey, 30% of adults with school age children said they would be more likely to enroll their children in private schools if tuition tax credits were available, 64% said it would make no difference, and 7% said they would be less likely to do so.

Source: Survey by NBC News/Associated Press, October 25-26, 1981.

Question: Do you favor or oppose President Reagan's plan to give tax credits to parents who send their grammar and high school age children to private or parochial schools?



Source: Survey by Audits and Surveys for the Merit Report, April 19-22, 1982.

SCHOOL PRAYER: OVERWHELMING ENDORSEMENT

Question: A number of criticisms and suggestions are also being made these days. Will you tell me for each of the following whether you mostly agree or mostly disagree with each one. Let's start with (Read first statement on list) Do you mostly agree or disagree with this . . . the Supreme Court and Congress have gone too far in keeping religious and moral values like prayer out of our laws, our schools, and our lives?



Source: Survey by *Time*/Yankelovich, Skelly and White, May 12-14, 1981.

Question: Generally speaking, do you approve or disapprove of allowing prayers in public schools?



Source: Survey by the *Los Angeles Times*, September 27-October 4, 1981.

Question: Do you favor or oppose a constitutional amendment to allow daily prayers to be recited in school classrooms?



Note: Sample size = 1253.

Source: Survey by Louis Harris and Associates, February 12-17, 1982.

ONE NATION UNDER GOD

Other recent questions on prayer in public schools are:

ABC News, September 14-20, 1981
"In your opinion, should school prayer be allowed in public high schools, or not?" (Asked of 287 parents with children in high school) Should = 77%, Should not = 23%

NBC/Associated Press, May 18-19, 1981
"Do you favor or oppose an amendment to the Constitution that would permit prayers to be said in public schools?" Favor = 78%, Oppose = 22%

NBC/Associated Press, January 27-28, 1982
"Do you believe that organized prayers should be allowed in public schools, or not?" Should = 72%, Should not = 28%

ABC News/Washington Post, March 3-8, 1982
"Now, just a few more questions about various subjects. On the subject of the reading of prayer in public schools, do you approve or disapprove of schools having a required time for the regular reading of prayer?" Approve = 71%, Disapprove = 29%

NBC/Associated Press, May 10-11, 1982
"Do you favor or oppose an amendment to the Constitution that would permit organized prayers in public schools?" Favor = 72%, Oppose = 28%

by Seymour Martin Lipset

Social Mobility in Industrial Societies

The period from the end of World War II to the mid-seventies has witnessed more upward mobility, that is, more persons improving their occupational and social position, than any other time in human history. Major structural changes in the economies of the industrialized world, both Communist and non-Communist, have resulted in an upgrading of occupations. The proportion of the work force employed in agriculture and in low-level unskilled manual positions has declined greatly. Conversely, the occupational shifts that have led many in the West to write about the emergence of a "postindustrial society" and in the East of a "scientific-technological revolution," involve a sharp increase in employment in areas that require high levels of education and skill—administration, technology, health, science, communications, culture, and government.

The shape of the occupational or class structure has been changing from a pyramid—with positions concentrated at the bottom—to an egg, with occupations concentrated more in the middle. Inherent in such shifts is an increase in the proportion of those who attain a higher position than their parents.

Changes in many less developed or Third World countries are as dramatic. These countries vary enormously in economic structure and level of income, and the shape of their occupational mix has also changed greatly. Their rate of growth has been more rapid than that of Europe or America during the nineteenth century. As a result, millions have moved from rural to urban occupations, many from lower- to middle-class positions. But since these societies remain primarily agrarian, most people in them remain in roughly the same position as their parents. Total mobility is increasing, but it remains at a lower rate than that presently occurring in the more developed nations.

Interest in social mobility dates back to the ancient Greeks, and empirical studies have been around for more than a century, but it is still difficult to be certain how much societies vary. The reasons for this are complex. Different countries define occupational classes differently. Estimates of mobility are affected by variations in the distribution of occupations among countries and over time. Even more important, it is possible to compare nations in at least three ways: first, with respect to total mobility, ignoring the shape of the occupational structure; second, controlling for the differing distributions of occupations; and third, controlling for structural changes in the economy between generations. All three are legitimate approaches.

Structural Forces

Postwar evidence gathered from national samples—from Japan, the United States, Australia, and a number of West European and Communist countries—indicates sizable increases in rates of total mobility. The movement toward more open societies is largely independent of differences in political systems or social values. Comparing the results of studies in western countries, Featherman, Jones, and Hauser emphasize that "in the final analysis, values may play a relatively minor role, relative to the impact of the economy, in shaping and sustaining the mobility processes. . . ." [1] M. N. Rutkevich, head of the Soviet Union's major sociological research institute, points out that increased rates of upward mobility are inherent in the general dynamic of modern societies, in which "progress of technology and culture demands an accelerated rise in the numbers of scientists, engineers, technicians, teachers, physicians, and other experts. . . ." [2] He emphasizes that these generalizations apply to western nations as well as to the Soviet Union.

Since the dynamic behind the large increase in upward movement is structural, changes in rates of exchange mobility—people moving into occupational positions lower than their parents', thus making room for others to move up—are not important in accounting for variations over time or among nations, although such shifts account for much of the mobility within each country. Two recent analyses—the first for seventeen countries and the second for twenty-four—confirm this. Not surprisingly, structural changes apart, rates of immigration and social mobility correlate. Thus, immigrant-receiving countries like Israel, Australia, Canada, and the United States are among the most mobile when other factors are controlled.[3]

Movement Into Elites

Inheritance of high-status positions has declined, and the rate of movement to the top from socially inferior origins has increased. This refutes the belief that mature capitalist societies must inevitably become more immobile. John Goldthorpe and Catrina Llewellyn stress that "the claim by some [leftist] scholars that access to the higher levels of the . . . class structure is tightly controlled, thus creating at these levels a marked homogeneity of social origin, would seem open to serious doubt."[4] Their 1972 study of mobility in England, France, and Sweden found that entry into the managerial and administrative positions in public and private bureaucracies was by no means closed to sons of manual workers. Twenty-two to 25 percent of those in this upper-level group had fathers of similar background, but 44 to 55 percent were from a blue-collar family background.[5]

American research clearly indicates that elite positions have become much more open over time. On the basis of various national surveys, Hauser et al. report that opportunities "to enter high-status occupations appear to have improved in successive cohorts of U.S. men for at least the last forty years. . . ."[6] A 1964 *Scientific American* survey of the backgrounds of big business executives of the 600 largest corporations offers evidence on this point.

> Only 10.5 percent of the current generation of big business executives . . . are sons of wealthy families; as recently as 1950 the corresponding figure was 36.1 percent, and at the turn of the century, 45.6 percent . . . two-thirds of the 1900 generation had fathers who were heads of the same corporation or who were independent businessmen; less than half of the current generation had fathers so placed in American society. On the other hand, less than 10 percent of the 1900 generation had fathers who were employees; by 1964 this percentage had increased to nearly 30 percent.[7]

The *Scientific American* study finds that the post-World War II period saw the greatest increase in the proportion of those from economically "poor" backgrounds (from 12.1 percent in 1950 to 23.3 percent in 1964) who reached the top echelons of American business. There was a correspondingly sharp decline in the percentage of those at the top recruited from wealthy families (from 36.1 percent in 1950 to 10.5 percent in 1964).

Developments such as these, which are common to various western nations, reflect a number of structural changes: the replacement of the family-owned enterprise by the corporation; the bureaucratization of corporate life; the recruitment of management personnel from the ranks of college graduates; and the awarding of higher posts on the basis of a competitive-promotion process similar to that which operates in government bureaucracy. With the spread of higher education to the children of the working class, the ladder of bureaucratic success has become increasingly open to those from poorer circumstances. A privileged family background continues to be an advantage in the quest for elite positions, but training and talent can make up for it in an increasing number of cases.

Higher education is more widely available in the United States than in any other country, so it is not surprising that the proportion of Americans who move from lowly backgrounds into elite positions is greatest in this country. Peter Blau and Otis Dudley Duncan, comparing data from the United States, Japan, and five West European countries, find that "upward mobility from the working class into the top occupational stratum of society is higher in the United States than in other countries. . . . The proportion of manual sons who achieve elite status is six-sevenths of that of all men occupying such status in the United States (.85) whereas this proportion is in no other country as great as two-thirds. . . . There is a grain of truth in the Horatio Alger myth."[8] But since the proportion in the elite stratum is small everywhere, only a minority can actually move into top positions.

Mass Mobility

Social mobility appears to be an extensive phenomenon in all industrialized or industrializing societies. The earliest effort at broad international comparisons, published in 1927 by the Russian-American sociologist Pitirim Sorokin, reported on literally hundreds of studies in many countries, some dating back to the late nineteenth century. The early investigations did not deal with national data, so their usefulness is limited. They do indicate that none of the societies could be described as "closed" or "non-mobile" systems. All the studies located substantial proportions who rose or fell in occupational status when contrasted with the position of their fathers.[9] The Austrian-American economist Joseph Schumpeter, also writing in 1927, concluded that "class barriers are always, without exception, surmountable, and are in fact surmounted. . . ."[10] He pointed out that "there is constant turnover" between social classes: "Entries and exits occur continually—the latter directed both upward and downward." And he suggested an image to illustrate the point, "each class resembles a hotel or an omnibus, always full, but always of different people."[11]

In 1959, Hans Zetterberg and I published a comprehensive analysis of surveys of social mobility based on national samples of adult males in France, Germany, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States. In our discussion of movement between manual and nonmanual occupations across two generations, we reported as "our major finding . . . that the countries involved are comparable in their high amounts of vertical mobility."[12] About one-quarter to a third of the nonfarm population moved across the manual-nonmanual line. Comparing the results of a comprehensive 1962 American survey with those found elsewhere, Blau and Duncan confirmed this finding and concluded that there is "little difference among various industrialized nations in rates of occupational mobility between the blue-collar and white-collar class."[13]

Results from national surveys of mobility in six Communist countries (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia), compared with seven non-Communist ones (Australia, France, Italy, Norway, Sweden, the United States, and West Germany) reveal considerable similarities, once people of rural origin are set aside. "Blue-collar nonfarm sons (workers) are mobile into nonmanual jobs in 29.2 percent of the cases in the Socialist average, and 28.2 in the non-Socialist sample. . . ." The proportion moving downward from white-collar to manual occupations was also virtually identical.[14] Ignoring shifts from rural to urban occupations obviously distorts estimates of total movement. But it is often difficult to classify movement from heterogeneous and vaguely specified forms of farm employment to various urban positions as unambiguously upward or downward. It should be noted, however, that farmers' or peasants' sons are less likely to move into nonmanual positions than are the sons of manual workers in Communist countries and in the western societies—13.4 percent in the former and 18.4 percent in the latter. The difference between the rates for upward mobility from urban occupations relates to the fact that eastern bloc countries have a much larger rural sector than the more industrialized non-Communist nations.

Most of the national comparisons referred to above are based on movement among males between the working class and the middle class, that is, between manual and nonmanual positions. But movement up or down the occupational hierarchy is obviously more complex than this. Those who shift between farm and urban occupations, unskilled and skilled jobs, or from clerical to professional positions, also are socially mobile. The more occupational classifications differentiated in the analysis, the greater the proportion who may be classified as having changed position in the occupational hierarchy. This is reflected in a number of recent national surveys (conducted from 1962-1974) that report the total percentage of the male population that has moved up or down between generations. The surveys use five or more occupational classifications. These results from eight countries are, of course, not directly comparable, since they are based on studies in which the number of occupational categories varies from five to seventeen. The most significant finding among these results is that half or more of the adult males in eight countries were in an occupational stratum different from that of their fathers. (See table 1.)

Table 1

ESTIMATED TOTAL MOBILITY IN
VARIOUS INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES

Country	Year of Survey	Number of Occupational Categories	Total Mobility for All Categories
1 U.S.A.	1962	5	67%
1a	1962	17	84
2 U.S.A.	1973	5	68
2a	1973	17	86
3 France	1964	8	63
4 France	1970	9	69
5 England	1972	9	68
6 Sweden	1974	9	75
7 Hungary	1973	12	73
8 Poland	1972	12	63
8a	1972	6	48
9 Finland	1972	6	49
10 Germany	1969	6	55
11 Germany	1974	6	52

Note: How to read this chart: When mobility is calculated among seventeen occupational classes, the percentage of males who are in a different class from their fathers is 84% in the U.S. When occupational classes are reduced to five, the proportion who are classified as mobile between generations is 67%.

Sources (in descending order of table):

1 and 1a David L. Featherman and Robert M. Hauser, *Opportunity and Change* (New York: Academic Press, 1978), p. 93.

2 and 2a Ibid.

3 Maurice Garnier and Lawrence E. Hazelrigg, "Father-to-Son Occupational Mobility in France: Evidence from the 1960s," *American Journal of Sociology* 80 (Spring 1974), p. 484.

4 Robert Erikson, John H. Goldthorpe, and Lucienne Portocarero, "Intergenerational Class Mobility in Three Western European Societies: England, France and Sweden," *British Journal of Sociology* 30 (December 1979), p. 425.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid.

7 Rudolf Andorka and Krzysztof Zagorski, "Structural Factors of Social Mobility in Hungary and Poland," *The Polish Sociological Bulletin* (No 2, 1979), p. 129.

8 Ibid.

8a Michael Pohoski, Seppo Poetinen and Krzysztof Zagorski, "Social Mobility and Socio-Economic Achievement," in Erik Allardt and Wlodzimierz Wesolowski, eds., *Social Structure and Change: Finland and Poland Comparative Perspective* (Warsaw: Polish Scientific Publishers, 1978), p. 150. These data are from the same study as reported in Note 8.

9 Ibid.

10 Gerhard Von Kleining, "Soziale Mobilitat in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland II: Status- oder Prestige-Mobilitaet," *Koelner Soziologia und Sozial-Psychologie* 27 (August 1975), p. 287.

11 Ibid.

Much of the mobility reported in these studies is structural, a consequence of the upgrading of the urban occupations and the decline of the rural sector. These data therefore reveal more upward than downward movement. Thus, a 1964 French survey reports 40 percent moved up and 23 percent down,[15] while American research indicates corresponding figures of 49 percent upwardly mobile and 19 percent downwardly mobile for 1963, and 49 percent upwardly mobile and 17 percent downwardly mobile for 1962.[16]

Such studies also demonstrate that estimates of total mobility are affected by the classification systems employed by researchers. When English (1972), French (1970), Swedish (1974), and German (1974) results are each collapsed into a trichotomous class structure—nonmanual, manual, and farm—the rates are much lower. Similarly, when the 1962 and 1973 American data are reduced from seventeen to five categories, and the 1972 Polish findings are merged from twelve to six categories, total mobility drops at least 15 percent. But whatever the virtues or limitations of using two, three, six, nine, or more categories to estimate mobility rates, it is evident that there is considerable movement in all these societies.

Political Consequences

Concern with social mobility reflects an interest in how near or distant given societies are from the ideal of equality of opportunity. The evidence indicates that no existing society comes close to allowing all people the same chance to achieve desired positions. In all societies, family class background has a large bearing on status placement of offspring. But at the same time, no industrialized society denies its male citizens the opportunity to rise. In each country for which data are available, a large proportion of the male population (the extent varying with the number of occupational categories employed) have moved up or down between generations. And given the continued strength of modern economies, opportunities to rise from lowly positions have been increasing. Contemporary industrialized nations are probably the most mobile ever.

Interest in findings such as these is motivated partly by a desire to evaluate how much opportunity exists, and whether it is increasing or decreasing. Political analysts have assumed that varying rates of social mobility are related to the degree of class consciousness present in different countries. In this vein, it has been suggested that socialist and union movements have been weaker in the United States than in Europe, because America, originating as a frontier society without a history of fixed-status lines, has been much more "open" than European nations, whose class structures evolved from the more rigid emphasis on the estate categories of feudal societies. Writing about the United States, Karl Marx asserted: "Though classes, indeed, already exist, they have not become fixed, but continually change and interchange their elements in the constant state of flux."[17]

If, however, the United States has not differed significantly from other industrialized societies in the proportion of persons who are socially mobile between the working and middle classes, what explains the contrast in the political values and allegiances of American workers with those in other democratic nations? Why are people at the lower rungs of the social ladder in the United States less disposed than those in other western countries to give support to socialist movements and to join unions, and more inclined to believe that equality of opportunity exists here? The answer given by Reinhard Bendix and myself in *Social Mobility in Industrial Society* still seems to be valid.

> Data on social mobility—the bare facts and figures—cannot speak for themselves. Although continued social mobility in American society helps to sustain the belief in the "open" class system, it does not follow that in another society, a similar rate of social mobility would give rise to such a belief, or encourage it. The point is that in a society in which prevailing views emphasize class differences, even a high degree of social mobility may not suffice to undermine these views.[18]

In the United States, the evidence of a high degree of social mobility goes hand in hand with the traditional American commitment to the ideal of egalitarianism. Both influences combine to perpetuate the belief that even the most lowly can rise, that hard work, ambition, and intelligence pay off. In societies that were formerly aristocratic—in which class hierarchy and family inheritance were emphasized—even the existence of extensive mobility does not mitigate the belief of those in lowly positions that their situation is a result of a rigid class structure that deprives them of the opportunity to improve their position through individual action. The social, cultural, and political context of mobility, rather than the bare statistical facts about rates of movement, determine popular beliefs concerning opportunity in society. As Bendix and I stressed, "it is the American emphasis on equality as part of the democratic credo which differentiates American society from the more status-oriented cultures of Europe."[19] ☑

---

[1] David L. Featherman, F. Lancaster Jones, and Robert M. Hauser, "Assumptions of Social Mobility Research in the U.S.: The Case of Occupational Status," *Social Science Research* 4 (December 1975), p. 357.

[2] M. N. Rutkevich, "Elimination of Class Differences and the Place of Non-Manual Workers in the Social Structure of Soviet Society," *Soviet Sociology* 3 (Fall 1964), pp. 4-5, 11.

[3] Andrea Tyree, Moshe Semyonov, and Robert W. Hodge, "Gaps and Glissandos: Inequality, Economic Development, and Social Mobility in 24 Countries," *American Sociological Review* 44 (June 1979), p. 417.

[4] John H. Goldthorpe and Catrina Llewellyn, "Class Mobility in Modern Britain," *Sociology* 11 (May 1977), p. 262.

[5] Robert Erikson, John H. Goldthorpe, and Lucienne Portocarero, "Social Fluidity in Industrial Nations: England, France and Sweden," *British Journal of Sociology* 33 (March 1982), p. 5.

[6] Robert M. Hauser et al., "Temporal Change in Occupational Mobility: Evidence for Men in the United States," *American Sociological Review*, 40 (June 1975), p. 280. The authors cite a number of studies to this effect.

[7] *The Big Business Executive/1964: A Study of His Social and Educational Background* (a study sponsored by the *Scientific American*, conducted by Market Statistics, Inc., of New York City, in collaboration with Dr. Mabel Newcomer).

[8] Peter Blau and Otis Dudley Duncan, *American Occupational Structure* (New York: John Wiley, 1967), pp. 434-35.

[9] Pitirim A. Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Mobility* (New York: Free Press, 1959).

[10] Joseph Schumpeter, *Imperialism and Social Classes* (New York: Meridian Books, 1951), p. 124.

[11] Ibid., p. 126.

[12] S. M. Lipset and Hans Zetterberg, "Social Mobility in Industrial Societies," in S. M. Lipset and Reinhard Bendix, *Social Mobility in Industrial Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959), p. 27; see pp. 17-27 for the data. See also Raymond Boudon, *Education, Opportunity and Social Inequality* (New York: John Wiley, 1973), p. 185.

[13] Blau and Duncan, *American Occupational Structure* p. 433. See also Maurice Garnier and Lawrence E. Hazelrigg, "Father-to-Son Occupational Mobility in France: Evidence from the 1960s," *American Journal of Sociology* 80 (September 1974), p. 481 for comparable documentation for Australia, France, Italy, and the United States.

[14] Walter D. Connor, *Socialism, Politics, and Equality* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), pp. 163-64.

[15] Garnier and Hazelrigg, "Father-to-Son," p. 490.

[16] David L. Featherman, "Opportunities Are Expanding," *Society* 16 (March/April 1979), pp. 7-8.

[17] Karl Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (New York: International Publishers, 1963), p. 25.

[18] Lipset and Bendix, *Social Mobility*, p. 81.

[19] Ibid., p. 111.

by Robert Worcester and Simon Jenkins

Britain Rallies 'Round the Prime Minister

From the first news of the landing of Argentinian forces on the Falkland Islands on April 2, Market & Opinion Research International (MORI) has been polling the British public's reaction to the situation almost every week. Ten polls have been taken so far: a panel study of four waves for the *Economist* (and one wave for BBC's "Panorama"); two separate polls for the *Sunday Times*; two more for "Panorama" and one for the *Daily Star*. These followed the "base-line" survey which was in the field at the time of the initial landing.

The Tories Rebound

The war in the Falklands has, for the time being, changed the face of British politics. The rise of the SDP/Liberal Alliance (see "What's Ahead for Britain's New Party?" *Public Opinion*, December/January 1982),

Figure 1

THE FALKLANDS AND VOTING INTENTION

Question: How would you vote if there were a general election tomorrow? (If undecided or refused, ask) Which party are you most inclined to support?



Note: For Panels II-V, MORI reinterviewed by telephone the number of respondents indicated in the source below from a representative sample interviewed previously (Panel I) in face-to-face interviews in fifty-three constituencies throughout Great Britain. The data were weighted by sex, age, social class, and previous voting intention to be representative of the original face-to-face sample.

Source: Surveys by MORI for the *Daily Star* (August 1981-March 1982); *Daily Star*, April 1-5 (N = 1905); *Economist* (Panel I), April 14 (N = 1018); BBC's "Panorama" (Panel II), April 20-21 (N = 463); *Economist* (Panel III), April 23-24 (N = 447); BBC's "Panorama," April 25-26 (N = 1069); *London Sunday Times*, April 30 (N = 1178); *Economist* (Panel IV), May 3-5 (N = 526); BBC's "Panorama," May 16 (N = 1036); BBC's "Panorama," May 23 (N = 1091); *Economist* (Panel V), May 25-26 (N = 400), June 18 for the *Sunday Times*.

peaked at the time of the Crosby by-election on November 26, 1981 when Shirley Williams became the SDP's first elected Member of Parliament. Then the Alliance slide began. By early April the parties were just about even. Since then, the Tory share has soared to 52 percent on June 18 (see figure 1).

Opinion polls have not been the only measure of the political mood of the country. Just one month after the news of the Falklands invasion hit the headlines of British newspapers, local government elections took place in Britain. These elections are largely a referendum on the performance of the government of the day and customarily swing heavily against the party in power. In this instance, however, extrapolation of local government results to the national picture showed the Conservatives at 40 percent, Labour 31 percent, and the Alliance at 26 percent. Hundreds of seats that had been expected to go to the Alliance (especially in the south of England where the Conservatives have been running first, the Alliance second) and to Labour (especially in the north which is more urban and more pro-Labour) stayed Tory.

Two by-elections took place during the fighting. Both were expected to show Alliance strength. The Conservatives won them handily. The conclusion is unavoidable: so far, the conflict has been extremely good for the party in power.

Handling the Situation

The public mood toward the handling of the Falklands issue—coming as it did totally out of the blue—was one of cautious, wait-and-see support for the government. The conflict started badly for the cabinet with the resignation of Foreign Secretary Carrington and two of his deputies. As the crisis developed, however, the level of satisfaction with the way the government has handled the situation has improved steadily—from 60 percent approval in early April to 84 percent in late May.

Figure 2

TRENDS ON BRITISH OPTIONS IN THE FALKLANDS

Question: Should Britain take/have taken the following measures over the Falkland Islands . . . land troops on the Falklands . . . sink Argentinian ships in Falkland waters . . . bomb Argentinian military and naval bases?



Source: Surveys by MORI for the *Economist* for Panels I, III, IV, and V; for the BBC's "Panorama" for Panel II.

Public Opinion and the War

Much criticism of opinion polls is based on wisdom after the fact—it's often easier to know what questions *should have been* asked than to know which questions should be asked. The base-line questionnaire for the panel was developed while British ships were steaming toward the Falklands, before the precise nature of the conflict was clear. To cover any eventuality, a series of should/should not questions was devised on "whether Britain should take/have taken the following measures over the Falkland Islands situation." These ranged from measures taken immediately, such as severing diplomatic relations with Argentina (71 percent agreed), banning Argentinian imports into Britain (84 percent) and freezing Argentinian assets in British banks (82 percent), to the roughly one-in-four of the British public who were hawkish to the point of wishing to intern Argentinian citizens residing in Great Britain (24 percent), bomb Argentinian military and naval bases on the mainland (28 percent), land troops on the Argentinian mainland (21 percent), and the incredible one-in-twenty who believed that the situation called for the use of nuclear weapons against Argentina (see figure 2).

Initially, there was some doubt in the British public's mind about the importance of retaining British sovereignty over the Falklands if it resulted in the loss of British servicemen's lives (44 percent said it important enough, 49 percent disagreed). There was even less enthusiasm if carrying the war to the Falklands caused the loss of Falkland Islanders' lives (36 percent yes, 55 percent no). As the crisis developed and the island of South Georgia was taken without loss of life, the answers to the conditional question turned from negative to positive, with 51 percent in agreement that the loss of servicemen's lives could be justified in the April 20-21 survey to 58 percent in the April 23-24 survey, then down slightly to 53 percent early in May after the first loss of life, and finally to 62 percent at the end of May.

This slight hesitation occurred at the time of the sinking of the Argentinian warship *General Belgrano* on May 2 by a British submarine with a reported 1,000-plus men on board. On May 4, HMS *Sheffield* was sunk by an Argentinian Exocet missile and twenty British sailors lost their lives. Fieldwork was going on between the 3rd and the 5th of May. An examination of the findings shows that the downturn in confidence was occasioned by the sudden loss of life—i.e., with the sinking of the *General Belgrano*—rather than the loss of British lives specifically. With the death toll rising into the hundreds, the late May findings showed that although nearly two-thirds of those questioned believed

Figure 3

RETAINING SOVEREIGNTY AND LOSS OF LIFE TO BRITISH SERVICEMEN

Question: Do you think that retaining British sovereignty over the Falklands is important enough to justify the loss of British servicemen's lives?



Source: Surveys by MORI for the *Economist* for Panels I, III, IV, and V; for the BBC's "Panorama" for Panel II.

retaining sovereignty is justification enough for the loss of lives, 34 percent disagreed. This issue of "proportionality" has remained the hardest for polling questions to elucidate (see figure 3).

The most constant figure of all has been the level of concern about the issue of sovereignty. At the outset, just half (51 percent) of the British public said they "care very much" whether Britain regains sovereignty over the Falkland Islands. The "care very much" figure has remained at about that level through panel V.

Future of the Falklands

Throughout the conflict there have been a number of proposals for the solution of the Falkland Islands crisis. At the outset, one option—that the Falklands should become Argentinian territory but be leased back to the British government for administration—was favored by 26 percent and opposed by 63 percent. In May, the figures had hardly shifted—23 percent in favor and 64 percent opposed. Other proposals included a joint Argentinian/British civil administration with America as overseer and islanders involved. More people opposed than favored this proposal as well (49 percent to 39 percent). However, a majority (57 percent) in the early May panel felt it wrong "to go to war now if the government is willing to give up the Falkland Islands in the long term."

In a separate May 16 survey for the popular BBC television program "Panorama," MORI's sample felt that in any negotiation with Argentina over the Falkland Islands, the withdrawal of Argentinian troops should be insisted upon by the British government (90 percent); the Argentinian flag should be removed from the Falklands during negotiations (69 percent); full British administration of the islands should be restored immediately (70 percent); Argentina should recognize the British sovereignty of the Falklands pending a final agreement (75 percent); and the Falkland Islanders should have the final say in any settlement (62 percent). But, a narrow plurality felt that "it is not essential for Argentina to recognize full British sovereignty forever," and a plurality were also in agreement that it was acceptable for sovereignty to be transferred to a United Nations trusteeship (51 percent to 43 percent).

By mid-May, the patience of the British war cabinet with the drawn-out negotiations process had worn thin—and that of the public with it. Continued British attacks on the Port Stanley airfield, the failure of the Haig peace initiative, of the Peruvian plan and of the United Nations negotiations all led to a widespread acceptance of the inevitability of escalation of the conflict. When asked, "If negotiations do break down, which of the following options on this card would you favor?" 59 percent of the sample were by then for a full-scale invasion of the Falklands, and 34 percent even felt Britain should bomb military bases in Argentina.

During the time of the landing and as British losses mounted, some observers expected public support to begin to dwindle. In fact, the opposite occurred. By that time the *Sheffield* had been lost, Sea King helicopters had been ditched, Harriers had been shot down, the HMS *Antelope* was sinking and scores of lives lost, but 80 percent of those polled thought on the 23rd of May that the government was right to go ahead with the landing on the Falklands. By that time, a majority (54 percent) felt that Britain should retain the Falklands forever; but a majority was also in favor of handing the islands over to a United Nations trusteeship (51 percent favorable, 43 percent against by May 25-26). This overlap probably reflected a deep-seated conviction that victory was essential to restore British status and pride —yet a subsequent compromise was inevitable.

The picture of the Falklands conflict conveyed by the polling organizations is predictable from previous instances of democracies engaged in "just wars." As in the early stages of Suez and Vietnam (and this is not an attempt to draw either a political or a military parallel), domestic support for both the war and the government prosecuting it tends to be high. In the case of Suez, it should be said, although opinion was eventually equivocal on the merit of the expedition, support for the Eden government and even for Eden himself remained high throughout. Although he subsequently resigned (due to quite genuine ill-health) his Conservative party went on to win a resounding election victory two years later. Mrs. Thatcher's administration has two years to run. ☑

R2110-1 A

Public Opinion

Published by
American
Enterprise
Institute

Aug/Sept 1982

ACQUISITIONS EDITOR
STATISTICAL REFERENCE INDEX
CONGRESSIONAL INFORMATION SERVICE 1
4520 EAST-WEST HIGHWAY
WASHINGTON, DC 20014
88-25794 1

POLITICS 1982

Amitai Etzioni, Peter Hart, Everett Carll Ladd, Warren Mitofsky, Martin Plissner, Richard Scammon, John Sears, Ben J. Wattenberg, and Richard Wirthlin.

plus

John Silber on Apocalypses.

Stanley Rothman and Robert Lichter on Nuclear Energy, Scientists and the Media.



This is America's off-year political heartbeat! See our unique center spread pages 30 and 31.

Public
Opinion

Volume 5, Number 4 August/September 1982

Publisher
William J. Baroody, Jr.

Co-Editors
Seymour Martin Lipset
Ben J. Wattenberg

Managing Editor
Karlyn H. Keene

Associate Editor
Victoria A. Sackett

Assistant Editor
Nicola L. Furlan

Research Assistant
Mary Bruun

Editorial Consultant
Hunter C. Harrison, Jr.

Editorial Board
David R. Gergen, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, Irving Kristol, Everett Carll Ladd, Howard Penniman, Austin Ranney, Richard M. Scammon, Laurence H. Silberman, Herbert Stein, and Richard J. Whalen

Consulting Editor for Opinion Roundup
Everett Carll Ladd

Editorial Associate
Marilyn M. Potter

Art & Design Director
Pat Taylor

Chart Illustrator
Hördur Karlsson

Staff Editor
Elizabeth D. Ashooh

PUBLIC OPINION, August/September 1982, Vol. 5, No. 4. Published bimonthly by the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. Copyright 1982 American Enterprise Institute. Subscription rates: $18.00 for one year, $34.00 for two years. Individual copy: $3.50. Information on bulk orders or multiple subscriptions available on request. Editorial and business offices: c/o AEI, 1150 17th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. Send changes of address and all subscription correspondence to Circulation Department, c/o AEI, same address. "American Enterprise Institute" and are registered service marks of the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.

Second class postage paid at Washington, D.C.

ISSN 0149-9157

CONTENTS

2 WHICH WAY ARE THE POLITICAL WINDS BLOWING?
A conversation with Richard Wirthlin, Peter Hart and Everett Carll Ladd
Three eminently qualified political observers hold fingers aloft to test the 1982 election breezes. Their readings predict strategies, seat loss, and turnout.

8 THE THOUGHTS OF CHAIRMAN SCAMMON
by Richard Scammon
This political savant shares his witty and provocative insights about Election '82. The nuclear freeze is phony; the flat tax is false; and the balanced budget is baloney. These issues, he says, are the opiates of campaign '82.

10 WHAT THE 1982 ELECTION SHOULD TELL RONALD REAGAN ABOUT 1984
by John Sears
This well-known strategist predicts how many seats the GOP will lose, and then goes on to chart a course for presidential success in the "out" years.

14 VOTING TWICE ON ELECTION DAY
by Warren Mitofsky and Martin Plissner
At the polls, many voters will cast two ballots—at the voting booth, and then in the networks' "ballot" boxes. The authors tell us what can go wrong with voter polls and why they are uniquely valuable.

17 THE GAP: WHY PRESIDENTS AND PARTIES FAIL
by Robert Shogan
After years of writing about politics, this veteran journalist takes a critical look at the system. Presidents and parties are doomed to fail, and the remedies that have been proposed won't heal the ailing patient.

20 THE FREEZE FRAMEWORK
by Everett Carll Ladd
The author takes an historical look at attitudes toward nuclear weapons.

21 OPINION ROUNDUP
Updating Emily Post; Americans Evaluate the Courts, Election '82 Preview, and Assessing the Nuclear Option

42 APOCALYPSES THEN AND NOW: THE PEACE MOVEMENT AND THE ANTINUCLEAR CRUSADE
by John Silber
The principal home of apocalypse is the newly resurgent peace movement and the antinuclear crusade. The author argues that by embracing false apocalypses, we make the true ones more likely. He traces intellectuals' misguided fascination with pessimistic visions.

47 THE NUCLEAR ENERGY DEBATE: SCIENTISTS, THE MEDIA, AND THE PUBLIC
by Stanley Rothman and Robert Lichter
Until now, little information has been available about the scientific community's views of nuclear energy. The authors provide the evidence, and compare it to the views of the media and the public.

53 MAKING INTEREST GROUPS WORK FOR THE PUBLIC
by Amitai Etzioni
The public and political scientists part company when they evaluate interest groups, and they're both right. Interest groups are more potent and less functional.

58 SNAPSHOTS by Karlyn Keene

60 TOO BAD FOR OUR SIDE: WAR IS A VIDEO GAME
by Ben J. Wattenberg
Our editor asks, does the nature of television rig the odds against democracies engaged in war?

Which Way Are the Political Winds Blowing?

a conversation with Richard Wirthlin, Peter Hart and Everett Carll Ladd

Richard Wirthlin: Some political winds blow very gently; others hit with gale force. To understand which way the winds are blowing today we need to look at the direction the weather vane was pointing in 1980.

The 1980 election was highly significant. If it was not a watershed, it clearly gave Reagan a mandate for change. Our postelection analyses show that a desire for change provided the landslide Reagan received two years ago. The first item for change on the agenda was the public's desire for strong leadership—leadership that could cope effectively with inflation.

To answer the question of which way the political winds are blowing today, we need to look at the major elements of that 1980 campaign. Major themes of the 1980 campaign were reducing the size and cost of government, reducing waste and fraud, cutting down overregulation, and developing a more stable world through enhancing U.S. strength and launching meaningful initiatives for peace. A final and critical theme was establishing a growing economy with moderate or low rates of inflation. Americans still favor these general objectives.

The election of 1982 is going to turn on one simple precept—the extent to which Ronald Reagan is perceived to have been successful in satisfying the expectations that were created in 1980. Those expectations are not always consistent, nor do they always point unequivocally in the "conservative" direction.

Look at the nuclear freeze issue. Its emerging strength has been one of the anomalies of the last two years. That issue directly touches on one of Reagan's main goals—peace through strength. But support for the freeze issue is not support for a specific way to approach the Soviets or arms reduction. It is simply and clearly a strong desire to begin a process that will reduce armaments. Our data show clearly that people want to achieve that goal, but they want to achieve it only with verification and safeguards.

The second goal—reducing the size and cost of government—is still supported. But the pain which that involves, especially for some on welfare, is one of the serious problems this administration faces.

The overriding issue in this November election will be the economy. More specifically, the election is going to turn on unemployment. I wouldn't say that Republicans are going to win if unemployment falls to 7 percent, or lose if unemployment increases to 10 percent. Rather, people will weigh the suffering of the unemployed against the gains that have been made fighting inflation.

The election is going to turn specifically on the extent to which the president is seen as either being personally responsible for the recession or for what may be a slow and lethargic recovery.

I can speak about public attitudes more definitively on the first point than on the second. If you ask the question, "From what you've heard and read, who do you think is most responsible for the present recession, Ronald Reagan and the Republicans or Jimmy Carter and the Democrats?" almost half of all Americans tag the Democrats. About one out of five tags Reagan and the Republicans.

The second question may be more critical in determining elections this fall. Even though many believe Reagan may have inherited the recession, people *do* look to him to alleviate it. The jury hasn't decided whether the president will be given credit for the progress that is made.

At this juncture, there seems to be a strong belief held by most Americans that it will take time—a year or longer—to pull us out of the recession. That clearly redounds to Reagan's benefit.

Now, concerning more general expectations, we find Reagan has exceeded initial expectations in the area of strengthening U.S. defense capabilities; has met expectations in reducing the amount of federal regulation of business; has almost met expectations in restoring the confidence of the people in the American government; and he has exceeded expectations in getting our allies abroad to respect the United States again.

In sum, there are no magic storm lanterns that will light the road of the future. How Republicans fare in the fall of 1982 will depend to a large extent on how people view this president. Right now a majority of Americans are giving Reagan the benefit of the doubt. How long their patience will endure is not known.

Peter Hart: The 1982 election will be a "mid-course correction election." The voters' objectives will be to tell the Reagan administration and the Congress that the president misinterpreted the 1980 election and some adjustments are necessary.

Our polls suggest that major blocs of blacks, Hispanics, union voters, environmentalists, and women are in the Democratic camp. The Republicans have captured their own party faithful and the conservatives. The contest is for the middle. Independents, white collar and sales workers are just beginning to tune in and sort out the stakes.

Every election has its own set of dynamics. There are basically five dynamics in play in 1982. The first and most important is that this is going to be a "big issue" election. In 1978, voters were concerned about splinter issues. Nineteen eighty-two will be a single-issue election, if there is such a thing. The single issue of 1982 is the health of the economy.

The second dynamic is the present and future versus the past. The more the Republicans are able to run on the past—whether it is Congress's performance for the last twenty-five years or Jimmy Carter—the stronger their case will be. The more the election deals with the present and the future, the stronger the Democrats' case will be.

The third dynamic is the proper role of government. Ronald Reagan won in large measure in 1980 because people supported his idea of cutting back regulations and the role of government. Reagan's initial actions had majority support. But we sense that the public thinks the cuts are going too far. There is a growing perception of excesses, missteps, and false economies on the part of the Republicans. We see this dramatically in the area of social security and to a great extent in the environmental policies of Interior Secretary James Watt.

The Democrats have to be constructive in what they're saying. The voters aren't saying, "Let's get rid of Reagan." They are saying, "Let's make some changes." The voters are looking for a return to the center. They want to find the proper balance between a government that cuts too much and one that spends too much. Right now, they perceive each party as fulfilling one-half of the equation.

The fourth dynamic is more evident on a state than a national level. I call it a "back to basics" agenda. A set of issues—education, crime, child abuse, gun control, drunk driving, and the nuclear freeze—don't break left or right in ideological terms either, but suggest that Americans want to get back to some sort of basic agenda.

Education is a fascinating issue. Busing is not the focus. Nor is funding. Instead, it's competency and discipline in the classroom. The agenda is different. These issues have not been active concerns for some time.

The last dynamic is that the 1982 election is a continuation of a transitional period. Nineteen eighty was not a watershed election in terms of a major and lasting political realignment. There will be more back and forth movement. The Republicans are going to be forced to reevaluate the meaning of the 1980 elections, and the Democrats are going to be forced to develop a coherent policy to deal with the future. That is the meaning of the 1982 elections.

In order for the Democrats to make the most of their chances in 1982, we expect them to pursue the equity theme—ensuring that the scales are not tipped against the average person; that the wealthy and the powerful live up to their responsibilities; and that government lives up to its legitimate responsibilities. Finally, the Democrats will campaign for a foreign policy and a defense that is strong, consistent, and prudent, while making the world a less dangerous place to live.

The equity theme was used with a vengeance in the Philadelphia Democratic mini-convention. That rhetoric gives us a preview of what we're going to see in the fall.

I feel the economy will change enough to keep people from rejecting what Reagan has done. They might conclude that what this president is trying to do is sufficiently revolutionary that it does take time to make his program work.

Everett Ladd: The question of which way the political winds are blowing has an interesting bias. It assumes there is some distinct movement. I don't see that movement.

If you look at the underlying structure of party identification, there has been no clear movement toward either party in the last year and a half. Party ties have continued to weaken, but the underlying strength and relative standing of the Democrats and Republicans has not changed significantly. There hasn't been any significant ideological or philosophical movement either.

Finally, I don't detect any decisive answer to the referendum on how this administration is doing. At times there has been a decisive answer. In 1935 and 1936, the referendum on FDR was definitely positive. The last two years of the Carter presidency elicited a decisive negative answer. With this administration, Reagan is popular, but not overwhelmingly so. Many of his policies receive significant approval, but hardly overwhelming affirmation.

That the winds of political change don't seem to be blowing very strongly doesn't mean there aren't any interesting political currents. There are several.

How Republicans fare in the fall of 1982 will depend to a large extent on how people view this president. Right now a majority of Americans are giving Reagan the benefit of the doubt. How long their patience will endure is not known.

WIRTHLIN

To say there has been no decisive vote for or against the Reagan administration is not to make a neutral judgment. The modern presidency is a fairly weak office in an age of big government. Demands made of it are very hard to meet. The prevailing climate of public opinion in the United States with regard to political leadership is different today from what it was two decades ago. It is harder to convince and mobilize the public.

If a president comes into office and experiences the inevitable decline in popularity that Reagan has, and if after a year and a half there's a basic stabilization in his popularity at a substantial level, that's the most an administration can expect. I wouldn't hesitate to call it "success."

The lack of clear partisan or ideological movement is especially interesting given the conditions of the American economy. In the face of painfully high interest rates and substantial unemployment, there isn't any strong movement against Reagan, against the Republicans, or against conservative policies. I attribute this to countervailing forces pushing against the natural bias of these adverse economic developments.

There are three of these countervailing forces. The most interesting—and perhaps most unappreciated one—is the strength of the anti-inflation constituency in the United States. We've asked endless numbers of poll questions on public attitudes toward inflation. There are some steps that polls, no matter how well designed and executed, can't take. Polls cannot measure what the public will tolerate on behalf of a goal such as bringing inflation under control. The answer of the past eighteen months is that the public will tolerate a great deal of short-term pain in the interest of obtaining the objective.

The second countervailing factor is the strength of the view that some real changes are necessary in the conduct of public business in the United States. Americans don't want to reverse the New Deal, but they want some changes made. The parallel between the United States and Britain is interesting. The same general consensus exists in Britain, and it has played a significant role in propping up the Thatcher administration whose economic problems are far more severe than our own.

The final factor is the underlying strength of the American economy. If, as we've been told so often, our economy entered a static stage around 1970, culminating in today's high unemployment and high interest rates, one would think we have the conditions for a substantial *ressentiment* that could move large numbers of people to vote in protest. But it's simply not the case. It's worth asking why.

The public has been realistic. It has tempered its dissatisfaction with a recognition of continuing economic progress. Recent Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) reports suggest that in 1980 U.S. gross per capita income was $1,850 higher than that of our nearest competitor, West Germany. The margin had actually increased in dollar terms over the period. The index OECD used was a realistic one designed to get at the real comparative standard of living by using 1,300 market basket items and making cross-national comparisons. That success is not often recognized. The economic issue in 1982 would be very different from what it seems to be if we didn't have this underlying sense of economic progress.

There's a dynamic equilibrium operating. There are negative factors—problems in the economy and elsewhere. But there are also significant countervailing pressures. Thus, the electorate is in a wait-and-see mood. It's going to

The Democrats have to be constructive in what they're saying. The voters aren't saying, "Let's get rid of Reagan." They are saying, "Let's make some changes." The voters are looking for a return to the center.

HART

stay in this wait-and-see mood through November. November 2, 1982 won't be decisive. The answer will come in 1984.

Wirthlin: Our data support Everett's observation about the size of the anti-inflation constituency. In a recent D/M/I survey, we posed a question about two budgets. One budget would cut human services expenditures by $5 billion, leaving a deficit of yet $100 billion. The other budget would restore these cuts—and some other programs as well—but doing so would cost an additional $16 billion and would likely generate more inflation.

I phrased the question specifically to bias it in favor of the kinds of service expenditures that people almost automatically approve, such as retirement benefits, education, training and employment programs. Still, 47 percent opted for the more austere budget and 44 percent for the more socially oriented one. The conditioning phrase was that the one budget was inflationary. That surprised me.

> If a president comes into office and experiences the inevitable decline in popularity that Reagan has, and if after a year and a half there's a basic stabilization in his popularity at a substantial level, that's the most an administration can expect. I wouldn't hesitate to call it "success."
>
> LADD

Hart: I don't think you can go to the American people on inflation alone. Those who care most about inflation tend to be more optimistic about the economy. They also tend to be more Republican.

The bottom line is whether the economy is healthy, and most people are saying it's not. Democrats have to do more than carp.

Right Track, Wrong Track

Hart: Dick, it's been alleged you have a favorite stock you like to watch, a question about the country being on the right or wrong track. How's your favorite stock doing?

Wirthlin: I believe in a very balanced portfolio. [Laughter] In our June survey, 62 percent of Americans believed the country had seriously gotten off on the wrong track. That particular stock isn't doing as well as it did in August of last year. We have found that a large proportion of the concern about "wrong track" comes specifically from the problem of unemployment.

That doesn't bode well for the incumbent president. But, the linkage between that unemployment concern and this president is not, as I said earlier, direct. That leads me to be neither terribly optimistic nor pessimistic about Republican chances this fall.

Ladd: I don't look at any particular stock. There are all kinds of measures of pessimism and cynicism. You get some back-and-forth movement on these, but on the whole there's been a downward slide for twenty years.

Another large battery of questions bearing on the structure of the economy, the nature of the society, its worth, and its comparative position exists. On these questions the numbers are unbelievably positive.

One of the things we've learned from public opinion research is that people don't always answer poll questions the way the questions are literally framed. Rather, they use poll questions to convey messages of one kind or another. If the message the public intends is a basic affirmation of the society, one finds one set of responses. On the other hand, if the message is meant to express some concern about an aspect of the economy or the performance of political leaders, a whole different set of answers is forthcoming.

Obviously, there is economic concern at the present time. You don't need polls to show that. The interesting question isn't whether people are happy about the current direction of unemployment or interest rates. They would be idiots if they were satisfied. The important question is what larger conclusions they draw about the administration's responsibilities for these things. People are arguing that the administration's economic programs cause them some problems but still they expect longer-term benefits from them.

The data show that people recognize that the world is complicated. You can have protests and dissatisfaction about unemployment or whatever *and* the sense that the program correctives the administration has pursued are necessary. The simultaneous occurrence of these is the simple fact of American attitudes at the present time.

Hart: I agree. In addition to our qualitative research, we conduct focus groups. We find over and over again that people are willing to endure short-term pain to reach long-term goals.

People recognize that the world is complicated. I agree with that. At the same time they're also trying to say, "Make some adjustments, don't stay right here." That's part of the message of 1982. But people are willing to bear the short-term pain.

Elections '82: A National Test?

Question: *How many congressional seats actually move on the basis of national issues and Reagan's popularity?*

Hart: I would say 150 of them.

Wirthlin: In the 1960s, elections turned more on an incumbent's responsiveness or experience in office. But the Republicans proved in 1980 that you can move the electorate with a national message. In 1982 I believe many seats will turn on national issues as they relate to the president.

Hart: "Responsiveness" won't win many seats in 1982.

Wirthlin: Your question is a difficult one. Let me answer a more simple one. "To what extent does a change in Reagan's job rating affect congressional elections?" The answer to that question is "A lot!" The level of presidential job rating is not so important, but the change that occurs between the fall of 1981 and 1982 is important. We have done some empirical work in the last ten years on making estimates of changes in congressional seats based upon a number of variables. Two variables compiled by Edward Tufte—namely, change in presidential job rating and changes in real per capita disposable income—have been good predictive variables. Now, to separate how the mega-issues affect the job rating which in turn affects congressional races is very difficult.

It is evident that if President Reagan does get a bounce of two or three or four percentage points in his job rating, in that critical year's time, that will have strong impact. I wouldn't say 150. But there will be many congressional races that will be helped, if they stand on the margin.

Ladd: You get variations from one election to another. In the case of an election with a clear national direction in ideological, partisan, or the "referendum" terms, many more congressional races will be affected. My general view is that we're not seeing a lot of movement in this election and consequently the number is on the lower side.

Short-Term Pain, Long-Term Goals: The Case of Social Security

Question: *The panel agrees that the public is willing to accept short-term pain for long-term goals. Is this true with respect to social security?*

Hart: In terms of social security, Ronald Reagan raised a fear about cuts and reinforced a concern the voters had in the 1980 campaign. It is a self-inflicted wound.

The issue is one of future risk. The voters recognize that there have to be some changes in the social security system. It is a question of who is going to administer those changes. The Democrats have an advantage here in the fall election.

I believe the American people think that there will be changes. The short-term pain that people were willing to put up with—at least in a survey we did for the Presidential Commission on Social Security—was higher taxes.

Wirthlin: Attitudes about reforming social security depend on the age cohort you're examining. Those sixty-five and older give very different responses from those who are fifty-five to sixty-four, or those who are under forty.

Those who are under forty accept some rather revolutionary options. Those about ready to retire favor the status quo.

Ladd: I've reviewed several hundred questions on social security and public attitudes toward it, and I don't think we have the slightest idea what short-term pain the public will bear. The questions are inadequate. The questions generally begin "Do you favor cuts in social security?" or something like that. As far as I know, no one has proposed cuts in social security. That is not the issue. The question is the *rate of increase* in social security benefits. This isn't just playing with words. It is a critical conceptual matter. The survey research community hasn't posed it well. We simply don't know.

Turnout

Question: *Will voter turnout be higher or lower than in the last congressional election?*

Hart: In 1978 it was about 38 percent. It will be higher in 1982 for two reasons. First, there will be heavier turnout among minority groups who perceive a greater stake in sending the Reagan administration a message. Second, referenda in various states are going to bring people out in greater numbers.

Wirthlin: Turnout is going to be higher. Forty to 42 percent is as good a guess as any other. We're moving toward stabilization in voter turnout.

Ladd: I agree. The whole question of turnout in the United States has been misinterpreted.

The turnout in 1976, for example, was about the same as in 1936. And yet Roosevelt was supposed to be revitalizing the country, bringing up spirits, and mobilizing a population.

We've had a very long experience of low turnout. The satisfaction thesis—that people don't go to the polls be-

---

FIGURE 1

Question: From what you've heard and read, which of the following two positions best describes the way Ronald Reagan feels about nuclear weapons? Position A: Ronald Reagan believes that we must build as many nuclear weapons as quickly as we can so that we won't be pushed around by the Russians any more. Position B: Ronald Reagan believes that once the Soviets and the United States have about the same strength in nuclear weapons, then nuclear weapons must be reduced dramatically to assure lasting peace and security.

Among those who have heard or read recently anything Reagan has said about nuclear weapons



Note: In the April survey, 42% had heard or read recently anything Reagan has said about nuclear weapons, 58% had not; in May, 45% had, 55% had not; in June, 44% had, 56% had not.

Source: Surveys by Decision/Making/Information, latest that of June 16-22, 1982.

cause they are basically satisfied—tells us a lot more than the "grave discontent" explanation.

Foreign Policy and the 1982 Election

Question: *Is there now a perception that the United States has become the pusher rather than the pushee in foreign policy?*

Ladd: In the thirty-five years since World War II, American public opinion on foreign policy has changed very little. Americans want an *assertive* but not a *bellicose* foreign policy. Both are "pushing," but one is pushing too far. Poll data have shown that Reagan as president—and, indeed, as a candidate—was seen as walking right down the middle—dangerously close to bellicosity but gaining from a sense of assertiveness.

Wirthlin: One of the things a president lives with is the legacy of his prior campaign. Clearly, one of the legacies we inherited was Carter's charge that Reagan would likely get this country into an unnecessary war. That perception was prevalent as we went into the last days of the campaign even though it did not affect many votes.

The president has had now sixty or seventy good days in the foreign policy area. We had the Eureka speech and the trip to Europe. Those events helped strengthen somewhat the public perception that he handles foreign affairs well. We have redressed in part the balance between assertiveness and bellicosity.

The Nuclear Freeze and Ronald Reagan

Wirthlin: The freeze issue could have rolled the Reagan administration because it could have ignited those latent concerns raised during the campaign.

As recently as April of this year we interviewed a national sample and asked, "Have you heard or read anything recently that Ronald Reagan has said about nuclear weapons?" The results are shown in figure 1 (left). This is probably as dramatic a single shift concerning the perception of this president that I have measured in three years. The increase in position B has been remarkable (see figure 1).

Whither the Social Issues?

Question: *What happened to the social issues such as abortion and school prayer? Reagan campaigned on those issues. Have they just disappeared?*

Wirthlin: Clearly, the economic issue represents a major priority for us. But as far as school prayer and some of the other social issues are concerned, the president has demonstrated that he will keep his commitments. Granted, the social issues won't dominate the fall election across the board, but the social issues that tap the Moral Majority support could be decisive in bringing many Republicans into the Congress who might otherwise not get there.

Ladd: There's been a general liberalization on social issues in the United States over the past fifteen years. There are exceptions such as school prayer where large majorities favor an amendment. If social issues were to become more important to the electorate, it wouldn't be very helpful for the Reagan administration.

Debunking and Defending Models

Question: *There are a number of models used to explain election behavior. You mentioned Edward Tufte's earlier. How useful are these models?*

Ladd: In my profession an enormous amount of attention is given to developing models to explain voting decisions. It's been a singularly unproductive exercise. A number of considerations are involved in a vote decision. There are ideological views. There are policy commitments on specific issues; there are impressions of candidates. Then there is the tenor of the times. There is party I.D., and various group attachments to parties. The mix is very complex.

All of these efforts try to find formulas that attach quantitative and numeric weight to one dimension or another. It's rarification. It doesn't work. It's a fundamentally flawed picture of the nature of the voting decision.

Wirthlin: It may be rarification as far as academic hypotheses are concerned, but the exercise of developing complex variables, combining party I.D., ethnicity, age, partisanship, or whatever, has been extremely fruitful in developing strategy for campaigns.

Granted, there are no magic formulas, but each campaign and each election can be more clearly understood and the scarce resources of the campaign more effectively allocated through modeling that sheds light on the interactions between constituencies, issues, demographics, and partisanship, to come up with a clearer view of what is driving the vote decisions.

Politics is like the wind. Sometimes you don't know from where it comes or where it goes; you simply feel it at the moment; you measure it, and try to assess it. In developing strategy for campaigns, you have to understand the direction of the wind, and its force. Quantifying some of the key relationships you believe are *a priori* important can be very helpful in making those decisions rational.

Teledemocracy's Peril

Question: *In five or ten years, with new technologies, any member of Congress will be able to assess the mood of his district instantly. Or, he will be able to hire a pollster to find answers to a selection of national concerns. What does this mean for the political process as we know it?*

Ladd: On the basic attitudes toward government and the economy, the public wants government to do a lot and thinks there's no recourse but for the government to have these responsibilities. At the same time the public believes big governmental structures create all kinds of problems. That's all there is with regard to public attitudes. I don't see the technology or the nature of the inquiry changing the situation very much.

Wirthlin: The technology you describe is very close. We'll soon be able to do exactly what you have described.

Measuring public attitudes accurately simply adds another dimension that both politicians and public servants have to take into account when they make a major decision on an issue.

With the advance of technology comes also a better understanding of the tool—its strengths and weaknesses. The more you know about the measurement of attitudes, the more careful you become about hastily concluding that the public is crying for a particular action.

Regardless of how sophisticated polling becomes, regardless of how quickly we're able to collate the results and present them, the measure of how good our government is, I strongly believe, will ultimately rest simply on how good the judgment of those people we elect turns out to be. ☑

OPINION ROUNDUP

UPDATING EMILY POST

MANNERS OF DRESS . . .

Question: How important or unimportant do you think a man's physical appearance is in determining how successful he is in a business career? (Read list)



Note: 48% of men and 51% of women said a man's physical appearance is "very important" in determining success in a business career.

Question: How important or unimportant do you think a woman's physical appearance is in determining how successful she is in a business career? (Read list)



Note: 53% of men and 64% of women said a woman's physical appearance is "very important" in determining success in a business career.

Source: Survey by Audits & Surveys for The Merit Report, November 17-22, 1981

UNDRESS . . .

Question: Do you approve or disapprove of women wearing slacks in public?

Question: Do you approve or disapprove of women wearing shorts in public?

1961





Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, October 19-24, 1961.

Question: In general, do you think that the bathing suits worn by most young American women today are too revealing, too concealing, or just about right?



Note: 63% of women compared to 34% of men thought that bathing suits today are "too revealing."

Source: Survey by Audits & Surveys for The Merit Report, April 19-22, 1982.

AND ADDRESS

Question: Some women prefer the use of "Ms."—that is "m" "s"—instead of "Miss" or "Mrs." Do you approve or disapprove of the use of the title "Ms." for women instead of "Miss" or "Mrs."?



Source: Survey by NBC News/Associated Press, June 14-15, 1982.

Crudeness and Rudeness

Question: Do you think that men should or should not maintain traditional manners toward women—such as holding doors, helping women get seated and standing when introduced?



Source: Survey by Audits & Surveys for The Merit Report, March 1982.

CUSSING

Question: How do you feel about the use of profanity in public by women as compared to men? Would you say it is much worse for a woman than a man, somewhat worse for a woman than a man, no worse for a woman than a man?



Source: Surveys by Audits & Surveys for The Merit Report, May 3-6, 1982.

Question: Would you disapprove if you heard the following people swear, or wouldn't it make any difference?

Iowans' response:

Would disapprove if heard...swear



Note: All types of response categories not shown. The "makes no difference" response for the categories shown was 19% (public school teacher), 22% (clergyman), 32% (president), 32% (your mother), 41% (your father), 66% (truck driver). Sample size = 605 Iowa residents.

Source: Survey by the Des Moines Register and Tribune Company, November 28-December 1, 1979.

PUFFING

Question: Do you ever ask people around you to stop smoking? (Asked of nonsmokers = 65%)



Source: Survey by R. H. Bruskin and Associates, April 1981.

Question: If . . . someone were to ask you to stop smoking, would you do it? (Asked of smokers = 35%)



Source: Survey by R. H. Bruskin and Associates, April 1981.

OPINION ROUNDUP

WHAT ANNOYS

Question: Do you find yourself getting annoyed a lot, getting somewhat annoyed, or hardly getting annoyed at all by any of the above?



Note: Sample size = 3,007 women. In 1970, 31% of women were annoyed a lot/somewhat by "a man talking about you as a girl and not as a woman," 32% were a lot/somewhat annoyed by "jokes about . . ." and 43% were a lot/somewhat annoyed by "pictures of nude women in men's magazines."

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization for Virginia Slims, late 1979.

AND GIRLS CALLING BOYS

Question: How do you feel about women calling men for a date? Do you approve or disapprove?



Note: 61% of the total sample approved of women calling men for a date, 40% disapproved.

Source: Survey by Audits & Surveys for The Merit Report, September 14-19, 1981.

AND WHAT WE THOUGHT FORTY YEARS AGO

Question: Do you agree with him (Governor Dickinson)* that liquor is what usually causes the downfall of young girls?

	Total	Men	Women
Liquor causes downfall of young girls	46%	39%	53%
Qualified yes	1	1	1
No	43	51	36
Don't know	9	9	10

Note: *Governor Dickinson served as Lt. Governor of Michigan from 1915 to 1921, from 1927 to 1933 and from 1935-39. He served as Michigan's Governor from 1939 to 1941.

Question: The recent public charges made by Governor Dickinson of Michigan have raised the question of whether businessmen and politicians in the East often have immoral relations with their secretaries. Do you think this is so?

	Total	Men	Women
Businessmen and politicians in East have immoral relations with their secretaries	19%	21%	16%
Do not	38	39	37
Don't know	43	40	45

Source: Surveys by Elmo Roper for *Fortune* magazine, November 1939.

On the Beach

TO SEE,

Question: Which one of the following is the main reason men go to the beach? (Read list)

TO BE SEEN

Question: Which one of the following is the main reason women go to the beach? (Read list)



Source: Survey by Audits & Surveys for The Merit Report, June 8-13, 1982.

BUT NOT OBSCENE

Question: Do you think all major public beaches should or should not reserve an area for nude bathers?



Source: Survey by Audits & Surveys for The Merit Report, June 8-13, 1982.

AMERICANS EVALUATE THE COURT SYSTEM

SYSTEM NEEDS IMPROVEMENT

Question: Now I'd like to ask you about four specific aspects of American life. Our political system, our system of administering justice, our system of business and industry, and our system of organized labor. . . . Which of the descriptions on the card do you feel best applies to our system of administering justice?



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 81-3), February 14-28, 1981.

PERMISSIVENESS OF COURTS A MAJOR CAUSE OF COUNTRY'S PROBLEMS

Question: Here is a list of possible causes of some of our problems in this country. (Card shown respondent) Would you call off the ones you think are the *major* causes of our problems today?



Major Cause of Our Problems	1973	1974	1975	1977	1979	1982
Lack of good leadership	49%	57%	54%	34%	52%	44%
Permissiveness in the courts	**39**	**47**	**51**	**50**	**51**	**53**
Permissiveness of parents	43	40	43	47	42	43
Selfishness, people not thinking of others	51	47	46	52	50	50
Wrongdoing in government	51	64	56	47	51	50
Radical attempts to force change	19	21	26	19	19	20
Growing conservatism	6	7	6	5	7	10
Too much emphasis on money and materialism	46	40	36	42	41	41
Too much technology	6	8	8	9	9	7
A letdown in moral values	50	53	53	57	56	57
Too much commitment to other nations in the world	48	54	52	38	49	51
Too little interest in other nations in the world	6	5	5	6	7	9

Note: "None" or "Don't know" not shown. Multiple responses per respondent.

Source: Surveys by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 82-3), latest that of February 13-27, 1982.

What the Problem Isn't

JUDGES ARE MOST SELFLESS

Question: Now I'm going to show you a list of some different groups of people, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think most people in that group tend to act more in their own self-interest or more in the public interest. Here's the list. (Card shown respondent) First, do you think most federal court judges tend to act more in their own self-interest, or more in the public interest?



Note: When subgroups in the federal court judges category were analyzed, some differences appeared. 32% of non-high school grads thought judges acted more in self interest and 53% in the public interest; 15% said "don't know." Among those with college degrees the percentages were 19%, 76%, and 5%. 19% of executive/professionals felt judges acted in their self-interest, compared to 27% of blue collar workers. 31% of those with incomes under $10,000 felt they acted in self-interest compared to 16% of those with incomes over $30,000.

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 81-8), August 15-22, 1981.

AND GENERALLY FAIR IMPARTIAL, AND HONEST

Question: Do you think that judges have assumed too much power these days, or not?



Note: Sample size = 1,047.

Source: Survey by the *Los Angeles Times*, December 16-18, 1979.

Question: Do you think judges usually base their decisions on their interpretation of the law, or do you think they usually allow their personal beliefs and political opinions [to] play too great a part in their rulings from the bench?



Note: Sample size = 1,047. In another *Los Angeles Times* question in this same survey, 81% of those surveyed felt that "judges do a good job." 19% said they do not.

Source: Survey by the *Los Angeles Times*, December 16-18, 1979.

Question: Do you think that judges deal fairly with everyone, or do you think that they tend to be biased against minorities and the poor?



Note: Sample size = 1,047.

Source: Survey by the *Los Angeles Times*, December 16-18, 1979.

PUBLIC USUALLY AGREES WITH VERDICTS

Question: Thinking about the court cases you have personally followed, do they usually come out the way you think they should, or not?



Note: Sample size = 1,047.

Source: Survey by the *Los Angeles Times*, December 16-18, 1979.

Question: Does the U.S. Supreme Court permit or does it forbid a woman to have an abortion during the first three months of pregnancy, or haven't you been following this closely enough to say?



What is your opinion? Should a woman be permitted or forbidden to have an abortion during the first three months of pregnancy?



Source: Surveys by CBS News/*New York Times*, March 11-15, 1982.

What It Is

CRIMINAL COURTS NOT DOING THEIR JOB

Question: Do you approve or disapprove of the way the criminal courts are doing their job?



Source: Survey by the *Los Angeles Times*, January 18-22, 1981.

PUBLIC WANTS TO GET TOUGH



Question: Generally, do you feel the courts have been too easy in dealing with criminals, too severe, or do you think they have treated criminals fairly?

	Courts have been too easy	Too severe	Fair	It varies (vol.)
1967	52%	1%	16%	31%
1970	67	3	20	9
1973	67	2	18	13
1975	71	2	18	9
1977	77	1	13	9
1978	80	1	10	8
1981	83	1	14	2

Note: Sample size = 1,250 in 1981.

Source: Survey by Louis Harris and Associates, latest that of January 22-25, 1981.

SOLID MAJORITIES FAVOR HARSHER PENALTIES

Question: Frequently on any controversial issue there is no clear-cut side that people take, and also frequently solutions on controversial issues are worked out by compromise. But I'm going to name some different things, and for each one would you tell me whether on balance you would be more in favor of it, or more opposed to it? . . . Harsher prison sentences for those convicted of crimes.



Note: * "Opposed" = 0. In a 1981 Harris question, "From what you know or have heard, do you feel that our system of law enforcement works to really discourage people from committing crimes, or don't you feel it discourages them much?" 79% said it "does not discourage." In 1967, 53% gave that response. In 1981, 16% thought the system "really discouraged people. . . ." In 1967, 26% felt that way.

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 81-2), January 10-24, 1981.

THROW THE BOOK AT THEM, OR REWRITE IT

Question: In August, a federal task force on crime submitted to the attorney general a list of recommendations to deal with the rising crime rate in this country. As you probably know, some of the recommendations have been controversial. Here is a list of some of the key proposals made by the task force. (Card shown respondent) Would you read down that list, and for each one tell me whether you personally favor or oppose it? First, permit judges to deny bail to persons where there is reasonable evidence they are a danger to the community?



Note: All "don't know" responses were less than 10%, except "make illegally seized evidence . . ." which was 14%. They were calculated out.

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 81-9), September 19-26, 1981.

OPINION ROUNDUP

Justice Not Served in Hinckley Case

PUBLIC SAYS NO TO INSANITY DEFENSE IN 1981 AND 1982

Question: When people are put on trial for murder, do you think the courts should continue to allow them to plead "not guilty by reason of insanity" or do you think the rules should be changed so that people charged with murder cannot use an "insanity" defense?



Source: Survey by NBC News/Associated Press, September 28-29, 1981.

Question: As you probably know, the law now says that a person can be found not guilty if proved insane at the time of a crime. Do you approve or disapprove of laws which allow someone to be found not guilty of a crime because of insanity?



Note: Sample size = 505.

Source: Survey by ABC News, June 22, 1982.

AND NO TO HINCKLEY VERDICT

Question: As you know, the jury decided yesterday that Hinckley was insane and therefore NOT legally responsible for having wounded Reagan and three other men back in March of 1981. Do you think that justice was done in the trial of John Hinckley or not?



Note: Sample size = 505. In a July 12-15 survey conducted by Audits & Surveys for The Merit Report, 71% of those surveyed said the Hinckley verdict "weakened (your) faith in this country's system of justice," 3% said strengthened, and 26% said it had no effect.

Source: Survey by ABC News, June 22, 1982.

HE SHOULDN'T GO FREE, BUT HE PROBABLY WILL

Question: If it is later determined that John Hinckley has recovered from mental illness, do you think Hinckley should be allowed to go free or not?



Note: Sample size = 505.

Source: Survey by ABC News, June 22, 1982.

Question: Just your best guess, do you think John Hinckley will ever be allowed to go free again?



Note: Sample size = 505.

Source: Survey by ABC News, June 22, 1982.

ELECTION '82 PREVIEW

OVERALL PARTY STANDINGS GOING INTO THE 1982 ELECTIONS

MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

	Republican	Democratic	Independent/ Other
Total	245	289	1
House	192	243	0
Senate	53	46	1

GOVERNORS

Republican	Democratic	Independent/ Other
23	27	0

STATE HOUSES, CONTROL BY PARTY

	Republican	Democratic	Independent/ Other
National	35	63	0
By region:			
Northeast	8	10	0
North Central	12	10	0
South	1	31	0
West	14	12	0

STATES WITH BOTH HOUSES OF LEGISLATURE AND GOVERNOR OF SAME PARTY

Republican	Democratic	Independent/ Other
7	17	—

MEMBERS OF STATE LEGISLATURES**

Republican	Democratic	Independent/ Other
2,918 (39%)	4,483 (60%)	11 (*)

Note: * = less than one-half of one percent.

**Excludes one vacancy each in lower house for Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, New York, North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Wisconsin, and two vacancies each for Indiana and New Hampshire; excludes one vacancy each in upper house for Connecticut, Missouri, New Hampshire, and Texas, and two vacancies each for New Jersey and Pennsylvania. Nebraska is excluded from legislative house calculations because it is a unicameral nonpartisan legislative system.

Source: Members of Congress: *Statistical Abstract of the United States 1981*, p. 484. Governors: *U.S. News and World Report*, November 17, 1980. Members of State Legislatures and State Houses Control by Party: *Statistical Abstract of the United States 1981*, p. 494. States with both Houses and Governor of Same Party: *Statistical Abstract of the United States 1981*, pp. 493-494.

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES PROPORTION OF POPULAR VOTE 1932-1980



	Democrat	Republican
1932	55%	41%
1934	54	42
1936	56	40
1938	49	47
1940	51	46
1942	46	51
1944	51	47
1946	44	53
1948	52	46
1950	49	49
1952	50	49
1954	53	47
1956	51	49
1958	56	43
1960	54	45
1962	52	47
1964	57	42
1966	51	48
1968	50	48
1970	53	45
1972	52	46
1974	58	41
1976	56	42
1978	54	45
1980	50	48

Source: 1932-1970: *Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970; Part 2.* U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census (1975), p. 1084. 1972: *Statistical Abstract*, 1977 (p. 500). 1974-1978: *Statistical Abstract*, 1979 (p. 505). 1980: *Statistical Abstract of the United States 1981*, p. 484.

Party Identification

GALLUP

Question: In politics, as of today, do you consider yourself a Republican, a Democrat, or an Independent?



Note: For comparison purposes, "Other" and "No opinion" calculated out.

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, June 25-28, 1982.

HARRIS

Question: Regardless of how you may vote, what do you usually consider yourself—a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?



Note: For comparison purposes, "Other" = 2% and "Not sure" = 4% calculated out.

Source: Survey by Louis Harris and Associates, July 9-14, 1982.

TIME/YANKELOVICH, SKELLY AND WHITE

Question: Are you a Democrat, Republican or what?



Note: For comparison purposes, "Other" = 7% and "Not sure" = 2% calculated out.

Source: Survey by *Time*/Yankelovich, Skelly and White, June 8-10, 1982.

NBC NEWS/ASSOCIATED PRESS

Question: In politics today, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?



Note: For comparison purposes, "Other" = 2% and "Not sure" = 4% calculated out.

Source: Survey by NBC News/Associated Press, June 14-15, 1982.

CBS NEWS

Question: Generally speaking, do you usually consider yourself a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?



Note: Sample size = 1,174. For comparison purposes, "Don't know" = 6% calculated out.

Source: Survey by CBS News, June 26-28, 1982.

LOS ANGELES TIMES

Question: Regardless of how you have voted in the past, do you consider yourself a Democrat, a Republican, an Independent, or what?



Note: "Independent" includes "Lean toward Democratic," "Lean toward Republican," and "Lean toward neither." Sample size = 1,004. For comparison purposes "Other" = 3% and "Don't know" = 4% calculated out.

Source: Survey by the *Los Angeles Times*, June 27-July 1, 1982.

ABC NEWS

Question: Do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat or Independent?



Note: Sample size = 1,018. For comparison purposes, "Other" = 4% and "Don't know" = 2% calculated out.

Source: Survey by ABC News, May 24-June 1, 1982.

ROPER

Question: Regardless of how you may have voted in the past, what do you usually consider yourself—a Democrat, a Republican, some other party, or what?



Note: For comparison purposes, "Other specific party" = 1%, "Refused" and "Don't know/No answer" = 3% calculated out. Independent includes "Independent" (vol.) and "No particular party" (vol.) = 14%.

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 82-7), July 10-17, 1982.

IF THE ELECTIONS

Question: If you were voting for congressman today, would you be most likely to vote for the Democrat, the Republican, or the candidate of some other party? (1946) If the elections for Congress were being held today, which party would you like to see win in this state—the Republican party or the Democratic party? If "undecided" ask: As of today, do you lean more to the Democratic party or to the Republican party? (1950, 1954, 1958, 1962)[1] Here is a Gallup Poll Secret Ballot. Now, suppose the elections for Congress were being held today. Which party would you like to see win in this congressional district? Will you please mark the



	Democrat	Republican
July 27-30, 1946	50%	50%
August 17-20	52	48
August 31-September 3	52	48
September 14-19	49	51
Actual % of vote for U.S. House of Representatives	44	53
July 11-14, 1950	53	47
July 30-August 4	53	47
August 21-24	62	38
September 18-21	54	47
Actual % of vote for U.S. House of Representatives	49	49
July 17-20, 1954	59	41
August 6-9	59	41
August 27-30	57	44
September 16-20	55	45
Actual % of vote for U.S. House of Representatives	53	47
July 11-14, 1958	63	37
July 30-August 4	58	42
August 20-25	60	41
September 10-15	61	39
Actual % of vote for U.S. House of Representatives	56	43
June 28-July 3, 1962	64	36
July 26-31	59	41
August 23-28	63	37
September 20-25	62	38
Actual % of vote for U.S. House of Representatives	52	47
July 8-13, 1966	62	38
July 29-August 3	64	36
August 19-22	57	43
September 8-13	61	39
September 30-October 6[2]	59	41
Actual % of vote for U.S. House of Representatives	51	48
July 10-13, 1970	58%	42%
August 1-4	61	39
August 25-September 1	58	42
September 11-14	58	42
Actual % of vote for U.S. House of Representatives	53	45
August 2-6, 1974	68	32
August 16-19	65	35
September 6-9	64	36
September 27-30	65	35
Actual % of vote for U.S. House of Representatives	58	41
July 21-24 and August 4-7, 1978	57	43
Actual % of vote for U.S. House of Representatives	54	45
February 29-March 3, 1980[3]	59	41
June 13-16	58	42
August 1-4	59	41
August 15-18	63	37
Actual % of vote for U.S. House of Representatives	50	48
June 16-19, 1981[3]	52	48
September 18-21	57	43
October 2-5	55	45
October 30-November 2	59	41
January 8-11, 1982[3]	54	46
January 22-25	57	43
February 5-8	60	40
April 2-5	61	39
April 23-26	61	39
April 30-May 3	58	42
May 14-17	58	42

RE HELD TODAY...

Secret Ballot and then drop the folded ballot in the box. If "undecided" or "refused": Well, would you please mark the ballot for the party toward which you lean, as of today? (Secret Ballot, September 1966) If the elections for Congress were being held today, which party would you like to see win in this congressional district—the Republican party or the Democratic party? If "undecided" ask: As of today, do you lean more to the Republican party, or more to the Democratic party? (1966-1982)[1]



Note: In some years, the order of the parties is reversed in the questions.

[1] Slight variation of question wording—in some years the "lean to" portion of the question was asked if the respondent answered "undecided" or "refuse to answer" to the first portion of the question. (September 1958-1970)

[2] September-October 1966 data shown is a combination of the Secret Ballot Poll and the Non-Secret Poll.

[3] 1980 and 1982 figures based on registered voters.

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of 1982. For Actual Democratic and Republican Vote: *Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970, Part 2*, p. 1084 (for 1946-1970); *Statistical Abstract of the United States 1977*, p. 500 (for 1972); *1979*, p. 505 (for 1974-1978); *1981*, p. 484 (for 1980).

LATE RESULTS

GALLUP, June 26-30: Democratic = 55%, Republican = 37%, Other = 1%, Undecided = 7%. (For comparison with above chart, when "other" and "undecided" are calculated out, Democratic = 60% and Republican = 40%.)

HARRIS, August 5-10: Democratic = 50%, Republican = 41%, Other = 2%, Not sure = 7%.

PENN + SCHOEN, August 21-22: (Among registered voters) Democratic = 43%, Republican = 31%, Other = 3%, Don't know = 23%.

OPINION ROUNDUP

Sizing up the Parties

Question: Now I'm going to read you a few phrases. For each, I'd like you to tell me whether you think that phrase accurately describes the national Democratic party and its leaders, or not. How about the phrase "well organized"—does that accurately describe the national Democratic party and its leaders, or not? (Read statements and record below.) Now I'd like you to tell me whether these phrases accurately describe the national Republican party and its leaders, or not? How about the phrase "well organized"—does that accurately describe the national Republican party and its leaders, or not? (Read statements and record below.)



Note: For comparison purposes "Don't know" and "No opinion" calculated out. Highest "Don't know/No opinion" = 12%.

Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, November 17-22, 1981.

"NO DIFFERENCE" WINS

Question: Do you feel that the Democratic party or the Republican party can do a better job in handling (Read first item on list) or don't you think there is any real difference between them?



Note: Sample size = 1,010 registered voters.

Source: Survey by *Time*/Yankelovich, Skelly and White, June 8-10, 1982.

Readers should be aware that different questions produce very different results on the matter of which party is better able to handle a given problem. For example, the *Time*/Yankelovich, Skelly and White question asked in early June and shown above, finds 19% of those surveyed saying that the Democratic party could better handle inflation; 24% chose the Republicans. Gallup asked a very similar question at about the same time and found that 37% thought the Democratic party would do a better job, 27% the Republicans. 11% had no opinion. What is significant on many of the "party best able" questions is the number of respondents who say "no difference." 58% of those in the *Time*/Yankelovich, Skelly and White survey gave that response. In the Gallup question, where respondents were not given the option of a "no difference" response, 36% still volunteered it.

PRESIDENTIAL PERFORMANCE NOT KEY IN CONGRESSIONAL VOTING CHOICE

Question: In general, because of President Reagan's performance in office, are you more likely to vote for a Democrat for Congress, most likely to vote for a Republican, or does his record not affect your vote?



Note: Sample size = 1,000 registered voters. 46% of Democrats, 49% of Republicans, 67% of Independents and 65% of those Democrats who voted for Reagan in 1980 said President Reagan's performance would have no effect on their vote.

Source: Survey by Penn + Schoen for The Garth Analysis, June 12-14, 1982.

OPINION ROUNDUP

AMERICANS ASSESS THE NUCLEAR OPTION

American opinion on nuclear weapons has changed very little since Hiroshima and Nagasaki. All of the dimensions of the public's belief today—awareness of the awesome destructive power of nuclear weapons, recognition of Soviet intentions and position, desire to preserve and use the nuclear option—existed thirty-seven years ago. What follows is an historical look at these dimensions. On page 20, Everett Carll Ladd describes the public's posture in more detail.

MEMORIES OF HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI

Question: Do you approve or disapprove of using the new atomic bomb on Japanese cities?



Note: When asked in 1946 by the Gallup Organization "Should the United States continue to manufacture the atom bomb?" 67% of those surveyed said "yes," 33% "no." To the question, "Do you think that the U.S. should stop making atom bombs and destroy all those we now have?" 73% said "no," 21% "yes," 6% "qualified."

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, August 10-15, 1945.

Question: Do you feel it was necessary and proper for the United States to drop atomic bombs on Japan during World War II, or do you think we were wrong to drop the bombs?



Note: Responses differed substantially by sex.

Source: Surveys by Louis Harris and Associates for the *Asahi Shimbun*, latest that of March 5-21, 1982.

But Awareness of

THE NUCLEAR PERIL

Question: If there should be another world war, do you think the H-bomb will be used against us?



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, February 7-12, 1963.

Question: If another world war were to break out, do you think nuclear bombs and weapons are likely to be used, or not?



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, September 21-24, 1973.

HOW LIKELY?

Question: Do you think a limited nuclear war is possible, or do you think any use of nuclear weapons would lead to a full-scale world war?



Source: Survey by NBC News/Associated Press, May 10-11, 1982.

Question: How likely do you think we are to get into a nuclear war within the next ten years—very likely, fairly likely, fairly unlikely, or very unlikely?



Note: In a June 1981 Gallup poll, 20% said nuclear war within the next ten years was very likely, 29% said fairly likely, 27% fairly unlikely, and 24% very unlikely.

Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, May 19-23, 1982.

WHO WOULD PUSH THE BUTTON?

Question: Some people say it is unthinkable that any nation, knowing the consequences of such a decision, would venture into nuclear war. What do you think? Do you think that . . . would start a nuclear war or not?

Question: Do you think that the United States would start a nuclear war or not?



Source: Survey by the *Los Angeles Times*, March 14-17, 1982.

wesome Destructive Power

CHANCES OF SURVIVAL NOT GOOD

Question: Do you think you and your family would be likely to live through an atomic war?



Note: [illegible] war between Russia and the West and atomic weapons like the H bomb were used, out of every ten people [illegible] the median response was three individuals out of ten. Seven in ten would be killed.

Source: [illegible]

Question: If we should happen to get into an all-out nuclear war, what do you think your own chances would be of living through it— very good, poor, or just 50-50?



Note: In response to a September 22-24 Gallup/*Newsweek* question, "If we should get into a limited nuclear war in which the Soviet Union attacked some of our military bases and installations with nuclear weapons, what do you think would be your chances of living through it—good, poor, or just 50-50?" 8% of those surveyed said "good," 45% "poor," and 45% "50-50." (1981)

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, latest that of June 19-22, 1981.

The Realities of U.S./U.S.S.R.

AMERICANS SEE RED ON SOVIET MOTIVES

Question: Suppose the United States stopped making atom bombs and destroyed those already made. Do you think Russia would then agree to let a United Nations committee check to see that Russia does not make atom bombs?



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, November 1-20, 1946

Question: Premier Khrushchev has said that he will agree to a ban on the testing of H-bombs if that ban is part of a program for total disarmament. Do you think Khrushchev is bluffing or do you think he sincerely wants total disarmament?



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, November 17-22, 1961

Question: I'm going to read a few statements that deal with a nuclear freeze. For each, I'd like you to tell me whether you agree with it, or disagree, or if, perhaps, you have no opinion on that statement. . . . The Soviet Union would try to cheat on any nuclear freeze agreement and get an advantage over the United States.



Note: [illegible] 66% of those surveyed [illegible] would not be trusted to keep its part of the bargain [illegible] agreement [illegible] 17% said they could [illegible] enough [illegible] were not sure, and 1% re[illegible]

Source: Survey by ABC News/Washington Post, April 21-25, 1982

Question: Do you think such an attempt to work out an agreement with Russia (to control the atom bomb before we try to make a hydrogen bomb) would be successful, or not?



Note: In the same survey, respondents were asked: "Do you think we should try again to work out an agreement with Russia to control the atom bomb before we try to make the hydrogen bomb?" 48% said we should, 45% we should not, 7% had no opinion.

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, January 28-February 2, 1950

Question: For the past few years, the United States and Russia have had a policy of trying to reach agreements which will relax tensions between them. Do you think the Russians can be trusted to live up to such agreements or don't you think so?



Note: In a June 1978 CBS/NYT question, 64% of those surveyed said the Soviet Union would not live up to its share of the agreement if both countries were to sign one to limit nuclear weapons, 21% they would, and 15% had no opinion.

Source: Survey by NBC News/Associated Press, October 16-17, 1978

Question: I'm going to read a few statements that deal with a nuclear freeze. For each, I'd like you to tell me whether you agree with it, or disagree, or if, perhaps, you have no opinion on that statement. . . . The U.S. Government would never agree to a nuclear arms freeze. . . . The Soviet Union would never agree to a nuclear arms freeze.



Source: Survey by ABC News/Washington Post, April 21-25, 1982

ntentions and Position

SOVIETS ARE AHEAD IN NUCLEAR STRENGTH

Question: At the present time do you think the United States is ahead of Russia in terms of nuclear arms capability, about even with them, or behind Russia in nuclear military strength?



	Ahead	About even	Behind	Don't know
October/November 1977	18%	38%	28%	16%
June 1978	17	36	31	16
January 1979	18	38	31	12
September/October 1980	15	29	43	13
October 1981	16	35	41	8
April/May 1982	12	32	41	15

Note: [illegible]

Source: [illegible]

IT DOESN'T REALLY MATTER, BUT JUST IN CASE

Question: I'm going to read a few statements that deal with a nuclear freeze. For each, I'd like you to tell me whether you agree with it, or disagree, or if, perhaps, you have no opinion on that statement. . . . It doesn't matter if the United States or the Soviet Union is ahead in nuclear weapons because both sides have more than enough to destroy each other no matter who attacks first.



Note: In a *Los Angeles Times* March 1982 question, "Do you think the United States needs more nuclear weapons for its defense, or do you think the U.S. now possesses enough nuclear weapons to destroy its enemies?" 50% of those surveyed said the U.S. now has enough, 31% said we need more, 18% were not sure, and 1% refused to answer.

Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, April 21-25, 1982.

Question: In thinking about the United States's national defense, how important is it to you that the United States produce as many nuclear weapons as the Soviet Union does . . . very important, somewhat important, or not important?

1982



Source: Survey by NBC News/Associated Press, May 10-11, 1982.

Preserving the Option

THE SPECTER OF SOVIET DOMINATION

Question: Suppose you had to make the decision between fighting an all-out nuclear war or living under communist rule—how would you decide?



Source: [illegible]

Question: Some people say that war is so horrible that it is better to accept Russian domination than to risk war. Others say it would be better to fight in defense of your country than to accept Russian domination. Which opinion is closer to your own?



Source: [illegible] Systems [illegible] 1981.

NO TO NO FIRST USE

Question: Some people say the United States should declare that it would only use nuclear weapons if the Soviet Union uses them first. Others say that would put the United States at a serious military disadvantage. What about you, do you think the United States should declare it will never be the first to use nuclear weapons or not?



Note: [illegible]

Source: [illegible]

Question: Another proposal that has been made to ease nuclear tensions and lessen the likelihood of nuclear war is for the United States to pledge never to be the first to use nuclear missiles, but only to use them in retaliation for an enemy nuclear attack. Some say this would reassure Russia and Europe about our intentions, while still retaining the deterrent power of our nuclear missiles. Others say it would give up an option which would put the United States at a disadvantage to Russia. Would you like to see the United States make a no first-strike pledge, or do you think that would be a mistake?



Source: [illegible] Roper [illegible] April 25-May 1, 1982.

THE ISSUE TOO COMPLICATED FOR THE PUBLIC

Question: Do you think the public can understand the issues involved in a nuclear freeze well enough to vote on it, or is the question of a nuclear freeze too complicated for the public to decide?



Source: [illegible] News/New York Times, May 19-23, 1982.

OPINION ROUNDUP

The Public's Terms

VERIFICATION AGREEMENT ESSENTIAL

Question: The major problem in arms control is the difficulty in verifying whether the other side is complying with the agreement. Some people feel that verification is essential for such an agreement. Others feel that it is more important for the United States to halt the growth of its nuclear arsenal even if we cannot be sure the other side is doing the same. Which is more important in your view? (Gallup/*Newsweek*, March 17-18, 1982)

Verification	73%	Halting growth	27%

GENERAL SUPPORT FOR FREEZE

Question: Well, would you approve or disapprove of a freeze on nuclear weapons by both the United States and the Soviet Union? Would you say you approve/disapprove strongly or approve/disapprove somewhat? (ABC News/*Washington Post*, April 21-25, 1982)

Approve	79%	Disapprove	21%

Question: Would you favor or oppose a freeze on the production of nuclear weapons in both the United States *and* the Soviet Union? (NBC News/Associated Press, June 14-15, 1982)

Favor	83%	Oppose	17%

Question: Do you favor or oppose the United States agreeing to a "nuclear freeze" with the Soviet Union—that is, putting a stop to the testing, production, and installation of additional nuclear weapons by both sides? (CBS News/*New York Times*, May 19-23, 1982)

Favor	77%	Oppose	23%

FAVOR IF BOTH SIDES EQUAL IN STRENGTH

Question: Let me ask you about some things that have been suggested to control the nuclear arms race. For each, tell me if you favor or oppose such a step. The United States and Russia should agree not to produce any new nuclear weapons, provided both countries have an equal number of such weapons. (Louis Harris and Associates, March 12-16, 1982)

Favor	84%	Oppose	16%

Question: What if a nuclear freeze would result in the United States and the Soviet Union having about an equal amount of nuclear strength, would you favor or oppose such a nuclear freeze? (CBS News/*New York Times*, May 19-23, 1982)*

Favor	91%	Oppose	9%

FAVOR IF CHEATING COULD BE DETECTED

Question: What if both the United States and the Soviet Union could catch the other country if it were cheating on the agreement—would you favor or oppose such a nuclear freeze? (CBS News/*New York Times*, May 19-23, 1982)*

Favor	87%	Oppose	13%

FAVOR DESTRUCTION OF ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Question: Let me ask you about some things that have been suggested to control the nuclear arms race. For each, tell me if you favor or oppose such a step. All countries that have nuclear weapons should agree to destroy them. (Louis Harris and Associates, March 12-16, 1982)

Favor	62%	Oppose	38%

OPPOSE IF EITHER SIDE COULD CHEAT WITHOUT DETECTION

Question: What if either the United States or the Soviet Union could cheat on the number of its nuclear weapons without being detected by the other side—would you favor or oppose such a nuclear freeze? (CBS News/*New York Times*, May 19-23, 1982)**

Oppose	80%	Favor	20%

OPPOSE IF FREEZE WOULD RESULT IN GREATER SOVIET STRENGTH

Question: What if a nuclear freeze would result in the Soviet Union having somewhat greater nuclear strength than the United States—would you favor or oppose such a freeze? (CBS News/*New York Times*, May 19-23, 1982)**

Oppose	67%	Favor	33%

OPPOSE IF U.S. FREEZES/REDUCES FIRST

Question: Some people say that the Russians are afraid to cut back on nuclear weapons until we do and that the United States should take the first step. Other people say that one-sided disarmament would only make us more vulnerable to attack. What do you think? Do you think the United States should reduce its nuclear weapons without waiting for the Russians to do the same thing, or do you think we should not reduce our nuclear weapons until the Russians agree to do the same thing? *(Los Angeles Times*, March 14-17, 1982)

Wait for Russians	86%	U.S. first	14%

Question: What if in order to get the Soviet Union to agree to freeze its nuclear weapons the United States would have to freeze its weapons first—would you favor or oppose such a nuclear freeze by the United States? (CBS News/*New York Times*, May 19-23, 1982)**

Oppose	72%	Favor	28%

OPPOSE IF U.S. HALTS PRODUCTION AND SOVIETS DON'T

Question: Let me ask you about some things that have been suggested to control the nuclear arms race. For each, tell me if you favor or oppose such a step. The United States should not produce any new nuclear weapons even if the Russians continue to produce them. (Louis Harris and Associates, March 12-16, 1982)

Oppose	76%	Favor	24%

Note: In the CBS/*NYT* survey respondents were first asked a general favor or oppose nuclear freeze question—"Do you favor or oppose United States agreeing to a nuclear freeze with the Soviet Union—that is putting a stop to the testing, production and installation of additional nuclear weapons by both sides?" The other variations in the freeze question wording were asked of certain respondents, based on their response to the general nuclear freeze question. *Question asked of those who responded "oppose" or "had no opinion" to the general freeze question. Percentages for variation question based on entire sample with the respondents "favoring" the general question included in the "favor" category for the variation question. **Question asked of those who responded "favor" or "had no opinion" to the general nuclear freeze question. Percentages for variation question based on entire sample with respondents "opposing" the general question put in the "oppose" category for the variation question.

Ronald Reagan and the Nuclear Freeze

Question: Do you trust Ronald Reagan to make the right kind of decisions about the control of nuclear weapons?



Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, May 19-23, 1982.

Question: Generally speaking do you think the policies of the Reagan administration are reducing the chances of a nuclear war, or increasing the chances of a nuclear war or do you think the policies of the Reagan administration are not changing the chances of a nuclear war?



Note: Sample size = 1,102. In a June 1982 Gallup/*Newsweek* question: "Generally do you think the defense policies of the Reagan administration are reducing the chances of nuclear war, increasing the chances of nuclear war, or not changing the chances of nuclear war," 22% said reducing, 44% said not changing and 34% said increasing. A March ABC News/*Washington Post* poll conforms more closely to the *Los Angeles Times* poll shown above: 55% Reagan policies have made no difference, 25% increased and 18% decreased.

Source: Survey by the *Los Angeles Times*, July 4-8, 1982.

Question: Do you agree or disagree with the Reagan administration's policies towards nuclear disarmament, or don't you know enough about them to have an opinion? (If disagree, ask) Do you think the Reagan administration is not going far enough in seeking reductions of nuclear weapons, or do you think the Reagan administration is going too far in seeking reductions?



Source: Survey by NBC News/Associated Press, March 29-30, 1982.



by Stanley Rothman and S. Robert Lichter

The Nuclear Energy Debate: Scientists, The Media and the Public

Public support for nuclear energy has declined sharply in the last several years. In 1956 only 20 percent of those queried by the Gallup Organization were opposed to having nuclear plants located in their communities. By 1977, in a Roper Organization question, that figure had risen to 33 percent and by 1979 to 56 percent. In 1977, 69 percent of Americans polled by CBS/*New York Times* were still in favor of building more nuclear plants. By 1979, the figure had fallen to 46 percent. In fact, by 1980 nuclear energy was the least favored energy source listed. Some 66 percent surveyed by Gallup rated solar energy among the top three energy sources they preferred; 36 percent chose coal; and only 27 percent chose nuclear energy. The accident at Three Mile Island contributed to the decline, but it began earlier. Rising fears about the safety of nuclear energy, and a growing belief that our energy needs could be met by safer energy sources, contributed to the public's heightened concern.[1]

Part of the public's growing unease about nuclear energy is probably a function of the divisions it perceives among scientists. The Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS), a group whose views have been widely reported on television and in the press, argues that the development of nuclear energy can lead to catastrophe. UCS has urged that greater attention be paid to conservation and renewable solar energy sources.[2] Physicist Amory Lovins, biologist Barry Commoner, and other science activists have written popular books on the importance of "soft energy" (solar) paths. Ralph Nader secured the support of five Nobel laureates for a public statement opposing further development of nuclear energy. In response, Nobel laureate Hans Bethe found thirty-two prestigious scientists, including eleven other Nobel winners, who signed a petition *favoring* the development of nuclear energy.[3]

This essay is part of a larger study of social and political leadership and change in America, directed by Rothman and Lichter under the auspicies of Smith College, the Research Institute on International Change of Columbia University, and George Washington University. The authors wish to thank Robert Cohen for his assistance with this study.

Many social scientists who write about nuclear energy also perceive the scientific community as sharply divided over energy issues, and assume that a significant proportion of scientists believe in the feasibility of "soft energy" alternatives.[4] A 1982 Roper poll which we commissioned found that almost one in four Americans believe that a majority of scientists "who are energy experts" oppose the further development of nuclear energy. One in three believe that solar energy can make a large contribution to meeting our energy needs in the next twenty years.[5]

Until now we have known little about the views of the entire scientific community. We conducted the study reported in this article to supply the missing evidence.

Between March and October 1980, slightly more than a year after the nuclear accident at Three Mile Island, we circulated a detailed questionnaire on energy issues to a stratified random sample of scientists listed in *American Men and Women of Science (AMWS)*. This represents a purely random sample of 1,000 supplemented by a stratified random sample of scientists whose disciplinary training should provide them some expertise on energy issues. Our response rate was 74 percent.

We examined separately the views of (1) those sampled at random from the entire scientific community listed in *AMWS;* (2) those scientists in energy-related disciplines, and (3) those in fields closely related to nuclear energy. We included 71 fields listed in *AMWS* as "energy-related disciplines." We defined the concept broadly enough to include such disparate specialties as atmospheric chemistry, solar energy, conservation, and ecology. Within that broader category, "nuclear energy experts" included experts in fields such as radiological health and radiation genetics, in addition to nuclear engineers and reactor physicists.[6] Our questionnaire contained seventy-eight energy-related questions, and additional background questions. Only a few of the key findings are presented here.

Scientists' Views

The questionnaire covered a wide variety of energy-related issues, but one question dealt directly with policy options. Scientists were asked to choose among four alternatives, ranging from rapid development of nuclear energy to the dismantling of existing nuclear plants. As table 1 indicates, 53 percent of all scientists would move ahead rapidly to develop nuclear energy; another 36 percent prefer to move ahead slowly and cautiously; 7 percent would halt nuclear energy development, but retain existing plants, and only 3 percent wish to dismantle existing facilities. Support is even higher among scientists in energy-related disciplines, especially those in nuclear energy-related fields (see table 1).

Table 1
VIEWS OF SCIENTISTS ON HOW TO PROCEED WITH NUCLEAR ENERGY

	Random sample (N=741)	Energy experts (N=279)	Nuclear experts (N=72)
Proceed rapidly	53%	70%	92%
Proceed slowly	36	25	8
Halt development	7	4	0
Dismantle plants	3	1	0

Note: In some cases, percentages in the tables in this article add to slightly more or less than 100% due to rounding.

This high level of support for nuclear energy development was reinforced by responses to several related questions, listed in table 2. For example, two out of three scientists consider the risks associated with nuclear energy to be acceptable, as do three out of four energy experts, and 99 percent of nuclear energy experts. Scientists have enough confidence in the safety of nuclear energy to be willing to locate nuclear plants in the cities where they live. Of those with opinions, almost seven in ten are willing to have plants in their own "backyards" as are eight in ten energy experts and 97 percent of those in nuclear-related fields.[7] When asked to rate the safety of nuclear plants on a one-to-seven scale (where one equals "very unsafe" and seven equals "very safe"), 76 percent of energy experts, and 99 percent of nuclear energy experts chose a rating of five or higher. Finally, most scientists believe that we already possess the knowledge to solve problems associated with nuclear energy.

Why do most scientists support nuclear energy development? Contrary to recent assertions that the energy crisis is over, almost three out of four scientists



HE'S GROWN A FOOT SINCE I SAW HIM LAST....

© 1981. Reprinted by permission of United Features Syndicate.

Table 2
SCIENTISTS' ATTITUDES ON NUCLEAR ENERGY ISSUES

	Random sample (N=741)	Energy experts (N=279)	Nuclear experts (N=72)
Risks acceptable	66%	75%	99%
Willing to locate nuclear plants in their cities	69	80	98
Enough knowledge to solve nuclear problems	75	91	100

Table 3
SERIOUSNESS OF ENERGY CRISIS

	Random sample (N=741)	Energy experts (N=279)	Nuclear experts (N=72)
Extremely serious	33%	39%	42%
Very serious	39	40	39
Fairly serious	22	15	14
Somewhat serious	5	5	4
Not at all serious	1	1	1

—and an even higher proportion of energy experts—regard the energy crisis as "very" or "extremely" serious (see table 3).

Moreover, scientific energy experts are far less sanguine than the general public about the short-term contribution of soft energy alternatives. No more than 2 percent of the energy experts look to either biomass or any form of solar energy for a large contribution to meeting our energy needs in the next twenty years. By contrast, 45 percent believe that nuclear fission can make a large contribution (see table 4). Eight of ten experts see fission as providing at least a moderate contribution, while no more than one in three foresee more than a small contribution from the other alternatives listed. Of the sixteen options listed in the questionnaire, energy experts rated the potential of nuclear fission ahead of all energy sources other than coal and oil.

Table 4
CONTRIBUTION OF ENERGY SOURCES TOWARD MEETING OUR ENERGY NEEDS IN THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS
(N=279)

Energy experts	None	Small	Moderate	Large
Biomass	10%	66%	12%	1%
Passive solar	6	68	20	2
Solar heat	4	62	31	2
Solar electricity	33	54	8	0
Nuclear fission	3	15	35	45
Coal	0	1	20	80
Oil	1	9	29	61

Note: "Unsure" not shown.

These data suggest that many scientists support nuclear energy development because they believe that the energy crisis is real and that fission can be among the most important (and relatively safe) sources of energy in the near future. Ralph Nader and other critics of nuclear energy suggest a quite different explanation. They charge that many scientists support the nuclear option primarily because of economic self-interest. As direct or indirect beneficiaries of the nuclear industry, their incomes allegedly depend upon the continued expansion of nuclear energy.[8]

To test the Nader explanation, we created a scale measuring support for nuclear energy from the questions dealing with policy preferences, risk levels, safety, plant locations, and confidence that problems can be solved. We then compared these "nuclear support scale" scores of energy experts who were employed by industry, government, and universities. The attitudes of these groups did not differ significantly. Scientists employed by private industry were slightly more likely to support nuclear energy than were other scientists, but the difference was small enough to be a product of sampling error. We then compared the attitudes of academic scientists who had received financial support from industry or government (consulting contracts, grants, and so on) with those who had received no financial support. By this measure as well, scientists with a possible financial interest were not significantly more pronuclear than those with no such interest.

Enter the Media

If the scientific community is so supportive of nuclear energy, why are public perceptions of its views different? Part of the answer may lie in the channels of communication between scientists and the public. The scientific community does not address the public; particular scientists and groups of scientists do. Further, their messages are transmitted to the public by the print and broadcast media. Two additional factors—scientists' willingness to seek out nontechnical audiences, and the media's receptivity to their messages—also play important roles in determining public perceptions. It is the interaction of these two factors that helps account for public perceptions of scientific opinion on nuclear energy.

First, we hypothesized that antinuclear scientists would be more willing than others to go public with their views. To test this hypothesis, we divided subjects

Table 5
SCIENTISTS SHOULD RESTRICT PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON SCIENCE POLICY MATTERS TO AREAS OF EXPERTISE

	Disagree strongly	Disagree somewhat	Agree somewhat	Agree strongly
All scientists N=936	23%	22%	30%	25%
Very pronuclear N=200	21	21	29	30
Very antinuclear N=22	75	13	6	6

according to their scores on the "nuclear support" scale described above. The scale ranges from —15 to +15. We defined our two groups as those scoring from +12 to +15 and —12 to —15. We then compared the views of the most pro- and antinuclear groups on two issues concerning scientists' involvement with the public. The results are shown in tables 5 and 6.[9]

Table 6

RESEARCH FINDINGS SHOULD BE ACCEPTED BY PROFESSIONAL JOURNALS *BEFORE* THEY ARE REPORTED IN THE POPULAR PRESS

	Disagree strongly	Disagree somewhat	Agree somewhat	Agree strongly
All scientists N=936	8%	12%	33%	48%
Very pronuclear N=200	6	13	33	48
Very antinuclear N=22	31	13	38	19

We asked first whether scientists should restrict their public statements on science policy questions to the specific areas of their training and research. A majority of the pronuclear group agree that they should, as do a majority of all scientists. In sharp contrast, only 12 percent of the antinuclear group agree, and three out of four strongly disagree. We then asked whether research findings should be accepted by professional journals (and hence be reviewed by other scientists) before they are released to the general public. We found the same pattern. Most scientists strongly support this restriction, and the most pronuclear among them are no exception. About four out of five uphold the principle of peer review, and almost half agree strongly. By contrast, only 57 percent of antinuclear scientists agree, and almost one in three strongly rejects prior peer review.

These differing attitudes may explain the quite different publication patterns of pro- and antinuclear scientists. Those most supportive of nuclear energy publish much more in professional journals than do antinuclear scientists. On the other hand, the antinuclear group publishes more on science policy issues in journals read by the general public (see tables 7 and 8).

Table 7

NUMBER OF ARTICLES PUBLISHED IN ACADEMIC OR PROFESSIONAL JOURNALS

	None	One to ten	Eleven or more
All scientists N=936	10%	28%	61%
Very pronuclear N=200	11	30	59
Very antinuclear N=22	18	41	41

Table 8

NUMBER OF SCIENCE POLICY ARTICLES PUBLISHED IN NONPROFESSIONAL JOURNALS

	None	One or more
All scientists N=936	89%	10%
Very pronuclear N=200	87	13
Very antinuclear N=22	64	37

To explore these patterns further, we asked scientists whether they had published articles on key nuclear energy issues in either professional or popular journals. We found that scientists who write only for the general public are far more skeptical of nuclear energy than those who write only for their peers, or for both technical and popular audiences.

The publicly oriented group is relatively small. One hundred twenty scientists in our sample have published professionally on nuclear energy. Of these, only ten have written solely for popular journals. Extrapolating from our sample, however, this suggests that between 1,000 and 2,000 scientists listed in *AMWS* are writing articles on nuclear energy for the general public, without having ever submitted their ideas to review by professional peers. Further, peer-oriented and public-oriented scientists differ markedly in their attitudes toward nuclear energy.

Only one out of ten scientists who have published professionally on nuclear energy think that the possibility of an accidental release of radioactivity from reactors is a very serious problem. On the other hand, four of the ten who have published only in popular journals hold this view. Only 15 percent of those who have published professionally believe that there are serious problems with the safety systems of nuclear plants, compared with seven of the ten who write only for the general public. Finally, more than nine out of ten of those who have published professionally are reasonably or very sure that we now possess the knowledge to solve the problems of nuclear energy, as against six of the ten who have written about nuclear energy only in nonprofessional journals. All these differences are statistically significant.

The Inner Club

The relative skepticism of scientists who write only in popular journals may help explain why the public has a distorted view of the attitudes of the scientific community. Yet, it cannot be the whole answer. After all, pronuclear scientists have published many more articles on science policy issues in popular journals than have antinuclear scientists. Further, eighteen scientists in our sample who have published professionally on nuclear energy have also written for the general public on this topic. These scientists were just as optimistic about nuclear energy as their colleagues who had published only in professional journals. We hypothesized that journalists might pay more attention to the writings and public statements of antinuclear scientists. We attempted to test this hypothesis in a number of ways.

We administered a questionnaire on energy-related issues to the inner club of science writers who work for the major media outlets.[10] This relatively small group of individuals plays a leading role in communicating information about science to the general public. The questionnaire included the same items on nuclear policy, safety, and plant location that we asked the scientists. From these items we constructed a shorter version of the nuclear support scale. Possible scores ranged from −9 to +9, with a higher score indicating greater support for nuclear energy.

We discovered that key science journalists are far more skeptical of nuclear energy than are scientists. As table 9 shows, science journalists score well below both energy experts and scientists in general. This is especially true of science journalists at major national media outlets, including the television networks, the *New York Times*, and the *Washington Post*.

Further, science journalists' attitudes toward nuclear energy are partly a function of political ideology. Among the "inner club," opposition to nuclear energy correlates at .35 with political liberalism, measured by self-descriptions on a scale ranging from "very conservative" to "very liberal." (Possible correlations range between 0, indicating no relationship, to ± 1, a perfect relationship.)

Table 9
SUPPORT FOR NUCLEAR ENERGY AMONG SCIENTISTS AND LEADING JOURNALISTS

	Score on nuclear support scale
Nuclear experts **N=72**	**7.86**
Energy experts **N=279**	**5.10**
All scientists **N=741**	**3.34**
Science journalists **N=42**	**1.30**
Prestige press journalists **N=150**	**1.16**
Science journalists at ***New York Times, Washington Post,*** **TV networks** **N=15**	**.47**
TV reporters **and producers** **N=18**	**−1.89**
Public television journalists **N=24**	**−3.25**

Of course, much reporting on science issues is done by journalists who are not classified as science reporters. In the October/November 1981 issue of *Public Opinion*, we published preliminary results from a comprehensive study of the attitudes of leading journalists in the prestige press—the "media elite."[11] These findings were based on interviews with a random sample which included reporters, editors, producers, and news executives from major national media outlets.

We asked them the same three questions about nuclear energy that we asked of science journalists. Their scores on this version of the nuclear support scale are far below those of scientists and slightly below those of leading science journalists.

Leading journalists' attitudes toward nuclear energy also are correlated with their political ideologies. The more liberal the journalist, the more likely he is to oppose nuclear energy. In the case of these journalists, we can define this issue more precisely. We asked them a large number of social and political questions. The best predictor of opposition to nuclear energy is the belief that American society is unjust.

Given the tremendous impact of television on public opinion, it is interesting to note that television reporters and producers—and public television personnel in general—are even more skeptical of nuclear energy than are other journalists. Our study and others have shown that such people now (as compared with twenty years ago) exercise a good deal of influence over the content of news programs.[12]

Of course most journalists would argue that, whatever their personal attitudes, their coverage of nuclear energy is as objective as they can make it. However, it is not only a question of conscious or unconscious bias. Everyone necessarily develops some world view or paradigm which tells him which facts are relevant and what sources can be trusted in understanding complex public issues. Reporters are no exception.[13]

The Contours of Coverage

We are currently engaged in a large-scale content analysis of the national media's treatment of nuclear energy, to determine more precisely the contours of their coverage of energy issues. In the interim, some evidence on this question already exists. At least two systematic studies have dealt with national media coverage of nuclear energy. One was conducted under the auspices of the Battelle Center, the other by the Media Institute.[14] Both studies simply count pro- and antinuclear statements in newspapers or on television, a procedure which does not yield the information necessary for a fully adequate evaluation. Nevertheless, the evidence they present appears quite accurate.

The Battelle study details increasingly negative treatment of nuclear energy from 1972 through 1976 in four national periodicals including the *New York Times*. In 1972, slightly more pronuclear than antinuclear articles appeared; by 1976, negative articles outnumbered positive ones by a two-to-one margin.

The Media Institute study documents the negative treatment of nuclear energy on evening network news broadcasts during the 1970s. The clearest evidence concerns the networks' use of "outside sources." By far the most widely quoted source on nuclear energy in the period between 1968 and 1979 was the Union of Concerned Scientists.[15] Ralph Nader was the most widely quoted "nuclear expert" on television news during this period, although the views of scientists with negative attitudes toward nuclear energy were also widely publicized. For example, Dr. Ernest Sternglass, a well-known radiologist and critic of nuclear energy, was the only outside individual scientific "expert" quoted on television during the month following the nuclear accident at Three Mile Island. Neither in the eleven-year period before Three Mile Island, nor during the month after, were any pronuclear "outside experts" among the ten top quoted sources. The only pronuclear sources in the top ten were spokesmen for utility companies and the nuclear industry.

The air time given the Union of Concerned Scientists is particularly interesting in light of our findings. Our random sample of 741 scientists contained only one who listed any affiliation with UCS. On that basis, we estimate that fewer than 200 scientists among the 130,000 listed in *American Men and Women of Science* were affiliated with UCS when we conducted our study. The Union of Concerned Scientists would not provide the information we needed to poll its membership, so we have no data on the training or background of its members.

Missing Links

In summary, the scientific community is highly supportive of nuclear energy development, regards nuclear energy as relatively safe, and is not persuaded of the short-term viability of various forms of solar energy. Moreover, support is strongest among those scientists best qualified to deal with the factual questions involved in energy issues. On the other hand, journalists in the prestige press are far more skeptical of nuclear energy, and this attitude is correlated with a more general skepticism toward American social and political institutions. Their reporting of nuclear energy issues may have been influenced by the fact that antinuclear scientists publish more heavily in popular journals than do pronuclear scientists. Nonetheless, this is clearly not the only factor. A reasonably large number of scientists who do publish professionally on nuclear energy also publish popular articles.

Nor is mere ignorance the culprit, as frustrated scientists sometimes suggest.[16] Ignorance may explain the superficiality of coverage; it does not explain its direction. During the fluoridation controversy of the 1950s, when there were fewer well-trained science journalists than today, the prestige press generally supported fluoridation and discounted alarms raised by its few scientific opponents.[17] The same analysis can be applied to arguments that journalists are drawn to disasters because these appeal to mass audiences. Many disasters or near disasters received less attention during the 1970s than did accidents at nuclear facilities. Further, supporters of nuclear energy have their own catalogue of disasters which, they argue, include social tensions and conflicts resulting from lowered economic growth.[18]

On the basis of our work we cannot be sure to what extent journalists' reporting on nuclear energy has influenced public opinion. Nor can we be certain about the relationship of public attitudes to the decline of the nuclear industry.[19] And we cannot judge whether the shift away from nuclear energy development in recent years has been wise or foolish. Too many other social and political issues are involved in that question. Finally, the scientific community may be wrong about the problems involved. Scientists are not infallible, even on technical questions.

For all this, our ability to make informed judgments about highly technical issues necessarily depends in part on accurate knowledge of the views of relevant experts. The experts may be wrong, or their opinions may be outweighed by other factors, but their analyses provide an invaluable resource to policy makers and other citizens in an increasingly complex world. It is important that their views be communicated accurately to larger publics. In the case of nuclear energy, however, some crucial links in the chain of information leading from the scientific community to the public seem to be missing.

---

1. Roger Kasperson, Gerald Berk, Alan Sharaf, David Pijawka, and James Wood, "Public Opinion and Nuclear Energy: Retrospect and Prospect," *Science, Technology and Human Values*, Spring 1980, pp. 11-23.

2. In 1975 UCS sent a petition containing several thousand names to the president and Congress urging extreme caution in the development of nuclear energy. The petition received a great deal of publicity.

3. *The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, March 1975, pp. 4-5.

4. For examples see Lewis J. Perlman, "Speculations on the Transition to Sustainable Energy," and Robert E. Goodin, "No Moral Nukes," *Ethics*, April 1980, pp. 392-416 and 417-449.

5. The full results of this poll, the questionnaires, and tapes of other surveys mentioned in this article will be deposited with The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research for examination by interested scholars once our study is completed.

6. A complete listing of the disciplines included is available on request. We expect to publish this listing in various technical articles.

7. We have eliminated "unsures" from the calculation. Fourteen percent of scientists gave this response as did 10% of energy experts and one percent of nuclear energy experts.

8. Ralph Nader and John Abbots, *The Menace of Atomic Energy* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1977).

9. A document outlining the basis upon which this division was made is available upon request, and will be published in technical articles.

10. We based our sample largely upon the analysis of Sharon Dunwoody, "The Science Writing Inner Club: A Communication Link between Science and the Lay Public," *Science, Technology and Human Values*, Winter 1980, pp. 14-22.

11. S. Robert Lichter and Stanley Rothman, "Media and Business Elites," pp. 42ff.

12. For a discussion see Stanley Rothman and S. Robert Lichter, "The Media and Business: A Question of Bias?" *The Public Interest* (forthcoming).

13. Ibid.

14. Stanley Nealy and William Rankin, "A Comparative Analysis of Print Media Coverage of Nuclear Power and Coal Issues" (Seattle, Washington: Battelle Human Affairs Research Center, n.d.); The Media Institute, *Television Evening News Covers Nuclear Energy* (Washington, D.C.: The Media Institute, 1979).

15. The Union is generally treated as relatively authoritative by the *New York Times* as well as by the nonscientific academic community. For example, see the *New York Times*, January 27, 1979; March 18, 1979; March 29, 1979; April 4, 1979; July 9, 1979; September 18, 1979; October 10, 1981; see also Robert E. Goodin, "No Moral Nukes."

16. For the view that journalists report nuclear energy issues badly, partly because of their ignorance of science, see John G. Kemeny, "Saving American Democracy: The Lessons of Three Mile Island," *Technology Review*, June/July 1980, pp. 65-75.

17. For a discussion of the controversy see Harvey M. Sapolsky, "The Fluoridation Controversy: An Alternative Explanation," *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, Summer 1969, pp. 240-248.

18. "The Real Energy Crisis," *The Economist*, December 29, 1979, p. 8.

19. For the fact of that decline and some of its consequences see the *New York Times*, April 11, 1982, p. E 5.